United States v. Duenas ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 21, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 08-3108
(D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20035-CM-2)
v.
(D. Kan.)
LUIS DUENAS,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Luis Duenas entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent
to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine mixture in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Duenas reserved the
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, a challenge he now presents
to this court. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
On March 7, 2007, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Duenas was traveling
eastbound on Interstate 70 in Kansas in a rented white Ford Expedition. Kansas
Highway Patrol Trooper James W. Taylor was driving in his cruiser in the
opposite direction and clocked Duenas’ car traveling at 85 miles per hour in a 70
mile per hour zone. Taylor crossed the median, turned his cruiser to the east,
caught up to the Expedition, and stopped Duenas for speeding.
Duenas was the driver and sole occupant of the Expedition. While Taylor
was explaining to Duenas why he had been stopped, Taylor noticed that Duenas
was breathing more heavily than normal, avoided eye contact, and his hands were
shaking. In Taylor’s view, Duenas was “very nervous over the stop”—much more
than Taylor usually encountered during traffic stops. Duenas denied traveling at
more than 70 miles per hour and claimed he was adjusting the cruise control at
the time of the encounter.
On request, Duenas produced a valid California driver’s license and a
vehicle rental agreement dated March 5, 2007. The rental agreement was issued
by Enterprise Rent-A-Car in San Rafael, California, and was in the name of Luis
Alvarez, although it was signed “Luis Duenas.” It provided for a five-day rental
and specified that the Expedition could be driven in only two states—California
and Nevada. The word “California” was typed on the agreement whereas the
word “Nevada” was written in by hand.
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On being asked where he had begun his trip, Duenas said he was coming
from California, had stopped in Las Vegas, and was going to Kansas because he
had family in the state and was planning to move there. When asked what part of
Kansas he was visiting, Duenas responded, “the main town.” Taylor then asked
why Duenas was driving in Kansas if the rental agreement limited use to
California and Nevada. Duenas claimed that Enterprise personnel knew he was
going to drive the car outside of those states and that he had been told it was okay
to do so. In Taylor’s view, “[t]he more I spoke with [Duenas], the more nervous
he got.”
Taylor then took all documents to the patrol car, contacted dispatch, and
asked for a check of Duenas’ driver’s license and criminal history. He then called
the San Rafael Enterprise office and reached Anthony Clumeck, the individual
who rented the car to Duenas. Taylor explained that he had stopped Enterprise’s
vehicle in Kansas and asked if Duenas had authorization to drive the car outside
of California and Nevada. Clumeck answered that he did not, but declined to
have the vehicle seized because seizure would require sending someone to Kansas
to retrieve it. Taylor completed his call and then asked his dispatcher to send a
canine unit to the scene.
Taylor walked back to Duenas’ vehicle, returned his paperwork, and issued
Duenas a warning. Taylor told Duenas, “Have a safe trip and drive safely,” and
took several steps back toward his cruiser. Approximately ten minutes had
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elapsed from the time when Taylor initially stopped the car to the time he
returned Duenas’ paperwork.
After taking a few steps back toward his cruiser, however, Taylor stepped
back toward the Expedition and asked Duenas, “Hey Luis can I ask you a couple
of questions? Is it okay to visit with you for a minute? Can I talk to you for a
minute?” Duenas responded, “Sure.” Taylor told Duenas that he had called the
rental company and that Duenas was not allowed to drive the car in Kansas.
Duenas responded that, because he had unlimited mileage, he could drive it
anywhere. Taylor asked Duenas what he did for work, and Duenas replied that he
worked in construction and as a gardener, reiterating that he wished to move to
Kansas. Taylor then asked Duenas, “You’re not hauling anything illegal in this
vehicle, are you?—any guns, drugs, money, anything like that?” Duenas replied,
“No.” Taylor then asked, “Would you have a problem if I searched the vehicle?”
Duenas refused to consent, explaining that he knew his rights from a previous
encounter with law enforcement.
Taylor then told Duenas that he thought there was something illegal in the
vehicle and that he did not believe Duenas’ travel plans. He asked Duenas to stay
in the vehicle with the windows rolled up until the canine unit arrived and then
Taylor returned to his patrol car. At this point, approximately three minutes had
elapsed from the time when Taylor returned Duenas’ paperwork.
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Another three minutes later, Taylor returned to the Expedition, asked
Duenas to step out, and completed a pat down search. At the same time, the
canine unit arrived and the police dog promptly alerted to the presence of
narcotics near the left rear passenger door. Taylor then informed Duenas that he
was going to search the vehicle. Approximately two pounds of methamphetamine
were found, and Duenas was arrested.
A grand jury later indicted Duenas on counts of (1) conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine
mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2; and (2) possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine mixture, in violation of the same. After the district court
denied his motion to suppress, Duenas pleaded guilty to the second charge
pursuant to an agreement with the government in which he reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the motion. This appeal followed.
