United States v. Ellis , 193 F. App'x 773 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 22, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-7136
v.
(D.C. No. CR-05-53-01-W H)
(E.D. Okla.)
M ARC US TA RIN ELLIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
A jury found M arcus Ellis guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (“Count One”), and of possession with intent to distribute and distribution
of five or more grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
& (b)(1)(B) (“Count Two”). He was sentenced to 361 months’ imprisonment for
each count, to be served concurrently. On direct appeal before us, Ellis brings
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
two issues. First, he appeals his conviction for Count One, arguing that there is
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that he conspired to possess
with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base. Second, in regard to
Count Two, Ellis argues that expert testimony regarding the total amount of
methamphetamine he possessed was presented in violation of the standards and
procedures established in Daubert v. M errell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579(1993), “and should be stricken and not relied upon by the Judge at sentencing.”
W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM .
I
Between April 2004 and M arch 2005, the government conducted an
undercover narcotics sales investigation in Pittsburg C ounty, Oklahoma. As part
of this investigation, a paid confidential informant working for the government
made a series of methamphetamine purchases from Ellis. The investigation led to
Ellis’s arrest and subsequent trial. At trial, Kristina Smith testified to purchasing
and reselling, on Ellis’s behalf, multiple “cookies” of cocaine base, commonly
referred to as “crack,” as well as methamphetamine. 1 A jury found Ellis guilty of
conspiracy to distribute five or more grams each of methamphetamine and cocaine
base and 500 or more grams of cocaine powder in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
1
“Cookies” are round blocks of crack cocaine. Smith testified that the
cookies in this case were approximately six inches in diameter, one inch thick,
and weighed about one pound.
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and of possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B).
II
Ellis claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base because the only person testifying to his
involvement with cocaine base did not know that crack was cocaine base. W e
review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. United States v. Higgins, 282
F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002). W e must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government and determine whether a reasonable jury could
have found the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).
Ellis focuses his argument on an isolated bit of testimony by Smith, the key
witness to Ellis’s involvement with cocaine base. Because Smith stated that she
was unfamiliar with the term “cocaine base,” Ellis argues there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. In
addition, Ellis attempts to create an issue over Smith’s use of the term “crack” as
opposed to “cocaine base.” However, our cases have recognized that as a matter
of law, “[c]ocaine base . . . as used in the federal statute [§ 841(a)], includes
crack.” United States v. M cIntyre, 997 F.2d 689, 709 n.33 (10th Cir. 1993). See
also United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1993) (“crack” is a
“slang term for cocaine base”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) Notes (stating that “cocaine
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base” means “crack” and “crack is the street name for a form of cocaine base,
usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate,
and usually appearing in a lumpy rocklike form.”).
After review of the record, we conclude that Ellis is trying to make a
mountain out of a molehill. Although Smith indicated she did not know the
difference between crack and cocaine base, she testified extensively to her
purchases and sales of both crack and cocaine on Ellis’s behalf, including the
purchase of more than a pound of crack. She stated that she could distinguish
crack from powder cocaine, and that crack was cocaine “rocked up with baking
powder.” Smith said that she knows what crack is because her ex-boyfriend
smoked crack, she had been around it, and had seen it consumed. She also
testified that she understood from her attorneys that cocaine base is crack. This is
more than sufficient evidence to indicate that Smith could identify crack as such.
The testimony of another witness, Billy Talley, supports Smith’s account. Talley
testified that he had witnessed Smith purchase crack on Ellis’s behalf and was
familiar with crack. Accordingly, there was more than sufficient evidence to
support Ellis’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base as well as the
jury’s special verdict that Ellis conspired to possess with intent to distribute five
grams or more of cocaine base.
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III
Ellis challenges the introduction of testimony at sentencing as to the
quantity of methamphetamine found in the drugs seized from him upon his arrest.
He claims that the court failed to conduct its gatekeeping role under Daubert by
ensuring that the testimony introduced was sufficiently reliable to be presented to
a jury. Specifically, he asserts that the testimony about the total amount of
methamphetamine found did not satisfy the requirements of Daubert because the
grinding and sampling procedures used did not meet scientific standards. W e
agree with Ellis that the court failed to perform its gatekeeping role. Because that
error w as harmless, however, w e affirm.
At trial, the identification and quantification of the drugs seized from Ellis
upon his arrest was a significant issue. John Giles and M arty W ilson, analysts for
the Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation, testified to the methods used to identify
and determine the quantity of methamphetamine. Both agents testified to the lab
protocols each used to identify these substances. Giles testified to using gas
chromatography mass spectroscopy (“GCM S”) to measure the actual
methamphetamine found in one sample, w hile W ilson testified to using high
performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”) to determine the quantity of actual
methamphetamine found in the alleged drug material seized from Ellis. Because
these tests destroy the samples used, only a small portion of the drugs seized is
tested.
