Pounds v. Department of Interior , 9 F. App'x 820 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 16 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MARY V. POUNDS, in propria
    persona libera lex, federal witness
    private attorney general,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 00-7113
    (D.C. No. 99-CV-328-B)
    DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR;                               (E.D. Okla.)
    COURT OF INDIAN OFFENSES,
    CHILDREN DIVISION MIAMI
    AGENCY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Mary V. Pounds appeals the district court’s order
    dismissing her action brought pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
    , 1983, 1985, 1986,
    and various federal criminal statutes. The district court dismissed Ms. Pounds’
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
    for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), and for insufficient service of process
    under Rule 12(b)(5). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and
    we affirm.
    Ms. Pounds brought this action alleging various violations of her
    constitutional rights in connection with a decision of the C.F.R. court   1
    located
    in Miami, Oklahoma, granting custody of her three grandchildren to the Eastern
    Shawnee Tribe (the Tribe). Due to mental instability and substance abuse,
    Ms. Pounds’ daughter, the children’s natural mother, relinquished custody of
    the children to the Tribe. The Tribe placed the children in the temporary
    Tribe-supervised custody of Ms. Pounds pending a home study. On March 14,
    1996, the Tribe revoked Ms. Pounds’ custody due to her refusal to cooperate with
    the Tribe, adjudicated the children as in need of care, and placed legal physical
    custody with the Tribe. In order to prevent the Tribe from taking custody of the
    1
    A “C.F.R. court” is a court created pursuant to Bureau of Indian Affairs
    regulations to preside over tribal matters in the absence of a court established by
    tribal government. 
    25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100
    ;     see Tillett v. Lujan , 
    931 F.2d 636
    , 638,
    640 (10th Cir. 1991). The Shawnee Indian Tribe uses C.F.R. courts.
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    children, Ms. Pounds moved them to various states including Nevada and
    California. The C.F.R. court issued and enforced an order requiring that the
    children be returned to the Tribe from Nevada and placed in sheltered care in
    Oklahoma.
    Ms. Pounds then brought a number of actions in an attempt to regain
    custody of the children. She filed an action in Ottawa County, Oklahoma, which
    was dismissed for failure to appear; her request to the C.F.R. court to modify
    the custody order was denied, and she did not appeal; she initiated at least two
    actions in the Northern District of Oklahoma which were dismissed and not
    appealed; another petition to the C.F.R. court to regain custody of the children
    was denied; and she filed an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act in federal
    district court in the Central District of California which was dismissed. Finally,
    on May 13, 1999, the C.F.R. court approved the adoption of the children by
    a Tribe family.
    Ms. Pounds then filed this action against the Department of the Interior and
    the C.F.R. court, alleging that (1) the 1996 orders were illegal; (2) the orders were
    obtained through deceit and fraud; (3) the C.F.R. court ignored her pleadings and
    her amicus curiae briefs; (4) the C.F.R. court violated her constitutional rights
    under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and
    (5) the C.F.R. court did not comply with The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
    -3-
    §§ 1901-63. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(1), (3), (5), and (7). The district court thoroughly addressed each of
    defendants’ bases for dismissal, concluding that, pursuant to absolute immunity,
    the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Ms. Pounds’
    claims, service on defendants was insufficient,     2
    and venue in the Eastern District
    of Oklahoma was improper. Ms. Pounds appeals.
    We are obligated to construe Ms. Pounds’ pro se pleadings liberally.
    Haines v. Kerner , 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). Regarding the issue
    of absolute immunity, we review      de novo the district court’s dismissal pursuant to
    Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.         U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani   ,
    
    182 F.3d 1202
    , 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). We also review a dismissal based on the
    validity of a forum selection   de novo . United States ex rel. B & D Mech.
    Contractors, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.      , 
    70 F.3d 1115
    , 1117 (10th Cir.
    1995).
    With these standards clearly in mind, we have conducted a thorough review
    of the briefs, the record, and the district court’s order. We conclude that the
    2
    The general rule is that “when a court finds that service is insufficient
    but curable, it generally should quash the service and give the plaintiff an
    opportunity to re-serve the defendant.”  Pell v. Azar Nut Co ., 
    711 F.2d 949
    , 950
    n.2 (10th Cir. 1983). In this case, however, the district court determined that
    allowing Ms. Pounds to effect proper service of process would be futile, because
    her claims could not survive defendants’ remaining bases for dismissal. The court
    also declined to address defendants’ claims of res judicata and failure to join an
    indispensable party as unnecessary to the decision.
    -4-
    district court’s well-reasoned dismissal decision was correct. Accordingly, we
    AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for substantially the same reasons given in
    its September 26, 2000 order.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
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