Sampson v. Integra Telecom Holdings, Inc. , 461 F. App'x 670 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 6, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
AARON L. SAMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 10-4227
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00120-CW)
INTEGRA TELECOM HOLDINGS,
(D. Utah)
INC., d/b/a Integra Telecom;
INTEGRA TELECOM OF UTAH,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, SEYMOUR, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Aaron Sampson, an African American, brought suit against his former
employer, Integra Telecom Holdings, Inc., and Integra Telecom of Utah, Inc.
(collectively, “Integra”), alleging that he was terminated because of his race and
in retaliation for his complaints about racial harassment in violation of Title VII
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to
Integra on all claims. Mr. Sampson appeals with respect to his retaliatory
termination claims, and we affirm. 1
Mr. Sampson was a sales representative at Eschelon Telecom, Inc., where
his job required him to sell Access Line Equivalents (“ALEs”) to new customers.
During his employment, Mr. Sampson was subjected to racially derogatory
comments and jokes by his co-workers and supervisors. Mr. Sampson complained
about these incidents, but he was never satisfied with the way Eschelon addressed
his complaints. Mr. Sampson also never met his sales quota at Eschelon. In July
2007, he was placed on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) that required
him to reach a three-month average of 70% of his three-month quota. He failed to
reach that target.
Integra acquired Eschelon on August 31, 2007. Mr. Sampson, along with
two other Eschelon sales representatives, were hired by Integra. In light of Mr.
Sampson’s PIP at Eschelon, Integra placed him on a PIP as a condition of his
hiring. While he was at Integra, Mr. Sampson continued to complain about his
treatment at Eschelon and his belief that the racially motivated conduct had not
1
“[T]he showing required to establish retaliation is identical under § 1981
and Title VII . . . .” Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1998). Therefore we consider both claims under the same analysis.
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been adequately addressed. He also reported that he was being mistreated by co-
workers at Integra.
On November 30, 2007, Mr. Sampson met with Chris Arambula, Integra’s
Vice President of Sales, who was one of Mr. Sampson’s supervisors. Mr.
Sampson again expressed his concerns about the handling of his complaints at
Eschelon and his belief that he was being mistreated by co-workers at Integra.
Mr. Sampson testified that Mr. Arambula responded by saying, “I’m disappointed
to hear that. I will look into your concerns and make sure they will be handled
appropriately. Your complaints are not going to be tolerated.” Aplt. App., vol. II
at 311. Mr. Arambula then discussed Mr. Sampson’s lackluster sales performance
and told him that his sales were not where they needed to be. The following
week, Mr. Sampson was placed on a Final Performance Improvement Plan (“Final
PIP”). He was terminated at the end of December 2007 after he failed to meet the
Final PIP’s requirements. Mr. Sampson contends he was terminated in retaliation
for having voiced complaints about racial harassment at Integra and Eschelon.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standards as the district court. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070
(10th Cir. 2004). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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Because Mr. Sampson offers no direct evidence of retaliation, we evaluate
his claim under the three-part framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this approach, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: “(1) that he engaged in
protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Argo v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for its decision. Id. If this is done, the burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s reason is merely a pretext
for retaliation. Id. at 1203.
Even assuming without deciding that Mr. Sampson established a prima
facie case of retaliation, his claim still fails. Integra offered a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for Mr. Sampson’s discharge: poor performance. See
Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Poor
performance is a quintessentially legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for
termination.”). Mr. Sampson never met his quota at Eschelon or Integra, and he
was Integra’s worst-performing salesperson in both September and November.
Mr. Sampson offers no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
believe that Integra’s proffered reason for his discharge was pretextual. A
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plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in a variety of ways, including by showing that
his employer’s proffered reason for the adverse employment action is false, the
employer acted contrary to written or unwritten policy or practice, or the
employer treated plaintiff differently from “similarly-situated employees who
violated work rules of comparable seriousness.” Kendrick v. Penske Transp.
Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that he and other employees were similarly situated. Kelley v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 220 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000).
Generally, to be similarly situated, employees must “deal with the same
supervisor and [be] subject to the same standards governing performance
evaluation and discipline.” 2 McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation mark omitted). We consider an employee’s
supervisor when evaluating whether others are similarly situated because
“[d]ifferent supervisors will inevitably react differently” to employee misconduct.
Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233. Although Dwayne Lazarre was Mr. Sampson’s
immediate supervisor at the time he was placed on the Final PIP, Mr. Arambula,
the Vice President of Sales, enacted the Final PIP and delivered it to Mr.
Sampson. Mr. Arambula also participated in the decision to terminate Mr.
2
The same supervisor test applies in this case because Mr. Sampson
provides no support for his claim that Integra engaged in a company-wide policy
of retaliation. See Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Sampson. 3 Because of Mr. Arambula’s role in disciplining Mr. Sampson, we
consider all sales representatives overseen by Mr. Arambula to determine whether
any were similarly situated to Mr. Sampson.
