West American Ins. v. Ambassador Pizza , 145 F.3d 1224 ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 14 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant,
v.
AV&S, AM&S, LSK, AS&S and
AMBASSADOR PIZZA, INC.,
Nos. 96-4094, 96-4096, 96-4097,
96-4138, 96-4151
Defendants-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants,
and
BARRY HARPER, as conservator for
James Harper,
Intervenor-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:95CV254S)
Donald J. Purser and Rebecca L. Hill, Donald Joseph Purser & Associates, P.C.,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, West American
Insurance Company.
Andrew H. Stone and Scott D. Cheney, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Ambassador
Pizza, Inc., AV&S, AM&S and LSK.
Joseph J. Joyce and Kristen A. VanOrman, Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant AS&S, Inc.
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Alan W. Mortensen and Paul M. Simmons, Wilcox,
Dewsnup & King, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Intervenor-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Barry Harper.
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
West American Insurance Company appeals the district court’s declaratory
judgment that it had a duty to defend its insureds under an insurance contract.
The insureds cross-appeal the district court’s denial of a motion for attorney fees
incurred by the insureds in litigating the declaratory judgment action. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 11, 1993, high school student Bryce K. Morris (“Morris”) hit
James P. Harper (“Harper”), a pedestrian in a crosswalk, with his car while
delivering a pizza for his employer, AS&S, Inc. (“AS&S”), in Riverton, Utah.
AS&S is a corporation whose business is a franchisee of Ambassador Pizza, Inc.
(“Ambassador”). Ambassador had several other franchisees, including AV&S,
Inc., AM&S, Inc., and LSK, Inc. (collectively, the “Other Franchisees”).
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As a result of the accident, Harper suffered severe injuries to his brain,
head, neck, legs, and back. Harper’s brother Barry Harper, acting as Harper’s
conservator, filed suit against Ambassador, AS&S, the Other Franchisees, and
Morris for negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring and training
(the “Harper litigation”). Ambassador, AS&S, and the Other Franchisees
tendered defense of the Harper litigation to their insurer, West American
Insurance Company (“West American”), under Ambassador’s Business Owner’s
Liability Insurance Policy (“the Policy”). The Policy covered Ambassador and all
of its franchisees, including AS&S. West American refused to defend
Ambassador or any of its franchisees because the Policy contained an “Auto
Exclusion” clause, which excluded from coverage under the Policy any claims for
“‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, ‘auto’ or watercraft owned or
operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.” (emphasis added). An “insured”
under the Policy included each named company and that company’s employees for
acts within the scope of their employment. However, the Policy also contained a
“Separation of Insureds” clause that provided: “Except with respect to the Limits
of Insurance, and any rights or duties specifically assigned in this policy to the
first Named Insured, this insurance applies: a. As if each Named Insured were the
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only Named Insured; and b. Separately to each insured against whom claim is
made or ‘suit’ is brought.”
West American filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) seeking a
declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend Ambassador, AS&S, the
Other Franchisees, or Morris. Resolving the parties’ motions for summary
judgment, the district court found that AS&S and Morris were not covered under
the Policy due to the Auto Exclusion clause. However, the district court
concluded that the Policy only excluded Morris and AS&S as Morris’ employer
and did not exclude Ambassador, AV&S, AM&S, or LSK from insurance
coverage. As a result, the district court ruled that West American had a duty to
defend Ambassador and the Other Franchisees in the underlying Harper litigation
and had to indemnify Ambassador and the Other Franchisees against any
judgment entered against them. The district court also held West American liable
for attorney fees incurred by Ambassador, AV&S, AM&S, and LSK in defending
the Harper litigation. However, the district court denied Ambassador’s and the
Other Franchisees’ motions for attorney fees incurred defending against West
American’s declaratory judgment action. These appeals followed. In case 96-
4097, West American appeals the determination that it had a duty to defend
Ambassador and the Other Franchisees. In case 96-4138, Ambassador and the
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Other Franchisees appeal the denial of attorney fees. 1 We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2
DISCUSSION
Because this is a diversity case, we apply the forum state’s choice of law
rules. See Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1532
(10th Cir. 1996). Here the parties agree that Utah courts would apply Utah
substantive law to this dispute, and we agree. See American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996).
I. Coverage Under the Policy
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d
1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). “Whether an exclusion in an insurance policy is
clear and unambiguous is a question of law that may be resolved by the court in
1
Barry Harper and AS&S also filed appeals numbered 96-4094, 96-4096,
and 96-4151. However, pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties, we
now dismiss those appeals as moot.
