United States v. Williams , 238 F. App'x 384 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                        F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    July 13, 2007
    TENTH CIRCUIT                    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                      No. 06-1297
    RA YSEA N ALLEN W ILLIAM S,                   (D.C. No. 05-CR-506-W DM -01)
    (D . Colo.)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before M U R PHY , B AL DOC K, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
    After a Colorado Springs police officer discovered a gun w hile searching
    D efendant Raysean W illiams incident to an arrest, a grand jury indicted him on one
    count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). Defendant moved to suppress the firearm. According to Defendant, the
    officer did not have probable cause to arrest him in the first instance. After the
    district court orally denied his motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional
    guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order. See Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Defendant now appeals. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    U.S.C. § 1291. W e review the district court’s determination of probable cause de
    novo and its findings of historical fact upon which such determ ination is based for
    clear error.   See United States v. Gordon, 
    173 F.3d 761
    , 765 (10th Cir. 1999).
    Applying these standards, we affirm.
    I.
    The relevant historical facts are taken from the transcript of the suppression
    hearing. On October 15, 2005, C olorado Springs Police Officer Scott Carnes was
    dispatched to the Ramada Inn. Kevin Beiker, the motel’s front desk clerk, reported
    housekeeping had found a gun and drugs in room 128. The housekeeper, M aria
    Herrera, informed her housekeeping supervisor, Felicia Peake, who in turn informed
    Beiker. W hile en route to the motel, Officer Carnes learned from dispatch that one
    W alter Turner was the individual who checked into room 128 the prior evening.
    Dispatch relayed that an individual, described as 5 feet 9 inches tall, in his forties,
    and wearing a white T-shirt and dark pants, appeared at the motel’s front desk and
    demanded return of the contraband.
    W hen Officer Carnes arrived at the motel Beiker gave him a copy of the
    Colorado identification card Turner presented upon check-in.          Officer Carnes,
    accompanied by Officer Joe Brown, began looking for Turner.            Officer Carnes
    encountered a man wearing a black T-shirt and blue pants. The officer asked him if
    he was staying at the motel and, if so, in which room. The man answered he was
    staying in room 228. Officer Carnes asked for identification. The man presented a
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    Colorado identification card identifying him as W alter Turner. The record reflects
    Turner is 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighs 200 pounds. He is in his early forties and
    lacks a muscular build.
    W hen questioned about the motel’s records indicating he rented room 128,
    Turner admitted he rented room 128 but stated he spent the night in room 228 with
    a woman. Turner also indicated that no one, other than himself, had access to room
    128. Turner, along with Officers Carnes and Brown, returned to the front desk.
    Officer Carnes asked Beiker if Turner was the man inquiring about the gun and the
    drugs earlier that morning. Beiker said he was not sure. B eiker stated he thought
    the man asking about the contraband was shorter and was wearing a light-colored
    shirt. Beiker’s answers gave Officer Carnes the impression that Turner was not the
    man w ho asked about the gun and drugs.
    After their conversation with Beiker, Officers Carnes and Brown searched
    room 128 per Turner’s consent. Thereafter, they again questioned Beiker. Beiker
    stated he believed the man w ho asked about the gun and drugs was bald and had a
    muscular build. Beiker thought the man had a scar or scars on his forehead. Again,
    Beiker’s description gave Officer Carnes the impression Turner w as not the man
    asking for the gun and drugs. Even though Beiker could not identify Turner as the
    individual the officers were seeking, they arrested him because he indicated no one
    other than himself had access to the room where the gun and drugs were found.
    M eanwhile, Detective M ark Robertson, also of the Colorado Springs Police
    3
    Department, became involved in the investigation. Officer Carnes briefed Detective
    Robertson on the recent events. Detective Robertson conducted two interview s w ith
    Turner w ho vehem ently denied ownership of the gun and drugs found in room 128.
    Then, on October 19, 2005, Detective Robertson received a phone call from an
    anonymous woman, who he later learned was Turner’s sister, Beatrice. Beatrice
    stated the police had the w rong person in custody. She told Detective Robertson she
    overheard her boyfriend, Troy Sago, bragging on the phone that the gun and drugs
    found in the motel room belonged to him.
    After the anonymous phone call, Detective Robertson prepared two photo
    lineups. The first lineup included a photo of Troy Sago and the second included a
    photo of Turner. Detective Robertson, along with Special Agent Shaw, took the
    lineups to the Ramada Inn. They first questioned M aria Herrera, the housekeeper
    who found the items in room 128.      The officers learned from Herrera, through
    Officer Shaw who speaks Spanish, that she w as confronted by the man seeking the
    return of the gun and drugs before he w ent to the front desk and confronted B eiker.
    The officers asked Herrera to identify the man from the photo lineups. In the lineup
    featuring Sago, she said Sago was definitely not the man who had confronted her.
