Garrett v. Bryan Cave LLP ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    APR 21 2000
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MICHAEL B. GARRETT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                     No. 98-6282
    BRYAN CAVE LLP, A Missouri                        (D.C. No. 97-CV-165)
    Professional Partnership/corporation;                 (W.D. Okla.)
    STIFEL NICOLAUS & COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED,
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT         *
    Before BRISCOE and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KIMBALL , District
    Judge. **
    This case arises from plaintiff Michael B. Garrett’s allegations against his
    former counsel, defendant Bryan Cave LLP (“Bryan Cave”), and his former
    employer, defendant Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. (“Stifel”). Garrett alleges
    that Bryan Cave committed malpractice by disclosing confidential information
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    **
    The Honorable Dale A. Kimball, United States District Judge for the
    District of Utah, sitting by designation.
    and by failing to protect his interests during a “proffer” session with the United
    States Attorney’s office. According to Garrett, Bryan Cave’s malpractice caused
    government officials to file insupportable criminal charges against him. The
    district court entered summary judgment for Bryan Cave, holding that Garrett
    could not establish causation and damages. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    I
    This litigation focuses on activities in Stifel’s Oklahoma City municipal
    bond office. Garrett was employed by Stifel from 1987 through 1995. During
    that time he worked at Stifel’s Oklahoma City office, which was headed by
    Robert Cochran. Bond issues that were underwritten by the Oklahoma City office
    came under suspicion in the early 1990s, spawning at least three lawsuits. Bond
    issuers filed a civil action in 1994 against Garrett and Stifel involving a Shawnee
    Hospital transaction (the “   Shawnee litigation”). After conducting an
    investigation, the SEC filed a complaint against Garrett and other Stifel
    employees in 1995. The FBI and the United States Attorney’s office conducted
    their own investigation, and filed criminal charges against Garrett and Cochran in
    1995.
    Bryan Cave represented Garrett during the   Shawnee litigation and the SEC
    investigation. Bryan Cave attorney Tom Archer began representing Stifel and
    2
    Garrett in the Shawnee litigation in the Spring of 1994.    The litigation concluded
    in late 1995. Garrett was initially represented by outside attorney Dino Viera in
    the SEC investigation, while Archer and other Bryan Cave attorneys represented
    Stifel. In 1994, Archer began representing Garrett in the SEC matter,       and
    appeared on Garrett’s behalf at one of Garrett’s SEC interviews.        Archer
    terminated his representation of Garrett in the SEC matter in August 1995.
    On July 19, 1995, Bryan Cave attorneys participated in a proffer session
    with federal authorities on Stifel’s behalf. Archer, Dan O’Neill of Bryan Cave,
    and Andy Coats from the law firm of Crowe & Dunlevy represented Stifel.
    Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Susan Cox, FBI agent Michael
    Shook, and FBI agent Steven Kaitcer represented the government. Garrett was
    not present at the proffer session. On August 4, 1995, Stifel and the United States
    Attorney’s office reached an agreement under which the government promised not
    to prosecute Stifel in exchange for Stifel’s full cooperation in the investigation of
    its Oklahoma City office.
    On September 20, 1995, the United States Attorney’s office filed a criminal
    indictment against Garrett and Cochran. The indictment charged Garrett with
    mail and wire fraud in connection with certain bond transactions.       Garrett moved
    to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s participation in the
    proffer session and its cooperation with Bryan Cave attorneys violated his
    3
    constitutional rights. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court in the
    criminal case concluded that “[t]he evidence does not support Garrett’s contention
    that the government’s conduct was so egregious as to warrant dismissal under
    these circumstances.”   Appellant’s Brief in Chief, Exh. A, at 10.   1
    Garrett was
    acquitted of all charges against him at trial.
    Garrett filed suit against Bryan Cave and Stifel in 1997. Garrett alleges
    that Bryan Cave disclosed sensitive information to federal prosecutors and failed
    to protect Garrett’s interests before, during, and after the proffer session.
    According to Garrett, these purported breaches of duty led federal prosecutors to
    file unwarranted criminal charges against him. Garrett contends that he was
    forced to spend more than $135,000 to defend himself against these charges.
