Hogan v. Trammell , 511 F. App'x 769 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
February 20, 2013
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KENNETH EUGENE HOGAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 11-6161
v. (D.C. No. 5:07-CV-00727-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
ANITA TRAMMELL, Interim
Warden, * Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Kenneth Eugene Hogan appeals from the district
court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal, he
argues that (1) he was deprived of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to have the jury consider heat of passion manslaughter as his defense and as
a lesser-included offense; (2) he was denied his right to have the jury fully
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Anita Trammel, who was appointed
Interim Warden of Oklahoma State Penitentiary on September 24, 2012, is
automatically substituted for Randall G. Workman as Respondent in this case.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
consider mitigation evidence; and (3) the failure to instruct the jury that his
statement to law enforcement was exculpatory violated his right to Due Process
and to present a defense. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 &
2253(a), we affirm.
Background
This appeal arises from Mr. Hogan’s second trial for the murder of Lisa
Renee Stanley. In 1988, Mr. Hogan was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. On habeas review, this court vacated Mr. Hogan’s conviction,
finding that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297,
1312 (10th Cir. 1999). The facts of Ms. Stanley’s murder are recounted in our
earlier decision, and we need not repeat them here. See id. at 1300–02.
Mr. Hogan was re-tried and again convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed
the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006). The OCCA denied two petitions for post-conviction
relief. Hogan v. State, No. PCD-2003-668 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2007)
(unpub.); Hogan v. State, No. PCD-2008-241 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2008)
(unpub.); R. 210–15, 535–39. On May 12, 2011, the federal district court denied
habeas relief. R. 752–848.
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The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the first-
stage jury instructions on first degree heat of passion manslaughter. R. 850–52.
This court expanded the COA to include (1) the denial of mitigation evidence due
to the state’s proffered second-stage rebuttal evidence, and (2) the failure to give
an exculpatory statement jury instruction. Case Management Order at 1 (10th Cir.
Sept. 27, 2011). Still pending before this court is Mr. Hogan’s motion to expand
the COA to include a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Discussion
We review the district court’s legal analysis de novo. Welch v. Workman,
639 F.3d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2011). Like the district court, we must defer to the
state court proceedings unless the state decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). We presume the factual findings of the
state court are correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by “clear and
convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
Our review of the record persuades us that the state courts’ resolution of
Mr. Hogan’s claims was not “diametrically different” or “mutually opposed” to
Supreme Court precedent. See id. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
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362, 405–06, 412–13 (2000). Nor did the Oklahoma courts apply the Supreme
Court’s rules to materially indistinguishable facts and reach a different result.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. Finally, no unreasonable determination of the facts
pertinent to each claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
A. First-Stage Jury Instructions on First Degree Heat of Passion Manslaughter
Mr. Hogan argues that the trial court’s first-stage jury instructions
restricted the jury from properly considering his heat of passion manslaughter
defense. Aplt. Br. 13. He contends the trial court should have instructed the jury
that (1) manslaughter was the defense; (2) the state was required to disprove heat
of passion beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) manslaughter may be considered at
the same time as first degree murder. Id. Reviewing for plain error, the OCCA
rejected this claim on the ground that the instructions, which were substantively
the same as those given and upheld in Black v. State, 21 P.3d 1047 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2001), informed the jury of Mr. Hogan’s defense. Hogan, 139 P.3d at
922–25. The OCCA acknowledged that the instructions were slightly modified
from those in Black, but found any error to be invited because the trial court gave
the instructions that Mr. Hogan proposed. Id. at 925. The district court found the
OCCA decision consistent with federal law, and that this court’s decision in
Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2006), foreclosed relief. R. 765–66.
In arguing that habeas relief is warranted, Mr. Hogan points to Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and our decision in United States v. Lofton, 776
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F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1985). Aplt. Br. 14–15. In Lofton, we interpreted Mullaney
to require the following jury instructions when a defendant properly raises a heat
of passion defense: (1) that manslaughter is the theory of defense; and (2) that the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion.
776 F.2d at 920. The problem with Lofton is that we cannot set aside a state
court decision if it does not follow a circuit court ruling. See Black v. Workman,
682 F.3d 880, 901 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a similar argument). Rather, the
only ground for setting aside the OCCA decision would be if it is “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Mr. Hogan, however, can find little relief in Mullaney because we have
twice rejected the suggestion that a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as he
requests warrants habeas relief. See Black, 682 F.3d at 902; Bland, 459 F.3d at
1013. Mr. Hogan urges us to disregard Black and Bland on the ground that these
cases unreasonably interpreted the requirements for heat of passion manslaughter,
see Aplt. Br. 23–26 & n.6, but we are bound by those decisions. See United
States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, a review of the record persuades us that the jury was well aware
of the State’s burden—i.e., to prove the absence of any mental state other than
deliberate intent. In Instructions 4 and 7, the trial court instructed the jury on the
elements of first degree murder and first degree heat of passion manslaughter,
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explaining that the State must “prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt each element
of the crime.” Trial R., Vol. IV at 735, 738. Instruction 5 defined “malice
aforethought,” the mental state of first degree murder, as “a deliberate intention to
take away the life of a human being.” Id. at 736. Instruction 10 explained that
for heat of passion to constitute first degree manslaughter, the heat of passion
“must have existed to such a degree as would naturally affect the ability to reason
and render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” Id. at 742. The OCCA found
these instructions distinguished the mental states for first degree murder and heat
of passion manslaughter such that it was clear “malice and heat of passion . . .
cannot co-exist.” Hogan, 139 P.3d at 924 (quotation omitted). The OCCA
decision was logical and certainly was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.
