Fox v. Noram Energy ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Tenth Circuit
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 844-3157
Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk
October 25, 1999
TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT
RE: 98-6141, Fox v. Noram Energy Corporation
Filed on October 21, 1999
The first paragraph of the order and judgment contains a clerical error. The first
paragraph is replaced in its entirety by the following paragraph:
The plaintiffs Jason Fox, Jeremy Callaway, and Elliot Byers seek to appeal the
district court's grant of summary judgment in this diversity negligence action.
The plaintiffs also challenge the district court's denial of their motion to
reconsider the summary judgment ruling. We first conclude that, because the
plaintiffs did not comply with the time limitations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) in
filing their motion to reconsider, the district court properly characterized the
plaintiffs' motion to reconsider as a motion for relief from the judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As a result, we may not now directly review the district
court's initial summary judgment ruling. We further conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider
under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) standards.
A corrected copy of the order and judgment is attached.
Sincerely,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By : Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
encl.
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 21 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JASON FOX, JEREMY CALLAWAY,
and ELLIOT BYERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 98-6141
v. (D.C. No. CIV-96-0372-L)
(Western District of Oklahoma)
NORAM ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Delaware Corporation, formerly known as
ARKLA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HENRY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and KIMBALL, District Judge,**
The plaintiffs Jason Fox, Jeremy Callaway, and Elliot Byers seek to appeal the
district court's grant of summary judgment in this diversity negligence action. The
plaintiffs also challenge the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider the
summary judgment ruling. We first conclude that, because the plaintiffs did not comply
with the time limitations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) in filing their motion to reconsider, the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Dale A. Kimball, United States District Judge for the
District of Utah, sitting by designation.
district court properly characterized the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider as a motion for
relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As a result, we may not now
directly review the district court's initial summary judgment ruling. We further conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) standards.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of carbon monoxide poisoning suffered by the plaintiffs on
March 12, 1994 at the home of Becky Kent in Chickasha, Oklahoma. The carbon
monoxide came from a defective furnace, and the plaintiffs allege that Noram, which
provided gas to Ms. Kent’s home, had notice of the defect, failed to take remedial action,
and thereby caused their injuries.
After the parties conducted discovery, Noram moved for summary judgment. In a
July 31, 1997 order, the district court granted the motion. Summarizing the relevant facts,
the court noted that the “plaintiffs did not directly dispute any of defendant’s undisputed
facts.” See Aplt’s App., doc. 1-D, at 2 n.2. Pursuant to a local court rule, the court
therefore based its legal conclusions on Noram’s statement of uncontroverted facts.
Relying on Noram’s account, the court found that “from the time of the installation of the
furnace until the time of the accident, no one living in the house made any complaints to
[Noram] regarding the furnace.” Id. at 2. Although Ms. Kent had complained to the
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company about a hissing noise emanating from the gas meter, Noram responded to her
complaint, discovered a leak in the meter, and repaired it.
In granting summary judgment to Noram, the court invoked a decision holding
that:
The consumer, by application for gas service, assumes the
burden of inspecting and maintaining in a safe condition the
pipe and fittings on his property, and the gas company has the
right to assume that this duty will be performed. A gas
company which does not install its customers pipes’ and has
no control over them, is in no way responsible for the
condition in which they are maintained, and is not liable for
injuries caused by leaks therein, of which it has no
knowledge.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted) (quoting Muniz v. Masco Corp., 744 F. Supp. 266, 267-68
(W.D. Okla. 1990)).
The plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal of the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Noram. However on August 11, 1997, they did file a motion to
reconsider the district court’s summary judgment ruling. On August 18, 1997, the district
court struck the motion for failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(c), which limits briefs
to twenty-five pages. See Aplt’s App. doc. 52-B. On the following day, the plaintiffs
filed an “Application to Reduce Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider to 25 pages by Using A
Smaller Font and Spacing.” See id. doc. 50. The court granted the application on August
25, 1997, and the next day the plaintiffs filed another motion to reconsider. The plaintiffs
informed this court at oral argument that, aside from the changes in font size and spacing,
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the second motion to reconsider was identical to the first one.
