United States v. Potter ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 28, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-8042
v. (D.C. No. 05-CR-236-J)
(D . W yo.)
DARRYL W AYN E POTTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Darryl W ayne Potter appeals from his conviction and
sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). M r. Potter was convicted following a
jury trial on M arch 7, 2006. He was fined $1500 and sentenced to 135 months of
imprisonment followed by 78 months of supervised release.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
M r. Potter filed his timely notice of appeal on June 2, 2006. In lieu of an
appellate brief, M r. Potter’s appointed counsel forthrightly filed a motion to
withdraw and brief in support thereof. See Anders v. California, 386 US. 738
(1967). In the Anders brief, M r. Potter’s counsel raised four issues: (1) the
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence seized from M r.
Potter’s vehicle and person, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence, (3) the
constitutionality of M r. Potter’s sentence under Blakely v. W ashington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004), and (4) the reasonableness of M r. Potter’s sentence under United
States v. Booker, 543 U .S. 220 (2005). M r. Potter subsequently filed a response
to the Anders brief which argued ineffective assistance of counsel. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U .S.C. § 3742(a). Because
every ground for appeal asserted by the defendant is frivolous, we dismiss the
appeal and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See United States v. Calderon,
428 F.3d 928, 930, 933 (10th Cir. 2005).
Background
On August 29, 2005, the manager of a truckstop near Fort Bridger,
W yoming alerted law enforcement that a man had shoplifted a radar detector
valued at $249. The manager reported that the man left the truckstop driving a
late 1970s model green Ford pickup with a camper shell on it. The manager also
provided a description of the vehicle’s license plate and general direction of
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travel.
W yoming Highway Patrol Trooper M ichael Adams subsequently heard a
“be-on-the-look-out”(BOLO) broadcasted from the local sheriff’s department.
The BOLO indicated that a blond-haired male, aged 30-40 years old, had
allegedly shoplifted a radar detector from the truckstop and was traveling
eastbound on Interstate 80 in a green Chevy pickup with a spray-painted black
camper shell. Trooper Adams drove his cruiser to the top of a hill on Interstate
80 some distance east of the truckstop. There Trooper Adams waited, his cruiser
not readily visible to oncoming traffic. After approximately seven minutes,
Trooper Adams spotted a vehicle matching the description given on the BO LO
traveling from the east. He clocked the green pickup speeding at 79 miles per
hour in a 75 mile per hour zone.
Trooper Adams then pursued the pickup. Trooper Adams testified that
after he and the pickup passed a semi-trailer, there was no traffic for
approximately four hundred yards. Trooper Adams observed that the pickup was
turquoise, and he attempted to read its license plate information. At this point,
while Trooper Adams’s cruiser was somewhat behind the pickup and in the left
lane, he observed a white object fly out of the passenger side of the pickup.
Trooper Adams assumed that the white object was the radar detector, and he
carefully observed where it landed, noting its distance from an emergency cross-
over. Trooper Adams specifically testified that there was no possibility that the
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white object came from anywhere other than the pickup because there were no
other vehicles near the pickup, except the semi-trailer that it had just passed.
Trooper Adams then turned on the cruiser’s overhead lights and attempted
to stop the turquoise pickup. The pickup continued east on Interstate 80 for
another mile until it pulled over and stopped at the top of an exit ramp. Trooper
Adams approached the pickup and ordered the driver out. Trooper Adams
handcuffed the driver, whom he subsequently identified as M r. Potter. Trooper
A dam s took M r. Potter to the passenger side of his cruiser and patted him down
for weapons. During the pat down, Trooper Adams felt an object he suspected
might be a pocket knife in M r. Potter’s pocket. Trooper Adams subsequently
removed a lighter and a small, plastic bottle that Trooper Adams identified as a
“bullet”– a container used to dispense various controlled substances in powder
form. Trooper Adams then secured M r. Potter in the back of the cruiser. At this
time, Trooper A dams told M r. Potter that he was not under arrest.
Trooper Adams then searched the pickup where he found a radar detector
under the driver’s seat. He also found a set of digital scales in the glove box.
Local sheriff’s deputies and another trooper, M ichael Felicetti soon arrived.