II
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the ultimate determination
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is considered de novo. United
States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government and accept the district court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d
1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000). “[C]redibility of witnesses, . . . weight to be given
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evidence, and . . . reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence [all] fall within
the province of the district court.” Id. (quoting United States v. Long, 176 F.3d
1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999)).
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, and is analyzed under the framework applicable to
investigative detentions. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir.
1997). We first ask “whether the stop was justified at its inception” and if so, if
“the officer’s actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (citing Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Duenas neither contests the reasonableness of
the initial traffic stop nor the propriety of the exchange that took place after
Taylor issued the warning but before Taylor asked for permission to search the
vehicle. Moreover, he does not challenge the district court’s finding that the
canine’s alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle. Thus, the sole issue
for us to decide is: was there reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Duenas
after he refused Taylor’s request to search the car. We conclude that there was.
“[O]nce an officer returns the driver’s license and vehicle registration and
issues a warning ticket, he must allow the driver to proceed without further
detention or questioning unless the officer has an objectively reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal activity.” United States
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v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007). We look to the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether Taylor had an objectively reasonable basis to
prolong the detention after Duenas refused to consent to a search. Id. “This
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v.
Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1134 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation omitted)). Applying these standards, we
must conclude that Taylor’s detention of Duenas was objectively reasonable.
A combination of three factors drives our conclusion. 1 First, the rental
agreement prohibited Duenas from operating the vehicle outside California and
Nevada. The district court found that Duenas lied about his authority to operate
the car in Kansas. Based on our review of the record, we have no reason to
second-guess the district court’s findings on this issue. The rental agreement
plainly did not authorize travel in Kansas. This was confirmed when Taylor
spoke to the very agent at Enterprise who rented the car to Duenas. Duenas did
claim that he believed he had authority to drive the car in Kansas because of
unlimited mileage provisions. But given the clarity with which the rental
agreement speaks, we cannot say that the district court’s finding that Duenas lied
1
We do not consider Duenas’ refusal to consent in our analysis. As we
have stated elsewhere, “it should go without saying that consideration of such a
refusal would violate the Fourth Amendment.” Wood, 106 F.3d at 946.
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about his right to travel outside California and Nevada was clearly erroneous. Cf.
United States v. Edwards, 576 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that
“exceeding the scope of the rental agreement would support a jury finding that
[the defendant] intended to steal the car”).
Second, Duenas’ travel plans were implausible. Duenas told Taylor that he
was planning to move to Kansas, but Duenas was unable to name the town to
which he was moving, stating only that he was going to “the main town.” Were
Duenas truly moving to Kansas or even considering such a move, it is unlikely
that he would have rented a car without authority to travel in Kansas. These facts
justifiably raised Taylor’s suspicion and more than adequately support the district
court’s finding that Duenas’ travel plans were not believable. See Santos, 403
F.3d at 1129 (“Implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion.”);
see also United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Sanchez-Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1993).
Third, Duenas appeared nervous throughout the encounter and, according to
Taylor, “[t]he more I spoke with [Duenas], the more nervous he got.” The district
court found that “Duenas acted extremely nervous, out of the ordinary
nervousness that [Taylor] sometimes encounters in making his traffic stops.”
This finding is supported by the record. We acknowledge that “nervousness is a
sufficiently common—indeed natural—reaction to confrontation with the police
that unless it is unusually severe or persistent, or accompanied by other, more
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probative, grounds for reasonable suspicion, it is ‘of limited significance in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.’” Santos, 403 F.3d at 1127(quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)).
However, Duenas’ nervousness was accompanied by the foregoing circumstances.
We agree with the district court that, combined with these two additional factors,
the nervousness supported Taylor’s decision to detain Duenas until arrival of the
canine unit.
Considering that Taylor was allowed “to draw on [his] own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to” him, we conclude that an objectively reasonable
suspicion that Duenas was involved in illegal activity properly arose in Taylor’s
mind. See id. at 1134. The district court’s factual findings were not clearly
erroneous, and Taylor’s decision to detain Duenas pending arrival of the canine
unit was reasonable. 2
2
Duenas relies heavily on our decision in Wood, 106 F.3d 942. In that
case, however, only two factors arguably supported reasonable suspicion: the
defendant’s nervousness and his prior narcotics history. Id. at 948. Wood’s
travel plans, unlike Duenas’ plans, were not “the sort of unusual plans which give
rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,” because, among other things,
Wood had “authority to operate [his rental] car.” Id. at 947. Consistent with the
above analysis, we explained in Wood that both of the validly considered factors
were “of only limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion
existed,” id. at 948, particularly in light of the paucity of other articulable bases
to support the detention. Here, by contrast, we have two significant and probative
factors, in addition to Duenas’ nervousness, that justified the detention. Thus,
Duenas’ reliance on Wood is misplaced.
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III
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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