United States v. Harris , 10 F. App'x 682 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 27 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 00-3061
v.
(D.C. No. 99-10086-01-MLB)
(District of Kansas)
SH-PONE A. HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
On November 15, 1999, Sh-Pone A. Harris pleaded guilty to the offense of
being an accessory after the fact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. In exchange for
his plea, the government agreed to recommend that Harris receive a two point
reduction in the offense level for acceptance of responsibility and to file a motion
for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1 for substantial assistance.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This Court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
At sentencing, the court considered two guilty pleas, now expunged,
entered by Harris in Oklahoma. The court rejected Harris’s motion that
considering the expunged pleas was improper under the Sentencing Guidelines,
noting that even if he had ruled in Harris’s favor, Harris would have been in the
same criminal history category for purposes of sentencing. Harris was ultimately
sentenced by the district court to serve a total prison term of thirty months.
Proceeding under Tenth Circuit Rule 46.4, Harris’s counsel has filed an
Anders brief characterizing the issue raised on appeal as frivolous and requesting
to withdraw his representation. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967) (“[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”). Because we
agree with counsel’s characterization of the argument on appeal and because he
has met the requirements of Rule 46.4, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm appellant’s sentence.
Before us, Harris argues only that the trial court incorrectly considered his
two expunged guilty pleas when applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Section
4A1.2(j) of the Guidelines provides that “[s]entences for expunged convictions
are not counted” in computing a defendant’s criminal history category. However,
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the Guidelines do not define the term “expunged.” See United States v. Hines ,
133 F.3d 1360, 1362 (10th Cir. 1998). We review the district court’s application
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Fisher , 132 F.3d 1327,
1328 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
In Hines , we considered the issue of when a conviction is “expunged” for
purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. 133 F.3d at 1362–63. We concluded that
“a state’s use of the term ‘expunge’ is not controlling in determining whether a
conviction is properly included in calculating a defendant’s criminal history
category. Instead, sentencing courts are to examine the grounds upon which a
defendant was pardoned or his sentence was set aside or expunged.” Id. at 1363.
Quoting our earlier decision in United States v. Cox , 83 F.3d 336, 339–40 (10th
Cir. 1996), we stated that
Convictions reversed or vacated for reasons related to constitutional
invalidity, innocence, or errors of law are expunged for purposes of
the Guidelines and therefore cannot be included in criminal history
calculations. . . . When convictions are set aside for reasons other
than innocence or errors of law . . . those convictions are counted for
criminal history purposes.
Hines , 133 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis and second ellipses added ) (citations omitted).
Harris does not argue his convictions were expunged because of innocence
or legal error. In fact, both convictions were expunged because Harris served his
sentences. Both orders stated that Harris’s convictions were expunged because
“the Defendant has satisfactorily discharged his responsibilities required of him
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by the Oklahoma State Department of Corrections.” (R. Doc. 115, Exs. A, B.)
Accordingly, the trial court properly considered Harris’s earlier guilty pleas in
calculating his criminal history because the expungements were not based upon
innocence or legal error.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED , and counsel’s motion to
withdraw is GRANTED .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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