United States v. Lutz , 313 F. App'x 103 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 21, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 08-3017
v. (D.Ct. No. 5:02-CR-40031-SAC-1)
(D. Kan.)
RUSSELL EUGENE LUTZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Russell Eugene Lutz appeals his sentence following revocation
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
of his supervised release on grounds the district court unreasonably imposed a
twenty-four-month sentence of imprisonment, rather than sentencing him to
inpatient drug and mental health treatment as requested. On appeal, Mr. Lutz
contends his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm Mr. Lutz’s sentence.
I. Procedural Background
Mr. Lutz pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and
received a sentence of sixty months imprisonment followed by three years of
supervised release. On July 7, 2006, he began serving his term of supervised
release and, on September 1, 2006, consented to a modification of the terms of his
supervision which included mental health treatment. On December 18, 2007, the
government filed a petition seeking revocation of Mr. Lutz’s supervised release,
alleging he violated the conditions of his supervised release because he: (1)
failed to refrain from drug use; and (2) failed to participate in a drug abuse
program. 1
1
Previously, on January 9, 2007, the government filed a petition for
revocation of Mr. Lutz’s supervised release, alleging, in part, that he failed to
refrain from drug use and participate in a drug treatment program. While that
petition is provided in the record on appeal, it was later withdrawn based on Mr.
(continued...)
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On January 15, 2008, the district court held a hearing, at which time Mr.
Lutz stipulated he “missed counseling sessions and urinalysis testing
appointments.” R., Vol. 2 at 3-4. In turn, the government presented the
testimony of supervising probation officer Mary Handley, who confirmed Mr.
Lutz: (1) failed to adhere to a special condition of his supervised release
requiring him to participate in a drug treatment plan, which constituted a Grade C
violation of his supervised release; and (2) tested positive for methamphetamine
and marijuana on two occasions during his supervised release and admitted using
methamphetamine, evidencing his failure to refrain from the use of controlled
substances, which constituted a Grade B violation of his supervised release. On
cross-examination, she acknowledged the United States Probation Office had
1
(...continued)
Lutz’s apparent compliance with the terms of his supervised release following the
filing of that petition. In turn, the December 18, 2007 petition discussed in the
instant appeal was not provided in the record by either party. Instead, the record
on appeal contains the January 2, 2008 amended petition filed by the government,
but which it admitted it failed to serve on Mr. Lutz’s counsel.
During the revocation hearing, counsel for the government voluntarily
agreed to limit its evidence and arguments to the allegations contained in the
initial December 18, 2007 petition, which, again, we do not have before us.
Because the revocation hearing transcript is sufficient to enable us to discern the
two allegations presented in the December 18, 2007 petition, we are able to
dispose of this appeal without its inclusion in the record. Nevertheless, the
parties are reminded that Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 10 and 28 and
Tenth Circuit Rules 10.3, 28.1, and 28.2 require them to provide sufficient
references to the record in their appeal briefs and the applicable portions of the
record on which they rely or to which they refer. See also Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d
897, 912 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding“[w]here the record is insufficient to permit
review we must affirm”).
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available to it inpatient drug treatment programs as well as mental health
programs.
The district court found Mr. Lutz violated his supervised release, noting the
highest violation was a Grade B violation which, together with his criminal
history category of V, resulted in a United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range of eighteen to twenty-four months
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (Revocation Table). The district court
then revoked his supervised release, announced a tentative sentence of twenty-
four months with no supervised release to follow, and allowed the parties to
present argument and comment on the tentative sentence. In response, Mr. Lutz’s
counsel claimed Mr. Lutz would not receive adequate treatment within the Bureau
of Prisons system and therefore expressly, but generally, argued the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors warranted a modified sentence to include inpatient drug and
mental health treatment, which the probation officer acknowledged, during her
testimony, was available. Alternatively, he requested a sentence of twelve
months and one day.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Lutz personally addressed the court,
saying he was “fighting some kind of mental thing,” and “I couldn’t ask for a
better probation officer. And I’m stumped as to why this happened.” R., Vol. 2
-4-
at 12-13. Following these statements, the district court addressed Mr. Lutz,
stating:
All right, sir. Thank you. Well, not only Ms. Handley but also your
counsel has attempted to give you the benefit of the best that they
can do for you. I’m not really sure they can do much for you. The
Court is not impressed with the position of the Defendant.
R., Vol. 2 at 13. The district court then stated it found Mr. Lutz violated the
terms of his supervised release, based on the violation report and the evidence
presented, and imposed a sentence of twenty-four months imprisonment.
However, it did agree, at Mr. Lutz’s counsel’s request, to recommend Mr. Lutz
participate in drug treatment and mental health treatment while serving his
sentence.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Lutz continues to claim his twenty-four-month sentence of
imprisonment is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because
the circumstances of his case warrant a sentence of “inpatient drug and mental
health treatment,” as requested. We review Mr. Lutz’s argument his sentence is
substantively unreasonable under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See
United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 802, 805-06 (10th Cir. 2008). For the first
time on appeal, Mr. Lutz also argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court did not consider the mandatory 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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sentencing factors or objectives in imposing the twenty-four-month sentence,
provide its reasons for imposing such a sentence, or address his argument for
inpatient drug and mental heath treatment. Because Mr. Lutz failed to raise these
objections before the district court, we review them for plain error, which “occurs
when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and
which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)
and (3), when a person violates the conditions of his supervised release, as Mr.
