United States v. Lee Vang Lor , 706 F.3d 1252 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 5, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
___________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 12-8024
LEE VANG LOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. Nos. 2:09-CV-00247-ABJ and 2:07-CR-00102-ABJ-2)
____________________________________
Jonathan W. Rauchway (Eric C. Reese with him on the brief), Davis Graham & Stubbs
LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher A. Crofts, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
____________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.*
____________________________________
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
____________________________________
A Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper stopped Defendant Lee Vang Lor for
speeding in March 2007. After gaining consent to search the vehicle, the trooper found
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
methamphetamine. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the
methamphetamine, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of conspiring to do
the same. The district court sentenced him to 121 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed
the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. United States v. Thao, 291 F. App’x
129 (10th Cir. 2008).
Defendant then filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This new evidence was that the
Wyoming Highway Patrol terminated the trooper who stopped Defendant because the
trooper called in a false dispatch report in April 2007, after Defendant’s arrest but before
his suppression hearing. Defendant argued this evidence would have undermined the
trooper’s testimony at Defendant’s suppression hearing and that he is therefore entitled to
a new hearing. The district court denied Defendant’s § 2255 petition. Defendant
appealed. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district
court’s denial of his petition.
I.
Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper Ben Peech stopped an SUV driven by
Defendant for speeding on Interstate 80. Defendant and his passenger, Lee Thao, both
said they had been to Reno, Nevada, but gave inconsistent stories as to why they were
there. Trooper Peech also noted other suspicious circumstances. For example, the
vehicle had been rented in Minnesota by a third party who lived in Wisconsin. Peech
gave Defendant a speeding ticket, and then Thao consented to a search of the vehicle.
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After consenting, but before Peech began the search, Thao asked if he could have refused
consent. Peech said “yes” he could “absolutely refuse.” Thao then said he did not want
the car to be searched. Peech acknowledged the withdrawn consent, but said he was
going to detain the men pending the arrival of a drug dog. Thao and Defendant then gave
verbal and written consent to a search of the SUV. The search, conducted by Peech and
three other troopers, yielded approximately two pounds of crystal methamphetamine.
At the suppression hearing on May 31, 2007, Defendant and Thao testified that
while the search was in progress Thao yelled at the troopers to stop. Each of the four
troopers present during the search testified that neither Defendant nor Thao made any
attempt to revoke their consent to search. On appeal from the district court’s denial of
their motion to suppress, Defendant and Thao argued (1) Trooper Peech unreasonably
detained them and (2) their consent to search the vehicle was involuntary. Thao, 291 F.
App’x at 132. We held that Peech had reasonable suspicion to detain the men based on a
number of facts. Id. at 133. As to the consent issue, we relied on the district court’s
credibility determinations with respect to Defendant, Thao, and the four officers who
testified. Id. at 134. The district court observed in the suppression hearing, “I was more
impressed with the truthfulness and testimonies of the sworn peace officers than I am of
an individual who has had numerous encounters in a confrontational situation with peace
officers all over and who is a convicted felon . . . .” Id. The district court also noted it
had observed both Defendant and Thao’s demeanor during the testimony. Id.Defendant outlined the factual basis for his § 2255 petition as follows:
On October 9, 2007, after I initiated my appeal, Mr. Peech was fired from
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the Wyoming Highway Patrol for falsifying a dispatch report for a traffic
stop that occurred on April 7, 2007. Mr. Peech falsely told the dispatcher
that the driver of the vehicle was driving under the influence of alcohol in
order to justify a traffic stop of a vehicle that he suspected of carrying
illegal drugs and a large quantity of money. See Jared Miller, Patrol
Upholds Trooper Firing, CASPER-START TRIBUNE, Nov. 8, 2007.
Record on Appeal (ROA) at 12. The Government introduced the referenced newspaper
article, as well as Peech’s report of the stop, into the record. The article indicates
Trooper Peech was cooperating with the federal Drug Enforcement Agency, which
directed him to conduct a “wall stop” of a silver Dodge truck.1 ROA at 74–75. When he
realized he would not be on patrol after midnight because of state cost cuts, Trooper
Peech called Wyoming’s drunk driving hotline and falsely reported seeing a vehicle
driven by someone under the influence. Id. at 75. After being called on duty to respond
to his own false report, he stopped the Dodge pickup for driving four miles per hour over
the speed limit. Id. at 56. After gaining consent to search the pickup, he found $3.3
million in cash inside. Id. at 75.
Defendant argued in his § 2255 petition that because the “main issue during the
suppression hearing was one of credibility,” the district court “would have ruled
differently in light of this new evidence.” Id. at 14. The district court rejected this
argument, and held that Defendant had a full opportunity to litigate his claim. The court
said the “newly discovered evidence” concerning Trooper Peech was from an unrelated
incident and “[a]t best . . . might have provided a basis for impeaching Trooper Peech’s
1
As we have explained elsewhere, “In a wall stop, a patrol officer is asked to find
his own lawful reason to stop and search the vehicle and is not advised of the information
known by investigators in order to protect the secrecy of the ongoing investigation.”
United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2012).
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credibility.” Defendant appealed, seeking a certificate of appealability, which the district
court had denied. Without granting the certificate, we ordered the Government to brief
the following questions: Whether evidence discovered after a Fourth Amendment claim
has been fully litigated can ever be the basis for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and if so,
under what standard that evidence should be assessed. After the Government submitted
its brief, we granted a certificate of appealability as to those questions, appointed
Defendant counsel, and ordered counsel to file supplemental briefing. The matter has
now been fully briefed.