    The district court entered judgment as a matter of law against Garrett on
    two grounds. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Bryan
    Cave disclosed confidential or privileged information to the United States
    Attorney’s office, and that no reasonable jury could conclude that Bryan Cave’s
    alleged breaches of duty caused the government to indict Garrett.        On appeal,
    Garrett contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the
    1
    Bryan Cave argued before the district court that this order collaterally
    estopped Garrett from asserting that Bryan Cave’s participation in the proffer
    session constituted a breach of duty. The district court rejected Bryan Cave’s
    argument, see Appellant’s Brief in Chief, Exh. A, at 8-12, and Bryan Cave has
    not raised the issue on appeal.
    4
    issue of causation by (1) applying a “but for” test instead of a “substantial factor”
    test; (2) ignoring or excluding evidence upon which a rational jury could have
    found in his favor; and (3) refusing to draw reasonable inferences in his favor
    from uncontested facts.
    II
    We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment.
    As we explained in Craig v. Eberly , 
    164 F.3d 490
    (10th Cir. 1998):
    Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
    matter of law. We view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
    therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
    Although the movant must show the absence of a genuine issue of
    material fact, he or she need not negate the nonmovant’s claim.
    Once the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant cannot rest upon
    his or her pleadings, but must bring forward specific facts showing a
    genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which [he or
    she] carries the burden of proof. The mere existence of a scintilla of
    evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position is insufficient to
    create a dispute of fact that is genuine; an issue of material fact is
    genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such that a reasonable
    jury could find in favor of the nonmovant.
    
    Id. at 493
    (citations and quotation marks omitted);   accord Geoffrey E.
    MacPherson, Ltd. v. Brinecell, Inc.   , 
    98 F.3d 1241
    , 1245 (10th   Cir. 1996).
    A.     Garrett’s Theories of Liability
    Garrett’s malpractice claim encompasses two theories of liability: “legal
    5
    negligence” and “breach of fiduciary duty.”        While Garrett claims in his Reply
    brief that the law of Oklahoma (rather than Missouri) should apply,          neither party
    analyzes the choice-of-law issue in any detail.       2
    Accordingly, the law of both
    jurisdictions is discussed below.
    1.     Negligence
    Oklahoma and Missouri law clearly define the elements of a negligence
    claim against an attorney. To prevail on such a claim in Oklahoma, a plaintiff
    must prove “the existence of an attorney-client relationship, breach of duty by the
    attorney, facts constituting the alleged negligence, that the negligence was the
    proximate cause of the injury, and that but for the negligence the client would not
    have suffered damage.”      FDIC v. Ferguson , 
    982 F.2d 404
    , 406 (10th        Cir. 1991)
    (citing Allred v. Rabon , 
    572 P.2d 979
    , 981 (Okla. 1977));          accord Erwin v.
    Frazier , 
    786 P.2d 61
    , 63-64 (Okla. 1989);       Myers v. Maxey , 
    915 P.2d 940
    , 945
    (Okla. Ct. App. 1996) . A plaintiff asserting a claim for attorney malpractice
    under Missouri law must establish “(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2)
    negligence or breach of contract by the defendant; (3) proximate causation of
    plaintiff’s damages; (4) damages to the plaintiff.”          Klemme v. Best , 
    941 S.W.2d 493
    , 495 (Mo. 1997) (citing     Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C.           , 900
    2
    The district court found that the rules governing malpractice in Oklahoma
    and Missouri were substantially similar, and thus declined to resolve the choice-
    of-law issue. Appellant’s Brief in Chief, Exh. A, at 7.
    
    6 S.W.2d 624
    , 626 (Mo. 1995)).
    2.      Breach of Fiduciary Duty
    Missouri law also clearly permits a plaintiff to sue an attorney for breach of
    fiduciary duty. The elements of such a claim include “(1) an attorney-client
    relationship; (2) breach of a fiduciary obligation by the attorney; (3) proximate
    causation; (4) damages to the client; (5) no other recognized tort encompasses the
    facts alleged.”    
