Homans v. City of Albuquerque ( 2002 )


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  •                                                               F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    PUBLISH
    SEP 6 2001
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    PATRICK FISHER
    TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk
    RICK HOMANS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 No. 01-2271
    CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,
    a Municipal corporation; MARGIE
    BACA ARCHULETA, in her capacity
    as Clerk of the City of Albuquerque,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ON EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
    (D.C. No. 01-CV-917-MV)
    Submitted on the briefs:
    Thomas C. Bird and Richard L. Alvidrez, of Keleher & McLeod, P.A.,
    Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Randy M. Autio and Daniel E. Ramczyk, Assistant City Attorneys, Albuquerque,
    New Mexico; Brenda Wright and John C. Bonifaz, of National Voting Rights
    Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before KELLY and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM .
    Plaintiff-Appellant Rick Homans has filed an emergency motion for an
    injunction pending appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 8; 10th Cir. R. 8.1 & 8.2, and an
    alternative motion for suspension of the appellate rules and expedited review of
    the district court’s denial of his application for a preliminary injunction, Fed. R.
    App. P. 2, 10th Cir. R. 2 We find that the emergency motion for an injunction
    pending appeal is well taken and should be granted thereby obviating the need to
    decide the alternative motion.
    Background
    Plaintiff-Appellant, Rick Homans is a duly qualified mayoral candidate in
    the upcoming October 2, 2001, Albuquerque mayoral election. He brought this
    action against Defendants-Appellees, the City of Albuquerque, and Margie Baca
    Archuleta, Clerk of the City of Albuquerque, seeking declaratory relief that
    Article XIII, Section 4(d)(2) of the Albuquerque City Charter violates the First
    Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also sought a preliminary and
    permanent injunction against the City and the Clerk enjoining them from
    enforcing the provision. That provision limits the acceptance of campaign
    contributions and expenditures by mayoral candidates to $174,720.00 1 The
    1
    In pertinent part, the provision states:
    (continued...)
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    district court found that under the terms of the City Charter, Mr. Homans is
    subject to a $500 fine for each violation of the expenditure limitations and, if Mr.
    Homans is successful in his bid for mayor, a potential public reprimand and
    removal from office by the Albuquerque City Council. D. Ct. Memo. Op. &
    Order at 2. Mr. Homans does not challenge the limitation on individual campaign
    contributions of no more than 5% of the mayor’s annual salary contained in
    Article XIII , Section 4(e) of the Albuquerque City Charter. I App. Doc. 3 at 1
    n.1.
    After a hearing, the district court granted Mr. Homans a temporary
    restraining order. Ten days later, the district court held another hearing, receiving
    further evidence, and denied a preliminary injunction. The district court
    acknowledged that the Supreme Court had invalidated, on First Amendment
    grounds, certain federal provisions limiting campaign expenditures, while
    1
    (...continued)
    (d)   Limits to Campaign Financing.      No candidate shall allow or
    accept contributions or make expenditures in excess of the
    following for any election:
    ....
    (2)    To a candidate for the office of Mayor, contributions or
    expenditures equal to twice the amount of the annual
    salary paid by the City of Albuquerque to the Mayor as
    of the date of filing of the Declaration of Candidacy.
    I App. Doc. 3, Ex. D. The current mayoral salary is $87,360.00.      Id. Doc. 3 at 4;
    Doc. 4 at 2.
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    upholding other provisions limiting campaign contributions. D. Ct. Memo. Op. &
    Order at 10 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
     (1976) (per curiam)). However,
    the district court was persuaded to read the holding of Buckley v. Valeo narrowly
    based not only on the passage of time, but also by “[t]he abundance of judicial
    commentary on compelling governmental interests which fall outside the ambit of
    Buckley . . . .” Memo. Op. & Order at 10. The district court determined that the
    expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to meet compelling governmental
    interests, specifically, preserving faith in democracy and reducing the appearance
    of corruption. The district court found an inverse relationship between voter
    turnout and campaign expenditures, at least in Albuquerque. It also determined
    that the public favors spending limits as improving the fairness of elections and
    insuring that all may become candidates, regardless of financial resources,
    without becoming beholden to special interests.
    Discussion
    For us to consider a request for a stay or an injunction pending appeal, 10th
    Cir. R. 8.1 requires the applicant to address the following: “(a) the likelihood of
    success on appeal; (b) the threat of irreparable harm if the stay or injunction is not
    granted; (c) the absence of harm to opposing parties if the stay or injunction is
    granted; and (d) any risk of harm to the public interest.” In ruling on such a
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    request, this court makes the same inquiry as it would when reviewing a district
    court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. McClendon v. City of
    Albuquerque, 
    100 F.3d 863
    , 868 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, we must consider,
    based on a preliminary record, whether the district court abused its discretion and
    whether the movant has demonstrated a clear and unequivocal right to relief.
    Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 
    256 F.3d 1061
    , 1066 (10th Cir. 2001).