W hile the deputies watched M r. Potter, Troopers Adams and Felicetti drove back
to w here Trooper A dams observed the white object fly out of the pickup. The tw o
troopers eventually found a white grocery bag lying down on the grass just past
the shoulder of the highway, near the location where Trooper Adams thought the
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white object had landed. Inside the grocery bag was a clear plastic food storage
bag containing a w hite substance. W ithin two feet of the grocery bag were two
packages wrapped in black electrical tape. The grocery bag and packages had
only a light layer of dust on them, while other items in the grass were caked in
mud and dirt.
Because the troopers did not have plastic gloves, they handled the items
with their bare hands. In a field test, the white substance in the food storage bag
tested positive for methamphetamine. The troopers then returned to the scene of
the traffic stop and advised M r. Potter that he was under arrest. Trooper Adams
was then able to confirm that the radar detector found in the pickup was of the
same make and model shoplifted from the truckstop. The troopers then conducted
an inventory search of the pickup and transported M r. Potter to a local jail. At
the jail, while performing an inventory search of M r. Potter, a sheriff’s deputy
recovered a plastic-wrapped chunk of methamphetamine from M r. Potter’s person.
Prior to trial, M r. Potter moved to suppress all the items confiscated from
the pickup and his person. M r. Potter argued that the items w ere seized in
violation of the Fourth A mendment because, when Trooper Adams first
handcuffed M r. Potter, he told M r. Potter that he was not under arrest.
Consequently, M r. Potter argued, the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was not present when Trooper Adams
first searched him and the pickup, nor was any other exception implicated by the
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facts.
In its order denying the motion to suppress, the district court characterized
the encounter between Trooper Adams and M r. Potter as an investigative
detention that turned into an arrest. The court found that the frisk of M r. Potter
was justified by probable cause and that the subsequent search of the pickup was
a search incident to arrest. Additionally, the district court noted that the search of
M r. Potter’s pickup could be justified under the automobile exception. See
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1991). Finally, the district court
noted that even if the search of the pickup was improper, the evidence in it would
have been inevitably discovered during a later inventory search and therefore
should not be suppressed. See Nix v. W illiams, 467 U.S. 431, 444-48 (1984).
Before trial, M r. Potter stipulated that a total quantity of 438.4 grams of
methamphetamine had been recovered from the food storage bag and packages
wrapped in electrical tape. He further stipulated that .79 grams of
methamphetamine were seized from his pocket during the inventory search at the
jail. At trial, there was expert testimony that this quantity of methamphetamine
exceed that of a “user” quantity. No other drug paraphernalia was recovered
other than the digital scales. W hile M r. Potter’s fingerprints were not found on
the items containing methamphetamine, four latent prints w ere identified that did
not match M r. Potter. No effort was made to distinguish these prints as belonging
to Troopers A dams and Felicitti, nor were the latent prints compared to those in
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any state or federal database.
Included in the jury’s verdict form was a special interrogatory regarding the
amount of methamphetamine involved in the offense. The jury concluded that
438.4 grams of methamphetamine were involved. 1 This amount was used by the
district court to establish a base offense level of 30, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§2D1.1(c)(5). There were no enhancements or reductions to this base offense
level. Based on this offense level and a criminal history category of IV, the pre-
sentence investigation report recommended a guideline range 135 to 168 months
of imprisonment. The district court ultimately sentenced M r. Potter to serve 135
months, the low-end of the guideline range.
Discussion
I. The M otion to Suppress
In reviewing the district court’s denial of M r. Potter’s motion to suppress,
we consider the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the government. United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992,
994 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006). W e accept the district court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Villagrana-Flores, 467 F.3d 1269,
1273 (10th Cir. 2006). Ultimately, the defendant must prove that the challenged
1
This represents the total quantity of methamphetamine from all sources
except the .79 grams found on M r. Potter’s person.
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search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment, the ultimate determination of
which is a question of reasonableness that we review de novo. Id.In this case, the district court correctly found that the searches of M r.
Potter’s person and the pickup were justified by numerous exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Trooper Adams was initially justified in stopping M r. Potter
because he observed M r. Potter speeding and littering. See United States v.
Botero-O spina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Whether M r.
