United States v. Brown , 126 F. App'x 448 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 28 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-8071
(D.C. No. 02-CR-150-D)
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BROWN, (Wyoming)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
By superseding indictment filed on March 19, 2003, in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, Benjamin Franklin Brown (defendant) was charged in
one count with the Use, on August 28, 2002, of Interstate Commerce to Entice a Minor
for Illegal Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Specifically, the
defendant was charged as follows:
On or about August 28, 2002, in the District of Wyoming, the
Defendant, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BROWN, using a
means of interstate commerce, namely the Internet, did
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
knowingly attempt to persuade, induce, and entice an
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years to engage
in sexual activity for which an individual could be charged
with a criminal offence, to wit: the Defendant, Benjamin
Franklin Brown, arranged to meet an individual he knew from
the internet as “cheybrittney,” a 13 year old female, for the
purpose of engaging in oral sex, which constitutes a violation
of Wyoming law, specifically W.S. §6-2-304(a)(i), commonly
known as Sexual Assault in the Third Degree.
In violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b).
The defendant pled not guilty to the foregoing charge. A jury trial began on May
19, 2003, and on May 21, 2003, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. On
August 7, 2003, the defendant was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment, a $500 fine,
three years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, present counsel (who was not trial counsel) raises two issues, which he
frames as follows:
1. Whether the district court committed prejudicial error by
allowing evidence of irrelevant instances of prior bad acts to
be admitted at trial?
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing to grant
Brown’s motion for judgment of acquittal when the United
States failed to prove the “interstate commerce” element of
the offense, thereby depriving the federal district court of
jurisdiction?
The charge in the instant case resulted from an undercover online investigation
conducted by Flint Waters, a Special Agent for the Wyoming Division of Criminal
Investigation (“DCI”). At trial, Agent Waters was the government’s only witness. On
August 28, 2002, Waters, in Cheyenne, Wyoming, was “online” in a YAHOO! chat room
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titled “Wyoming Chat Room,” having assumed the persona of a 13 year-old Cheyenne,
Wyoming, girl with the YAHOO! nickname “cheybrittney.” While in the chat room,
Waters was contacted by a YAHOO! user with the screen name “brown6230,” who
“asked” “cheybrittney” if she wanted to engage in a “private chat.” Agent Waters
recognized the screen name “brown6230” because he had a “private chat of a sexual
nature” with a person using the same screen name on June 14, 2002. Thereafter, in the
“conversation” occurring on August 28, 2002, between Waters and a person who
eventually turned out to be the defendant, the two conversed about arranging a sexual
encounter between the defendant and the 13 year-old persona whom Waters pretended to
be. The details of their conversation need not be recounted, since, on appeal, except for
his claim that the evidence does not show a “use” of interstate commerce, the defendant
does not claim, as such, that there is an insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. (Jumping ahead, defendant testified at his trial and stated that he didn’t mean
what he said in his “conversation” on August 28, 2002, with Agent Waters and that he
was only “fantasizing”).
The “conversation” occurring on August 28, 2002, between Waters and the
defendant ended when the defendant agreed to meet “cheybrittney” in a parking lot in
Cheyenne at about 3:35 p.m. The defendant drove his vehicle into the parking lot at the
appointed time and remained in his car until Waters, who arrived shortly thereafter,
approached the defendant, still in his car. Waters arrested the defendant and advised him
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of his Miranda rights. The defendant first told Waters that he was in the lot to meet a
deputy sheriff who was a friend. The defendant denied using his computer earlier that
day, and said that someone must have broken into his house and used his computer.
Defendant then agreed to go with Waters to the DCI offices for further questioning.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the use at trial of the transcript of
his online conversation with Agent Waters occurring on June 14, 2002. The district
court, after hearing, granted the motion, in part, but otherwise denied it. In so doing, the
district court redacted from the transcript of the conversation on June 14, 2002, a
reference by the defendant to his possession of “pornography” and that on a prior
occasion he had sexual activity with a 13 year-old female. The motion, as indicated, was
denied as to the balance of the June 14, 2002, online “conversation” as reflected in the
transcript thereof. In so doing, the district court relied on Fed. Rules of Evidence 404,
stating, inter alia, that, though the challenged evidence was no doubt “prejudicial” to the
defendant, it was, at the same time, immensely probative of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plans, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, as are
mentioned in 404(b). On appeal, the first issue raised by counsel is that the district court
erred in refusing to suppress the entire transcript of the online “conversation” occurring
on June 14, 2002, between the defendant and Agent Waters.