On March 2, 1997, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.
See id., doc. 1-C. Observing that the motion was not filed within the ten-day period after
the entry of judgment, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the court said that it would
treat the plaintiffs’ second motion as a motion for relief from the judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The court found the “exceptional circumstances” necessary for granting
relief under Fed. R. 60(b) to be lacking, and it therefore denied the motion. It concluded
that the plaintiffs had basically asserted the same arguments that they had already
presented to the district court in response to Noram’s summary judgment motion.
Although the plaintiffs did attempt to present some additional information, the court
found that they had failed to offer a sufficient explanation for their failure to present this
information in their initial response.
The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal of the district court’s March 2, 1997
order. However, they did not file a separate notice of appeal within thirty days of the
court’s July 31, 1997 order granting Noram’s motion for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in characterizing their
motion to reconsider as a motion for relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
rather than as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). They
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note that characterizing their second motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Rule 59 would allow this court to review the merits of the district court’s summary
judgment ruling (rather than merely the motion to reconsider). See Artes-Roy v. City of
Aspen, 31 F.3d 958, 961 n. 5 (10th Cir.1994) (observing that an appeal from the denial of
a Rule 59 motion is sufficient to permit consideration of the merits of the underlying
summary judgment ruling if the appeal is otherwise proper). They maintain that there is
evidence in the record supporting their contention that Noram had actual notice of the
defective furnace and that, as a result, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the company.
As the district court observed, Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend
the judgment must be filed within ten days of the entry of the judgment. Rule 6 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the time for filing a motion to alter or amend
the judgment under Rule 59(e) may not be extended “except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in [Rule 59 itself].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Because Rule 59 does not
authorize an extension of the time for filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the
district court lacks authority to grant such an extension. See Parker v. Board of Pub.
Utils. of Kansas City, Kan., 77 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 1996); Collard v United States,
10 F.3d 718, 719 (10th Cir. 1993).
“[I]f the motion is filed more than ten days after the entry of judgment, it is
considered a motion seeking relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).”
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Hatfield v. Board of County Comm’rs for Converse, County, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir.
1995). The distinction between a Rule 59 motion and a Rule 60 motion is significant in
preserving the right to appeal. The filing of a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time
period for filing a notice of appeal of the underlying judgment, while the filing of a Rule
60(b) motion more than ten days after the entry of the judgment does not. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv), (vi).
A. The Proper Characterization of the Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Reconsider
The plaintiffs maintain that the district court should have treated their second
motion to reconsider as a timely Rule 59(e) motion, even though it was not filed until
August 26, 1993 (well after the expiration of the ten-day period from the July 31, 1997
entry of judgment in favor of Noram). The plaintiffs’ theory is that because it was
identical in all respects but font size and spacing to the motion to reconsider that they
sought to file on August 11, 1997 (within the ten day period for Rule 59(e) motions), the
motion filed on August 26, 1997 should “relate back” such that it is deemed to have been
filed on August 11, 1997.1 Given the tolling effect of a timely Rule 59(e) motion, the
relation back of the second motion would render the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal timely as
to the underlying summary judgment ruling and would allow this court to review the
1
Here, the last day for filing a timely Rule 59 motion, August 10, 1997, fell
on a Sunday. Accordingly, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), the plaintiffs had until August 11,
1997 to file the motion.
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merits of that ruling in this appeal.
The plaintiffs’ argument is not supported by our precedent. Our decisions have
repeatedly held, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, that a district court lacks the authority to
extend the time for filing a Rule 59 motion. See Parker, 77 F.3d at 1291; Collard, 10 F.3d
at 719. The Supreme Court has indicated that there may be certain “unique
circumstances” in which a district court’s mistaken statements about the timeliness of a
Rule 59 motion have caused a party not to file a timely notice of appeal of the underlying
judgment and in which the misled party should be allowed to pursue the appeal. See
Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964). However, that exception “applies only
where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline
for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act
has been properly done.” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989)
(emphasis added).