2
At the time the parties filed their notices of appeal, it was unclear
whether the district court’s April 2, 1996, Order and April 8, 1996, Judgment
constituted a final judgment disposing of all claims that could be appealed under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. This court directed the parties to secure from the district court
either a certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or an order
adjudicating all remaining claims. The district court then issued a series of
further orders on August 8 and 9, 1996, disposing of all remaining claims. As a
result, the appeal ripened as of August 9, 1996, and we have jurisdiction under
F.R.A.P. 4(a). See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir.
1988).
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the context of a motion for summary judgment” under Utah law. See Cyprus
Plateau Mining Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (D.
Utah 1997) (applying Utah law) (citations omitted).
The Policy’s Auto Exclusion clause excluded from coverage bodily injury
resulting from operation or entrustment of an automobile to “any” insured. AS&S
was unquestionably a named insured and Morris was unquestionably an insured
under the Policy. However, the Policy’s Separation of Insureds clause provides
that the Policy applies to each named insured under the policy as if that named
insured were the only named insured, and unquestionably Ambassador, AV&S,
AM&S, and LSK were named insureds. Thus, under the Separation of Insureds
clause, Ambassador, AV&S, AM&S, and LSK were each entitled to have the
Policy construed as to it as if the Policy were issued only as to it alone. Under
that scenario, AS&S and Morris would not be regarded as “insureds” when
considering the coverage available to Ambassador, AV&S, AM&S, and LSK. Of
course, if AS&S and Morris were not insureds, then the Auto Exclusion clause
would not apply because it only excludes coverage for automobile accidents
attributable to the operation or entrustment of an automobile to an “insured.”
Further, the Separation of Insureds clause provides that a complaint against any
one insured should be applied “separately” as to each insured. The question
before us is whether the use of the term “any insured” in the Auto Exclusion
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clause excludes from coverage all automobile accidents attributable to any of the
named insureds, or whether the Separation of Insureds clause read in conjunction
with the term “any insured” in the Auto Exclusion clause means only that the
single named insured and its employees that actually operated or entrusted the
automobile involved in the accident are excluded under the Policy.
West American argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in
interpreting the Policy by ruling that West American had a duty to defend
Ambassador, AV&S, AM&S, and LSK, noting the broad exclusionary language
used in the Auto Exclusion clause. Relying on the majority rule, West American
cites a number of cases in other jurisdictions that broadly interpret the term “any
insured” under an exclusion clause to negate coverage for all insureds, even
innocent co-insureds, despite the inclusion of a severability clause similar to the
Separation of Insureds clause at issue here. See Taryn E.F. by Grunewald v.
Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418, 420, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (applying
Wisconsin law and holding “[T]he term ‘any insured’ unambiguously precludes
coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages in
excludable conduct,” notwithstanding a severability clause that provided, “Each
person listed above is a separate insured under this policy.”); see also Golden
Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 117 F.3d
1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Florida law and holding that the phrase
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“the insured” permits an innocent co-insured to recover for loss attributable to a
guilty co-insured, while contrasting that to a policy covering “any insured,” which
would preclude an innocent co-insured from recovery for the acts of a guilty co-
insured; however, it is not clear that the policy under consideration had an
explicit “Separation of Insureds” or “Severability of Insureds” clause); 3 American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 627, 629 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) (applying Missouri law in holding “the phrase ‘any insured’
unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one
of them engages in excludable conduct,” notwithstanding a severability clause
that “the liability coverage applies separately to each insured . . . .”) (citations and
quotations omitted); California Cas. Ins. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d 434, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (same, applying California law); Michael
Carbone, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 413, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(same, applying New Jersey law to essentially the same policy language as the
West American policy); Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165, 168-69 (La. Ct. App.
3
When the insurance contract does contain a severability clause providing
that “[t]his insurance applies separately to each insured,” the Florida State
District Court of Appeals has held that innocent co-insureds are covered,
notwithstanding an exclusion clause which excludes coverage for any injury
which is intended by “any insured.” Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So.2d 1054,
1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Thus, notwithstanding dicta in Golden Door,
we conclude that Florida law would provide coverage to an innocent co-insured
under contract provisions similar to those in the West American policy. Golden
Door failed to discuss or distinguish Premier Ins. Co..
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1995) (same, applying Louisiana law); Gorzen v. Westfield Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d
43, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (same, applying Michigan law); Chacon v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo. 1990) (same, applying
Colorado law); Great Central Ins. Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772, 774 (S.D.
1980) (same, applying South Dakota law).
