United States v. Lopez ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 23 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4168
(D.C. No. 97-CR-236-B)
JESUS BOBADILLA LOPEZ (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the
case is ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Jesus Bobadilla Lopez appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress and the court’s refusal to dismiss the original indictment
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
with prejudice. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
A grand jury returned an indictment on June 5, 1996, charging defendant
with two counts of unlawful possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Defendant filed a motion to suppress all items seized from the
searches of defendant’s apartment and defendant’s girlfriend’s apartment. The
magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 18, 1996, and directed
the parties to file supplemental briefs. Defendant filed a supplemental brief on
August 2 and the government filed a supplemental brief on August 14.
The docket sheet reflects no activity between August 14, 1996, and April 1,
1997. In its brief, the government states defendant sent an informal letter to the
magistrate requesting a prompt ruling on the suppression motion, but this request
is not in the record and there is no indication when the request was made. On
April 1, 1997, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice
based on violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq . The
magistrate issued a report and recommendation on April 4, 1997, suggesting the
motion to suppress be denied, and the district court adopted the report on May 20,
1997. The district court entered an order on July 16, 1997, dismissing the
-2-
indictment against defendant without prejudice for Speedy Trial Act violations. 1
The district court stated:
The crimes with which Defendant has been charged are serious,
involving allegations of possession, distribution and intent to
distribute illegal substances as well as the possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. Furthermore, the delay resulted from inadvertent
noncompliance with the Act and not from any action by the
government for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage over
Defendant. Finally, the Speedy Trial Act’s purpose and intent would
be misserved by a finding of prejudice. The same system that was
used to so conscientiously protect the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights should not be improperly employed by the Defendant to escape
any chance of criminal liability.
Order of Dismissal at 2-3.
On August 13, 1997, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment
charging defendant with the same three offenses as in the original indictment.
Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to count two, unlawful possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance, on September 15, 1997. This
count did not involve any items seized from the apartments. The remaining
counts were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment.
1
We have supplemented the record on appeal sua sponte with the docket
sheet from the original district court criminal action, the magistrate’s report and
recommendation, and the district court’s order dismissing the original indictment
without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C).
-3-
II.
There is no dispute here that defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act
were violated. Magistrate judges are subject to the Act’s time restrictions.
United States v. Mora , 135 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (10th Cir. 1998). The magistrate
here continued to keep defendant’s motion to suppress under advisement for an
additional 202 days after all supplemental briefing had been submitted and the
thirty-day disposition period had expired. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) & (J).
The issue on appeal is whether the district court acted properly in later
dismissing defendant’s indictment without prejudice. The Speedy Trial Act
delineates no preference for a particular form of dismissal, but commits the matter
to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Taylor , 487 U.S.
326, 335 (1988). Although we ultimately review the court’s decision for an abuse
of discretion, our deferential standard is dependent upon the district court having
examined all requisite statutory factors in its analysis. See United States v.
Tsosie , 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Taylor , 487 U.S. at
336-37).
There are three nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining
whether a dismissal for Speedy Trial Act violations should be with or without
prejudice: (1) seriousness of the offense, (2) facts and circumstances leading to
dismissal, and (3) impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Act and on
-4-
the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). In addition, the legislative
history of the statute indicates that, although not dispositive of the inquiry, the
presence or absence of prejudice to defendant should also be examined. Taylor ,
487 U.S. at 333-35.
Seriousness of Offense
The district court assessed all requisite factors in concluding defendant’s
indictment should be dismissed without prejudice. The drug and weapon charges
are of a highly serious nature. See United States v. Saltzman , 984 F.2d 1087,
1093 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993). Defendant suggests these offenses “are not the type of
aggravated, victim-type crimes that society” considers most pernicious.
Appellant’s Br. at 14. This argument misses the mark. The critical inquiry is
whether the specific offenses with which defendant is charged are serious and that
inquiry is clearly answered in the affirmative here. A defendant’s alleged
commission of a “serious” crime weighs heavily against dismissal with prejudice.
Id. at 1092-93; see United States v. Cardona-Rivera , 64 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th
Cir. 1995) (“When the crime is serious, the court should dismiss with prejudice
only for a correspondingly serious or prejudicial delay.”).
