United States v. Hardy , 479 F. App'x 178 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 15, 2012
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 12-6045
    v.                                             (D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00123-F-1)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    JAMES SIDNEY HARDY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
    Defendant-Appellant, James Sidney Hardy, appeals from the district court’s
    denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). We
    have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a), and
    affirm.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Background
    On April 12, 2010, Mr. Hardy pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
    distribute approximately one ounce of a mixture or substance containing a
    detectable amount of cocaine base (crack), in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).
    See Order, United States v. Hardy, No. CR-10-123-F, ECF No. 51, at 1 (W.D.
    Okla. Feb. 8, 2012) (hereinafter “Order”). He was sentenced to 96 months on
    May 18, 2011, to run consecutively with any other sentence. 
    Id.
    In the original presentence report, Mr. Hardy’s base offense level was 32
    based upon 290 grams of crack cocaine. See Order at 1. His offense level was
    lowered by three for acceptance of responsibility. 
    Id.
     His guideline range was
    140 to 175 months based upon a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history
    category V. 
    Id.
     After the disclosure of the initial presentence report, the district
    court noted that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”) had been enacted, and
    entered an order abating sentencing proceedings. ECF No. 33 (W.D. Okla. Aug.
    9, 2010). A revised report was issued on December 29, 2010, 2 Aplt. App. 1,
    applying the November 1, 2010 advisory guidelines that implemented the FSA,
    but the guideline range remained at 140 to 175 months. See Order at 2. The FSA
    was not applied retroactively.
    Mr. Hardy filed a motion for reduction of sentence, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). ECF No. 47 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 28, 2011). The court denied the
    motion on February 8, 2012, because Mr. Hardy’s guideline range had not been
    -2-
    subsequently lowered by the FSA and the 18-to-1 ratio in the FSA was not
    retroactive. See Order at 2. The court referred to Mr. Hardy’s conduct as “dope
    dealing” and stated that it would not reduce Mr. Hardy’s sentence (even if it
    could) because the 96-month sentence was significantly below the guideline range
    and constituted “minimal punishment for selling this poison into the community.”
    See Order at 3. This appeal followed.
    Discussion
    We review de novo the scope of a district court’s authority under
    § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Williams, 
    575 F.3d 1075
    , 1076 (10th Cir.
    2009). Mr. Hardy argues that, despite the fact that his guidelines range did not
    change with the application of the new guidelines, Aplt. Br. 3, his sentence should
    have been lowered. He claims that it was not lowered due to judicial bias. 
    Id.
    Though the judge’s remarks were not necessary to the resolution of the
    motion, they did not originate from an extrajudicial source and certainly do not
    reveal “such a high degree of . . . antagonism as to make fair judgment
    impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994). Most important,
    the district court could not modify Mr. Hardy’s sentence based on § 3582(c)(2)
    because his sentencing range was not “lowered” by the Sentencing
    Commission—it stayed the same. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Mr. Hardy further
    argues that he should have been sentenced below the five-year mandatory
    -3-
    minimum and that the FSA should be applied retroactively to his case. Aplt. Br.
    4. Though the government suggests several reasons why Mr. Hardy is not eligible
    for such treatment, Aplee. Br. 9-10, this circuit has held that the FSA does not
    apply retroactively. See United States v. Lewis, 
    625 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (10th Cir.
    2010); see, also, United States v. Sidney, 
    648 F.3d 904
    , 906 (8th Cir. 2011);
    United States v. Fisher, 
    635 F.3d 336
    , 338-40 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
    Carradine, 
    621 F.3d 575
    , 580 (6th Cir. 2010).
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-6045

Citation Numbers: 479 F. App'x 178

Judges: Gorsuch, Kelly, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 6/15/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023