Roe v. College Access Network , 551 F. App'x 927 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 9, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
In re:
ROXANN ROE,
Debtor.
ROXANN ROE,
No. 08-4022
Plaintiff-Appellant, (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00794-BSJ)
(D. Utah)
v.
COLLEGE ACCESS NETWORK;
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
ECMC; UTAH HIGHER
EDUCATION AUTHORITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellant Roxann Roe, proceeding pro se, filed for bankruptcy after
borrowing approximately $88,000 to attend college. Because her student loans
could not be discharged absent a finding of undue hardship as provided by
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), she brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
court to determine whether she satisfied the standard. The bankruptcy court
concluded she did not, and therefore, her loans could not be discharged. The
district court affirmed. We now affirm as well.
I
Ms. Roe graduated from college in 1994 with a bachelor of science degree
in Middle East studies. She also holds an associate’s degree and has taken
graduate level classes online to become a teacher. She worked part-time as an
interpreter until 1995, and has since earned money by delivering newspapers and
acting as a movie-extra two to five times a year. Her movie roles pay $72.50 per
day and require that she work between two and twelve hours each day, although
she has twice worked longer. Despite these jobs, however, Ms. Roe claims to be
unable to work. Indeed, she has submitted no job applications within the past ten
years and has not been employed on a full-time basis since 1986. As a single
mother of two children, ages 17 and 12, Ms. Roe collects $623 in Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and $385 from Aid to Families with Dependent Children
every month. She also receives $135 in food stamps each month. She once
-2-
received a lump sum of $6,000 in back SSI benefits and $10,000 as a settlement
for injuries sustained in a car accident. She has never made any payments on her
student loans, has exhausted her available forbearances and deferments, and has
declined loan consolidation.
After hearing testimony from Ms. Roe, the bankruptcy court concluded that
requiring her to repay her student loans would not impose an undue hardship.
The court reasoned that under Brunner v. New York State Higher Education
Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam), Ms. Roe was
maintaining a minimal standard of living but failed to show that her impoverished
circumstances were likely to persist or that she had acted in good faith to repay
her loans. Without providing any independent analysis, the district court
affirmed. Ms. Roe appealed, arguing that her state of affairs is unlikely to change
on account of her medical condition, and that she acted in good faith.
II
We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
conclusions of law de novo. Alderete v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
(In re Alderete), 412 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005). Under the Bankruptcy
Code, government backed student loans cannot be discharged unless the loans
impose an undue hardship. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). To evaluate whether an
undue hardship exists, we adopted the three-part test articulated in Brunner,
which requires a debtor to show:
-3-
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to
repay the loans.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). If a debtor fails to show all three elements,
there is no undue hardship and the loans cannot be discharged. Id.Ms. Roe argues the bankruptcy court erred in finding that she failed to
satisfy the second and third elements of the Brunner test. She claims she satisfied
the second element by discussing her medical condition, which is an additional
circumstance indicating that her impoverished lifestyle is likely to persist. She
claims she satisfied the third element by not immediately seeking to discharge her
student loans, but instead keeping them in deferment or forbearance as long as
possible. We reject both contentions.
“[A] permanent medical condition will certainly contribute to the
unlikelihood of a debtor earning enough money to repay her student loan debt,”
but such a condition is not a prerequisite to discharging the debt. Id. at 1311.
Ms. Roe, however, relies on her medical condition to show that she will be unable
to repay her debt, despite failing to produce any evidence of any diagnosed
medical condition in the bankruptcy court. Indeed, she was limited to her own
testimony of pain in her neck and back, numbness in her legs and feet, and
-4-
radiating pain in her arm. Although she also claimed to suffer from fear, racing
heartbeats, high blood pressure, and carpal tunnel syndrome, she admitted that no
doctor had ever told her she could not work. Rather, she stated that she must take
a ten to fifteen-minute break every hour. Additionally, she testified that she
home-schools her daughter and can sit, stand, walk, visit her father, and do just
about anything else she likes. Perhaps most importantly, Ms. Roe failed to submit
any evidence of a prognosis of her stated medical condition, which, at least in
part, compelled the bankruptcy court to conclude that she failed to satisfy the
second element of Brunner.