    In the line-up featuring Turner, she stated the man looking for the gun and drugs was
    younger than Turner.
    Detective Robertson also interviewed Beiker. B eiker described the person
    who asked him about the gun and drugs as betw een 5 feet 7 inches and 5 feet 9
    4
    inches tall, in his 20’s or 30’s, and either bald or very closely shaven with a scar on
    his forehead and a muscular build. Beiker stated he was certain Turner was not the
    man asking about the gun and drugs. Detective Robertson also showed Beiker the
    lineups. Beiker did not identify either Sago or Turner as the man asking for the
    return of the items.
    On October 22, 2005, D etective Robertson received a phone call from Felicia
    Peake, the m otel’s housekeeping supervisor. Peake informed the detective that the
    individual who demanded the return of the gun and drugs had just checked into the
    motel. Detective Robertson went to the motel and first spoke with Beiker. Beiker
    told Detective Robertson that the man who had just checked in was definitely the
    man who demanded the gun and drugs on October 15th. In particular, Beiker stated
    he remembered the scar on the Defendant’s forehead and his defined m uscles.
    Beiker provided Detective Robertson with a copy of the man’s identification and told
    the detective the man w as in room 133. Detective Robertson noticed the address
    listed on Defendant’s identification card was only tw o or three blocks from the
    motel. The identification card described Defendant as 5 feet 9 inches tall, 200
    pounds, and 38 years old. Detective Robertson unsuccessfully attempted to contact
    Defendant. The detective asked Beiker to notify him when Defendant returned.
    The next morning, Detective Robertson arrived at the motel to check if
    Defendant had returned to his room. W hile Detective Robertson was looking around
    the parking lot, Felicia Peake contacted him and pointed out the vehicle Defendant
    5
    drove to the motel. Detective Robertson retrieved the license plate number, drove
    to a nearby substation, ran the license plate, and discovered the car was a rental.
    W hile at the substation, Detective Robertson learned Defendant’s criminal history
    reflected a drug distribution charge. Detective Robertson tried to verify the address
    listed on Defendant’s identification by contacting the utility companies.        The
    detective w as unable to verify the address.
    After D etective Robertson conducted record checks, he called O fficer Carnes.
    The detective informed the officer that the man inquiring about the gun and drugs the
    previous week had returned to the Ramada Inn. Detective Robertson asked Officer
    Carnes to go to the motel and make contact with Defendant. Officer Carnes and
    Officer Adam Sandoval went to the motel and knocked on the door of room 133.
    Several seconds after they knocked, Defendant opened the curtains and asked the
    officers w hat they wanted. Officer Carnes responded that the officers needed to talk
    to him. Defendant told the officers to w ait a second and closed the blinds. Officer
    Carnes heard several thuds coming from inside the room before Defendant
    reappeared at the door. He again asked the officers what they w anted. Officer
    Carnes repeated they needed to speak with him. Defendant again told them to wait
    a minute. A fter another 30 seconds, Defendant opened the door just enough to exit
    the room.
    Officer Carnes told Defendant he had information D efendant inquired about
    a gun and some drugs found at the motel the week before.         Instead of denying
    6
    knowledge of the situation, Defendant asked Officer Carnes where he received such
    information.    Officer Carnes explained the police frequently get tips regarding
    criminal activity. Officer Carnes then asked if he could go inside the room to talk
    to Defendant and look for w eapons. Defendant declined. The officers returned to
    their cars where they contacted Detective Robertson and asked him to meet them
    across the street from the motel.
    Officer C arnes reported his conversation with Defendant to Detective
    Robertson.     The detective communicated that Beiker had positively identified
    Defendant as the individual w ho asked about the gun and drugs on October 15th.
    D etective R obertson told the officers to return to the motel and arrest Defendant. A s
    instructed, Officers C arnes and Sandavol returned to the motel.         They spotted
    Defendant approaching a vehicle outside room 133. Officer Carnes approached
    Defendant and told him he needed to speak with him again. Officer Carnes asked
    Defendant if he had any weapons on him. D efendant did not answer the question.
    Officer Carnes then patted Defendant down and place him under arrest. In the
    process the officer found the gun that became the subject of the indictment. After
    Defendant’s arrest, Detective Robertson questioned him about his whereabouts on
    October 15, 2005. Defendant reported he was on a plane to Los Angeles on the
    morning of October 15th.
    II.
    For purposes of the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated Defendant was
    7
    indeed on a plane to Los Angeles on October 15th and Beiker had mistaken
    Defendant for the person demanding the return of the gun and drugs. Thus, the only
    issue before us is whether the district court properly held that Officer Carnes had
    probable cause to arrest D efendant at the time he did so. W e easily conclude the
    court properly so held. Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and circumstances
    within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to justify a prudent officer in believing
    the defendant committed or is committing an offense.           See U nited States v.