    Id. at 496.
    However, “if the alleged breach can be characterized
    as both a breach of the standard of care (legal malpractice based on negligence)
    and a breach of a fiduciary obligation (constructive fraud), then the sole claim is
    legal malpractice.”    
    Id. In other
    words, to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary
    duty the alleged breach must be “independent of any legal malpractice.”         
    Id. While no
    case provides definitive guidance, we assume         without deciding
    that Oklahoma law likewise permits a plaintiff to sue his attorney for breach of
    fiduciary duty. To assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in other contexts, an
    Oklahoma plaintiff must demonstrate that he had a “special relationship” of
    confidence and trust with the defendant.       See , e.g. , Beshara v. Southern Nat’l
    Bank , 
    928 P.2d 280
    , 288-89 (Okla. 1996) (dismissing a breach of fiduciary claim
    for want of a “special relationship”);     Swickey v. Silvey Companies    , 
    979 P.2d 266
    ,
    269 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999) (same). Oklahoma courts hold that “a fiduciary
    relationship arises where one party reposes special confidence in another, as in
    7
    the case of attorney and client . . . .”   Crockett v. Root , 
    146 P.2d 555
    , 559 (Okla.
    1943); see also State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. McKenzie        , 
    788 P.2d 1370
    ,
    1378-79 (Okla. 1989) (stating that fiduciary obligations may “sprin[g] from an
    attitude of trust, confidence, and superior knowledge arising from the attorney-
    client relationship”). Other Oklahoma decisions similarly acknowledge that the
    attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary one.    See , e.g. , Panama Processes, S.A.
    v. Cities Serv. Co. , 
    796 P.2d 276
    , 290 n.61 (Okla. 1990);     In re Estate of Beal , 
    769 P.2d 150
    , 154-55 (Okla. 1989);        Lowrance v. Patton , 
    710 P.2d 108
    , 111 (Okla.
    1985); Renegar v. Bruning , 
    123 P.2d 686
    , 688 (Okla. 1942).
    B.      The “Causation” Element
    Our first task is to determine the amount of proof a plaintiff asserting a
    claim for malpractice must offer to satisfy the “causation” requirement. Bryan
    Cave contends that the traditional “but for” test applies to Garrett’s negligence
    and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Garrett asserts that a more relaxed
    “substantial factor” test should apply, at least with respect to his breach of
    fiduciary duty claim. We conclude that neither Oklahoma nor Missouri has
    adopted a relaxed standard of causation for malpractice or breach of fiduciary
    claims.
    1.      Negligence
    8
    Oklahoma law requires proof of “but for” and “proximate” causation to
    sustain a claim for negligence. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in           Allred that
    a plaintiff suing his attorney for malpractice must demonstrate that a defendant’s
    negligence “was proximate cause of an injury” and that “but for the negligence
    complained of the client would have succeeded in his 
    action.” 572 P.2d at 981
    .           3
    Other cases interpreting Oklahoma law are in accord.         E.g. , FDIC , 982 F.2d at
    406; see also Edwards v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of
    America , 
    46 F.3d 1047
    , 1051-52 n.2 (10th       Cir. 1995) (citing   Allred for the
    proposition that a plaintiff in a malpractice action “must prove he would have
    succeeded in the underlying action but for the attorney’s negligence”);        Collins v.
    Wanner , 
    382 P.2d 105
    , 108 (Okla. 1963) (indicating that        a plaintiff in a
    malpractice action normally has “the difficult task of demonstrating that, but for
    the negligence complained of, the client would have been successful in the
    prosecution or defense of the action in question”).
    Missouri also requires proof of “but for” and “proximate” causation to
    sustain a negligence claim. A plaintiff in a negligence case must show that the
    defendant’s conduct was “(1) the cause in fact; and (2) the proximate, or legal,
    3
    To establish “proximate” causation, an Oklahoma plaintiff typically must
    show that his injury was foreseeable and a “natural and probable” consequence of
    the defendant’s acts or omissions. Lockhart v. Loosen , 
    943 P.2d 1074
    , 1079
    (Okla. 1997).