In contrast to the cases cited by West American, some jurisdictions have
found that the term “any insured” in an exclusion clause only applied to a single
named insured and its employees and did not exclude other named but innocent
insureds or their employees from coverage when the insurance policy also
included a severability clause similar to the Separation of Insureds clause in this
case. See Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So.2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994)
(applying Florida law in holding that in order to give effect to all parts of the
contract the court must construe the policy as excluding only coverage for
separate insurable interest of insured who intentionally caused injury); American
Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 1991)
(applying Minnesota law in holding, “[t]he doctrine of severability limits
application of the exclusion to the insured claiming coverage and those deriving
their insured status from that insured claiming coverage”); Worcester Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Mass. 1986) (applying Massachusetts law in
holding that the severability clause modifies the exclusionary clause). In
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addition, in cases interpreting exclusions for injuries to an employee in an
insurance policy covering the employer and other named insureds that also
includes a severability clause, a number of courts have construed the severability
clause to mean that each insured has a separate policy and, consequently, to
require the insurer to cover the named insureds other than the employer for
liability arising from the employee’s injuries. See Charles W. Benton,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provision in Automobile
Liability Policy Excluding from Coverage Injury to, or Death of, Employee of
Insured, 43 A.L.R.5th 149 § 13(a) (1996) (citing cases).
We note that Utah has held that the term “any insured” in an exclusion is
not necessarily ambiguous. See Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839
P.2d 798, 807 (Utah 1992). However, Utah courts have not addressed the
interpretation of the term “any insured” directly in relation to a Separation of
Insureds clause. Given the conflicting interpretations of the interplay between a
severability clause and an exclusion clause using the term “any insured,” we find
the Policy in question in this case to be ambiguous. See also Cyprus Plateau
Mining, 972 F. Supp. at 1382-86 (applying Utah law in holding that term “any
insured” was ambiguous in light of other provisions of policy) (citing Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 146 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
and United States Steel Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 576, 584-85
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(Cal. Ct. App. 1966)); Transport Indem. Co. v. Wyatt, 417 So.2d 568, 571 (Ala.
1982) (“The wording [‘any insured’ in an exclusion clause] could be interpreted
either to mean only singularly ‘any one of the insureds’ or could apply
collectively to the whole group of insureds.”).
Under Utah law, an ambiguous clause in an insurance policy is construed in
favor of the insured. See Taylor v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279,
1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993)), cert. denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997). Moreover,
Utah law requires that exclusions in an insurance policy must be strictly construed
against the insurer. See id. Because we find the relationship between Separation
of Insureds clause and the Auto Exclusion clause to be ambiguous at best and
capable of two different interpretations, we believe that Utah would construe the
exclusion against West American and adopt the interpretation most favorable to
Ambassador and the Other Franchisees.
Under this rationale, we find that because the Separation of Insureds clause
treats each named insured separately as the only insured, the term “any insured”
in the Auto Exclusion clause only applies to the single insured that actually
owned the vehicle or whose employee operated the vehicle and the employees
claiming insurance through that named insured. As a result, the Policy only
excludes from coverage claims for bodily injury against either AS&S, the single
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named insured that actually operated or entrusted the automobile, or Morris, its
employee, and does not exclude claims against the Ambassador and the Other
Franchisees, the other named insureds covered by the Policy.
Thus, we concur with the conclusion reached in those cases holding that the
term “any insured” in an exclusion clause in a policy that also contains a
severability clause does not exclude coverage for all insureds when only one
insured is at fault. See Premier Ins. Co., 632 So.2d at 1057 (“The policy contains
an exclusion for intentional acts of ‘any insured’ and contains a severability
clause creating a separate insurable interest in each individual insured. . . . [T]he
most plausible interpretation is that the exclusionary clause is to exclude coverage
for the separate insurable interest of that insured who intentionally causes the
injury.”); Worcester Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.E.2d at 161 (severability clause
provides that the policy “applies separately to each insured” and “requires that
each insured be treated as having a separate insurance policy.”).
West American further argues that the district court erred by finding that
Morris was not an employee of Ambassador and the Other Franchisees. 4 West
4
Harper’s complaint in the underlying litigation alleged that Morris was an
employee of LSK, Inc., an entity separate from AS&S but one of Ambassador’s
franchisees. West American relies in part on that allegation in its attempt to link
Morris to Ambassador and the Other Franchisees. However, the only evidence in
the record regarding Morris’ employment status clearly states that AS&S, not
Ambassador or any of the Other Franchisees, employed Morris. West American
(continued...)
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American contends that the district court ignored the rule in Utah that an insurer
must defend its insureds only if the allegations of the complaint, if proven, would
result in liability for the insurer. See Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986). West American
notes that the complaint in the Harper litigation alleged that Ambassador and all
the franchisees (including AS&S) are corporate alter egos. Thus, West American
reasons that if Harper prevailed, Morris’ negligence would be attributable to
Ambassador and all the franchisees and West American would have no liability
because the terms of the Auto Exclusion clause would then apply to Ambassador
and the Other Franchisees as “any insured” who entrusted an automobile to
Morris.
