Hines v. Chrysler Corporation ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 19 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PAMELA HINES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1280
(D.C. No. 98-N-1462)
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff seeks review of an order of the district court granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
She alleged defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, by refusing to accommodate her disability and
ultimately terminating her employment. She also asserted state law claims for
promissory estoppel and bad faith breach of contract. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c).” Deboard v. Sunshine Mining & Ref. Co. ,___ F.3d ___,
Nos. 97-6226, 97-6249, 98-6020, 2000 WL 526928, at *8 (10th Cir. May 2,
2000). The parties have agreed that the only issue before us in this appeal is
whether the district court erred in ruling that defendant was not obligated to
reassign her to another position within the company as an attempt to
accommodate her disability. In so doing, the court relied on our panel decision in
Smith v Midland Brake, Inc. , 138 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d &
remanded , 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ( Midland Brake I ), that
[w]hen a plaintiff is not qualified, even with reasonable
accommodation, for the job which he currently holds . . ., the
employing entity has no obligation to consider reassigning
him to another position. Under the current EEOC guidelines, the
employer’s obligation to consider reassignment arises only if the
employer can accommodate the employee in his current position,
but would experience undue hardship in doing so.
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Our subsequent en banc decision modified the panel’s holding. In the en
banc opinion, we outlined the two questions before the court. We first asked
whether an employee can be a qualified person with a disability if the person is
unable to perform the essential functions of her present job, regardless of any
accommodations, but could perform the essential functions of another available
company job, with or without reasonable accommodations. Second, we
questioned and subsequently defined the scope of the employer’s obligation to
offer to that qualified person with a disability a reassignment job. See Midland
Brake , 180 F.3d at 1159 ( Midland Brake II ).
We recognized in Midland Brake II that the statutory definition of
a qualified individual encompasses a disabled person who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position
she currently holds “or desires.” Midland Brake II , 180 F.3d at 1161. The
inquiry is not limited to an employee’s existing job, but “[r]ather the
plain language of the statute [42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)] includes an employee who
has the ability to do other jobs within the company that such disabled employee
‘desires.’” Id. We further determined that “reassignment of an employee to a
vacant position in a company is one of the range of reasonable accommodations
which must be considered and, if appropriate, offered if the employee is unable to
perform his or her existing job.” Id. at 1167. Moreover, we twice emphasized
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that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance specifically states that reassignment does
not mean that an employee is permitted to merely compete for a vacant position,
but rather that “the employee gets the position if s/he is qualified for it.”
Id. at 1166-67; 1170.
Here, of course, the district court concluded that defendant was not
obligated to even consider transferring plaintiff to another position in the
company and therefore did not consider the second part of Midland Brake II ,
the scope of an employer’s reassignment duty. We address this issue briefly
because defendant would have us uphold the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the ground that it adequately fulfilled the requirements of Midland
Brake II by notifying her of the procedures for transferring to other company
facilities and of the collective bargaining procedures applicable to such transfers.
Appellee’s Br. at 13. Defendant also contends it was plaintiff’s obligation to
identify a vacant position to which she could have been transferred, but that
plaintiff failed to do so. See id. at 8-9; 16-19. Finally, defendant contends that
plaintiff did not ask her union representative to file a grievance regarding any
failure to receive a transfer. See id. at 15-16.
In delineating the scope of the reassignment duty, we recognized that the
interactive process between the employer and employee generally begins with
notification to the employer of the employee’s disability and limitations along
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with the employee’s desire for reassignment if no reasonable accommodation in
the existing job is possible. See Midland Brake II , 180 F.3d at 1171-72.
Thereafter, “ both parties have an obligation to proceed in a reasonably interactive
manner . . . .” Id. at 1172 (emphasis added).
We further recognized that “[t]he exact shape of this interactive process
will necessarily vary from situation to situation and no rules of universal
application can be articulated.” Id. at 1173. By example, we specifically
articulated that in “larger companies or companies where the employee does not
have ready access to information regarding available jobs, it might be reasonable
to require the employer to identify jobs . . .” appropriate for reassignment
consideration. Id. Thus, as in Midland Brake II , “summary judgment would be
premature if there is a genuine dispute regarding whether [defendant] participated
in good faith in attempting to secure a reassignment position for [plaintiff] as part
of its duty to offer a reasonable accommodation to [plaintiff].” Id. at 1174.
“[A] failure to reassign a disabled employee most certainly can constitute
discrimination, and therefore a basis for liability, under the ADA.” Davoll v.
Webb , 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to identify any job which was
vacant and for which she was qualified, emphasizing our requirement that to
survive summary judgment the employee “must, at the time of the summary
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judgment proceeding, specifically identify and show [that one or more appropriate
vacant jobs] were available within the company.” Appellee’s Br. at 10, citing
Midland Brake II , 180 F.3d at 1179. However, this presumes the preceding step
in the process, i.e., that the employee requested an accommodation “by
reassignment to a vacant position, which the employee may request the employer
identify through the interactive process.” Id. (emphasis added).
Defendant further argues that plaintiff should have requested her union
representative to file a grievance contesting the failure to transfer her. We
decline to consider this argument as it was not the basis of the district court’s
decision, nor does it obviate defendant’s requirements under Midland Brake II . In
this case, as in Midland Brake II , there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether defendant adequately responded to plaintiff’s request for reassignment.
We express no opinion on whether, after proper application of the Midland Brake
II factors, summary judgment will yet be appropriate. See id. at 1179-80.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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