    9
    cause” of his injury.     Jones v. Trittler , 
    983 S.W.2d 165
    , 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
    (citing Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp.        , 
    863 S.W.2d 852
    , 860-61 (Mo.
    1993)). The first prong of the test “requires finding the event would not have
    occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s conduct.”        
    Id. Missouri courts
    emphasize that
    “[t]he ‘but for’ requirement is a minimum standard in most cases. Proximate
    cause also requires a measure of foreseeability in addition to ‘but for’ causation:
    the injury must be a reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omission
    of the defendant.”      Vittengl v. Fox , 
    967 S.W.2d 269
    , 278-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
    (citations omitted); accord State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v.
    Dierker , 
    961 S.W.2d 58
    , 60 (Mo. 1998);        Sansonetti v. City of St. Joseph   , 
    976 S.W.2d 572
    , 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
    2.        Breach of fiduciary duty
    Recognizing that his negligence claim requires evidence of “but for”
    causation, Garrett contends that a relaxed standard of proof should apply to his
    claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Garrett cites       Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
    McCloy v. Boon , 
    13 F.3d 537
    (2d Cir. 1994) for the proposition that “[a]n action
    for breach of fiduciary duty is a prophylactic rule intended to remove all incentive
    to breach – not simply to compensate for damages in the event of a breach. . . .
    [B]reaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of
    cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and
    10
    damages.” 
    Id. at 543
    (citation and quotation marks omitted, applying New York
    law); see also 
    id. (stating that
    a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s breach of
    duty was a “substantial factor” in the plaintiff’s injury). Garrett also cites several
    cases from other states for the argument that a lesser standard of proof should
    apply. See , e.g. , Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers , 
    151 F.3d 574
    , 577, 579 (6th   Cir.
    1998) (stating that under Ohio law a plaintiff suing an attorney for negligence is
    not required to “prove in every instance that he or she would have been successful
    in the underlying matter(s)”) (citation omitted);      Daugherty v. Runner , 
    581 S.W.2d 12
    , 20 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that an attorney’s negligence must be a
    “substantial factor” in the plaintiff’s injury).
    Garrett’s argument is unpersuasive. The main problem with Garrett’s
    position is that he cannot cite any Oklahoma or Missouri law to support it. In
    Missouri, the rules governing causation are the same for malpractice claims
    sounding in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.        See Klemme , 941 S.W.2d at
    496. In Oklahoma, a plaintiff asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim must
    show that he was “actually and proximately injured as a result of the complained-
    of act.” Cockings v. Austin , 
    898 P.2d 136
    , 139 (Okla. 1995).       The Oklahoma
    Supreme Court’s definition of “proximate” cause includes an element of “but for”
    causation. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc.       , 
    741 P.2d 467
    , 470 (Okla.
    1987) (stating that “proximate cause” encompasses both “legal” causation and
    11
    “but for” causation); Gaines v. Providence Apartments     , 
    750 P.2d 125
    , 126-27
    (Okla. 1987) (“The proximate cause of an event must be that which in a natural
    and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause, produces the event
    and without which the event would not have occurred.”);     Johnson v. Mid-South
    Sports, Inc. , 
    806 P.2d 1107
    , 1109 (Okla. 1991) (same). Moreover, the Oklahoma
    Supreme Court has carefully limited exceptions to the “but for” test in the
    negligence context.   See Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.    , 
    910 P.2d 1024
    ,
    1037-30 (Okla. 1996) (restricting the application of a relaxed standard of
    causation to certain medical malpractice actions);   see also 
    id. at 1029
    ( citing
    Daugert v. Pappas , 
    704 P.2d 600
    (Wash. 1985) with approval, a legal malpractice
    case in which the Washington Supreme Court rejected a relaxed standard of
    causation). Thus, while neither    Cockings nor Hardy squarely addresses the
    standard of proof for a breach of fiduciary duty claim against an attorney, they
    strongly suggest that exceptions to the rule of “but for” causation should be
    applied sparingly.
