United States v. Hodge , 354 F. App'x 308 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 25, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-6062
v. (D.C. No. 05-CR-00160-R-2)
(W.D. Okla.)
LARRY EUGENE HODGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, SILER **, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. ***
Defendant-Appellant Larry Eugene Hodge appeals from the denial of his
motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court
determined that although amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) lowered certain base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, Mr.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
***
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument
Hodge was not eligible for resentencing because he was sentenced as a career
offender. 1 R. Doc. 82. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
Background
On November 2, 2005, Mr. Hodge pled guilty to knowingly and
intentionally distributing approximately 23.2 grams of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841 (a)(1). 1 R. Doc. 46-47. Mr. Hodge was considered accountable for 74.9
grams of cocaine base, resulting in a base offense level of 32, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 2 R. at ¶ 15. However, because Mr. Hodge had at least two
prior felony drug convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1, which resulted instead in a higher base offense level of 34. 2 R. at ¶ 20,
53. After an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Mr. Hodge’s total
offense level was 31. 2 R. at ¶¶ 21, 22. When combined with a criminal history
category of VI, mandated by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, Mr. Hodge’s guideline range was
188-235 months. 2 R. at ¶ 53. The district court sentenced Mr. Hodge to 188
months of imprisonment, the low end of the guidelines range, followed by four
years’ supervised release. 1 R. Doc. 61 at 2-3.
Subsequently, the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the
offense level applicable to most crack cocaine offenses by two levels. See U.S.
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Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 706 (Supp. May 1, 2008) (revising
crack cocaine guidelines); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend.
713 (Supp. May 1, 2008) (making Amendment 706 retroactive). Mr. Hodge then
moved for modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 1 R.
Doc. 76. The district court denied relief, 1 R. Doc. 82, and Mr. Hodge appeals, 1
R. Doc. 83.
Mr. Hodge argues that although he was sentenced as a career offender, his
sentence should be reduced under § 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive application of
the crack cocaine amendments. Aplt. Br. at 7. Also, he contends that under
Booker and later cases, the district court must treat the Guidelines as advisory
upon resentencing under § 3582(c)(2). Aplt. Br. at 10.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the
sentencing guidelines. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s
decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United
States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Because this case is not a direct appeal or an appeal from the
denial of § 2255 relief, Mr. Hodge’s motion for reduction of sentence depends
only on § 3582(c)(2). See Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238. Section 3582(c)(2) permits
a court to reduce a sentence if the sentencing range has been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.
Mr. Hodge’s sentence, however, is not based on a sentencing range that has
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been lowered. As we held in Sharkey, “Amendment 706 ha[s] no effect on the
career offender guidelines in § 4B1.1” and therefore a reduction in sentence is not
authorized under § 3582(c)(2). Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1239. Furthermore, Sharkey
rejected the argument that the Booker line of cases provides a separate basis for
relief under § 3582(c)(2). Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1239; see also United States v.
Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2052 (2009)
(concluding “that Booker simply has no bearing on sentencing modification
proceedings conducted under § 3582(c)(2)”).
Despite acknowledging Sharkey and Rhodes, Mr. Hodge urges us to revisit
these cases. Aplt. Br. at 8-18. We, however, are bound by the precedent of prior
panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the
Supreme Court. United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 752 n.14 (10th Cir.
2008).
Similarly, this court already found without merit the argument that the
Sentencing Commission’s policy statements are not binding because they
represent an unconstitutional restriction on the jurisdiction of an Article III court.
United States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009); Aplt. Br. at 10.
The policy statements of § 1B1.10(a)(2) are “merely a paraphrase of Congress’s
own language” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3582 limiting a sentence reduction to
cases in which a defendant’s sentencing range has been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. Id.-4-
Because Mr. Hodge’s status as a career offender determined his sentence,
Amendment 706 did not lower his applicable guidelines range. The district court
properly concluded that it lacked authority under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce Mr.
Hodge’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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