Blum v. Federal Bureau ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 23 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHESTER L. BLUM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 99-1055
v.
(D.C. No. 98-D-2357)
(D. Colo.)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Chester Blum brought a pro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Blum raised five claims to establish
that his sentence was enhanced without due process of law by prison officials in
two related disciplinary hearings. The district court sua sponte denied Blum’s
petition for relief prior to service of process on respondent, the Federal Bureau of
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Prisons (“BOP”) and denied Blum’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal. We deny Blum’s application for in forma pauperis status, and dismiss.
We construe the dismissal of Blum’s § 2241 petition as a dismissal for
frivolousness under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because (1) he was proceeding
in forma pauperis; (2) dismissal occurred prior to service of process; and (3) the
district court found most of Blum’s claims “without merit.” See Rourke v.
Thompson , 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The district court dismissed
[plaintiff’s § 2241] petition prior to service of process on the defendants; thus,
we find that it dismissed the petition as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d),” the
precursor to § 1915(e).) We review a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for
abuse of discretion. See McWilliams v. Colorado , 121 F.3d 573, 574-75 (10th
Cir. 1997).
On February 12, 1998, Blum, a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary at
Leavenworth, Kansas, was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of escape
from a secure institution and possession, manufacture, or introduction of a
hazardous tool. Blum appealed his disciplinary conviction, and on March 31,
1998, the BOP regional director ordered a de novo rehearing of the charges. On
May 5, 1998, Blum was again found guilty of the disciplinary charges against
him, and was punished with disciplinary segregation for ninety days, loss of fifty-
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four days of good time credit, and a disciplinary transfer to the United States
Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado.
Blum asserts a due process violation at his disciplinary hearing on February
12, 1998 because his conviction was not supported by evidence in the record.
This argument fails because Blum had a de novo rehearing on May 5, 1998
regarding the disciplinary charges against him. Blum was convicted at that
rehearing and his subsequent segregation, loss of good-time credit, and transfer
were sanctions imposed as a result of the second hearing. Thus, even if there
were due process violations at the February 12, 1998 hearing, we would have no
basis for overturning Blum’s conviction at his May 5, 1998 hearing. 1
Blum’s second claim alleges a violation of due process under Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), because his May 5 rehearing was not held within a
reasonable time after it was ordered on March 31, and a violation of due process
1
Blum points us to a provision of BOP Directive 5270.07 which states:
Where a remand is directed, the appropriate Unit Discipline
Committee or DHO [Disciplinary Hearing Officer] is bound by the
original sanction(s), except where the remand is made specifically
because of the sanction . . . .
This language has no bearing on Blum’s appeal because there was no
remand directed regarding Blum’s disciplinary conviction. Rather, his
disciplinary conviction on February 12, 1998 was reheard anew on May 5.
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under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), because between March 31 and
May 5, prison officials continued to house him in harsh, disciplinary segregation. 2
In Hewitt, the Court held that while a prisoner has no right under the Due
Process Clause to remain within the general population, id. at 468, the state of
Pennsylvania had created a protected liberty interest through its prison regulations
to engage in an “informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting [the
prisoner’s] administrative confinement . . . within a reasonable time after
confining him to administrative segregation,” id. at 472. However, the Court
concluded that the prisoner received all the process due, in part because his
hearing took place five days after transfer to administrative segregation. Id. at
477. Blum compares his case to Hewitt and asserts a due process violation
occurred because prison officials violated regulations in holding his rehearing
nearly five weeks after it was ordered. 3
The error in this argument, besides the fact that the Pennsylvania
regulations at issue in Hewitt have no relevance to Blum’s federal incarceration in
Kansas, is that the Supreme Court itself no longer follows the Hewitt
2
Blum also refers to this type of segregation as “punitive” confinement or
detention.
3
We reject Blum’s conclusory assertion that we should somehow infer that
the result in his rehearing was prejudiced by the fact it was not held until May 5th
or by the fact that he had allegedly been “predesignated” to the federal prison in
Florence, Colorado. (Aplt. Br. at 11.)