    C.     The Parties’ Evidence
    The evidence upon which Garrett relies falls into two categories. The first
    category relates to Bryan Cave’s alleged disclosure of sensitive information. The
    second relates to the causal connection between Bryan Cave’s purported
    malpractice and the indictment. The district court correctly determined that none
    12
    of this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
    1.     Disclosure
    Uncontested evidence demonstrates that no confidential or privileged
    information was disclosed during the proffer session. For example, AUSA Cox
    testified that she did not recall Garrett’s name being mentioned during the proffer
    session, and that there was no discussion of any “strategy or tactics that Mr.
    Garrett’s defense might use.”      Appellee’s Supplemental Appendix (“Aplee. Supp.
    App.”), Exh. C, at 704-05, 748-50. Attorney Coats also testified that he did not
    recall Garrett’s name being mentioned at the proffer session. Bryan Cave
    attorney Archer testified that he did not provide prosecutors with confidential
    information or “any information in any way adverse to Mr. Garrett.”          
    Id. at 317;
    id. , Exh. 
    A, at 34-35. Archer, Bryan Cave attorney O’Neill, and agent Kaitcer
    further testified that Garrett’s name only came up once during the proffer session,
    in connection with an unrelated matter.     Finally, John Williams, who served as
    Garrett’s personal counsel,     testified that he had no knowledge of any privileged
    information that was divulged during the proffer session. In short, uncontradicted
    testimony from those with personal knowledge of what transpired at the proffer
    session establishes that, at most, Garrett’s name came up once in connection with
    non-privileged information.
    Garrett’s attempt to avoid summary judgment on the issue of disclosure
    13
    revolves around two items of evidence. First, Garrett highlights a remark by
    AUSA Cox. In a letter to O’Neill regarding the proffer session, Cox stated that
    “Stifel attorneys then went on to express the opinion that they did have evidence
    available pointing to criminal culpability, and discussed such evidence as
    reflected in the notes.”    Appellant’s Appendix (“Aplt. App.”), Exh. A,   at 376-78.
    Garrett then refers to a statement by O’Neill that at the time of the proffer session
    the “only person that [O’Neill] had heard the FBI purportedly [say] might be a
    target was Mike Garrett.”     
    Id. at 565.
    Second, Garrett emphasizes the testimony
    of his former counsel, Dino Viera. Viera testified that he found it “extremely
    difficult to believe that an attorney could investigate all of these matters for a
    period of over two years, then have a discussion with someone about those
    transactions, and not divulge either direct privileged communications or the fruit
    of those privileged communications.”       
    Id. at 80,
    88.
    Cox’s “criminal culpability” remark falls far short of creating a genuine
    issue for trial. In her letter to O’Neill, Cox stated that Bryan Cave attorneys
    discussed evidence of criminal culpability “as reflected in the notes.” Despite
    being given access to these notes, Garrett cannot identify any privileged
    information that was leaked to prosecutors. Moreover, Cox’s “criminal
    culpability” remark does not even refer to Garrett. Cox herself testified that any
    discussion of “criminal culpability” at the proffer session focused on Cochran, not
    14
    Garrett. In the same vein, Archer and O’Neill testified that they did not believe
    the facts would support an indictment against Garrett at the time of the proffer
    session.
    Viera’s “expert” opinion that he found it “difficult to believe” that Bryan
    Cave attorneys did not divulge confidential information is also insufficient to
    prevent summary judgment. Viera admitted that he did not know what was said at
    the proffer session, and he cannot begin to describe the contents of privileged
    communications that were allegedly disclosed. We have previously recognized
    that “the testimony of an expert can be rejected on summary judgment if it is
    conclusory and thus fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”     Matthiesen v.
    Banc One Mortgage Corp. , 
    173 F.3d 1242
    , 1247 (10th          Cir. 1999); cf. United
    States v. Rice , 
    52 F.3d 843
    , 847 (10th    Cir. 1995) (affirming the exclusion of
    expert testimony under    Daubert because while “hypothesis may be an appropriate
    subject for expert testimony when based upon conclusions from established
    evidentiary facts,” such hypothesis cannot be “based entirely on pure surmise”).
