Jones v. State of Oklahoma , 191 F. App'x 752 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 11, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LO NNY JONES,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 06-6057
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV -630-L)
(W .D. Okla.)
STA TE OF O K LA H O MA ,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Lonny Jones, a state inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) so that he may appeal from the district court’s denial of his
habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because M r. Jones has failed
to demonstrate that it is reasonably debatable whether the district court’s
procedural ruling dismissing his claim is correct, Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
M r. Jones was convicted in Oklahoma state court of assault and battery on
a police officer (count 1), possession of a firearm after felony conviction (count
2), resisting a police officer (count 3), and aggravated trafficking in
methamphetamine (count 4). He was sentenced to 5 years, 2 years, 1 year and a
$250 fine, 35 years and a $50,000 fine, respectively. He appealed, and on August
27, 2003, the O klahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed counts 1
and 2, reversed on count 3, and reduced the sentence on count 4 to 30 years and
dismissed the fine. On July 9, 2004, M r. Jones moved for a 60-day continuance
to file his motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied on July 13, 2004.
But upon rehearing, the motion was granted and M r. Jones w as given until
September 30, 2004 to file. On September 27, 2004, M r. Jones filed his motion
for post conviction relief, which the state district court denied on November 2,
2004. Apparently M r. Jones did not receive a copy of that decision until
December 15, 2004. 1 M r. Jones appealed, and the O CCA dismissed on timeliness
grounds. On January 10, 2005, he sought a rehearing at the state district court,
which was denied on M arch 28, 2005.
On June 3, 2005, M r. Jones filed his federal habeas petition. 2 In it, he
1
The state apparently stipulated to this fact.
2
In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge concluded that
M r. Jones’ habeas petition was filed on April 25, 2005, the date reflected on the
original petition’s certificate of mailing. Report and Recommendation at 3. The
district court disagreed with that determination, finding instead that the date of
filing was June 3, 2005. Apparently the magistrate judge overlooked the law
regarding the prison mailbox rule as articulated in United States v. Cebellos-
M artinez, 371 F.3d 713 (10th Cir. 2004). Upon review of the record and the
district court’s application of Ceballos-M artinez, we find the district court’s
conclusion undebatable and thus base our limitations determination on a filing
date of June 3, 2005.
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challenged his convictions on several grounds. The state moved for dismissal,
arguing that the petition was time-barred. The magistrate judge disagreed,
recommending the motion be denied because equitable tolling rendered the
petition timely. See Report and Recommendation at 7-8.
On January 23, 2006, without addressing M r. Jones’ constitutional claims,
the district court dismissed his habeas petition as time-barred by the one-year
limitations period in 28 U .S.C. § 2244(d)(1). W hen the district court denies a
habeas petition on procedural grounds and fails to address the prisoner’s
constitutional claims, we may issue a CO A only if the prisoner demonstrates that
it is reasonably debatable whether (1) the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is
correct. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
On appeal, M r. Jones argues the merits of his claims and that the district
court erred in determining that his action is time-barred. The district court’s
conclusion that M r. Jones’ claims are time-barred is not reasonably debatable.
M r. Jones’ convictions became final on November 25, 2003, the last day on which
he could have file a certiorari petition with the United States Supreme Court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527-28 (2003)
(adding 90-day period in which defendant could seek certiorari). Thereafter, M r.
Jones had one-year to file his federal habeas petition, but the time period would
be tolled during the time a properly filed state post-conviction motion was
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pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2). Three-hundred six days elapsed
without such a motion. On September 27, 2004, M r. Jones filed a motion for
post-conviction relief, which the state district court denied on November 2, 2004.
The limitations period was tolled during that time. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). But
it was not tolled during the pendency of M r. Jones’ notice of appeal and petition
in error because they were untimely. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417
(2005). Nonetheless, the limitations period was tolled during the 30-day period
that he could have timely filed a petition in error. 3 See Serrano v. W illiams, 383
F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2004) (because New M exico did not preclude the
filing of a rehearing petition to reconsider the denial of certiorari, that time would
be tolled even where petitioner did not so file); see also Gibson v. Klinger, 232
F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (regardless of whether a petitioner actually
appeals a denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations period is tolled
during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an appeal under state
law). Thereafter, another thirty-seven days passed until M r. Jones filed a motion
for rehearing in state district court. That motion, which again tolled the limitation
period, see Nix v. Sec’y for the D ep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curiam), was pending from January 10 to M arch 28, 2005. Thus, M r.
Jones had another twenty days, i.e., until April 19, 2005, to file his habeas
3
W hile a notice of intent to appeal must be filed within 10 days of an
adverse ruling, a petition in error allows 30 days. See Rule 5.2(C)(1)-(2), Okla.
Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, app. W e give M r. Jones the benefit of the longer period.
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petition. He did not do so until June 3, 2005; it w as therefore untimely.
M r. Jones argues that the limitations period should be tolled during certain
additional periods. First, he contends that during the seventy-two day period in
which he prepared his state application for post conviction relief— i.e., from July
9, 2004, the date he moved for a 60 day continuance to file his motion, until
September 27, 2005, the date his motion was filed— the limitations period should
not have run. The limitations period is tolled while a properly filed application
for post-conviction or other collateral review is pending, not during its
preparation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); cf. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-
20 (2002) (holding that an application is pending as long as the ordinary state
collateral review process is “in continuance”— i.e., “until the completion of” that
process).
Second, M r. Jones contends the limitation period should have tolled for an
additional forty-three days, representing the time he was unaware that the state
court had denied him post-conviction relief. The limitations period is subject to
equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances. Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808. This
court has previously indicated that it would allow for such tolling when a
prisoner, despite his diligence, lacked knowledge that the state court reached a
final decision on his case. See W oodward v. W illiams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143
(10th Cir. 2001). It is undisputed that M r. Jones did not receive notice of denial
until December 15, 2004. But the limitations calculated above afforded M r. Jones
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the thirty day period in which he had to file a petition in error. Thus, the most he
could benefit from his lack of knowledge is thirteen days, which is insufficient to
render his petition timely.
Last, M r. Jones argues the limitation period should be tolled for the forty-
five days between April 6 and M ay 21, 2005, when, according to him, he was
unable to access applicable forms, addresses, or the mailbox due to a prison-wide
lock down. Though there is evidence of a lock down in the record, M r. Jones
claim fails because he has not shown that he was denied access he sought during
the lock down, or that such denial caused him to be unable to timely file his
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). In fact, our review of the record reveals
that M r. Jones accessed the prison mail system within the time he claimed to be in
lock down. See Aplt. Br. Ex. U (alleging that on April 13, 2005 he filed a notice
of appeal in state court).
W e GRANT IFP status, DENY a COA, and DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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