We perceive no error in the court’s judgment. Ms. Roe submitted only her
own testimony concerning her medical condition, without any professional
diagnosis or prognosis to show how her condition or symptoms might affect her
ability to work in the future. Although she insists that the Social Security
Administration found her disabled, there was no evidence of this determination
properly before the bankruptcy court, and the court offered no opinion on the
issue. Consequently, we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal.
See Robinson v. Tenantry (In re Robinson), 987 F.2d 665, 669 (10th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (“A reviewing court may not . . . decide factual issues not addressed
by the bankruptcy court.”). And absent any diagnosed medical condition or
prognosis indicting that her state of affairs is likely to persist, Ms. Roe fails to
satisfy the second element of the Brunner test.
-5-
Nevertheless, even if Ms. Roe could satisfy the second element of Brunner,
she cannot show the third element – that she acted in good faith to repay her
loans. Ms. Roe argues that she exercised good faith by not immediately seeking
to discharge her loans and instead exhausting her available deferments and
forbearances. Although these are certainly factors to be considered in assessing
good faith, the inquiry also “requires determining whether a debtor’s
circumstances are a result of factors beyond her reasonable control.” Polleys,
356 F.3d at 1311 (quotation omitted). The bankruptcy court found that Ms. Roe
had not acted in good faith because she had not applied for a job in over eleven
years and had never made a payment on her student loans, despite having received
two sizeable sums of money. We agree with this assessment.
“[T]he failure to make a payment, standing alone, does not establish a lack
of good faith.” Id. Courts should consider additional factors such as whether the
debtor immediately sought to discharge her student loans or opted to consolidate
or defer her loans. Id. at 1311-12. Courts also ought to consider whether the
debtor is “actively minimizing current household living expenses and maximizing
personal and professional resources.” Id. at 1312. Additionally, courts should
assess whether the debtor is “attempting to abuse the student loan system” by
seeking to discharge her debt. Id. (quotation omitted). A debtor who “willfully
contrives a hardship in order to discharge student loans should be deemed to be
acting in bad faith.” In re Alderete, 412 F.3d at 1206 (quotation omitted).
-6-
Ms. Roe claims she acted in good faith by keeping her loans in deferment
or forbearance as long as possible, rather than seeking to discharge them as soon
as they became due. Yet she also acted in ways that foreclose a finding of good
faith. For example, she received two lump sum payments totaling $16,000 but
used none of it to pay down her loans. Instead, she spent nearly $1,000 on dance
lessons and approximately $4,000 on orthodontic work; she used the remainder to
buy essentials, pay bills, and repay family and friends. Her choice to forgo her
student-loan payments in favor of dance lessons and braces is not dispositive, but
because it was a decision within her reasonable control that negatively impacted
her ability to repay her loans, it suggests she did not act in good faith.
Perhaps more revealing, however, is Ms. Roe’s failure to maximize her
personal and professional resources. Indeed, despite having two college degrees
and potentially invaluable experience as an interpreter for Iraqi refugees, Ms. Roe
has not applied for a job in at least ten years and has not held a full-time job since
1986. Moreover, since 1995, she has completely failed to make any use of her
education or experience, which has apparently resulted in her losing the
translation skills she acquired as an interpreter. These facts demonstrate that she
has not attempted to maximize (or even use) her personal and professional
resources. Ms. Roe responds that her medical condition precludes her from
working, but we have already held that she failed to show her medical condition
prevented her from working. The argument is unavailing.
-7-
Still, Ms. Roe adds that she did not act in bad faith by refusing to
consolidate her loans. She asserts the consolidation program available to her – an
income-contingent repayment plan – would itself impose an undue hardship,
because she would remain liable for interest accrued during the repayment period,
which, after amortization, could exceed the original loan amounts. Her argument
misses the point. The undue-hardship analysis evaluates whether a debtor’s loan
debt may be discharged, not whether a debtor should participate in a repayment
plan. Because a debtor’s willingness to participate in a repayment plan is “an
important indicator of good faith,” id. (quotation omitted), Ms. Roe’s refusal to
consolidate her loans is one more factor indicating a lack of good faith. This is
especially true where she conceded she could pay the consolidated monthly
payment, which could be as little as zero to five dollars. This and the other
relevant factors already discussed compel us to agree with the bankruptcy court
that Ms. Roe did not act in good faith to repay her loans. Consequently, she fails
to satisfy the third element of the Brunner test and cannot show an undue
hardship. Thus, her student loans are not subject to discharge.
The judgment of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED. Ms. Roe’s motion to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
-8-