Bergman v. Lacouture , 218 F. App'x 749 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 21, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
G W E N B ER GM A N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 06-1342
(D.C. No. 06-CV-761-ZLW )
JOH N R ICH AR D LA CO UTU RE, (D . Colo.)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Gwen Bergman, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of her claim for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 1 W e have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm for
substantially the same reasons as set forth in the district court’s order.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).
M s. Bergman is a federal prisoner and the mother of minor child KW B.
W hile in prison, M s. Bergman has been involved in custody proceedings against
appellee, M r. LaCouture. On April 29, 2005, a juvenile court in Garfield County,
Colorado held a custody hearing in M s. Bergman’s absence. As a result of this
hearing, M s. Bergman suffered an adverse judgment that, among other things,
allocated sole decision-making authority over K W B to M r. LaCouture.
M s. Bergman attempted to appeal this judgment by petitioning for a writ of
certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court, but her petition was denied. See In re
K.W.B., No. 06SA77, (Colo. M ar. 20, 2006). At that point, M s. Bergman’s sole
avenue of recourse was to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. M s. Bergman did not take that
path. Instead, she filed in federal district court a motion to appeal the juvenile
court’s orders, arguing that she was denied due process because she was not given
adequate notice of, or an opportunity to be heard at, the April 29, 2005, custody
hearing. R. Doc. 3 at 2-3.
Applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court concluded that its
jurisdiction was foreclosed because M s. Bergman sought review of a final
state-court judgment. Id., Doc. 11 at 3-5. In arriving at this conclusion, the
district court set forth the basis of M s. Bergman’s appeal, delineated its
procedural history, and determined that she was attempting to challenge the
juvenile court’s decision by appealing to a lower federal court. Id. at 2-4.
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Consequently, the district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it
of jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 4.
M s. Bergman now appeals the dismissal of her complaint. M s. Bergman
argues that Rooker-Feldman is not “involved” because the juvenile court’s
purported due-process violation occurred “apart from any other court order.”
Aplt. Br. at 7. She contends the injury for which she seeks redress is the juvenile
court’s failure to give her adequate notice of, and an opportunity to be heard at,
the April 29, 2005, custody hearing; she denies that her claim directly challenges
the orders resulting from that hearing. Therefore, asserting that her claim does
not directly challenge the juvenile court’s order, M s. Bergman concludes that
Rooker-Feldman did not divest the district court of jurisdiction.
W e review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006).
Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally construed, it is not the
proper function of the courts to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
W e perceive no error in the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
However M s. Bergman chooses to characterize her injury, the inescapable fact is
that her appeal sought review and rejection of a final state court judgment. 2 Her
2
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally precludes the lower federal courts
from sitting in direct review of final state-court decisions. Bolden v. City of
(continued...)
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motion filed in district court is entitled, “Appeal From State District Court Order
for the Ninth Judicial District and Dismiss the Order(s) Dated January 25, 2006
and June 9, 2005.” R. Doc. 3 at 1. Through this filing, M s. Bergman asserted
that the district court had jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order, and
expressly requested that the district court dismiss the “state [juvenile] court order
as void.” Id. at 2. Denying this request, the district court recognized that
“Rooker-Feldman bars not only cases seeking direct review of state court
judgments[, but also] cases that are inextricably intertwined with a prior state
court judgment.” Id., Doc. 11 at 4 (internal quotations omitted). The district
court explained that a claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment “[i]f adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the court to
determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void.” Id.
Thus, because M s. Bergman sought to void the juvenile court’s order, the district
court concluded that M s. Bergman’s case was barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Id. Having thoroughly reviewed the district court’s order,
M s. Bergman’s materials, the record on appeal, and the pertinent law, we agree
with the district court’s ruling and affirm for substantially the same reasons as
2
(...continued)
Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2006). Recent Supreme Court
precedent cautions against expansive interpretations of the doctrine. See Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201 (2006) (per curiam); Exxon M obil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). Notwithstanding
the Court’s recent warnings, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nonetheless
bars M s. Bergman’s claim.
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stated in the district court’s order. To the extent that M s. Bergman’s brief raises
new jurisdictional arguments not before the district court, we do not consider
them. See Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[The]
general rule [is] that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not
passed upon below.”).
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. Appellant’s motion to
proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is granted. The Clerk of
the Court is directed to enter an order assessing fees for the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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