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methodology to determine whether regulations create liberty interests protected by
the Due Process Clause. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Court
stated:
States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are
protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence
in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek [v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
493 (1980)] (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington [v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 221-222 (1990)] (involuntary administration of psychotropic
drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Id. at 483-84 (other internal citation omitted). In Sandin, “the Court held that the
plaintiff’s discipline in segregated confinement was not the sort of atypical,
significant deprivation that would give rise to a liberty interest entitled to due
process protection.” Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412 (10th Cir. 1996). “To
reach this conclusion, the Court carefully examined the specific conditions of the
prisoner’s confinement. The Court determined that the prisoner’s conditions
essentially < mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative
segregation and protective custody,’ so the prisoner’s < confinement did not exceed
similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of
restriction.’” Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 808-09 (10th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Sandin).
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In Perkins, this court reversed a district court dismissal of a prisoner’s due
process claim under Sandin where the prisoner alleged that he was wrongfully
confined to an eight-foot by fourteen-foot concrete cell for twenty-three and one-
half hours a day; was permitted to leave his cell for thirty minutes a day to take a
shower, but, when he left his cell, was required to wear a face mask covering his
entire head; and was not permitted to exercise outside his cell for over a year. Id.
at 809. Unlike the prisoner in Perkins, here, Blum has alleged no facts to show
that his confinement presented the type of atypical, significant deprivation that
would implicate a liberty interest. Blum alleges that his disciplinary segregation
left him without “store privileges, radio, phone calls, etc. that other inmates just
being held in segregation had the privileges of,” and that he wrongfully endured
mental stress for being punished for an offense “that was fabricated against” him.
(Aplt. Br. at 10.) Though mental stress and the loss of benefits complained of
may be difficult, we conclude that such conditions are not different in such degree
and duration as compared with “the ordinary incidents of prison life” to be a
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at
484; see also Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467 (“[L]awfully incarcerated persons retain
only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. . . [O]ur decisions have
consistently refused to recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in
prisoners.”); Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Changing
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an inmate’s prison classification ordinarily does not deprive him of liberty,
because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison.”).
Blum’s third claim alleges interference with and denial of the constitutional
right of access to the courts and a First Amendment right to petition the
government because the charges levied against him that warranted a disciplinary
hearing were supposedly “fabricated” by the investigating officer in retaliation for
Blum’s prior filing of grievances in regards to his placement in the prison’s
special housing unit. (Aplt. Br. at 12.). We reject this argument, as the district
court below did, because even if an officer were to have filed disciplinary charges
against a prisoner for retaliatory purposes, that reason by itself does not provide a
basis for this court on habeas review to expunge Blum’s underlying disciplinary
conviction. 4
Blum also alleges his due process rights were violated because he was
denied a purported mandatory right under 28 C.F.R. § 40.7 to appeal to the BOP
general counsel the regional director’s decision to rehear, instead of dismiss
outright, the disciplinary charge. 28 C.F.R. § 40.7 is contained within the
4
To the extent that Blum’s characterization of the charges against him as
“fabricated” is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, after reviewing the
record, we find that there was sufficient evidence at the May 5 rehearing to
support a conviction. Most compelling was the information provided by two
confidential sources that detailed the contraband items seized despite no
opportunity to observe the items once they were detected by the prison staff.
(App. Att. 15.)
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Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures, regulations authorized by
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b), which is part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
In relevant parts, 28 C.F.R. § 40.7 provides:
(d) Reasoned, written responses. Each grievance [filed by an inmate] shall
be answered in writing at each level of decision and review. The response
shall state the reasons for the decision reached and shall include a statement
that the inmate is entitled to further review, if such is available, and shall
contain simple directions for obtaining such review.
(e) Fixed time limits. Responses shall be made within fixed time limits at
each level of decision. Time limits may vary between institutions, but
expeditious processing of grievances at each level of decision is essential to
prevent grievance from becoming moot. Unless the grievant has been
notified of an extension of time for a response, expiration of a time limit at
any stage of the process shall entitle the grievant to move to the next stage
of the process. In all instances grievances must be processed from
initiation to final disposition within 180 days, inclusive of any extensions.
(f) Review. The grievant shall be entitled to review by a person or other
entity, not under the institution’s supervision or control, of the disposition
of all grievances, including alleged reprisals by an employee against an
inmate. A request for review shall be allowed automatically without
interference by administrators or employees of the institution and such
review shall be conducted without influence or interference by
administrators or employees of the institution.
The district court rejected Blum’s due process argument premised on these
regulations “because Mr. Blum does not allege that he was denied any of the
process to which he is entitled pursuant to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
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563-66 (1974) . . . .” 5 However, Wolff does not necessarily dispose of Blum’s
claim, because Wolff only addressed (as is relevant here) whether certain statutes
and regulations, which were complied with, violated the Due Process Clause.