We also reject Mr. Hogan’s argument that the jury was precluded from
considering his defense because it was instructed to consider first degree murder
before heat of passion manslaughter. The OCCA reasonably determined that
“[a]ppellant was not deprived of having the jury consider his heat of passion
defense in tandem with the murder charge.” Hogan, 139 P.3d at 925 (quotation
omitted). Instruction 6, for example, provides in part that “[t]he external
circumstances surrounding this commission of a homicidal act may be considered
in finding whether or not deliberate intent existed in the mind of the defendant to
take a human life.” Trial R., Vol. IV at 737. Moreover, as we recently explained
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in Black, no Supreme Court precedent requires “an instruction stating that the
jury may consider a manslaughter charge before reaching a verdict on first-degree
murder.” 682 F.3d at 902.
Finally, Mr. Hogan argues that the instructions prevented the jury from
considering manslaughter as a lesser-included offense in violation of Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). Aplt. Br. 26–30. The parties dispute whether this
issue was raised below, see Aplee. Br. 23; Aplt. R. Br. 5–6, but assuming that it
was, we reject Mr. Hogan’s argument because Instruction 13 explicitly tells the
jury to “consider the lesser included crime of Manslaughter in the First Degree” if
it has “a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of the charge of Murder in the
First Degree with Malice Aforethought.” Trial R., Vol. IV at 745. 1 Thus, the jury
was not foreclosed from considering the lesser-included offense. And to the
extent Mr. Hogan suggests that the trial court violated Beck because the first
degree manslaughter instructions were flawed, we disagree as explained above.
Thus, the OCCA decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Supreme Court law.
B. Right to Present Mitigation Evidence
1
Mr. Hogan proposed similar language. See Trial R., Vol. V at 814 (“If
you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of the charge of murder in
the first degree, you must then consider the charge of manslaughter.”); id. at 815
(“If you are unable to agree unanimously that Kenneth Hogan is guilty of the
charged offense, you may proceed to consider a lesser included offense upon
which evidence has been presented.”).
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Mr. Hogan next argues that he was denied the right to present mitigation
evidence because (1) the trial court failed to rule in advance on the admissibility
of potential rebuttal evidence; and (2) his counsel failed to recognize that the
government’s rebuttal evidence was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. We
address each point in turn.
1. Erroneous Trial Court Ruling
Mr. Hogan first challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. Aplt. Br. 38.
Prior to the second-stage of Mr. Hogan’s trial, the government informed the court
that it wished to introduce new evidence about Mr. Hogan through his cousin,
Kevin Freeman. Trial Tr., Vol. VIII at 136. The government agreed to hold this
evidence for rebuttal purposes only, to which Mr. Hogan inquired about the type
of character evidence that would open the door for the rebuttal evidence. Id. at
139, 145. The court refused to issue an advance ruling. Id. at 146. Mr. Hogan
contends that this failure to advise precluded him from presenting a full
mitigation case. Aplt. Br. 41.
The OCCA denied relief on Mr. Hogan’s claim, finding that the trial court
presented the defense “with a strategic decision” on whether to introduce
mitigation evidence. Hogan, 139 P.3d at 931–32. The district court found the
OCCA’s determination reasonable, noting that (1) state evidentiary decisions do
not present federal constitutional issues cognizable on habeas review; and (2) the
absence of mitigation evidence did not render the trial unfair because of the
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overwhelming evidence that the crime was heinous, atrocious or cruel. R.
769–70.
Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, in order to constitutionally
impose a capital sentence, the sentencer may “not be precluded from considering
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). However,
“[w]e may not provide habeas corpus relief on the basis of state court evidentiary
rulings unless they rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair that a denial of
constitutional rights results.” Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir.
2002) (quotation omitted).
The OCCA decision that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling merely
presented defense counsel with a strategic decision on whether to introduce
mitigation evidence and potentially open the door to rebuttal evidence is
supported by the record. Moreover, no Supreme Court precedent requires an
advisory ruling on potential evidence. Regardless, the failure to introduce this
mitigation evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair—Mr. Hogan
introduced much of the substance of the testimony from corrections officers and
family members that he contends he would have introduced but for the trial
court’s ruling. See Trial Tr., Vol. IX at 86–87, 93–94, 95, 98, 100; Trial R., Vol.