    In the words of the First Circuit,
    [t]he evidentiary rules regarding expert testimony at trial were “not
    intended . . . to make summary judgment impossible whenever a
    party has produced an expert to support its position.” We are not
    willing to allow the reliance on a bare ultimate expert conclusion to
    become a free pass to trial every time that a conflict of fact is based
    on expert testimony. . . . Where an expert presents “nothing but
    conclusions – no facts, no hint of an inferential process, no
    discussion of hypotheses considered and rejected”, such testimony
    15
    will be insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
    Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc.      , 
    8 F.3d 88
    , 92 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations
    omitted); see also Weigel v. Target Stores , 
    122 F.3d 461
    , 468-69 (7th      Cir. 1997)
    (“[A] party cannot assure himself of a trial merely by trotting out in response to a
    motion for summary judgment his expert’s naked conclusion about the ultimate
    issue.”) (citation omitted).
    2.      Causation
    Even if Garrett could establish that confidential information was conveyed
    to the government, summary judgment would still be warranted on the issue of
    causation. Uncontested evidence demonstrates that Bryan Cave’s conduct did not
    cause federal prosecutors to indict Garrett. For instance, agent Kaitcer testified
    that the government did not learn anything at the proffer session that “affected the
    scope or the direction of the criminal investigation.”     Aplee. Supp. App., Exh. C,
    at 593. AUSA Cox similarly testified that she did not learn anything she did not
    already know at the proffer session, and that the session did not influence the
    indictment against Garrett. Cox also testified that the indictment against Garrett
    had been drafted and presented to the “in-office indictment review committee”
    prior to the proffer session,   and that the session did not lead to any changes in the
    indictment. 
    Id. at 695-96.
    Along the same lines, Garrett’s criminal defense
    counsel was unable to convince the U.S. Attorney’s office that it should not
    16
    prosecute Garrett.
    This evidence notwithstanding, Garrett insists that a reasonable jury could
    find in his favor on the issue of causation. First, Garrett points to the non-
    prosecution agreement that Bryan Cave attorneys helped negotiate for Stifel.
    Garrett suggests that a similar agreement could have been obtained for him, and
    observes that Stifel’s agreement potentially required the company to cooperate
    with the government at Garrett’s expense.        Second, Garrett stresses the timing of
    the indictment. Garrett notes that in response to subpoenas, Bryan Cave attorneys
    assisted in the production of documents containing payroll information       and
    information about a transaction that was at issue in the SEC and FBI
    investigations.   On September 20, 1995, the day after some of Garrett’s payroll
    records were produced, the United States Attorney’s office filed criminal charges
    against Garrett. Third, Garrett contends that he explained complicated bond
    transactions to Bryan Cave attorneys, and that the attorneys later used this
    information to explain the transactions to prosecutors. Garrett asserts that in
    1993, while he was still being represented by Viera, he discussed the subject
    matter of the SEC investigation with Archer.       Viera testified that in the 1993
    meeting Garrett “educated” Archer about particular bond transactions, because
    17
    Archer was “behind on the learning curve.”        Aplt. App., Exh. A, at 67-68.   4
    Once again, this evidence falls far short of creating a genuine issue for
    trial. First, the non-prosecution agreement is insufficient to sustain an inference
    of causation. Agent Kaitcer and AUSA Cox unequivocally testified that the
    proffer session affected neither the investigation nor the indictment.       In view of
    this testimony, it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer either that the
    resultant agreement “imbued the prosecutorial team with the confidence it needed
    to prosecute Garrett criminally,”    see Aplt. Brief in Chief at 3, or that Garrett
    could have avoided criminal charges if Bryan Cave had actively defended his
    interests at the proffer session. Furthermore, the non-prosecution agreement
    required Stifel , not Bryan Cave, to provide documents and cooperate with federal
    investigators. Second, the mere fact that Garrett was indicted shortly after the
    production of his payroll records does not prove that the latter caused the former.
