United States v. Deollos ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 7 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 97-8066
v. (D.C. No. 97-CR-18)
(D. Wyo.)
ALFREDO DEOLLOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.**
This appeal requires us to decide whether the government breached its plea
agreement with Defendant by refusing to file a motion in the district court for a
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Exercising
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that the government did not
breach the plea agreement and affirm.
On January 18, 1997, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with
one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in respective violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Instead of proceeding to trial, Defendant and the government entered
into a plea agreement whereby Defendant agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine and the government agreed to dismiss the remaining count.
The plea agreement also contains additional terms defining the government’s obligations
to Defendant and the government’s position regarding application of the sentencing
guidelines to Defendant. Specifically, the agreement states that the government believed
Defendant distributed between ten and thirty kilograms of methamphetamine, that
Defendant was entitled to a three-level downward departure for accepting responsibility,
and that the applicable sentencing guideline range would be between 151 and 188
months. The agreement further provides that Defendant was free to argue for an
additional downward departure at sentencing. The parties included no language
suggesting that the government would file a motion for downward departure pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
At the change of plea hearing, before Defendant became bound by the plea
agreement, the government clearly stated that it would not file a motion for downward
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departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Rec. Vol. IV at 8-9.
However, the prosecutor stated that the government would “certainly be open to
discussions along those lines” at a later time. Id. Subsequently, a DEA agent interviewed
Defendant regarding his willingness to participate in the government’s investigation
against Will Smith. Defendant provided certain information to the agent which was later
combined with other evidence to indict Smith. Defendant then filed a motion to compel
the government to move for a substantial assistance downward departure pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The district court concluded that the
government was not bound under the agreement to move for the downward departure and
denied the motion.
The government has wide discretion in determining whether to move for a
substantial assistance downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e). Indeed, our review of the government’s decision not to move for a downward
departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 is typically limited to determining whether the decision was
based on an unconstitutional motive or was not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). Thus,
even if a Defendant renders substantial assistance to the government, the government
retains discretion to decide whether to move for a substantial assistance downward
departure. United States v. Courtois, 1997 WL 763464 at *2 (10th Cir. 1997). The
government may bargain away this discretion, however, in a plea agreement. Id.3
We review whether the government breached the plea agreement de novo. United
States v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1997). Guided by
contract principles, we examine the nature of the prosecutor’s promise based upon what
Defendant reasonably understood when he entered into the plea agreement. Id. Whether
the government is bound under a plea agreement to move for a substantial assistance
downward departure turns on the specific language of the agreement. Courtois, 1997 WL
763464 at *2. In order to find that the government bargained away its discretion to file a
motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), we have generally required an
express promise by the government. Id. Thus, where the language of the plea agreement
is equivocal and merely leaves open the possibility that the government may move for a
substantial assistance downward departure in the future, the government does not breach
the agreement by refusing to file the motion. Id.Defendant contends that the government breached the plea agreement by refusing
to file a motion asking the district court to depart downward pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
and 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). Specifically, Defendant argues that the government became
bound under the plea agreement to file the motion when a DEA agent gained information
from him which was later used to procure an indictment against Will Smith. We disagree.
The plea agreement before us contains no language indicating an express or
implied duty on the government’s part to file a motion for downward departure under
either U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). On the contrary, the agreement clearly
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suggests that, aside from the government’s acquiescence to a three-level departure
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, any arguments in favor of further downward departures
rested with Defendant. Additionally, no statements made at the change of plea hearing or
in the prosecutor’s statement expressly bargained away the prosecutor’s discretion to
move for a substantial assistance downward departure. The prosecutor’s statement
clearly states that “at this point, [the government] does not intend to file a motion for
downward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 U.S.S.G. or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).” Rec. Vol. I,
Tab 17 at 10. Moreover, the prosecutor’s statement at the change of plea hearing that
“[a]t some point in time we’re certainly open to further discussions along those lines, but
at this point . . . we’re not prepared to file 5K1 [sic]. . .,” Rec. Vol. IV at 8-9, suggests an
intention to retain, not bargain away, its discretion.
Construing the plea agreement according to Defendant’s reasonable understanding
at the time he entered into it, we conclude that government did not breach the agreement
by refusing to file a motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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