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One concern with any sampling test is ensuring that the sample is
representative of the whole. If a sample tested has a higher or lower
concentration of the target drug, the test results provide inaccurate information
about the total amount of that drug and may mislead the court if used during
sentencing. Giles and W ilson both testified that, to ensure the uniformity of the
samples tested, they ground up the partially crystalline powders seized from Ellis
prior to performing their tests. Both technicians testified that the Oklahoma State
Bureau of Investigation does not have a protocol for conducting such
homogenization procedures. They also testified that methamphetamine is
typically not uniform in its mixture, and at times can “glob[] together.” Clumping
is particularly problematic when the sample is moist. W ilson testified that when
he conducts the test on a small sample, he grinds the entire sample and takes a
small section from that sample. For larger samples, he grinds only a portion of
the sample. Giles testified to two different techniques for preparing samples. His
practice is to grind the entire sample before removing a portion for testing. In
contrast, Giles stated that the method used by one of his employees, Brad Knight,
is to remove a portion of the sample and grind only that portion prior to testing.
Knight’s procedure generated a result that varied from Giles’s result by more than
ten percent. Both Giles and W ilson testified that they did not know of any tests
or scientific papers demonstrating the uniformity of methamphetamine after
grinding. W ilson testified that his method was “based on the general principles
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used in science. If you are going to sample something and try to determine the
identity or how much is in there, good science is to get a representative sample of
it.”
Ellis moved to exclude W ilson’s testimony on the grounds that it did not
comply with Daubert. Ellis claims that W ilson presented no evidence
demonstrating the reliability of the techniques used to extrapolate the quantity
findings from the small portions tested to the entire drug sample. The district
court denied the motion, finding that “the tests that were done are sufficiently
reliable under . . . 702, [and] 703, . . . and under the Daubert case I think that any
. . . potential or perceived problems with that can be something for the jury to sort
out and is a proper subject of argument, but I don’t think it rises to the level that I
need to exclude it under Daubert.” Ellis renew ed his motion after Giles’s
testimony and at the close of trial. The court again denied the motion, stating that
“it doesn’t take a scientist to know that when you make a pitcher of Kool-Aid you
don’t just pour the package in on top of the w ater. I mean, you stir it up so
there’s not hot spots of cherry.”
Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, the Supreme Court has required district courts to
perform a gatekeeping role to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
The reliability of expert testimony turns on its status as scientific knowledge. Id.
at 590. The district court may determine that expert testimony is reliable by
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inquiring into the qualifications and background of the expert and asking if “the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Bitler
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592-93). The scientific validity of a test may be established by
considering, among other factors: “(1) whether a theory has been or can be
tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and
publication, (3) whether there are known or potential rates of error with regard to
specific techniques, and (4) whether the theory or approach has ‘general
acceptance.’” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
W e review de novo whether the district court has performed its critical
gatekeeping role. Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1232. If the court has performed this role,
we review for abuse of discretion the manner in which a district court makes the
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. Id. A district court has latitude in
determining the procedures used to perform its gatekeeping function. United
States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999). For instance, it may do
so without holding a Daubert hearing. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402,
1405 (10th Cir. 1997). As long as a district court has sufficient evidence to
assess that the expert testimony “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
the task at hand” it may satisfy the gatekeeping function by ruling on an objection
at trial. Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087
(10th Cir. 2000). The court must, however, “adequately demonstrate by specific
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findings on the record that it has performed its duty as gatekeeper.” Dodge v.
Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003). “W ithout specific findings
or discussion on the record, it is impossible on appeal to determine whether the
district court carefully and meticulously review ed the proffered scientific
evidence or simply made an off-the-cuff decision to admit the expert testimony.”
Id. (quotations omitted). “In the absence of such findings, we must conclude that
the court abused its discretion in admitting such testimony.” Id.A district court must conduct a two-part inquiry to fulfill its gatekeeping
role. First, the court asks w hether the proffered testimony has “a reliable basis in
the knowledge and experience” of the relevant discipline. Bitler, 400 F.3d at
1232-33. To make such a determination, a court should inquire into the
qualifications and background of the expert and ask if “the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Id. (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). “[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable . . .
renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.” M itchell v. Genecorp., Inc., 165
F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999). Second, the court must determine if the
testimony is “relevant to the task at hand.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1234 (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).
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The district court made no specific findings that the testimony by Giles and
W ilson was based on a reliable foundation. 2 The court did not address whether
the grinding and sampling techniques used were generally accepted by the
forensic community. Ellis’s attorney established that the technique had not been
tested for uniformity, that there had not been peer review or publication on this
matter, and that there was at least a possibility of error, given the differing results
on the tests conducted by Knight and those conducted by Giles. Accordingly, the
court failed to perform the first task of the gatekeeping role – determining
whether the proffered testimony was reliable and had a scientific basis.
In performing the gatekeeper function, the district court’s role is not to
determine whether a matter testified to by an expert could be interpreted by a
jury, but rather to assess the reliability of the principles and methods underlying
the expert’s opinion to determine if it should be presented to a jury in the first
instance. Bitler, 430 F.3d at 1232-33. In other w ords, the district court’s effort
to draw an analogy of the dry grinding process used to homogenize a sample to
making Kool-Aid is not apt.