    See , e.g. , Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.     , 
    811 F.2d 511
    , 521 & n.8
    4
    Garrett also claims that the following facts support his theory of
    causation: (1) Bryan Cave attorneys were aware in the Spring of 1994 that, in
    addition to the SEC, the FBI was investigating Stifel and its employees; (2) prior
    to the proffer session, Bryan Cave attorneys knew that Garrett had been contacted
    by and was a potential target of the FBI; (3) Bryan Cave attorneys did not
    personally inform Garrett of the proffer session or obtain Garrett’s permission to
    negotiate a deal on Stifel’s behalf; and (4) Bryan Cave attorneys did not present
    exculpatory evidence or otherwise attempt to obtain an agreement with federal
    prosecutors on Garrett’s behalf.   However, these alleged facts relate to the issue
    of whether Bryan Cave was negligent or breached a fiduciary duty, not whether
    Bryan Cave’s actions caused the government to indict Garrett.
    18
    (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting evidence based on “reasoning from sequence to
    consequence, that is, assuming a causal connection between two events merely
    because one follows the other”) (citation omitted). Third, nothing in the record
    suggests that Bryan Cave’s purported tutorial had any influence on the
    government’s decision to indict Garrett.
    Garrett also argues that the testimony of expert witness Joel Wohlgemuth
    precludes summary judgment. Wohlgemuth testified that he believed the decision
    to indict Garrett “had to be based in part upon that proffer session,” and that he
    was “not confident that Garrett would have been indicted had his counsel used
    that window to address the problems that he had as well as the problems that
    Stifel had.”   Aplt. App., Exh. I, at 15, 19. Wohlgemuth also        testified that he
    believed Garrett was harmed “by not being afforded the opportunity that was
    given to Stifel by Bryan Cave to be the first in to engage in a proffer session” and
    by “not having the benefit of continuity of counsel.”      
    Id. at 13.
    Garrett’s argument misses the mark. Wohlgemuth acknowledged that his
    “experience” was the only basis for his conclusion that Garrett was harmed by
    “not being afforded the opportunity . . . to be the first in to engage in a proffer
    session” and by “not having the benefit of continuity of counsel.”         
    Id. at 13.
    The
    only specific fact discussed in Wohlgemuth’s testimony is the “criminal
    culpability” remark in Cox’s letter – a remark that has little probative value on
    19
    the issue of disclosure, and no probative value as to whether the information
    allegedly disclosed caused the government to indict Garrett. Under cases such as
    Matthiesen , Hayes , and Weigel , Wohlgemuth’s unsupported opinion (like Viera’s)
    cannot forestall summary judgment.       See also Black v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. , 
    107 F.3d 1457
    , 1460 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing      Vitkus v. Beatrice Co. , 
    11 F.3d 1535
    ,
    1539 (10th Cir. 1993) for the proposition that “[s]ummary judgment may be
    granted if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative”   ). 5
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    5
    Although the element of causation often presents issues of fact for the
    jury, summary judgment in this case is consistent with Oklahoma and Missouri
    law. Oklahoma courts recognize that “[t]he question of proximate cause becomes
    one of law when there is no evidence from which the jury could find a causal
    nexus between the negligent act and the resulting injuries.”     Elledge v. Staring ,
    
    939 P.2d 1163
    , 1165 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996) (citing        Thompson v. Presbyterian
    Hosp., Inc. , 
    652 P.2d 260
    , 263 (Okla. 1982)). “When the matter is one of pure
    speculation or conjecture or the probabilities evenly balanced,” judgment as a
    matter of law is proper.  Hardy , 910 P.2d at 1027; see also Butler v. Oklahoma
    City Pub. Sch. Sys. , 
    871 P.2d 444
    , 446 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (granting summary
    judgment for the defendant and commenting that “[s]peculation is the antithesis
    of proximate cause”). Missouri courts similarly recognize that “[e]vidence of
    causation must be based on probative facts and not on mere speculation or
    conjecture.” Bond v. California Compensation & Fire Co.       , 
    963 S.W.2d 692
    , 697
    (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); accord Stanley v. City of Independence , 
    995 S.W.2d 485
    ,
    488 (Mo. 1999); Brison v. O’Brien , 
    645 S.W.2d 142
    , 145-46 (Mo. Ct. App.
    1982).
    20