Potter’s detention is characterized as a Terry stop, a Terry stop that evolved into
an arrest, or simply an arrest, we agree with the district court that, based on the
description contained in the BOLO, M r. Potter’s throwing an object out of the
pickup’s window, and M r. Potter’s reluctance to yield, Trooper Adams possessed
probable cause to suspect M r. Potter of shoplifting and could have arrested him at
any time. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); M arshall
v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003).
Because Trooper Adams could have arrested M r. Potter at any time, and did
eventually arrest him, the searches of both M r. Potter and his pickup were
justified as searches incident to an arrest. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460 (1981). Additionally, because Trooper Adams had probable cause to believe
that M r. Potter used his pickup as a getaway vehicle for his theft of the radar
detector, Trooper Adam’s search of the pickup was also justified under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
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Finally, even if the searches of M r. Potter and the pickup were not justified at
their onset, the evidence discovered would have been found during the subsequent
inventory searches of both M r. Potter and the pickup. Thus, the evidence
discovered during the searches w ould be admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444-48. Thus, the district court
correctly denied M r. Potter’s motion to suppress.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“W e review the record de novo to determine w hether a reasonable jury
could have found sufficient evidence to convict [M r. Potter] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 778 (10th Cir. 2006). In so
doing, we view all the evidence, including the reasonable inferences drawn from
it, in a light most favorable to the government. Id. W e do not weigh conflicting
evidence or judge credibility. Id. W e only ask, “w hether the evidence, if
believed, would establish each element of the crime.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
To sustain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government had to prove that M r. Potter: (1)
possessed the controlled substance, (2) knew he possessed the controlled
substance, and (3) intended to distribute or dispense the controlled substance.
United States v. M ontgomery, 468 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 2006). M r. Potter
never contested that the amount of substance recovered was approximately 440
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grams of methamphetamine. Therefore, the government only had to prove that
M r. Potter knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine and that
he intended to distribute it.
M r. Potter essentially attacks the credibility of Trooper Adams and argues
that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the wrapped packages of
methamphetamine found on the shoulder of I-80. Yet, Trooper Adams testified
that he saw a white object fly from M r. Potter’s pickup and that he carefully noted
its location. Troopers Adams and Felicetti testified that when they walked back
to the location where Trooper Adams observed the white object fall, they
discovered a white plastic grocery bag, partially ripped open, containing a
package of white substance, and two packages wrapped in black electrical tape
laying nearby. M r. Potter stipulated that the material found in the grocery bag
and wrapped in tape was methamphetamine. Agent M atheson testified that the
quantity of methamphetamine found was consistent with a quantity used for
distribution.
There was sufficient evidence to infer that M r. Potter possessed
approximately 440 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The
jury apparently found Troopers Adams and Felicetti and Agent M atheson to be
credible, and we will not disturb that determination on appeal. Valdez v. Bravo,
373 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2004).
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III. The Constitutionality of M r. Potter’s Sentence
In B lakely v. W ashington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its prior ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000),
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In this case, the quantity of
methamphetamine used to establish M r. Potter’s base offense level was
specifically determined by a special jury interrogatory. There were no
enhancements to M r. Potter’s base offense level. His sentence was increased due
to prior criminal convictions, but prior convictions are exempted from the general
rule set forth in Apprendi. See id.M r. Potter also argues that his sentence was unreasonable under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). W e have held that a sentence within the
recommended guideline range is presumptively reasonable. See United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). Not only was M r. Potter’s sentence
within the recommended guideline range, it was at the bottom of that range. It
also appears from the record that the district court fully considered the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which we use as a benchmark for determining
whether a sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Gillespie, 452 F.3d 1183,
1192 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court took full notice of the nature and
circumstances of the offense, as well as M r. Potter’s history and characteristics.
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It considered both mitigating and aggravating factors, including M r. Potter’s
criminal history involving methamphetamine. Accordingly, we conclude that M r.
Potter’s sentence was reasonable.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his pro se filing, M r. Potter argues, on numerous grounds, that his
appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance. W e have frequently held that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in the first instance on
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 438
F.3d 1231, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006); Calderon, 428 F.3d at 931. The Supreme Court
has held likew ise. See M assaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). M r.
Potter’s claims in this regard are premature.
D ISM ISSED . C ounsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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