In an effort to show pretext, Mr. Sampson claims that other similarly
situated sales representatives were not required to meet Integra’s sales quota of 70
ALEs, no employees were terminated during his time at Integra for failing to meet
their quotas, and he was the only sales representative subjected to a PIP with a
mid-month quota.
The record belies Mr. Sampson’s claim that other sales representatives at
Integra were similarly situated to him. His closest comparators are MW and SM,
who were also retained from Eschelon during the merger. But unlike Mr.
Samson, MW and SM had better sales performances at Eschelon and were not on
any form of PIP when they began their tenure at Integra. 4 As a result, Mr.
3
Mr. Sampson claims there are conflicting accounts of who made the
decision to terminate him. But Mr. Sampson distorts the record in an effort to
establish pretext. The record shows that Mr. Arambula made the decision to place
Mr. Sampson on the Final PIP, that he discussed this decision with a human
resources representative who prepared the document, and that Mr. Lazarre agreed
the Final PIP was appropriate. See Aplt. App., vol. II at 374, 383, 367; Supp.
App. at 2, 5. The record also shows that Mr. Arambula and Mr. Lazarre both
participated in the decision to terminate Mr. Sampson. See Aplt. App., vol. II at
374-75; Supp. App. at 2.
4
Mr. Sampson attempts to create an appearance of impropriety regarding
his first Integra PIP by noting that it was not in writing. But Mr. Sampson
testified during his deposition that he was told when he was hired that he was
being put on such a plan. It is undisputed that Integra hired him only on the
condition that he be on a PIP. Moreover, whether Mr. Sampson’s termination was
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Sampson was not “subject to the same standards governing performance
evaluation,” McGowan, 472 F.3d at 745, at Integra as MW and SM. Similarly,
the other sales representatives at Integra joined the company before its merger
with Eschelon and therefore had longer sales histories than Mr. Sampson. Mr.
Sampson has not shown that any other Integra employee was on a PIP at the time
of hiring or during the months he was employed at Integra.
Even if all of the sales representatives at Integra were similarly situated,
however, Mr. Sampson has not shown he was subject to disparate treatment. All
employees with sales results similar to or worse than Mr. Sampson either quit or
were themselves fired within six months of Mr. Sampson’s termination. Further,
Integra has shown there were various other sales representative who were placed
on PIPs – including two PIPs with mid-month sales quotas – and terminated
within a few months of Mr. Sampson. 5 Even MW, who had stronger sales records
than Mr. Sampson at both Eschelon and Integra, was placed on a PIP in May 2008
retaliatory is unrelated to any alleged irregularities regarding the first PIP he was
placed on when he was hired by Integra.
5
Mr. Sampson claims that Integra’s documentation of other employees’
PIPs and terminations have irregularities that render them untrustworthy. The
district court refused to interpret these irregularities as evidence of pretext, as do
we. We agree with the district court that “Integra has offered proof that these
inconsistencies are not attempts to mislead the court or fabricate evidence . . . . In
response to this proof, Mr. Sampson has presented no evidence to the contrary,
instead arguing only that the court should assume that something improper has
occurred.” Sampson v. Integra Telecom Holdings, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-120 CW,
2010 WL 5069851, at *10 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2010).
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due to his sales performance and was terminated in June 2008 after he failed to
meet his quota. While some Integra employees had lower sales numbers than Mr.
Sampson during the five months of his employment, Integra’s failure to terminate
these employees at the exact time they terminated Mr. Sampson is insufficient for
a reasonable jury to conclude Integra’s reason for terminating Mr. Sampson was
pretextual.
Undisputed facts in the record also undermine Mr. Sampson’s claim that
the manner in which Integra enforced its employees’ sales quotas shows pretext.
As the district court noted, “Integra has shown that it did not strictly impose this
quota on anyone, including Mr. Sampson.” Sampson v. Integra Telecom
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-120 CW, 2010 WL 5069851, at *9 (D. Utah Dec. 6,
2010). Only two sales representatives met their quotas during Mr. Sampson’s
tenure at Integra. And although Mr. Sampson was placed on a PIP upon being
hired by Integra, he was not fired after selling zero ALEs in September, 42 ALEs
in October, or six ALEs in November. It is true that Mr. Sampson sold more
ALEs than any other sales representative during December 2007, but by this point
he had been placed on the Final PIP and failed to meed the end-of-month quota it
required. A reasonable jury could not find pretext in the way Integra enforced its
sales representatives’ quotas.
Finally, Mr. Sampson points to Mr. Arambula’s statement, “Your
complaints are not going be tolerated,” Aplt. App., vol. II at 311, as evidence of
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pretext. He claims this statement indicates Mr. Sampson’s complaints about the
allegedly hostile work environment were the reason for placing him on the Final
PIP and ultimately terminating him. We disagree. When read in context, Mr.
Arambula’s statement can only reasonably be understood to mean that the subject
matter of Mr. Sampson’s complaints would not be tolerated. Indeed, after this
conversation, Integra’s human resources department conducted a new
investigation into Mr. Sampson’s concerns. No reasonable jury could conclude
that Mr. Arambula’s statement is evidence of pretext.
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Integra.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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