The government suggests that the matter at issue before us – whether the
sub-sample tested is representative of the entire portion of drugs seized – is not
2
Although the relevance of the expert testimony was not at issue – the
amount of methamphetamine seized from Ellis is clearly relevant to the charge of
possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of methamphetamine –
the court was obligated, under G oebel, to make a specific finding as to relevance.
See Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1087.
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subject to the rules of Daubert because the district court took notice of “a
centuries old principle of uniformity, i.e. when a substance is mixed, it becomes
more uniform.” 3
Daubert did suggest that a court could take judicial notice of “theories that
are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law .” D aubert,
509 U .S. at 592 n.11 (giving as an example the laws of thermodynamics); see also
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of facts by resort to
sources “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). However, multiple
discrete probes of a dry substance in order to obtain a representative sample is not
so well known. Neither the government nor the court pointed to any source
“whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” demonstrating that
methamphetamine becomes so uniformly distributed when ground up that
different samples from the same population will provide sufficiently similar
results. If anything, Ellis’s attorney’s questions, and Giles’s and W ilson’s
answ ers, quite reasonably call into doubt the uniformity of the samples,
demonstrating a variation of ten percent between one sample and the next, and the
lack of a protocol for preparing and selecting samples from seized drugs.
3
The government also argues that Daubert does not apply to the agents’
sampling method because Ellis’s attack goes only to the method of acquisition of
the evidence, not the analysis of the evidence. W e disagree. As w e stated in
United States v. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005), a methodology
used to analyze evidence – whether to determine quantity or quality – clearly falls
within the Daubert framework.
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Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement thus applies to Giles’s and W ilson’s testimony
about the quantity of methamphetamine, and the government must establish, at a
minimum, that the sampling technique used is reasonably reliable. See United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that statistical
evidence supporting sampling technique is not required; instead, the government
may establish reliability of drug quantity measurements based on extrapolation
from a test sample by demonstrating an adequate basis in fact for extrapolation
and that the quantity was determined with an accepted standard of reliability); see
also United States v. Scalia, 993 F.2d 984, 989 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
statistical evidence supporting the sampling techniques is not necessary; instead,
reasonable reliance may be found where a preponderance of evidence establishes
that (1) a proper “random” selection procedure was employed, (2) the chemical
testing method conformed with accepted methodology, (3) the tested and untested
samples were sufficiently similar in physical appearance, and (4) the tested and
untested samples were contemporaneously seized at the search scene).
W e now turn to Ellis’s specific challenge to the court’s reliance on Giles’s
and W ilson’s testimony. It is not clear whether he challenges the underlying
conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of
methamphetamine or the determination of drug quantity for purposes of
sentencing. Assuming that he did challenge the underlying conviction, on review
of the record we conclude that although the district court failed to perform its
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gatekeeping role under D aubert, any consideration of G iles’s and W ilson’s
testimony was harmless error. A government agent testified that an informant
made multiple purchases of more than 3.6 grams of methamphetamine, the agent
himself made one purchase of more than 3.6 grams of methamphetamine from
Ellis, and Smith testified to buying from and selling on behalf of Ellis more than
five grams of methamphetamine. Thus, as to Ellis’s conviction, any error from
the introduction of Giles’s and W ilson’s testimony is harmless. See Goebel, 215
F.3d at 1089 (“Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless only if other
competent evidence is ‘sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the
improper evidence had no effect on the decision.’”).
As to the use of G iles’s and W ilson’s testimony at sentencing, we also
conclude that it was harmless error. Unquestionably, the district court relied on
the evidence presented at trial in deciding to accept the sentencing
recommendations in the pre-sentence report (“PSR”). The PSR indicated that
Ellis possessed with intent to distribute 71.1 grams of a mixture of
methamphetamine (142.2 kilograms of marijuana equivalent), 4 or approximately
24.9 grams of actual methamphetamine (497.5 kilograms of marijuana
equivalent). In review ing the total amount of drugs identified in the PSR, we
conclude this was equivalent to 20,420.85 kilograms of marijuana. Had Giles’s
4
Ellis does not raise any issue as to the validity of the testing by Giles or
W ilson to determine that Ellis possessed with intent to distribute the 71.1 grams
of a mixture of methamphetamine.
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and W ilson’s testimony been excluded, the court would have had to consider only
the amount of mixed, rather than actual, methamphetamine when determining
Ellis’s sentence. Under this calculus, Ellis’s marijuana equivalent would be
reduced by 355 kilograms, for a marijuana equivalent total of 20,065.85
kilograms. Either amount places Ellis at a base offense level of thirty-six. 5 As a
result, the exclusion of Giles’s and W ilson’s testimony would not have affected
Ellis’s base offense level and we AFFIRM his sentence.
IV
Because w e conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Ellis’s
conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine
base, and methamphetamine, we AFFIRM his conviction on Count O ne.
Additionally, we conclude that the district court’s failure to perform his Daubert
gatekeeping function was harmless, and therefore AFFIRM his conviction and
sentence for possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of
methamphetamine (Count Two).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
5
Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, violations of §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) involving
between 10,000 and 30,000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent are sentenced at a
base offense level of 36.
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