Vaupel v. United States , 491 F. App'x 869 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 5, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JON STEPHAN VAUPEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-1348
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-01443-PAB-KLM)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and MURPHY,
Circuit Judge.
Jon Stephan Vaupel appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
file a second amended complaint and its dismissal of his action. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND1
Vaupel is an Australian citizen. He entered the United States a number of
times between 1995 and 2003 under the Visa Waiver Program.2 In 2002, he married
an American citizen, Stacey Schwab, in Australia. Schwab became pregnant and
returned to the United States in late 2002 so that the couple’s son could be born there.
When she encountered serious complications with her pregnancy, Vaupel flew to the
United States. On January 31, 2003, he applied for admission under the Visa Waiver
Program but was denied due to an overstay in 1997. He was, however, granted
humanitarian parole through March 7, 2003. Vaupel and his wife then filed
documents to change his immigration status to lawful permanent resident (LPR). On
March 12, 2003, the couple’s son was born. In October 2003, the family moved from
Texas to Denver, Colorado. In February 2004, Vaupel was granted temporary LPR
status.3 In April, Schwab was charged with child abuse and harassment against
1
We draw the facts largely from Vaupel’s first amended complaint in this
action, Doc. 10, see Supp. App. at 1-83, as supplemented or corrected by public
documents elsewhere in the record. Although not captioned as such, we refer to this
complaint as Vaupel’s first amended complaint because he filed it in response to the
district court’s order stating that he had not filed his initial complaint on the proper
form.
2
Under the Visa Waiver Program, nonimmigrant visitors from certain
participating countries may enter and remain in the United States for a period not
exceeding 90 days without having to obtain and present a visa. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1187(a).
3
In his second proposed amended complaint, Vaupel alleged that he was
granted a conditional permanent residency valid until February 5, 2006.
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Vaupel and their son. She pleaded guilty to harassment. In June, Vaupel was
arrested on multiple charges based on false allegations by Schwab. He was released
on bond.
On the same day Vaupel was released on bond, Schwab withdrew her
immigration sponsorship for his application to adjust status to LPR. Mario Ortiz,
who was then the District Director of the Denver District Office of the United States
Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS), signed a letter explaining that Vaupel’s
application was denied because Schwab had withdrawn her visa petition. In early
July, Vaupel filed for divorce after discovering that Schwab was having an affair
with Ortiz.4
In October 2004, Vaupel filed a petition to adjust his status to LPR under the
Violence Against Women Act as an abused spouse of a United States citizen. The
next day, Vaupel was arrested and detained by officers of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). ICE issued a Determination of Inadmissibility and a Notice and
Order of Expedited Removal. In November, Vaupel was transferred to the custody of
the Jefferson County, Colorado, Sheriff’s Office to answer the criminal charges
Schwab had filed. ICE officer John Samson placed a no-hold bond on Vaupel and
argued to the state-court judge that unless the court revoked Vaupel’s bond, ICE
would promptly remove Vaupel. The judge then revoked Vaupel’s bond. Ultimately,
4
According to Vaupel’s proposed second amended complaint, Ortiz and Schwab
married in July 2007.
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Vaupel pleaded guilty to one count of disorderly conduct, and the remaining charges
were dismissed.5
Next, Vaupel, still in ICE custody, sought federal habeas relief in February
2005. The district court denied his petition, and Vaupel was removed on February
25, 2007. We dismissed his appeal from the denial of his habeas petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Vaupel v. Ortiz, 244 F. App’x 892, 893 (10th Cir. 2007). Meanwhile, in
2006, Vaupel was found not guilty on charges of attempted murder one and
solicitation of murder one, which allegedly were based on fabrications by Ortiz.
Vaupel filed his complaint in this civil action pro se in July 2007 and an
amended complaint in September 2007. He asserted five claims against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) arising from the denial of his
application to adjust to LPR status, his detention, and his removal: negligence, false
arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. He named
only the United States as a defendant, presumably under the principle that “[t]he
United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action,” Oxendine v. Kaplan,
241 F.3d 1272, 1275 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001). But he repeatedly referred in the body of
his first amended complaint to other government actors, including Ortiz and Samson,
as defendants or respondents.