    Stephenson, 
    452 F.3d 1173
    , 1178 (10th Cir. 2006). Probable cause only requires a
    fair probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing of such activity. See
    Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 243 n. 13 (1983). The law requires no “greater proof
    – certainly not conclusive proof – of any particular factor establishing probable
    cause.” United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 
    380 F.3d 1235
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2004). W e
    determine probable cause from the totality of the circumstances taking into account
    both inculpatory as well as exculpatory evidence. See Stephenson, 
    452 F.3d at 1178
    .
    Several factors inform our conclusion that the district court properly held
    Officer Carnes had probable cause to arrest Defendant. At the time of D efendant’s
    arrest, Beiker had positively identified D efendant as the individual who asked about
    the gun and drugs on October 15th.         Detective Robertson relied on Beiker’s
    identification when he decided to order Defendant’s arrest. Officer Carnes knew of
    that identification. See United States v. M atthew s, 
    615 F.2d 1279
    , 1284 n.5 (10th
    Cir. 1980) (“It is well settled that an officer may rely upon his fellow officers to
    8
    supply the information which forms the basis of the arresting officer’s reasonable
    grounds for believing that the law is being or has been violated.”). W e are convinced
    Detective Robertson’s reliance on Beiker’s identification was reasonable. W e have
    stated that “w hen examining informant evidence used to support a claim of probable
    cause for a . . . warrantless arrest, the skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found
    in cases involving informants, sometimes anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is
    appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary citizen
    witness.” Easton v. City of Boulder, 
    776 F.2d 1441
    , 1449 (10th Cir. 1985); see
    generally 2 W ayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(a), at 209-11 (3d ed. 1996)
    (explaining that “when an average citizen tenders information to the police, the
    police should be permitted to assume that they are dealing with a credible person in
    the absence of special circumstances suggesting that such might not be the case”).
    B ecause Beiker w as an “ordinary citizen witness,” we may lower the scrutiny w e
    apply to Detective Robertson’s reliance on Beiker’s identification. Yet even absent
    the lower level of scrutiny, we would conclude Detective Robertson reasonably
    relied on Beiker’s identification.
    First, we note B eiker w as definitive about his identification of Defendant.
    According to Detective Robertson’s testimony at the suppression hearing, Beiker
    used the words, “this is definitely him.” The detective stated Beiker seemed “100
    percent sure that this w as the gentleman.” N ot only w as Beiker positive about his
    identification, Beiker was specific about the consistencies between the man he
    9
    encountered on October 15th and Defendant.           In particular, Beiker identified
    Defendant’s defined muscles and the scar on Defendant’s forehead as consistent with
    the individual he encountered on October 15th. Also, Beiker’s description of the
    m an seeking the gun and drugs was largely consistent throughout the investigation.
    Beiker’s description was not vague, but instead was detailed and included
    descriptions of the man’s physique, his hair cut, and the scars on his face. That tw o
    other individuals, Sago and Turner, were possible suspects does not make Detective
    Robertson’s reliance on Beiker’s identification of Defendant unreasonable. No one
    identified Sago or Turner as the individual who asked for the contraband on October
    15th, and neither of them matched the description which Beiker provided.
    Defendant, however, did match that description.
    In addition to Beiker’s identification, several other factors support the district
    court’s probable cause determination.          First, Defendant’s identification card
    indicated he lived only a few blocks from the Ramada Inn. Detective Robertson
    testified that in his experience, drug dealers often do not conduct their business
    directly out of their hom es. Instead, they “get a motel room for a night or whatever
    and conduct their business, so . . .    not to let police know where they reside.”
    Second, the fact Defendant was driving a rental car added suspicion considering he
    only lived a couple of blocks from the motel. Third, Detective Robertson knew
    Defendant had a prior drug distribution conviction.
    Defendant’s strange behavior during Officer Carnes visit to his room further
    10
    added to police suspicion. Defendant gave the appearance he was hiding something
    by asking the police twice what they wanted, waiting some time to come to the door,
    causing loud bangs or thuds from inside the room, and opening the door only enough
    to squeeze himself out of the room. W hen Officer Carnes confronted Defendant with
    the information that someone had told them he w as asking about the gun and the
    drugs a week earlier, Defendant did not deny it was him, but instead asked where the
    officer had received the information.      All these factors, along with Beiker’s
    identification, lead us to conclude the facts within the knowledge of Officer Carnes
    gave him probable cause to arrest Defendant. Because Officer Carnes found the
    weapon on Defendant’s person during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the district
    court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.           See United States v.
    Anchondo, 
    156 F.3d 1043
    , 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1998).
    A FFIR ME D.
    Entered for the Court,
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
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