Kelly v. Topeka Housing Authority , 147 F. App'x 723 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                            F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    August 30, 2005
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    LAWRENCE L. KELLY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 04-3448
    (D.C. No. 04-CV-4069-JAR)
    TOPEKA HOUSING AUTHORITY,                               (D. Kan.)
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before HENRY, ANDERSON , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Lawrence L. Kelly, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of this
    action seeking money damages from defendant Topeka Housing Authority. We
    affirm.
    Background
    Mr. Kelly resided with his adult son Michael in the Oakwood Manor
    Apartments. His rent was paid by defendant under the federal program for
    low-income housing assistance.        See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. When Michael was
    arrested and charged with drug-related offenses, including possession, Mr. Kelly
    and Michael were evicted from the apartment. Oakwood Manor, a landlord
    receiving rent payments from a federally subsidized source, had cause to
    terminate the tenancy if a member of the tenant’s household engaged in any
    “drug-related criminal activity on or near [the rented] premises.” 42 U.S.C.
    1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii). Defendant ceased making Mr. Kelly’s rent payments because
    of Michael’s drug-related offenses.      See 
    24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551
    (l);
    982.553(b)(1)(i).
    Mr. Kelly sued, contending that his eviction was contrary to federal
    constitutional and statutory law. He maintained that his son was not on his
    premises at the time he was accused of possessing drugs; his son was not
    convicted on any drug charge, but pled not guilty and was placed on diversion;
    and the eviction was in retaliation for Mr. Kelly’s prior complaints against
    -2-
    defendant. He alleged that he sustained money damages as a result of the
    eviction.
    The district court liberally construed Mr. Kelly’s complaint to allege
    several causes of action, held that none stated a claim upon which relief can be
    granted, and dismissed the action without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6). On appeal, Mr. Kelly reasserts his claims made in the district court.         1
    Appellate Jurisdiction
    We must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
    Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
    district court merely dismissed Mr. Kelly’s complaint without prejudice and did
    not dismiss the entire action. The district court’s judgment stated that the action
    was dismissed, as did its memorandum order of dismissal. R. doc. 25;              
    id.
     doc. 24,
    at 10. Our review of those documents convinces us that the district court
    intended to dismiss the entire action, and we therefore have jurisdiction to hear
    the appeal.   Mobley v. McCormick , 
    40 F.3d 337
    , 339-40 (10th Cir. 1994); 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    1
    Mr. Kelly has alleged that the district judge ruled against him because she
    was bribed to do so. This unsupported invective is not persuasive.
    -3-
    Merits
    We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
    claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).    Hartman v. Kickapoo Tribe Gaming
    Comm’n , 
    319 F.3d 1230
    , 1234 (10th Cir. 2003). “We accept as true all
    well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and view those
    facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”      Maher v. Durango
    Metals, Inc. , 
    144 F.3d 1302
    , 1304 (10th Cir. 1998). Dismissal of a complaint
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) will be upheld only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
    plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
    to relief.” Conley v. Gibson , 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 45-46 (1957). Mr. Kelly is
    representing himself on appeal, so we construe his pleadings liberally.    Haines v.
    Kerner , 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972).
    We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, as well as the briefs
    submitted by the parties. Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the
    judgment of dismissal substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s
    comprehensive memorandum order and opinion granting defendant’s motion to
    dismiss, dated October 13, 2004.
    -4-
    Defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment of the
    district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-3448

Citation Numbers: 147 F. App'x 723

Judges: Anderson, Henry, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 8/30/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023