Lutz did here, the district court may modify the conditions of release or revoke
the term of supervised release and impose prison time. See United States v.
Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2004). In imposing a sentence following
revocation of supervised release, a district court is required to consider both
Chapter Seven’s policy statements as well as the factors provided in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). 2 See Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1188.
2
These factors include:
The nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and
characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
(continued...)
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“Reasonableness review is guided by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006). “Our
appellate review for reasonableness includes both a procedural component,
encompassing the method by which a sentence was calculated, as well as a
substantive component, which relates to the length of the resulting sentence.”
Smart, 518 F.3d at 803. “In Gall, the Supreme Court identified ‘failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors’ and ‘failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence’ as forms of procedural error.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States,
___U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). On the other hand, “[a] challenge to
the sufficiency of the § 3553(a) justifications relied on by the district court
implicates the substantive reasonableness of the resulting sentence.” Id. at 804.
Beginning with the district court’s alleged procedural error in failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors or explain the chosen sentence, the Supreme Court
has “made clear that a district judge is not required to give an exhaustive list of
reasons” for the sentence imposed. United States v. Tindall, 519 F.3d 1057, 1065
(10th Cir. 2008). However, a district court must provide some basis for us to
2
(...continued)
care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid
unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to provide restitution.
Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1188-89 (quoting United States v. Contreras-Martinez, 409
F.3d 1236, 1242 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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conclude it “has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States,
___U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). In that regard, when a sentence falls
within the Guidelines range, we have said § 3553(c) requires the court to provide
only a general statement in explaining the imposition of a sentence. See United
States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
113 (2007). If the sentence is within the correctly-calculated Guidelines range,
the sentence is presumptively reasonable, unless the defendant “rebut[s] this
presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the
other sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
In this case, Mr. Lutz contends the district court failed to consider his
argument for inpatient drug and mental health treatment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) or otherwise provide sufficient reasoning for his sentence. However, a
review of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals Mr. Lutz expressly presented
his § 3553(a) argument for inpatient treatment to the district court and that the
district court heard, considered, and then rejected that argument when it declared
it was not impressed with Mr. Lutz’s position and imposed the Guidelines range
sentence of twenty-four months imprisonment, as recommended by the Chapter
Seven policy statement revocation table. It also agreed to recommend to the
Bureau of Prisons Mr. Lutz’s participation in a drug and mental health treatment
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program while serving his sentence, thereby evidencing it considered his request
for such treatment while in prison.
While a more comprehensive explanation might have aided this court in
concluding whether a reasoned basis existed for the district court’s twenty-four-
month sentence, the district court imposed a sentence within the recommended
Guidelines range, which requires only a general explanation of the reason for the
sentence imposed. Even if we determined a more comprehensive explanation was
required, we can find no procedural error. This is because Mr. Lutz cannot
satisfy the third or fourth prongs of the plain error analysis. To meet the third
prong, he must demonstrate his substantial rights were affected, which requires a
showing the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different but for
the asserted error. See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 319 (2007). Nothing in the record or Mr. Lutz’s argument
indicates the district court would have imposed a different sentence had it
provided further or more explicit reasoning for the sentence imposed. 3
3
See United States v. Rainwater, 274 F.App’x 629, 631 (10th Cir. April
16, 2008) (unpublished op.) (upholding sentence on determination defendant
could not satisfy substantial rights plain error prong in revocation of sentence
case, although district court imposed sentence without discussion of § 3553(a)
factors or Chapter Seven Guidelines policy statements). While this unpublished
opinion does not have precedential value, it has persuasive value with respect to
the same material issue raised here and assists with our disposition of this appeal.
See 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Similarly, Mr. Lutz has failed to establish the fourth prong of the plain
error analysis, which requires a showing his twenty-four-month sentence seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In
order to make this showing, he must demonstrate the district court’s limited
explanation of his sentence was “particularly egregious” and a failure to correct it
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta,
403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Mr. Lutz has failed to make such a
showing, especially in light of the district court’s recommendation to the Bureau
of Prisons that he participate in drug and mental health treatment during his
incarceration and his own failure to participate in a drug abuse program which
was one of the conditions of his supervised release.
Having rejected Mr. Lutz’s claim his sentence is procedurally unreasonable,
we turn to his argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because “a
twenty-four month sentence is greater than necessary to meet the statutory
sentencing objectives” of § 3553(a). Apt. Br. at 7. As previously explained, we
review such a claim under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Because
Mr. Lutz’s twenty-four-month sentence clearly falls within the applicable
advisory Guidelines range, his sentence is presumptively reasonable. In
attempting to rebut his presumption with respect to the § 3553(a) factors, Mr.
Lutz has not shown his argument for a variant sentence of inpatient drug and
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mental health treatment is sufficiently compelling for the purpose of showing his
sentence is substantively unreasonable, especially in light of the district court’s
recommendation Mr. Lutz participate in such treatment during his incarceration
and Mr. Lutz’s prior flagrant evasion of the conditions of his supervised release,
which included a requirement he participate in an approved substance abuse
treatment program, which he failed to do. Thus, under the circumstances
presented, Mr. Lutz has not overcome the requisite presumption of reasonableness
attached to his twenty-four-month sentence or otherwise demonstrated his
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Lutz’s sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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