    The district court determined that Mr. Homans had not shown a likelihood
    of success on the merits because Buckley v. Valeo did not present an absolute bar
    to expenditure limits and the expenditure provision was narrowly tailored to meet
    a compelling governmental interest. It also determined that the public interest
    was better served by the denial of an injunction given public opinion about the
    benefits of expenditure limitations and the probable increased voter turnout with
    those limitations. Recognizing the importance of Mr. Homans’ First Amendment
    right to political expression, the district court found that Mr. Homans made a
    sufficient showing of irreparable harm to merit a preliminary injunction and that
    the balance of the harms favored Mr. Homans. 2
    Before turning to these factors, Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(C) also requires that
    a motion for an injunction while an appeal is pending must ordinarily be made
    first in the district court. Mr. Homans suggests that he should be excused from
    2
    We agree.
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    this requirement because the district court would essentially make the same
    inquiry it made before and only a short time remains before the October 2, 2001
    election. Although it remains this court’s strong preference that relief pending
    appeal be sought first in the district court, we have excused this requirement
    where another application to the district court would serve little purpose.
    McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 
    79 F.3d 1014
    , 1020 (10th Cir. 1996). We do
    so here because of the immediacy of the problem and the district court’s legal
    error concerning the First Amendment.
    Mr. Homans has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
    merits on his First Amendment claim that campaign expenditure limitations are
    unconstitutional given the Supreme Court’s clear statement that such limitations
    are subject to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First
    Amendment rights of political expression” and do not survive even under the
    rationale of (1) deterring corruption and preventing evasion of contribution limits,
    (2) equalizing the financial resources of the candidates, and (3) restraining the
    cost of election campaigns for its own sake. Buckley, 
    424 U.S. at 54-55
    . In
    arguing that Buckley need not be overruled to sustain expenditure limitations,
    Defendants remind us that “[t]he facts do matter, even when the courts are
    applying the strictest standard of constitutional review.” Aplees. Memo. at 9.
    When it comes to the First Amendment, however, an appellate court makes an
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    independent examination of the record to protect against the diminution of First
    Amendment rights. Wells v. City & County of Denver, 
    257 F.3d 1132
    , 1146-47
    (10th Cir. 2001).
    The district court made factual findings to support its identification of
    compelling governmental interests served by the expenditure limitations. The
    compelling governmental interests identified by the district court, under the broad
    headings of preserving faith in democracy and deterring the appearance of
    corruption, are really no different than the interests deemed insufficient to justify
    expenditure limitations in Buckley.
    The district court also perceived that the Supreme Court currently was
    divided over Buckley’s scope. It bears noting that the Supreme Court cases relied
    upon by the district court all involve limitations on contributions, and even then,
    the statements are not those of a majority even if joined by other members of the
    Court. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
    Election Comm’n, 
    518 U.S. 604
    , 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting); Nixon v.
    Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 
    528 U.S. 377
    , 405 (2000) (Breyer, J.
    concurring); 
    id. at 409
     (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Moreover, the Supreme Court
    has not suggested that the distinction between campaign expenditures and
    campaign contributions is about to change. FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
    Campaign Committee, 
    121 S. Ct. 2351
    , 2356 (2001) (“We first examined the
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    Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 in Buckley v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 612
    , 
    46 L. Ed. 2d 659
     (1976) (per curiam), where we held that the Act's
    limitations on contributions to a candidate's election campaign were generally
    constitutional, but that limitations on election expenditures were not. 
    Id., at 12-59
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 612
    . Later cases have respected this line between contributing
    and spending.”).
    The district court also relied upon a concurring opinion in Kruse v. City of
    Cincinnati, 
    142 F.3d 907
    , 919-20 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, D.J., concurring),
    suggesting that Buckley might not be the last word on expenditure limits. We
    note that the panel in Kruse held an expenditure limitation invalid on the strength
    of Buckley, employing an analysis similar to that we employ here. Similarly, in
    Landell v. Sorrell, 
    118 F. Supp. 2d 459
    , 481-83 (D. Vt. 2000), a district court
    invalidated a campaign expenditure limitation in Vermont.
    Having determined that Mr. Homans has demonstrated a substantial
    likelihood of success on the merits, we believe that the public interest is better
    served by following binding Supreme Court precedent and protecting the core
    First Amendment right of political expression. Although Defendants argue that
    Mr. Homans has not demonstrated irreparable harm because he should have
    sought a judicial determination before exceeding the expenditure limitations and
    seeking federal injunctive relief, we are unpersuaded. Mr. Homans was not
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    required to participate in state court proceedings to vindicate his federal rights,
    see Edwards v. Balisok, 
    520 U.S. 641
    , 649 (1997) (Ҥ 1983 contains no judicially
    imposed exhaustion requirement”) and Mr. Homans reasonably relied upon
    assurances that the expenditure caps would not be enforced.
    Because all of the requirements have been satisfied for an injunction
    pending appeal, Defendants City of Albuquerque and Defendant Margie Baca
    Archuleta, in her capacity of Clerk of the City of Albuquerque, are hereby
    enjoined from further enforcing Article XIII, Section 4(d)(2) of the Albuquerque
    City Charter, pending further order of this court.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
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