-5-
Circumstances Leading to Dismissal
In evaluating the facts and circumstances precipitating the dismissal, the
proper focus is “on the culpability of the delay-producing conduct.” Saltzman ,
984 F.2d at 1093. “Where the delay is the result of intentional dilatory conduct,
or a pattern of neglect on the part of the Government, dismissal with prejudice is
the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 1093-94. The district court noted the delay here
resulted solely from inadvertent noncompliance by both parties and not from any
deliberate government intent to manipulate the proceedings for a tactical
advantage. Defendants alleged the magistrate committed a “pattern” of
unspecified violations. Even assuming arguendo that a judge’s misconduct in the
Speedy Trial Act context may warrant dismissal with prejudice, there is no
evidence in the record to support defendant’s contention.
Defendant has produced no evidence that he made a timely demand for a
ruling on his motion to suppress. His attorney apparently submitted an informal
request to the magistrate, but there is no indication when the request was made.
We cannot, and will not, speculate on this matter. “[A] defendant who waits
passively while the time runs has less claim to dismissal with prejudice than does
a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt attention.” Id. at 1094.
Nor do we find the length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a
dismissal with prejudice in the absence of government misconduct. See United
-6-
States v. Johnson , 29 F.3d 940, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1994) (188-day delay in bringing
defendant to trial did not necessitate dismissal with prejudice where delay was
unintentional and government did not act in bad faith); United States v. Koory , 20
F.3d 844, 848-49 (8th Cir. 1994) (59-day delay beyond 70-day Speedy Trial Act
limitation did not mandate dismissal with prejudice).
The government bears part of the responsibility for insuring the
effectuation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. See United States v. Wright ,
6 F.3d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1993). It is not appropriate to place this obligation
fully upon the court. However, there is no evidence in the record on appeal to
suggest Utah federal prosecutors have contributed to repeated violations of the
Speedy Trial Act.
Impact of Reprosecution on Speedy Trial Act and Justice
In analyzing this final factor, the court must consider the prejudice inflicted
upon defendant as a result of the delay, the necessity of dismissing the case with
prejudice to insure future compliance with the Act, and the public’s interest in
bringing defendant to trial. United States v. Blevins , 142 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.
1998) . As a general rule, “[t]he longer the delay, the greater the presumptive or
actual prejudice to the defendant, in terms of his ability to prepare for trial or the
restrictions on his liberty.” Taylor , 487 U.S. at 340. However, defendant has the
-7-
burden of demonstrating “specific prejudice other than that occasioned by the
original filing.” Saltzman , 984 F.2d at 1094.
The district court concluded administration of the Act would not be
impacted adversely by subjecting defendant to renewed prosecution. We conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. At the
time of dismissal, all pretrial motions had been resolved and defendant had not
been subjected to trial. Therefore, reprosecution would entail neither lengthy
pretrial motions nor a second trial. See Koory , 20 F.3d at 849. Moreover,
defendant has articulated no impairment in his ability to prepare a defense as a
result of the court’s dilatory resolution of his suppression motion. Indeed, the
only charge in the superseding indictment calling for evidence other than that in
the government’s possession involved a drug transaction committed in
defendant’s car with a cooperating witness who, according to the government,
was in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons at all relevant times and was available
to testify at defendant’s trial. Defendant’s anger at being incarcerated during the
period in which the magistrate kept the suppression motion under advisement is
legitimate. However, we cannot say a dismissal with prejudice was mandated
here. See United States v. Kramer , 827 F.2d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 1987) (general
assertions of prejudice and unproven allegations of post-dismissal prejudice are
insufficient to support dismissal with prejudice). The public’s strong interest in
-8-
requiring defendant to be held responsible for his crimes has not been overcome
on this record.
Although dismissal with prejudice sends a stronger message to the
government, Taylor , 487 U.S. at 342, dismissal without prejudice is not a
meaningless sanction:
[I]t forces the Government to obtain a new indictment if it decides to
reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. Given the burdens borne by the prosecution and
the effect of delay on the Government’s ability to meet those
burdens, substantial delay well may make reprosecution, even if
permitted, unlikely. If the greater deterrent effect of barring
reprosecution could alone support a decision to dismiss with
prejudice, the consideration of the other factors identified in §
3162(a)(2) would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant
barring reprosecution.
Id. Further, Congress included a litany of remedial sanctions, short of dismissal
with prejudice, to punish dilatory counsel. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b); Taylor , 487
U.S. at 342 n.14.
After careful analysis, we do not find the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing defendant’s indictment without prejudice.
III.
Defendant also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence seized from the apartments. This issue is moot. The only
charge to which defendant pleaded guilty involved a drug transaction with a
cooperating witness in the defendant’s vehicle and none of the evidence seized in
-9-
the apartments was connected in any way to that count.
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
-10-