5
Vaupel alleged that all charges were dismissed due to lack of evidence, but
this allegation is contradicted by court records attached to a motion to dismiss filed
by the United States. In any event, what actually happened is immaterial to our
disposition of this appeal.
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The United States filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied on
June 12, 2008, concluding that the better course was “to request the Clerk of Court to
canvass interested counsel as to their willingness to represent Mr. Vaupel, and to
allow Mr. Vaupel to amend his complaint.” App. at 249. The court ordered that if no
attorney entered an appearance on Vaupel’s behalf by September 30, 2008, Vaupel
would have until October 30, 2008, to file an amended complaint or face dismissal
for failure to prosecute. In December 2008, after Vaupel had failed to find an
attorney or file an amended complaint by the October 30 deadline, the magistrate
judge issued a recommendation that the case be administratively closed for six
months, subject to reopening upon a showing of good cause.
The district court rejected the recommendation as moot after counsel entered
an appearance on behalf of Vaupel in September 2010. Counsel then filed a
proposed second amended complaint in December 2010. The magistrate judge struck
that complaint because it was not accompanied by a motion for leave to file an
amended complaint, as previously ordered. Vaupel then filed both a motion for leave
and a shorter version of his proposed second amended complaint in which he added
Ortiz and Samson as defendants and asserted eight FTCA claims. He invoked a
number of bases for jurisdiction, including the FTCA and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).6 The
6
“Under Bivens, an individual has a cause of action against a federal official in
his individual capacity for damages arising out of the official’s violation of the
(continued)
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government filed an opposition, Vaupel replied, and the government was permitted to
file a surreply.
The motion to file the amended complaint was referred to the magistrate judge,
who recommended that the motion be denied and the action be dismissed. The
district court adopted the recommendation over Vaupel’s objections. The court first
concluded that Vaupel had not properly pleaded a Bivens claim. The court observed
that although Vaupel had alluded to the denial of due process two times in his factual
allegations, he had not included a claim for denial of due process and failed to
identify what process he was allegedly denied. The court declined to look for
missing factual allegations supporting a Bivens claim in either the stricken proposed
amended complaint or Vaupel’s reply to the government’s opposition.
Turning to the FTCA claims, the district court concluded that two of the
intentional tort claims—fraud and interference with contract—were subject to
dismissal because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity for such
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). As to the other two intentional tort claims—abuse
of process and false imprisonment—the court observed that the FTCA waives the
United States’ sovereign immunity to the extent such claims are based on the “acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
United States Constitution under color of federal law or authority.” Dry v. United
States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted). “Similarly, the
FTCA allows injured persons to sue for torts committed by federal employees while
acting within the scope of their office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).” Id.-6-
Government,” defined as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law
to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law.” Id. Thus, the viability of those claims depended on whether Ortiz or Samson,
the only federal officers identified in the proposed second amended complaint, were
investigative or law enforcement officers.
The court concluded that Oritz was not an investigative or law enforcement
officer based on an affidavit from Ortiz attesting as much. The court rejected
Vaupel’s argument that it was precluded from considering such evidence unless it
was in the context of summary judgment, noting that under Holt v. United States,
46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995), it had discretion to consider a wide variety of
affidavits and other documents pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction without the
necessity of a summary judgment proceeding.7 The court also considered a job
description Vaupel submitted for a Supervisory Adjudications Officer at the USCIS
but concluded that the description did not show that such officers are investigative or
law enforcement officers under § 2680(h).
Regarding Samson, the court noted that he had admitted in an affidavit that he
was an investigative or law enforcement officer but concluded that it would be futile
to allow the abuse of process claim against him, as amended, because it was subject
7
This standard is typically cited in the context of converting a motion to dismiss
to a motion for summary judgment. Here however, there was no pending motion to
dismiss with regard to the proposed second amended complaint, only the
government’s opposition to amendment.
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to dismissal. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a] proposed amended
complaint is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal”).
One element of an abuse of process claim under Colorado law is “an ulterior purpose
for the use of a judicial proceeding,” Walker v. Van Laningham, 148 P.3d 391, 394
(Colo. App. 2006),8 and Vaupel had not alleged any facts showing that Samson had
an ulterior motive in placing a detainer on Vaupel and convincing the Jefferson
County judge to revoke his bond. The court reached the same conclusion with
respect to the amended false imprisonment claim against Samson, concluding that it
lacked factual support for the essential element of unlawfulness. See McDonald v.
