Doyle v. Cella , 318 F. App'x 644 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 26, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MICHAEL DOYLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 08-1398
v. (D. Colorado)
SGT. CELLA; C.O. REYES; LT. (D.C. No. 1:07-cv-01126-WDM-KMT)
KENTOPLISS; LT. FAZZINO;
EVANS, Case Manager; R. VIOLA,
Mail Officer; LT. TOLLIS; FOSHEE,
Associate Warden; ABBOTT, Warden,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Michael Doyle, a prisoner proceeding pro se, sued officials at the Colorado
Territorial Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a number of
constitutional violations. In a thorough opinion the United States District Court
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
for the District of Colorado dismissed his suit in its entirety. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We begin by summarizing Mr. Doyle’s claims and the district court’s
reasons for dismissing them: First, Mr. Doyle claimed a violation of his due-
process rights when, without a hearing, he was placed on restricted-privilege
status for fourteen-and-a-half months following an incident in which he refused to
work in the prison kitchen. The district court dismissed this claim because
Mr. Doyle failed to demonstrate a liberty interest for which process was due. To
do so, he had to establish that restricted-privilege status “impose[d] atypical and
significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 2007)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But the district court noted that
the hardships Mr. Doyle alluded to in his pleadings—restrictions on his use of
personal property and on socializing with other inmates—did not rise to the level
of atypical hardships. Nor did his placement in what he characterized as a
“punishment cell with ‘Aids inmates,’” R. Doc. 28 at 9, because he failed to
present specific allegations regarding a physical threat from the specified inmates.
Second, Mr. Doyle claimed that another due-process violation occurred
when, after already being placed on restricted-privilege status, he was placed in
administrative segregation because he refused to go to his cell after being ordered
to do so. The district court ruled that such placement did not implicate a liberty
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interest because all that Mr. Doyle was alleging was that he had been placed in
administrative segregation pending a disciplinary hearing, which failed to
constitute an atypical or significant hardship.
Third, Mr. Doyle claimed that he did not receive a fair disciplinary hearing
regarding the second incident because (1) the two officers involved in the
incident, Sergeant Cella and Correctional Officer Reyes, allegedly submitted false
reports of the incident; (2) at the hearing he was not allowed to utilize a
surveillance-video tape of the incident; and (3) he was not allowed to call Cella
and Reyes as witnesses. Ultimately, Mr. Doyle’s claims amount to challenges to
his convictions for violating the Colorado Department of Corrections Code of
Penal Discipline (COPD). But, as the district court noted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
inapplicable to “‘challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison
disciplinary infractions,’” unless the disciplinary conviction has been set aside.
R. Doc. 91 at 7 (quoting Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.
2007)). Because Mr. Doyle’s COPD convictions have not been set aside, the
district court dismissed his fair-hearing claim.
Fourth, Mr. Doyle claimed that Cella and Reyes destroyed or confiscated
property in his cell, including his headphones and glasses, when they transferred
him to administrative segregation. The district court said that if the claim is
based on the officials’ negligence, it is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which extends only to deliberate deprivations of constitutional rights. See Rost
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ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[N]egligent government conduct is insufficient to prove liability under
§ 1983.”). And if Mr. Doyle’s claim rested on deliberate misconduct, the court
noted, he ran into a separate barrier: Intentional destruction of property does not
violate due process if there are adequate state postdeprivation remedies. See
Moore v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 F.3d 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2007). As the
district court observed, Colorado provides such a remedy because Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-10-105(1) allows tort actions against public employees for “willful and
wanton” actions.
Fifth, Mr. Doyle claimed that his right to access to the courts was violated.
He alleged that he did not receive various mailings that he had requested from
legal-service organizations. The district court rejected this claim because
Mr. Doyle failed to show how the denial of legal materials frustrated his ability to
pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403
(10th Cir. 1996) (to challenge the denial of legal resources, a litigant must show
that the denial “hindered the prisoner’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim”).
Mr. Doyle also alleged that letters he sent to law firms seeking representation
were “[r]efused.” R. Doc. 8 at 12. The district court rejected this claim because
Mr. Doyle failed to specify how any of the named defendants were personally
involved in the refusal. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir.
2006) (“In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal
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responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be
established.”).
Finally, the district court dismissed claims that were not specifically
denominated in Mr. Doyle’s complaint. To the extent that he asserted claims
against two named defendants, Warden Abbott and Associate Warden Foshee,
those were dismissed because Mr. Doyle failed to allege with specificity their
personal involvement in the asserted misconduct. And to the extent that
Mr. Doyle’s vague and meandering complaint alluded to claims other than those
disposed of above, the district court dismissed them all for failure to comply with
the requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
For substantially the reasons stated by the district court, we AFFIRM. We
DENY Mr. Doyle’s pending motions, including those seeking a change of venue
and leave to appeal without prepayment of filing fees. We ORDER Mr. Doyle to
pay immediately the unpaid balance due.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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