Abiodun v. Maurer , 257 F. App'x 111 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 4, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BENAD ABIODUN,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-1184
v. (D. of Colo.)
DOUGLAS MAURER, (D.C. No. 05-cv-2305-WDM-PAC)
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, JOHN SUTHERS,
Attorney General of the State of
Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HENRY, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
Benad Abiodun is currently on parole under the supervision of the Colorado
Department of Corrections. He seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to
challenge the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief to him under 28
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied all of Abiodun’s constitutional claims.
Proceeding pro se, 1 Abiodun now seeks a COA from this court on four of the
grounds raised below.
We conclude Abiodun is not entitled to relief under § 2254 and therefore
DENY his petition.
I. Background
Benad Abiodun is in both state and federal custody. The Colorado
Department of Corrections supervises his parole for a state drug conviction, while
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has detained him in
federal jail for an immigration violation. Abiodun’s drug conviction in Colorado
state court made him a removable alien under federal law. Thus, when Abiodun
was paroled from Colorado state prison, ICE officials placed him in an
immigration jail to await the conclusion of removal proceedings against him.
Those proceedings determined that Abiodun should be removed by virtue of his
conviction for an aggravated felony.
A. Factual and Procedural History
Abiodun, an alien from Nigeria, has lived in the United States since the
1990s. His trouble with the law began in 2001. In June of that year, Abiodun
sold cocaine to undercover agents on two separate occasions. He was
1
Because Abiodun proceeds pro se, we review his pleadings and filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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subsequently charged and convicted of two counts of possession and two counts
of distribution of a controlled substance. See People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462,
464 (Colo. 2005). He was sentenced to four concurrent four-year terms of
imprisonment, as well as five-years mandatory parole. Id. On appeal, the
Colorado Court of Appeals determined the offenses of possession and distribution
merged under Colorado state law. The court therefore vacated Abiodun’s two
convictions for possession, while simultaneously affirming his two convictions
for distribution. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’s
decision in 2005. Id.Upon learning of Abiodun’s drug conviction, ICE officials began removal
proceedings against him. As an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, he was
removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). See Abiodun v.
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). Abiodun’s parole from
Colorado state prison began on December 30, 2004. Id. at 1212. Federal
immigration authorities immediately took him into custody. Id. Five months
later, an immigration judge ordered Abiodun removed from the United States to
his homeland of Nigeria. Id. at 1214. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
affirmed the removal order. This court has twice reviewed the BIA’s order, and
twice affirmed it. See id. at 1218; Abiodun v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 738,
742–43 (10th Cir. 2007).
B. Abiodun’s Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254-3-
Abiodun now seeks review of his state court conviction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. He petitioned the federal district court for relief on eight grounds.2 The
district court, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied relief on
every ground. See Abiodun v. Maurer, No. 05-2305, 2007 WL 987482 (D. Colo.
Mar. 30, 2007) (slip copy). The district court also dismissed from the suit, as
improperly pled defendants, the federal officials holding Abiodun at the ICE
facility. See id. at *2. The Colorado attorney general is the only remaining
defendant. On appeal to this court, Abiodun does not challenge the dismissal of
the federal officials. He renews four of the claims brought before the district
court.
II. Discussion
Abiodun seeks a COA from this court on four grounds. First, he argues the
Colorado Supreme Court’s decision constituted an unreasonable application of
double jeopardy principles to his case. Second, he asserts there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. Third, he claims prosecutorial misconduct
rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Fourth, he argues he was denied
2
Abiodun’s eight grounds for relief were: (1) insufficient evidence to
support possession and distribution convictions; (2) convictions for possession
and distribution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) prosecutorial
misconduct violated the right to due process and a fair trial; (4) prosecutor’s
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the jury violated the Constitution; (5)
conviction violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; (6) conviction
was obtained without effective assistance of counsel; (7) conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted was constitutionally protected; and (8) ICE officials
violated procedural and substantive due process by issuing a detainer against him.
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effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. All of these claims were
raised in Abiodun’s state court proceedings, as well as before the district court.
To obtain a COA, Abiodun must make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 327 (2003). This standard is satisfied by demonstrating that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] claim can be debatable even though
every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case
has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail.” Miller-El, 537
U.S. at 338.
A. Double Jeopardy
The district court correctly concluded Abiodun’s sentence did not violate
the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals’s decision to vacate the two counts of possession for
which Abiodun had been convicted. People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 467 (Colo.
