United States v. Burch, Gerald ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 25 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 97-3208
GERALD G. BURCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 95-40045-01-SAC)
Eric Kjorlie, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Thomas G. Luedke, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
__________________________
Defendant, Mr. Gerald Burch, was traveling with his wife in a semi-
tractor/trailer rig when he was stopped by Kansas Highway Patrolman Brian
Smith. A subsequent search of Mr. Burch’s commercial vehicle yielded
approximately 538 pounds of marijuana. After a jury trial, Defendant was found
guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 538 pounds of marijuana
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession with intent to distribute 538
pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Defendant argues that the search violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches and, therefore, the district court erred in
refusing to suppress the marijuana seized. We review the factual findings of the
district court for clear error, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 (1996). The ultimate
determination of the reasonableness of the search and seizure is a question of law
that we review de novo. See United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th
Cir. 1992).
Trooper Smith’s stated reason for stopping Defendant was to conduct a
routine safety inspection of Defendant’s commercial vehicle pursuant to Kansas
law. During the inspection, Trooper Smith requested Defendant collect the
necessary commercial vehicle paperwork and accompany him to his patrol car.
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When the trooper had reviewed the paperwork to his satisfaction, he returned
Defendant’s documents and issued Defendant a clean inspection report. After
issuing the report and returning the paperwork, Trooper Smith directed Defendant
to open the trailer so he could inspect the cargo as authorized by the Kansas
statutes governing commercial vehicle inspections. Defendant does not dispute
that Trooper Smith’s initial stop and search met the constitutional requirements
for a valid regulatory search. Defendant asserts that when Trooper Smith issued
the inspection report and returned Defendant’s paperwork, Trooper Smith
abandoned his regulatory search and, therefore, any further search of Defendant’s
vehicle had to be supported by reasonable suspicion or consent.
“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
‘seizure’” under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979). We evaluate the reasonableness of a traffic stop in two respects: “[F]irst,
whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and, second, whether
the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that first justified
the interference.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1095 (1994); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968). There is no dispute that Trooper Smith’s action was justified at its
inception pursuant to the regulatory search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. See Appellant’s Br. at 12; cf. V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94
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F.3d 1420, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Motor carriers are closely regulated by both
state and federal governments.”); United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d
464, 468-70 (6th Cir.) (holding regulatory search in trucking industry proper),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 (1991); Lievesley v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 985
F. Supp. 206, 210 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the trucking industry is closely
regulated); State v. Campbell, 875 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that motor carriers in Kansas are a pervasively regulated industry). The
critical issue is whether the trooper’s search of the truck after issuing an
inspection report was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that first
justified the interference.” Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483.
Kansas Statutes Annotated §§ 66-1,105 through 66-1,142, §§ 66-1302
through 66-1334, and § 74-2108 outline the regulatory scheme that justified the
stop and search of Defendant and his truck. Defendant does not dispute that
searches pursuant to this statutory authority meet the test for a valid regulatory
search set forth in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). 1 See
1
In Burger, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining
whether a warrantless inspection of a closely regulated industry violated the
Fourth Amendment:
First, there must be a “substantial” government interest that informs
the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made.
Second, the warrantless inspections must be “necessary to
(continued...)
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United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1061 (10th Cir. 1993). We can therefore
assume without deciding that the regulations of the trucking industry in Kansas
performed the two basic functions of a warrant: They advised Defendant that “the
search [was] being made pursuant to law and ha[d] a properly defined scope” and
they “limit[ed] the discretion of the inspecting officers.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 703;
see Seslar, 996 F.2d at 1061. Trooper Smith testified at the suppression hearing
that his reason for inspecting the cargo in the interior of the truck was to check
the blocking and bracing. 2 See R., Supplemental Vol. I at 26, 38, 50, 69, 70.
Such an inspection is authorized by the Kansas Administrative Regulations. See
Kan. Admin. Regs. § 82-4-3; see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 373.100 - 393.106. Since
Trooper Smith’s inspection of the interior of the truck was specifically authorized
and limited by the regulatory scheme that “first justified” the stop, the inspection
1
(...continued)
further [the] regulatory scheme.” . . . .
Finally, “the statute’s inspection program, in terms of the
certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 (citations omitted) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 600-603 (1981)).
2
To check blocking and bracing, an officer must inspect the interior of a
trailer. Proper blocking and bracing ensures that the cargo is secured “so that,
when the vehicle decelerates at a rate of 20 feet per second per second, the cargo
will remain on the vehicle and will not penetrate the vehicle’s front-end structure”
and the cargo is protected against shifting sideways in transit. 49 C.F.R. §
393.104.
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passes the “reasonably related in scope” prong of the test unless the issuance of a
clean inspection report made the subsequent search unrelated in scope to the
authorized inspection of the vehicle. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483.
Although it is hardly model police procedure, we cannot say that issuing a
clean inspection report prevented Trooper Smith from completing the regulatory
search authorized by Kansas law. The clean inspection report did not remove the
trooper’s inspection from the scope of actions authorized by “the circumstances
that first justified” the stop. Id. When he issued the inspection report and
returned Defendant’s paperwork, Trooper Smith had not yet completed the
inspection authorized by law. Trooper Smith still had not determined, pursuant to
the Kansas regulations, that Defendant was operating the truck safely. The stop
and inspection were conducted pursuant to a statute that sets the scope of the
inspection and authorizes trained and certified officials like Trooper Smith to
conduct the inspections. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 711. Because the validity of the
regulatory scheme is unchallenged, we can assume that the Kansas statute curtails
inspecting officers’ individual discretion, notifies commercial carriers like
Defendant that they are subject to potential searches, and specifies what can be
investigated pursuant to the regulatory scheme. Defendant “[could not] help but
be aware that his property [was] subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes,” including inspection of the blocking and bracing. Donovan,
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452 U.S. at 600; see Kan. Admin. Regs. § 82-4-3(a)(4); 49 C.F.R. § 393.104.
