United States v. Benavidez , 528 F. App'x 829 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 24, 2013
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-1268
(D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00191-MSK-1)
(D. Colo.)
PHILIP MARTIN BENAVIDEZ, a/k/a
Phillip Martin Benavidez,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, SEYMOUR and BACHARACH, Circuit
Judges.
Philip Benavidez, the defendant, was seen at about 11:00 p.m. in a parking
lot that had been identified as a frequent place for drug deals. At the time, Mr.
Benavidez was crouched next to another car and looking at something in a remote
section of the parking lot. The scene appeared suspicious to a police officer, and
he responded by temporarily detaining Mr. Benavidez and searching his person.
During the search, the officer discovered a gun. Mr. Benavidez moved to suppress
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
the gun, and the district court denied the motion. Under Supreme Court precedent,
the stop and search were lawful if police had reasonable grounds to suspect Mr.
Benavidez of a crime. Thus, we must ask: Did the police have reasonable grounds
to suspect a crime? Holding that they did, we affirm.
I. THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Benavidez was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. Mr. Benavidez moved to suppress evidence
involving the gun, arguing that the initial stop was not supported by a reasonable
and articulable suspicion as required by Terry v. Ohio. 1 The district court
disagreed, holding that “the time of night, the location, the apparent lack of
connection between the folks in the parking lot and the Safeway, and the fact that
. . . the Safeway parking lot was known as an area where drug transactions
occurred” gave rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 2 Mr.
Benavidez pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.
II. REASONABLENESS OF THE
POLICE OFFICER’S SUSPICION
On appeal, Mr. Benavidez challenges the lawfulness of the stop. Evidence
of the gun, he argues, is inadmissible as the fruit of an unlawful stop. We reject
1
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2
R., vol. 1 at 153: 11-14.
2
this contention because the police were justified in stopping and temporarily
detaining Mr. Benavidez.
A. A Terry Stop and its Requirements
As Mr. Benavidez acknowledges, police officers may detain an individual
for investigatory purposes when the totality of the circumstances creates
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 3 Brief investigatory stops—though
exempt from the probable cause requirement—remain subject to the Fourth
Amendment’s general requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable. 4 A
stop is reasonable if it is justified at the start and reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. 5
A stop is justified if the “specific and articulable facts and rational
inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion [that] a
person has or is committing a crime.” 6 We view the facts in their totality,
applying an objective standard to determine if a reasonable officer would have
suspected a crime. 7
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
5
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d
1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009).
6
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990).
7
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v. Salazar,
609 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (10th Cir. 2010).
3
The officer need not “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 8 But he
can initiate a detention only if he has a “particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting criminal activity. 9 Hunches are not enough. 10
B. Reasonableness of the Suspicion
The district court held that the police officer could initiate an investigative
detention because he had reasonable grounds to suspect Mr. Benavidez of a
crime. 11 This holding involves a mixed question of law and fact, triggering de
novo review. 12 In conducting this review, we consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the district court and uphold its factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. 13 “In practice, this looks more like deference—indeed, double
deference—than de novo review.” 14
The police officer testified that:
! the grocery store was closing at 11:00 p.m.,
8
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
9
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); United States v.
Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005).
10
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
11
R., vol. 1 at 153:19 - 154:3.
12
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v.
Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).
13
United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).
14
Unites States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2005).
4
! Mr. Benavidez and another man were crouched near a car door,
looking at something,
! the men were parked about 120 feet from the entrance of the grocery
store, and
! the grocery store was known as a meeting place for drug deals. 15
The district court relied on this testimony and made similar factual findings. 16
When these circumstances are viewed in the light most favorable to the district
court’s holding, a reasonable police officer would have suspected criminal
activity. 17
Perhaps in isolation, the circumstances might have seemed innocent. For
example, the police might have viewed the scene differently if the store had not
been closing, if the two men had been parked closer to the store entrance, if Mr.
Benavidez had not been crouched and looking at something, or if the parking lot
had not been known as a place for drug deals. But viewing the circumstances
together, the district court concluded that Detective Bravo had specific articulable
15
See R., vol. 1 at 71, 73, 79.
16
See R, vol. 1 at 148, 153.
17
See United States v. Conner, 699 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating
that the time of night and a substantial history of crime at the place where the
stop had occurred affect reasonableness of the suspicion); United States v.
McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that a report that men
were “‘lurking’ around [a] parking lot” and “acting hinky” had added to the
circumstances creating reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop).
5
facts to harbor a reasonable suspicion that a crime was in progress. 18 Considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s resolution, we agree
and affirm.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
18
See R., vol. 1 at 153.
6