Lakewood Country Club, 461 P.2d 437, 440 (Colo. 1969) (listing elements of false
imprisonment claim, including unlawfulness of restraint).
The district court then addressed the other four FTCA claims—negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), conspiracy, and breach of
fiduciary duty. As to the negligence claim, the court concluded that Vaupel failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, which is a jurisdictional bar to judicial review under
the FTCA, see Bradley v. United States ex rel. Veterans Admin., 951 F.2d 268, 270
(10th Cir. 1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (“A tort claim against the United
8
FTCA claims are governed by “the law of the state in which the allegedly
tortious act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).” Staggs v. United States
ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 425 F.3d 881, 884 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005).
Thus, Colorado law governs Vaupel’s FTCA claims.
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States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues . . . .”). Next, the court
agreed with the magistrate judge that Vaupel failed to allege extreme and outrageous
conduct necessary to support his IIED claim. See Han Ye Lee v. Colo. Times, Inc.,
222 P.3d 957, 963 (Colo. App. 2009) (requiring extreme and outrageous conduct for
IIED claim). The court observed that the district court in Vaupel’s habeas
proceeding had found that his detention was lawful, and although the habeas court
was troubled by the affair between Ortiz and Schwab, it found that Ortiz had not
improperly denied Vaupel’s application to adjust status because the denial occurred
after Schwab had withdrawn her petition in support. See Vaupel v. Ortiz,
No. 05-cv-00327-WDM-MJW, 2005 WL 1799360, at *1-*2 (D. Colo. July 28, 2005)
(unpub.). Finally, the district court concluded that Vaupel failed to allege any facts
showing a conspiracy between two or more persons, see Magin v. DVCO Fuel Sys.,
Inc., 981 P.2d 673, 674 (Colo. App. 1999) (stating that civil conspiracy requires
“agreement by two or more persons”), or that the United States or any of the
immigration officers involved in the case owed him any fiduciary duty.
Because the proposed amended complaint was futile, the district court denied
Vaupel’s motion for leave to file it. The court then concluded that the case should be
dismissed because a prior order instructed Vaupel to file an amended complaint after
he was appointed counsel, and Vaupel had admitted that his first amended complaint
was deficient. This appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
We review the “denial of a motion to amend a pleading for abuse of
discretion.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 565 F.3d
1232, 1249 (10th Cir. 2009). But “when denial is based on a determination that
amendment would be futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo
review of the legal basis for the finding of futility.” Id.We first agree with the district court’s conclusion that Vaupel failed to
adequately plead a Bivens claim in the proposed second amended complaint. Vaupel
did not assert any constitutional claims, even in the formulaic manner in which he
pleaded his eight FTCA claims, and his isolated jurisdictional reference to Bivens is
insufficient to adequately present a constitutional claim. Further, as the district court
noted, he made only two passing references to constitutional rights in the entirety of
the proposed second amended complaint, both of which occurred before any mention
of Ortiz’s or Samson’s alleged conduct. In the first, Vaupel alleged that “[r]escission
of [his legal permanent] residency required due process of law.” App. at 282. In the
second, he alleged that “it was unlawful to divest him of his residency without due
process of law.” Id. Vaupel did not allege that Ortiz, Samson, or any other federal
officer violated his due process rights, and he did not identify any process to which
he claimed entitlement. Vaupel did allege that Ortiz lacked authority to rescind his
lawful permanent residency and that ICE lacked authority to subject him to
mandatory detention and expedited removal, but he never tied that alleged lack of
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authority to any constitutional deprivation. In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s determination that Vaupel failed to include a Bivens claim.
As to the district court’s refusal to permit amendment of the FTCA claims, the
government argues that Vaupel has waived appellate review of many of them by
failing to make adequately specific objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation (and as to the negligence claim, to make any objection at all). The
government also argues that Vaupel’s appellate arguments are insufficient to invoke
appellate review on a number of the FTCA claims. While we might be inclined to
agree with the government’s position, we need not conclusively decide these matters,
for we agree with the district court’s rulings regarding sovereign immunity and
futility, and therefore affirm those rulings for substantially the same reasons set forth
in the district court’s order dismissing the case.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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