A district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior “bad acts” of a defendant is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 (10th
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Cir. 1999). In this regard, in United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1141 (10th Cir.
1999), we held that, in order for a district court to admit at trial evidence of “other bad
acts” under Fed. Rules of Evidence 404(b), four requirements must be met:
(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the
evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a
Rule 403 determination of whether the probative value of the
similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice; and (4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the
trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that evidence
of similar acts is to be considered only for the proper purpose
for which it was admitted.
Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting into evidence the transcript of the “online” conversation between
the defendant and Agent Waters, occurring on June 14, 2002, after redacting a small part
thereof. We agree that under 404(b) the evidence was probative, and, arguably, extremely
so, of defendant’s motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident. We agree
with the district court that the transcript of the “conversation” occurring on June 14, 2002,
was no doubt very prejudicial to the defendant, but, at the same time, was highly
probative of the elements of the crime charged. Also, the two online “conversations”
were close in time, i.e., two months apart. All of this is especially true in light of
defendant’s testimony at trial, i.e., that in both of his “conversations” with Agent Waters
he didn’t mean what he said, and was only fantasizing. In this connection, we would also
note that trial counsel did not ask for a cautionary instruction on this matter.
Defendant also argues in his brief that the district court erred in denying his
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motions for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government’s case and
renewed after the defendant’s testimony and that of his wife. (There were only three
witnesses in the case: Agent Waters, defendant and defendant’s wife).
In those motions for judgment of acquittal, defendant argued that “because both
the defendant and Agent Waters were located in Cheyenne, Wyoming,” the prosecution
had failed to show the “interstate commerce element of the crime charged.” In this regard
the defendant, in the privacy of his own home, located on the grounds of Fort Warren Air
Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, used his computer and went “online,” inquiring about
possible sexually activity with a 13 year-old female. That message was routed through
California and was used by Agent Waters on August 28, 2002, in responding to
defendant’s inquiry. In United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), the
defendant was charged with sending a threatening communication in interstate commerce
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §875(c). In that case, both the sender and the recipient of the
threat lived in Utah. However, the message (a bomb threat) was automatically
transmitted through interstate telephone lines from the sender’s computer in Utah to the
America On Line server in Virginia and than back to Utah. We held in that case that the
“interstate commerce” requirement of the statute there involved had been met. That
would seem to cover our situation, where the message sent by the defendant in Wyoming
was routed through California and Agent Waters received the message in Wyoming from
California. In this connection, see also United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th
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Cir. 2005), where we said:
In short, the government presented sufficient evidence at trial
from which a reasonable juror could have found Munro guilty
of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts
through use of a computer connected to the Internet.
As stated, the district court granted defendant’s motion to suppress a small part of
defendant’s online “conversation” with Agent Waters occurring on June 14, 2002. When
Agent Waters read to the jury the transcript of his online conversation with the defendant
on June 14, 2002, the redacted material was not read to the jury. However, later in his
testimony, when Agent Waters was testifying about his interrogation of the defendant at
DCI headquarters on August 28, 2002, somehow, we are not quite sure just how, the
redacted part of their June 14, 2002, conversation was inadvertently heard by the jury.
(All agree it was inadvertent and not intentional). The mistake was apparently
immediately noticed by all concerned. In any event, the district court immediately
instructed the jurors, in fact, twice, that they should disregard that part of the transcript
which mentioned the statements made by the defendant in the June 14, 2002, conversation
with Agent Waters, which had been redacted. Thereafter, trial counsel, out of the
presence of the jury, immediately moved for a mistrial. After hearing, the district court
denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The jury was fully instructed to disregard
and not take into consideration the matters contained in the redacted portion of the June
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14 conversation. Presumably, the jury followed the court’s instruction.1 Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968), United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d 1267, 1277
(10th Cir. 2000).
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
1
We note that in his opening brief, counsel for the defendant did not list the
“mistrial” matter as a ground for reversal. However, counsel for the government did
discuss this matter, at some length, in his answer brief, and counsel for the defendant then
discussed the matter in his reply brief. At oral argument, the mistrial issue was the only
matter argued by counsel.
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