In this case, the plaintiffs did not receive “specific assurance” from the district
court that they had filed a timely Rule 59 motion. The court struck the plaintiffs’ first
motion to reconsider because it violated a local rule. Although it granted the plaintiffs
permission to file a second motion to reconsider, there is no indication in the record that
the court informed the parties how it would treat the second motion. The court’s order
granting the plaintiffs’ application simply states that the plaintiffs will be allowed to file
the motion; the order does not state that the motion will be treated as a Rule 59 motion or
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a Rule 60 motion, or that the time for the plaintiffs to file a notice of appeal of the
underlying summary judgment ruling will be extended.
In the absence of such a specific assurance from the district court, the plaintiffs
were chargeable with knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local
rules of court. “Rules of procedure are vitally important in judges’ efforts to manage
burgeoning caseloads with some semblance of efficiency.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n v.
Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994). “Valid local rules are an
important vehicle by which courts operate,” and they “carry the force of law.” Id. Here,
the district court reasonably applied the local rules and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See id. (concluding that “[w]ithin wide limits, it is for courts, not litigants, to
decide what rules are desirable and how rigorously to enforce them.”). Under those rules,
when the plaintiffs failed to file within the ten-day period established by Rule 59 a
motion to alter or amend the judgment that complied with applicable page limitation,
their second motion to reconsider was properly treated as a Rule 60 motion, and the time
period for filing a notice of appeal of the underlying summary judgment motion was not
tolled.
The First Circuit’s decision in Air Line Pilots Ass’n provides further support for
this conclusion. There, the district court struck a motion to reconsider a summary
judgment ruling because it failed to comply with a local rule. The court struck the first
motion (which the plaintiffs had submitted within the ten-day period established by Fed.
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Rawle Civ. P. 59(e)), and the plaintiff then filed a second motion that complied with the local
rule but that was submitted outside the ten day period. After the district court denied the
second motion, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in which it sought to challenge not
only the denial of the motion to reconsider but also the underlying summary judgment
ruling. Noting that the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion could not be extended, the
First Circuit held that the second motion to reconsider did not relate back to the first
motion and that the second motion “cannot serve as a vehicle for restarting the appeal
period because it was filed beyond the 10-day period stipulated in Rule 59(e).” Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, 26 F.3d at 225. The court therefore concluded that it could not review the
summary judgment ruling on the merits, and it considered only the district court’s
decisions denying the plaintiff’s timely post-trial motions.
The same approach is warranted here. Because the plaintiffs did not file a timely
notice of appeal of the district court’s July 31, 1997 summary judgment ruling, we will
not review the merits of that ruling. Because the district court struck the plaintiffs’ first
motion to reconsider pursuant to a reasonable application of binding local rules and did
not give the plaintiffs any specific assurance that their second motion to reconsider would
be treated as a Rule 59 motion, we conclude that the district court properly characterized
the plaintiffs’ second motion to reconsider as a Rule 60(b) motion, and we will review
that decision accordingly.
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B. The Denial of the Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to grant
relief from an order or a judgment on a number of specific grounds, including
inadvertence, excusable neglect, fraud, and newly discovered evidence. “Relief under
Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Bud
Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule
60(b) for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs do not contest the district court’s conclusion
that their motion to reconsider presented many of the same arguments that were advanced
in response to Noram’s initial motion for summary judgment. As to the new information
presented in support of the motion, the plaintiffs have not explained why this information
was not presented in their initial response to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’
motion to reconsider under the Rule 60(b) standards.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the district court’s July 31, 1997 order granting summary judgment to the
defendant Noram. We AFFIRM the district court’s March 2, 1998 order denying the
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plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
PER CURIAM
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