Deseret held that “the duty to defend is measured by the nature and kinds of
risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the insurer ascertains facts which
give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.” Id. at 1146 (emphasis
added). The court in Deseret found that the insurance company in that case did
not have a duty to defend the insured because the plaintiff’s allegations, which
4
(...continued)
presented no evidence to the contrary other than its reliance on the allegations in
Harper’s complaint. A party “may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for
which it carries the burden of proof.” Kaul, 83 F.3d at 1212. Therefore,
summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of which company employed
Morris.
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concerned only matters specifically excluded under the policy, “presented no
potential liability” under the insurance policy. Id. at 1147 (emphasis added). In
this case, West American faced the possibility of liability to Ambassador and the
Other Franchisees for claims brought by Harper – such as lack of training – that
did not depend on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Morris and Ambassador or the Other Franchisees. Because not all of Harper’s
claims required the attribution of Morris’ negligence to Ambassador and the
Other Franchisees to impose liability on them, the Auto Exclusion clause as we
have interpreted it would not have eliminated the possibility of West American’s
liability for all of Harper’s claims under Deseret. Consequently, West American
had a duty to defend Ambassador and the Franchisees under Utah law. Cf.
Overthrust Constructors, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Utah
1987) (“Once an insurer has a duty to defend an insured under one claim brought
against the insured, the insurer must defend all claims brought at the same time,
even if some of the claims are not covered by the policy.”).
II. Attorney Fees
The district court awarded Ambassador and the Other Franchisees $6,100 in
attorney fees to compensate them for the attorney fees expended in defending the
Harper litigation. On appeal, Ambassador and the Other Franchisees argue that
the district court misapplied Utah law by denying them additional attorney fees
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incurred in litigating West American’s declaratory judgment action. Although
neither the Policy nor Utah statutory law provides for an award of “fees for fees”
here, Ambassador and the Other Franchisees contend that Utah recognizes that
“such fees may be recovered as foreseeable consequential damages flowing from
West American’s breach of its contractual obligation to extend coverage and a
defense.” We review de novo the legal analysis providing the basis for the award
or denial of attorney fees. See Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758,
765 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Utah case most analogous to the case at bar is Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), where an insurance company filed a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether an exclusion clause negated its duty to
defend the insured. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the company had a duty
to defend the underlying action, see id. at 232, but refused to award the insured
the fees the insured incurred in defending the declaratory judgment action, see id.
at 237-38. The court stated:
When faced with a decision as to whether to defend or refuse to
defend, an insurer is entitled to seek a declaratory judgment as to its
obligations and rights. . . . An award of attorney fees is not
warranted ‘where the plaintiff merely stated its position and initiated
this action for determination of what appears to be a justiciable
controversy.’
Id. (quoting Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (1980)); see
also Overthrust, 676 F. Supp. at 1091 (applying Utah law); Crist v. Insurance Co.
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of North America, 529 F. Supp. 601, 607 (D. Utah 1982) (applying Utah law);
American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1971).
We acknowledge that the viability of the Farmers line of cases may be in
some doubt, given recent decisions of the Utah courts which have allowed parties
to collect attorney fees incurred in litigation brought to collect fees. See Salmon
v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, we note that since
Farmers was decided Utah has held that attorney fees can be considered an item
of consequential damages flowing from an insurer’s breach of contract. See
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989). However,
Canyon Country did not address awarding “fees for fees,” and both of the recent
Utah cases that do address that situation are distinguishable from the instant
action. In Salmon, which allowed a party to recover attorney fees expended in an
action to regain fees, the Supreme Court of Utah construed a Utah statute which
authorized the recovery of fees in an opinion which commanded no clear majority.
See 916 P.2d at 895-96, 900. In James Constructors, the award of fees was rooted
in a specific provision in an indemnity agreement. See 888 P.2d at 673-74. By
contrast, our case involves neither a statutory authorization for, nor a contractual
agreement regarding, fees. More importantly, however, none of these recent cases
overruled or even cited the Farmers line of cases. Without clearer guidance that
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the Supreme Court of Utah would overrule Farmers, we feel compelled to follow
it, particularly because it arises in a factual context so clearly analogous to this
case.
There is no evidence in the record that West American did not file this
action in good faith or was stubbornly litigious. Consequently, under Utah law,
there is no basis for awarding Ambassador and the Other Franchisees the attorney
fees they incurred in defending this declaratory judgment action. See Farmers,
712 P.2d at 237; Western Casualty, 615 P.2d at 427; cf. American States, 486
P.2d at 1044.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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