Chaara v. Intel Corporation ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 20, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M A BROU K CH A A RA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2191
(D.C. No. CIV-05-278 JB/RLP)
INTEL CORPORATION; DAVID (D . N.M .)
BAGLEE; BRIAN RASH AP; and
TA M M Y WA SH ,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, M U RPH Y and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant M abrouk Chaara appeals the district court’s judgment
dismissing his complaint, its order determining that diversity jurisdiction exists as
to this matter, and its order granting summary judgment to defendants as to his
claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
M exico Human Rights Act (“NM HRA”), breach of employment contract, breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation. Because we agree
with the district court’s analysis and its rulings on all of M r. Chaara’s points of
error, we AFFIR M .
I.
M r. Chaara is a United States citizen who was born in Tunisia and is of
Arab descent. He worked for defendant Intel in Rio Rancho, New M exico, as a
grade-seven senior process engineer. In September 2001, M r. Chaara filed a
charge of discrimination and retaliation against Intel and defendant-appellee
David Baglee with the Equal Employment O pportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
The charge alleged, among other things, that they falsely changed his
performance review and attempted to unjustifiably place him under a corrective
action plan. According to M r. Chaara, he decided not to file a federal court
complaint because Intel gave him an 8.5% raise, doubled his stock options, and
told him he “was a valuable employee.” Aplt. A pp. at 325.
In April of 2003, M r. Chaara filed a discrimination charge with the New
M exico Human Rights Commission (“NM HRC”) alleging that defendants had
discriminated against him because of his national origin, religion, and gender and
had retaliated against him for filing his first discrimination charge. The heart of
M r. Chaara’s discrimination claim was and is that defendants failed to award him
a “group leader” position that he applied for and then failed to promote him to a
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grade-eight senior process engineer after giving him what he considered to be an
impermissibly low ranking on his 2002 performance review. The NM HRC issued
an order of non-determination on M r. Chaara’s religious and gender claims but
found probable cause as to his national origin and retaliation claims. On
February 17, 2004, he moved to Colorado to take a job as a group leader in an
Intel plant there.
On April 16, 2004, M r. Chaara filed a complaint in New M exico state court
alleging gender discrimination in violation of the NM HRA, breach of employment
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation
(“Chaara I”). On June 2, 2004, defendants removed Chaara I to federal district
court claiming that M r. Chaara w as a Colorado citizen, Intel was a Delaw are
corporation with its principal place of business in California, and the remaining
defendants w ere New M exico citizens. The district court remanded the case in
August 2004, determining that diversity of citizenship was lacking because,
although he was living in Colorado, M r. Chaara was still domiciled in New
M exico at the time he filed his complaint.
Subsequently, the NM HRC also denied M r. Chaara’s national origin
discrimination and retaliation claims and, on February 10, 2005, he filed a second
complaint in New M exico state court alleging national origin discrimination and
retaliation in violation of the NM HRA, breach of employment contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation (“Chaara II”). On
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M arch 10, 2005, the New M exico state court consolidated Chaara I and Chaara II
at the request of the parties. Intel promptly removed the consolidated cases to
federal district court.
A. O rder Granting R emand in Part and D enying R emand in Part
Following an evidentiary hearing on M r. Chaara’s motion to have the
consolidated cases remanded to state court, the district court granted the motion
to remand w ith regard to Chaara I but denied the motion to remand with regard to
Chaara II. The district court ruled as to Chaara I that it was bound by its
previous decision to remand by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (providing that, with one
exception not applicable here, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherw ise”).
As to Chaara II, M r. Chaara argued that remand was required because
(1) he was still domiciled in New M exico at the time that he filed the complaint,
and (2) the district court’s ruling in Chaara I governed Chaara II as well because
when the cases were consolidated they took Chaara I’s case number. In turn,
defendants argued that both of the cases were removable because they had been
consolidated and because M r. Chaara was domiciled in Colorado at the time the
second complaint was filed.