V at 831. Therefore, the OCCA decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
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application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Hogan also argues that counsel was ineffective for not realizing that
the character evidence the government sought to admit would be inadmissible.
Aplt. Br. 47–48. Mr. Hogan first raised this argument in his second application
for post-conviction relief. R. 536–37. The OCCA denied the claim on the ground
that it was procedurally barred under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(8). Id. The
district court found Oklahoma’s procedural bar adequate and independent, and
concluded there was no cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice
to excuse the default. R. 770–82.
In order to bar federal review, a state procedural rule must be adequate to
support the judgment and independent from federal law. A state procedural rule
is adequate if it is “strictly or regularly followed and applied evenhandedly to all
similar claims.” Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted). “A state procedural default is ‘independent’ if it relies on
state law, rather than federal law.” Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274
(10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In arguing the procedural bar is inadequate,
Mr. Hogan cites to a string of cases in which the OCCA irregularly applied its
procedural bar. See Aplt. Br. 54. However, we recently considered the effect of
these cases and concluded that Oklahoma’s procedural bar remains adequate. See
Thacker v. Workman, 678 F.3d 820, 835–36 (10th Cir. 2012); Banks, 692 F.3d at
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1145. Our disposition is similar on the question of independence. Mr. Hogan
suggests the procedural bar is not independent because it “is intertwined with
federal law.” Aplt. Br. 59. Once again, we recently considered this argument and
determined that Oklahoma’s procedural bar is independent. See Banks, 692 F.3d
at 1145–47. We thus reject Mr. Hogan’s challenge.
We also find that Mr. Hogan cannot establish cause and prejudice to excuse
his default. Mr. Hogan asserts that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel
excuses his default. Aplt. Br. 61–62. He claims that Oklahoma has created a
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and thus, Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a
habeas petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, does not
apply. Id. Mr. Hogan instead looks to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318
(2012), where the Court held that when state law prohibits a defendant from
presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,
post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance in failing to assert the claim on
collateral review can serve as cause for the default. However, as we recently
explained, Martinez is inapplicable when Oklahoma law permits a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. See Banks, 692 F.3d at
1148. Therefore, we reject Mr. Hogan’s claim that his default is excused. 2
2
For similar reasons, we deny Mr. Hogan’s motion to expand the COA to
include a separate claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court
found this claim procedurally barred. Where the district court dismisses a § 2254
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C. Jury Instruction on Exculpatory Statements
Mr. Hogan’s final argument is that the trial court violated his right to Due
Process and to present a defense when it refused his requested jury instruction on
exculpatory statements. Aplt. Br. 63–67; see Trial R., Vol. V at 808. Mr. Hogan
contends that he was entitled to Oklahoma’s exculpatory statement instruction
because his confession, which the government introduced at trial, was exculpatory
in nature. 3 The OCCA rejected this claim on the merits, holding that (1) the
motion on procedural grounds, the movant must demonstrate that it is reasonably
debatable whether (1) the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is correct. Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In light of Supreme Court precedent and
our decisions interpreting that precedent, Mr. Hogan has failed to demonstrate it
is reasonably debatable that the district court’s procedural ruling is correct.
3
Oklahoma’s exculpatory statement instruction provides:
An exculpatory statement is defined as a statement by the defendant
that tends to clear a defendant from alleged guilt, or a statement that
tends to justify or excuse his/her actions or presence.
Where the State introduces in connection with a confession or
admission of a defendant an exculpatory statement, which, if true,
would entitle him/her to an acquittal, he/she must be acquitted unless
such exculpatory statement has been disproved or shown to be false
by other evidence in the case. The falsity of an exculpatory statement
may be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence.
A statement is exculpatory within the meaning of this instruction only
if it concerns a tangible, affirmative, factual matter capable of
specific disproof. A statement is not exculpatory within the meaning
of this instruction if it merely restates the defendant’s contention of
innocence.
OUJI-CR 9-15.
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instruction was not required because Mr. Hogan’s statement was “disproved by
other evidence in the case”; and (2) Mr. Hogan was not prejudiced because “the
jury was fully instructed on the State’s burden of proof, the presumption of
innocence, and the voluntariness of his statement.” Hogan, 139 P.3d at 926. The
district court found the OCCA decision consistent with federal law. R. 803–04.
Mr. Hogan’s claim is based in state law—whether he was entitled, under
Oklahoma law, to an exculpatory statement jury instruction. However, habeas
relief does not lie for errors in state law. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16
(2010). We may only grant habeas relief if a state-law error “so infected the
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Cummings v.
Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431
U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Furthermore, “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction,
is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431
U.S. at 155.
The OCCA held that Mr. Hogan suffered no prejudice from the court’s
failure to instruct the jury. This finding is supported by the record. Mr. Hogan
was able to present his defense without this requested instruction—it was clear
from the other instructions that he claimed to be acting in a heat of passion and
was not guilty of first degree murder. That the jury chose to disbelieve his
defense does not mean the instructions were flawed. Thus, the OCCA decision
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was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Supreme Court precedent.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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