2005). The high court agreed with the court of appeals that the acts of possessing
and distributing a controlled substance merged into one offense under Colorado
Revised Statutes § 18-18-405(1)(a) (2000). Id. However, because Abiodun had
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admitted to two separate acts of distribution, the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed Abiodun’s two convictions for distribution of a controlled substance. Id.
Abiodun now challenges the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision to uphold
his two convictions for distribution. It is undisputed, however, that Abiodun
engaged in two separate transactions, each on different days and in different
amounts. Id. at 464. Abiodun admitted this at trial. Because the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated when a defendant is convicted of two wholly
separate offenses that occur days apart, Abiodun’s claim fails. See, e.g.,
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932) (“Each of several
successive sales constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow
each other.”). The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in no way violated
Abiodun’s constitutional rights; rather, the court upheld his rights under the Fifth
Amendment and offered him all the relief to which he was entitled.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The district court correctly concluded there was sufficient evidence for the
Colorado state courts to uphold Abiodun’s second conviction for distribution.
Abiodun claims the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sold at
least one ounce of cocaine in the second transaction. Proof of an ounce is
required for the mandatory minimum penalty Abiodun received. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 18-18-405(3)(a)(I) (2000) (prescribing a sentence where the amount of
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drugs “is or has been represented to be . . . [a]t least twenty-five grams or one
ounce but less than four hundred fifty grams”).
“[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The sole evidence on the amount of cocaine Abiodun
distributed came from the testimony of one of the undercover agents. People v.
Abiodun, 87 P.3d 164, 165 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003). The agent testified Abiodun
confessed, after his arrest, he had just sold “about an ounce of crack cocaine.” Id.The Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court concluded the
agent’s testimony was sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof under the relevant
statute. Id. at 166; People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 471 (Colo. 2005). Thus, the
state courts concluded a rational jury could have found the essential elements of
the crime. Because state court interpretations of state law are binding on this
court in habeas proceedings, Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir.
2005), we cannot conclude there was insufficient evidence to support Abiodun’s
second conviction.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The district court correctly rejected Abiodun’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct rising to the level of a constitutional violation. The basis of
Abiodun’s argument was a single question posed by the prosecutor during his
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cross-examination of Abiodun. The prosecutor asked Abiodun, “You are not a
U.S. citizen, is that right?” People v. Abiodun, 87 P.3d 164, 167 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003). Defense counsel objected on grounds of relevance and the court sustained
the objection. The prosecutor did not make any other similar remarks and did not
refer to Abiodun’s nationality in his closing statement.
To prevail on this claim, Abiodun must show the prosecutor’s conduct “so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). The
Colorado Court of Appeals found that “the questioning was not prejudicial,
flagrant, or glaringly or tremendously improper.” Abiodun, 87 P.3d at 167. We
agree and reject Abiodun’s claim. 3
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The district court correctly concluded Abiodun had not suffered a
constitutional violation as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Abiodun
argues his trial and appellate lawyers failed to make certain motions Abiodun
thought favorable to his defense. Moreover, Abiodun asserts his trial counsel
failed to sufficiently cross-examine the undercover agent, neglected to call
Abiodun’s wife as a witness, and failed to request appropriate jury instructions.
3
Abiodun’s citation to United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 775–76
(1st Cir. 1995), offers him no support. In that case, the defendants pointed to four
potentially prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutor about their Colombian
nationality, yet the court found no prosecutorial misconduct.
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“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). To prevail, Abiodun must
demonstrate his lawyers’ performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687–88.
Counsels’ failure to raise an unmeritorious issue at trial or on appeal does not
constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Sperry v. McKune,
445 F.3d 1268, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 2006).
After evaluating each of Abiodun’s claims of ineffective assistance, the
magistrate judge found his lawyers’ decisions were reasonable and in no way
prejudicial to Abiodun’s defense. We have conducted a complete review of the
state court record. For substantially the same reasons as set forth in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and adopted by the district court,
we reject Abiodun’s claims. See Maurer, 2007 WL 987482, at *3 (“I agree with
[the] recommendation that Abiodun received effective assistance of counsel in the
state court proceedings, notwithstanding his objections to the contrary, which are
based on assumption and conjecture.”).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we DENY Abiodun’s petition for a COA
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and DISMISS this appeal. We also DENY his motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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