The district court ruled that “[c]onsolidation is not like a marriage,
producing one indissoluble union from two distinct cases. Instead, consolidation
is an artificial link forged by a court for the administrative convenience of the
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parties; it fails to erase the fact that, underneath consolidation’s facade, lie two
individual cases.” Aplt. App. at 342(2). 1 It therefore held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) did not bar it “from deciding whether Chaara II . . . possesse[d]
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id.The district court went on to hold that there was complete diversity of
citizenship when Chaara II was filed because M r. Chaara was domiciled in
Colorado at the time. The court found that he moved to Colorado almost a year
before his suit was filed and had evinced an intent to remain in Colorado
indefinitely because, among other things, his Colorado job was a regular, full-
time position for an indefinite period and he had moved his entire family to
Colorado with the exception of a college-age daughter who was living in the
house he still owned in New M exico. The district court recognized that
M r. Chaara possessed a New M exico driver’s license and bank account, his car
was still registered in New M exico, he still owned a house in New M exico, and he
testified that he had “definite plans” to move back to New M exico. Aplt. App. at
378(1). But the district court held that it was not required to accept, without
more, M r. Chaara’s mere assertion that he intended to move back to New M exico
and that the evidence showed that M r. Chaara held nothing more than a “floating
intention” to do so, i.e., that he “allegedly desire[d] to return, but ha[d] no idea
1
M r. Chaara’s appendix has numbered two different sets of pages w ith
numbers 340 to 390. Page cites to these sections will therefore reference either
the first set–(1)–or the second set–(2).
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when or how he w[ould] do so.” Id. at 347(2). The district court therefore
determined that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over Chaara II.
B. Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants as to Chaara II
Defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment as to
M r. Chaara’s claims (1) that he was discriminated against because of his national
origin in violation of the NM HRA, (2) that the adverse employment actions at
issue were taken in retaliation for his 2001 EEOC complaint, (3) that those
actions breached his employment contract with Intel and also the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in that contract, and (4) that a critical passage
in his 2002 performance review amounted to defamation.
1. National O rigin D iscrimination.
The NM HRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin. See
N.M . Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(A). The district court recognized that “[u]nder the
M cDonnell Douglas analysis, which the Supreme Court of New M exico looks to
as helpful, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case of discrimination, which then shifts the burden to the employer to provide a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” A plt.
App. at 366(2).
As to M r. Chara’s claim that he was not awarded the group leader position
because of his national origin, the district court assumed that he had presented a
prima facie case of discrimination. Defendants presented evidence that another
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candidate w as awarded the group leader position because she had more
managerial experience and better interpersonal skills than M r. Chaara and because
a panel of six Intel employees all recommended that she be awarded the job. The
district court ruled that summary judgment was proper as to this part of the claim
because M r. Chaara had not presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact-
finder could find that defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reason for not
making him a group leader was pretextual.
The second part of M r. Chaara’s national origin discrimination claim was
an allegation that defendants discriminated against him by ranking another
employee in the “first cloud” and him in the “second cloud” and not promoting
him from grade seven to grade eight. Employees at Intel were evidently divided
into “clouds” of similarly-performing employees based on their evaluations.
M r. Chaara averred that this ranking affected the employees’ entitlement to
certain privileges such as bonuses and additional stock options. Defendants
presented evidence that the sole employee who was ranked in the “first cloud”
was placed there because he “had made a wide impact throughout Intel, was often
sought out for assistance, and mentored other employees.” Id. at 368(2) (internal
quotation marks omitted). They also presented evidence that a ranking and rating
group of six group leaders unanimously recommended that the other employee be
the sole employee in the top cloud. The rating group also made M r. Chaara the
top-ranked employee in the second cloud and therefore the second-ranked
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employee in his section. But it was the consensus of the rating group that
M r. Chaara was not performing at a grade-eight performance level and should not
be promoted. The district court also granted summary judgment as to this portion
of the discrimination claim, holding that M r. Chaara had not presented sufficient
evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could find that defendants’ proffered non-
discriminatory reason for failing to place him in the first cloud and promote him
was pretextual.
2. Retaliation
The district court also granted defendants summary judgment on M r.