Because Defendant was operating a carrier that is closely regulated, he had a
“significantly reduced expectation of privacy” in his trailer. Seslar, 996 F.2d at
1061; see Burger, 482 U.S. at 702. Defendant does not dispute that the regulatory
scheme at issue in this case is validated by a state interest that “outweighs the
intrusiveness of [the] program of searches or seizures” of commercial carriers.
Seslar, 996 F.2d at 1061. Trooper Smith’s inspection of the tractor/trailer was
within the scope of the safety inspection that he initially stopped Defendant to
conduct, and, therefore, “the action was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that first justified the interference.” Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at
1483.
We note that the Kansas regulatory scheme does not give officers license to
harass commercial carriers or to conduct unreasonable searches. We also
emphasize that evidence of a regulatory scheme that circumscribes an officer’s
discretion by providing that the issuance of a clean inspection report terminates
the regulatory search would present a different case. In this case, the record
reveals no harassment of Defendant nor any evidence indicating that Trooper
Smith conducted his inspection unreasonably. We therefore agree with the
district court that the inspection qualifies as a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
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Defendant attempts to analogize the significance of the return of documents
in a Terry stop or a routine traffic stop to the return of his documents and the
issuance of the inspection report in this case. In Terry stops and routine traffic
stops, courts have consistently held that undue retention of a defendant’s
documents renders the encounter nonconsensual. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 501-03 (1983); United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.
1993). In a Terry stop or routine traffic stop, an officer’s retention of a
defendant’s documents is significant because it indicates that the defendant, as a
general rule, did not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter and,
therefore, the government cannot rely on the defendant’s consent to justify further
detention, questioning, or a search. See United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1040
(10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir.
1995) (“[W]hat began as a consensual encounter quickly became an investigative
detention once the agents received Mr. Lambert’s driver’s license and did not
return it to him.”); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he encounter in this case was clearly not consensual. Officer Graham
retained the defendant’s driver’s license and registration during the entire time he
questioned the defendant.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). In this case,
however, the government does not rely on Defendant’s consent to justify the
inspection of the trailer. The legality of Trooper Smith’s search “depends not on
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consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 315 (1972). Whether Defendant felt free to leave is irrelevant to
Trooper Smith’s authority to inspect the cargo. Our analysis is whether the return
of Defendant’s documents and the issuance of a clean inspection report removed
the cargo inspection from the scope of the search justified at the inception.
Because we determined that the cargo inspection was reasonably related to the
initially proper stop and search, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
Defendant claims that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his
possession of $60,000.00 in cash at a New York airport on January 21, 1996. He
claims that this evidence is improper bad act evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). We review the district court’s decision to admit this evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d
1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 726 (1998);
United States v. Rackley, 986 F.2d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
860 (1993).
After reviewing the district court’s decision to admit this evidence, we
believe Defendant misunderstood the basis for its admission. It was not admitted
pursuant to Rule 404(b). The evidence was admitted within the bounds of
relevant cross-examination under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) to impeach the
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substantive evidence offered by Defendant and his credibility. Defendant raised
the issue of his financial status on direct examination by submitting his tax return
and his bankruptcy petition into evidence. See R., Vol. V at 25-27, 81. As we
have explained,
Cross examination “may embrace any matter germane to the direct
examination, qualifying or destroying, or tending to elucidate,
modify, explain, contradict, or rebut testimony given in chief by the
witness.” Admission of rebuttal evidence, particularly when the
defendant “opens the door” to the subject matter, is within the sound
discretion of the district court.
United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). In this case, as in Rackley, “[t]he government
did not offer the evidence for any of the purposes covered by Rule 404, proper or
improper, but rather to impeach credibility.” Rackley, 986 F.2d at 1363.
Without expressly balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect
according to the test set out in Rule 403, the trial court declined to exclude the
evidence on that basis. See R., Vol. V at 80-81. “The trial court has broad
discretion to examine whether the probative value of evidence substantially
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,” and we find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion. United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994); see
United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1490 (10th Cir. 1996). The use of the
evidence on cross-examination was not unfairly prejudicial in light of
Defendant’s testimony about his financial condition on direct examination.
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See United States v. Lara, 956 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1992). Our review of the
record indicates that the trial court properly admitted the evidence for
impeachment purposes. 3
Finally, Defendant argues that the district court erroneously added two
points to his sentence offense level for obstruction of justice. We review the
district court’s decision to apply the enhancement under U.S. Sentencing
Guideline § 3C1.1 for clear error. United States v. Fitzherbert, 13 F.3d 340, 344
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1059 (1994). The enhancement was based
on the district court’s “specific finding” that Defendant had perjured himself.
United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1573 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
515 U.S. 1167 (1995); see R., Vol. VII at 19-21. “Because ‘the trial judge is
entitled to observe the defendant at trial and consider in sentencing
whether he . . . gave perjured testimony,’ we apply deference in reviewing the
trial court’s finding” of perjury. United States v. Yost, 24 F.3d 99, 106 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1993)).
After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the district court’s findings
clearly satisfied the requirements of the law. See R., Vol. VII at 20-21; United
States v. Smith, 81 F.3d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1996). Because we find no clear
3
Because the offered information was unnecessary to our determination,
we deny Defendant’s Motion to Supplement.
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error in the district court’s decision to apply the two-point enhancement, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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