Longstreth v. Franklin ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 29, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
C HRISTO PH ER E. LO N G STR ETH,
Petitioner - A ppellant, No. 07-6026
v. (W . D. Oklahoma)
ERIC FRANKLIN, W arden, (D.C. No. 05-CV-1364-C)
Respondent - Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Longstreth, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial by the United States
District Court for the W estern District of Oklahoma of his application for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (requiring COA); Davis v.
Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (COA required to appeal denial of
state prisoner’s § 2241 application). W e deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
On August 23, 2004, prison officer Steven Tucker filed a misconduct report
that he had found “two metal sharpened instruments, one drill bit and one set of
metal clippers” while conducting an inventory of M r. Longstreth’s property
before M r. Longstreth was to be transferred to another facility. R. Doc. 23 Ex. 5
at 1 (R esp’ts’ A nswer to Pet. for W rit of Habeas Corpus with Br. in Supp.,
Apr. 21, 2005). According to the report, M r. Longstreth explained to the
investigating officer: “I was a barber, these were part of the barber tools. They
were in a barber box satchel. Officer Tucker didn’t find those items, Of[ficer]
Clark did. They were not found in my property. These same officers were the
same ones involved in an assault and battery on me.” Id. at 2. The investigation
report notified M r. Longstreth that a hearing on the matter would be held on
September 9, 2004.
At the hearing M r. Longstreth offered several documents pertaining to
grievances he had filed against Officer Tucker for allegedly assaulting him. H e
argued that the hearing officer should consider those documents to impeach
Tucker’s report. The hearing officer stated that he had considered the documents
but had determined that they were not relevant to the proceeding and did not
impact Tucker’s credibility because they were merely M r. Longstreth’s account of
the alleged assault. The hearing officer, relying on the incident report and
M r. Longstreth’s admission that he had access to those types of tools, found him
guilty and imposed a punishment of 30 days’ disciplinary segregation, loss of 365
days of earned-time credits, and demotion to classification level 1 for 90 days.
M r. Longstreth sought a due-process review from the director of the
Department of Corrections, whose designee found that there was sufficient
evidence to support the finding, that the punishment was w ithin the allowable
sanctions for his offense, and that disciplinary procedures had been followed.
-2-
M r. Longstreth’s § 2241 application alleged that he had been denied due
process in a prison disciplinary hearing because (1) there was no credible
evidence to support the finding of guilt; (2) there was no evidence to support the
credibility of the reporting officer; (3) the hearing officer failed to consider
evidence of the reporting officer’s retaliatory motive; (4) prison authorities failed
to investigate evidence of retaliation and a set-up; (5) the hearing officer was
biased; and (6) the punishment imposed exceeded that allowed. The district
court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied his
application and denied a CO A. It held that (1) the reporting officer’s incident
report was sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt; (2) the hearing
officer could believe the reporting officer without corroborating evidence; (3) the
hearing officer read and considered the documents that M r. Longstreth offered
into evidence; (4) the hearing officer considered evidence relating to the alleged
set-up and no further investigation was required; and (5) there was insufficient
evidence that the hearing officer was biased. As for M r. Longstreth’s claim that
his penalty was excessive, the court held (6) that the punishment did not violate
the ex post facto clause because the penalty for his disciplinary infraction had
been established before he committed the infraction, and (7) that even if the
punishment involved an atypical and significant hardship, such hardship could be
imposed when, as in this case, he had received due process. The district court
also held that M r. Longstreth had not stated a claim for retaliation in his opening
-3-
brief, and that assuming such a claim could be found in his reply brief, it was
raised too late.
Before this court M r. Longstreth appears to be asserting four claims: (1)
that the evidence relied on by the hearing officer was insufficient to establish
guilt, in part because he had challenged the credibility of the reporting officer yet
the authorities had failed to investigate his claim that the reporting officer had a
retaliatory motive; (2) that the district court erred in finding that there was “some
evidence” to support the finding of guilt without conducting an evidentiary
hearing to assess credibility; (3) that the district court erred in ruling that he had
failed to state a claim of retaliation because he had argued in his brief that the
reporting officer falsified evidence against him after he had filed grievances
against the reporting officer; and (4) that the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary hearing committee constituted an atypical and significant hardship.
I. D ISC USSIO N
A COA will issue only if M r. Longstreth makes “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a
demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must show that
-4-
the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either “debatable or
wrong.” Id.A prisoner’s due-process rights are limited. “Prison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. M cDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The minimum requirements of procedural due process in a
prison disciplinary proceeding are that the inmate receive “(1) advance written
notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder
of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.”
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–66. There must also be “some evidence in the record”
supporting the findings of the prison disciplinary board. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.
This is all the process that is required. See Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 119
(2d Cir. 2004) (“the only process due an inmate is that minimal process
guaranteed by the Constitution, as outlined in Wolff.”); Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d
660, 662 (7th Cir. 2003) (only process due prisoner in disciplinary hearing is
advance written notice of the charges, opportunity to present evidence to
impartial decision-maker, and written explanation for discipline supported by
“some evidence.”); Brown v. Rios, 196 Fed. App’x 681, 683 (10th Cir. 2006)
-5-
(same); Walker v. Edgell, 5 F.3d 548, *2 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table
decision) (same). “Ascertaining whether [the some-evidence] standard is satisfied
does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. A
disciplinary board’s decision can be upheld by a reviewing court “even if the
evidence supporting the decision is meager.” M itchell v. M aynard, 80 F.3d 1433,
1445 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
M r. Longstreth’s first claim fails because the incident report was “some
evidence.” See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. Although M r. Longstreth concedes that
an incident report is generally adequate, he argues that when an inmate contests
the credibility of the report, “prison disciplinary committee personnel must
corroborate the disciplinary report with credible material facts.” Application for
COA at 10. For support he relies on M cCall-Bey v. Franzen, 585 F.Supp. 1295(N.D. Ill. 1984), in which the summary report of the defendant’s hearing did not
set forth the facts relied on for a finding of guilt. See id. at 1298. This failure,
according to that district court, violated the prisoner’s right to due process. See
id. M cCall-Bey provides no support for M r. Longstreth’s contention that
corroborating evidence is necessary when the prisoner raises a credibility
challenge, nor are we aware of any other support for that proposition. M cCall-
-6-
Bey is also distinguishable because the facts relied on for finding M r. Longstreth
guilty were set forth in the hearing officer’s report.
Likewise, we reject M r. Longstreth’s second contention because the district
court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the
reporting officer’s credibility. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (“Ascertaining whether
[the some-evidence] standard is satisfied does not require . . . independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.”). His third contention— that the
district court failed to consider his claim of retaliation— amounts to a restatement
of his first two contentions. He appears to be suggesting that his evidence of
retaliation requires abandonment of the some-evidence standard and an
evidentiary hearing in district court. But we know of no authority suggesting
such a requirement, which would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Hill.
M r. Longstreth’s fourth claim is that the punishment imposed constituted
an atypical and significant hardship. The district court properly rejected the
claim because M r. Longstreth received due process, so such hardship can be
imposed. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005) (placement in
super-max prison created atypical and significant hardship but was permissible
because preplacement procedure satisfied due process).
-7-
II. C ON CLU SIO N
The district court’s resolution of the issues raised in M r. Longstreth’s
application was neither debatable nor wrong. Because M r. Longstreth has failed
to m ake a substantial show ing of the denial of a constitutional right, we DENY a
COA and DISM ISS the appeal. W e GRANT M r. Longstreth’s motion to proceed
in form a pauperis but DENY his “Request for Judicial Notice” regarding
documents he allegedly submitted to the disciplinary hearing officer.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
-8-