Chaara’s claim that he was not awarded the group leader position and was placed
in the second cloud and not promoted to grade eight in retaliation for filing his
2001 EEOC complaint. The district court held that no reasonable fact-finder
could determine that M r. Chaara had established a prima facie case of retaliation
because the only evidence presented to support his claim was the fact that these
events occurred a year to a year and a half after he filed his EEOC complaint. 2
3. Breach of Employment Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of
G ood Faith and Fair Dealing, and D efamation
2
The district court also determined, as an alternative reason for finding that
M r. Chaara’s placement in the second cloud could not be retaliation, that no
reasonable fact-finder could have found from the record that placement in the
second cloud adversely affected his employment.
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Finally the district court granted defendants summary judgment as to his
remaining claims. As to M r. Chaara’s claim of breach of contract, the district
court held that M r. Chaara’s contract with Intel was an at-will employment
contract and that the terms of Intel’s “Open Door policy” were not sufficiently
explicit to create in M r. Chaara a reasonable expectation of an implied contract.
It also ruled that Intel’s anti-discrimination policies were too indefinite to form a
contract, and that M r. Chaara’s general claim that Intel’s actions violated “certain
policies, procedure[s] and practices for evaluating employees,” must also fail
because he failed to provide any information as to what policies, procedures and
practices he was referring. Id. at 375(2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court also found that New M exico does not recognize a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
at-will employment contracts and that the statement in M r. Chaara’s performance
review that he needed to work on his communication skills could not be
considered defamatory because it was clearly nothing more than an opinion, or, in
the district court’s words, “an entirely subjective judgment about [M r.] Chaara’s
comm unication skills,” id. at 377(2).
The district court therefore granted defendants summary judgment and
dismissed M r. Chaara’s complaint. M r. Chaara appeals, raising five points of
error.
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II.
M r. Chaara’s first argument on appeal is that the district court should have
treated Chaara I and Chaara II as one case following the state court consolidation
and remanded the entire matter to state court. M r. Chaara’s second argument is
that, even if it was proper to treat the cases separately, the district court should
have found that he was domiciled in New M exico for the purposes of Chaara II.
M r. Chaara’s third argument is that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment as to his national origin discrimination claim because he presented
sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have determined that
defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reasons for not awarding him the
group-leader position, and for failing to rank him in the top cloud and promote
him to grade eight, were pretextual. M r. Chaara’s fourth argument is that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment as to his retaliation claim
because he presented a prima facie case of retaliation and a reasonable fact-finder
could have determined that defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reasons for
its actions were pretextual. M r. Chaara’s fifth and final argument is that genuine
issues of material fact existed regarding his claims of breach of employment
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
defamation.
As to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, “[t]his Court reviews a
district court’s ruling on the propriety of removal de novo.” Lovell v. State Farm
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M ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 2006). But the district court’s
determination that M r. Chaara was domiciled in Colorado for purposes of Chaara
II is a mixed question of fact and law and that determination should not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678
(10th Cir. 1983). “Because the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, there is a
presumption against our jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of proof.” M erida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919
(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment following its exercise of jurisdiction, the standard of
review is well-established:
W e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answ ers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). W hen applying this standard, we view the
evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Although the movant must show the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, he or she need not negate the nonmovant’s claim.
Once the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant cannot rest upon
his or her pleadings, but must bring forward specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which he or
she carries the burden of proof. The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmovant's position is insufficient to
create a dispute of fact that is ‘genuine’; an issue of material fact is
genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such that a reasonable
jury could find in favor of the nonmovant.
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Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Finally, our review of the district court’s interpretation of state law is de novo.
Wade v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 666 (10th Cir. 2007).
III.
W e have carefully examined the parties’ briefs, M r. Chaara’s appendix, and
the defendants’ supplemental appendix under the standards articulated above.
Following this review, we conclude that the district court applied the proper
standards, conducted an appropriate analysis, and reached the correct result in
both its order determining that it could exercise jurisdiction as to Chaara II and
its order granting summary judgment to defendants as to the claims raised in
Chaara II. Accordingly, we A FFIRM both orders for substantially the reasons
given by the district court and summarized above and, therefore, AFFIRM the
district court’s final judgment dismissing M r. Chaara’s complaint with prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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