Wolff did not address whether a due process claim arises when an agency violates
its own regulations. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1444-45 (10th Cir.
1996) (analyzing under Wolff, prisoner’s claim that disciplinary hearing violated
due process because unreliable evidence was admitted; separately analyzing under
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), prisoner’s claim that disciplinary
hearing violated due process because defendants failed to follow their own
established policy of banning staff members directly involved in the disciplinary
case from being the disciplinary officer because “a fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard”); see also Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d
589, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1986) (“An agency must conform its actions to the
5
To meet the standards of due process in a disciplinary proceeding under
Wolff,
the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see also Mitchell v. Maynard,
80 F.3d 1433, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996). “If there is some evidence to support the
disciplinary committee’s decision . . . then the requirements of procedural due
process have been met.” Id.-9-
procedures that it has adopted. An inmate, too, has the right to expect prison
officials to follow its policies and regulations.”) (internal citations omitted).
Nevertheless, we dismiss because even accepting Blum’s allegations as
true, there has been no violation of federal regulations. Under the regulations’
plain language, a prisoner’s claim is only entitled to review “by a person . . . not
under the institution’s supervision or control.” 28 C.F.R. § 40.7(f). Blum’s
claim was reviewed by the BOP regional director, and Blum is only arguing on
appeal that the BOP General Counsel should also have reviewed his claim. Since
the BOP General Counsel and the Regional Director are equally independent
from the local federal prison, Blum received one level of independent review,
which is all that § 40.7(f) requires. Blum does not allege, nor does the record
support, that the Regional Director was, and the General Counsel was not, under
Blum’s prison’s “supervision or control.” Accordingly, the defendants complied
with federal regulations in its handling of Blum’s grievance, and no due process
violation thereby arises.
Blum also alleges interference with and denial of the constitutional right of
access to the courts because he, once again, allegedly was denied his mandatory
right under 28 C.F.R. § 40.7 to appeal to the BOP general counsel the regional
director’s decision to rehear, instead of dismiss outright, the disciplinary charge.
According to Blum, though he had appealed the regional director’s rehearing
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order, a rehearing was held despite the absence of any resolution of his
intervening appeal to the BOP general counsel. Blum contends that under federal
regulations, once he made his appeal to the BOP general counsel, “no further
action by prison officials were allowed.” (Aplt. Br. at 13.) The district court
rejected this claim on jurisdictional grounds, finding in part that Blum had not
alleged any “actual injury” in his ability pursue a habeas petition. We agree.
An inmate alleging a violation of constitutional access to the courts “must
show actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Penrod v.
Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (interpreting Lewis).
For example, an inmate cannot bring a constitutional access to the court claim
simply because that person’s prison law library is subpar. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at
351. Rather, such an inmate “must go one step further and demonstrate that the
alleged shortcomings in the library . . . hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim.” Id.; see also id. (stating that healthy inmate in a prison cannot claim
constitutional violation because of inadequacy of the prison infirmary). Here,
Blum has failed to show how an error, if any, in holding the disciplinary rehearing
before resolution of his appeal to the BOP general counsel “hindered his efforts to
pursue a legal claim” in the courts. Therefore, Blum has not suffered an actual
injury from the alleged violation of internal grievance procedures, and his
constitutional access to the courts claim was properly dismissed below. See
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Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990); (“[A]n isolated incident,
without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [the
prisoner’s] right to . . . access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional
violation.”).
Blum’s fourth claim specifically alleges a denial of procedural due process
under Wolff v. McDonnell. In particular, Blum contends that he was denied
advance written notice of the May 5 rehearing, even though he received written
notice of the original February 12 hearing, and even though he received oral
notice of the rehearing. Blum argues that he was entitled to a written notice for
the rehearing “due to changes in the charge or evidence.” (Aplt. Br. at 22.)
However, the record belies any suggestion that the charges against Blum changed
at the rehearing, and, as the district court explained, under Wolff, Blum is entitled
to advance written notice of the disciplinary charges against him, not to written
notice of the evidence that will be used at the disciplinary hearing.
Blum’s fifth and final claim also alleges a denial of due process because
the disciplinary hearing officer did not assess whether admitted evidence from
two confidential informants was reliable. For the same reasons well-articulated
below, we disagree. The reliability of the confidential informants was established
by “some evidence” in the record, as the written statement of reasons indicates
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that “the confidential informants had corroborating statements which added to
their credibility.”
The appeal is DISMISSED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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