II.
A federal prisoner is entitled to have his sentence vacated or corrected if it was
“imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Defendant makes two arguments
in support of his § 2255 motion. First, he argues that he had no full and fair opportunity
to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim because he did not have “crucial evidence needed
to impeach the Government’s sole witness to establish reasonable suspicion.” Aplt.’s
Supp. Br. at 19. Second, he argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the Government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires
the Government to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to trial. We take these
arguments in reverse order.
A.
Defendant’s second argument is that the district court erred in not conducting an
evidentiary hearing to consider his Brady claim. But Defendant’s § 2255 petition did not
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mention Brady or request an evidentiary hearing. Defendant raised Brady only in his
reply brief before the district court. Accordingly, the district court did not discuss Brady,
but only mentioned it in passing. In civil cases, at least, a party waives an issue in the
district court if he waits to raise the argument until his reply brief. F.D.I.C. v. Noel, 177
F.3d 911, 915–16 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding the appellant waived an issue by not
raising it until his reply brief in the district court). Section 2255 petitions are, admittedly,
“strange and slippery creatures” that defy “traditional ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’
characterization.” United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 742, 743 (10th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2003).
But the same rule logically applies in a § 2255 proceeding, considering that plain error
review does not apply to forfeited errors on § 2255 review. United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 166 (1982). The Ninth Circuit reached exactly this conclusion. United States
v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a Brady claim raised by a
pro se § 2255 petitioner in his district court reply brief was too late and was not within
the certificate of appealability). Of course, we construe pro se pleadings liberally, United
States v. Tony, 637 F.3d 1153, 1155 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011), but even construed as liberally
as possible, Defendant’s § 2255 petition simply does not raise a Brady claim. Therefore,
we do not consider his second argument on appeal.2
2
Whether Brady’s disclosure requirements even apply at the motion to suppress
stage is an open question. See United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 901 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting a split in the circuits). As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “Suppression hearings do
not determine a defendant’s guilt or punishment, yet Brady rests on the idea that due
process is violated when the withheld evidence is ‘material either to guilt or to
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B.
Defendant’s first argument is that the newly discovered evidence of Trooper
Peech’s deception entitled him to § 2255 relief because it shows he was “denied the
opportunity for ‘full and fair litigation’ . . . of his Fourth Amendment claims in the trial
court or on direct appeal.” Aplt.’s Supp. Br. at 12. Defendant’s petition asked the district
court to grant him a new suppression hearing so he could present the newly discovered
evidence.3
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has enforced the Fourth
Amendment through the exclusionary rule, a “prudential doctrine created . . . to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty.” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Suppression of evidence is not “a personal
constitutional right,” nor is it designed to “redress the injury to the privacy of the victim.”
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). Rather, the rule is a “prophylactic device
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers.”
Id. at 479 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)).
punishment.’” United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
3
Defendant has not cited, nor have we found, any cases saying a new suppression
hearing is an appropriate form of relief under § 2255. The statute itself only says a
district court granting § 2255 relief “shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as
may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Nevertheless, we assume without
deciding that § 2255 gives district courts leeway to grant a new suppression hearing if
§ 2255 relief is appropriate.
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The exclusionary rule “has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Id. at 486–87 (quoting United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). Thus, the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to habeas corpus proceedings by state prisoners
“where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim.” Id. at 494. The Court concluded the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule on collateral review outweighed the rule’s deterrent effect. Id. at 493.
“The view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests
on the dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and
on appeal.” Id. And even if “some additional deterrent effect would be presented in
isolated cases,” the resulting protection to Fourth Amendment rights “would be
outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of
criminal justice.” Id. at 494.
We have expanded the Stone bar to § 2255 petitions.4 United States v. Cook, 997
F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, “Fourth Amendment violations are not
reviewable in a § 2255 motion when the federal prisoner has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim at trial and present issues on direct
4
The Supreme Court thereafter implicitly endorsed this expansion, saying, “After
Stone v. Powell, the only cases raising Fourth Amendment challenges on collateral attack
are those federal habeas corpus cases in which the State has failed to provide a state
prisoner with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim, analogous federal
cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and collateral challenges by state prisoners” where state
statutes allow collateral attack on Fourth Amendment grounds. United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 562 n.20 (1982) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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appeal.” Id. at 1317.
The Stone Court did not define a “full and fair opportunity to litigate,” but only
said in a footnote, “Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494
n.36. This citation to Townsend is not particularly illuminating because Townsend
described when a federal court in habeas corpus proceedings must hold an evidentiary
hearing to develop additional facts. That question turns on whether the “the habeas
applicant . . . receive[d] a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court.” Townsend,
372 U.S. at 312. Because Stone’s “single, oblique footnote” referencing Townsend is not
very helpful, we have concluded that “Townsend is not the sole measure of the meaning
of ‘opportunity for full and fair litigation.’” Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1164
(10th Cir. 1978). Instead, we have focused on the “procedural ‘opportunity’ aspect of the
Stone standard.” Id. at 1165. An “opportunity” for full and fair consideration requires at
least “the procedural opportunity to raise or otherwise present a Fourth Amendment
claim,” a “full and fair evidentiary hearing,” and “recognition and at least colorable
application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitutional standards.” Id. at 1165.
Ineffective assistance of counsel may deny a defendant this opportunity. Cook, 997 F.2d
at 1318.
Defendant identifies no procedural deficiencies in this case and does not claim his
counsel was ineffective. Instead, he makes two arguments. First, he argues the existence
of newly discovered evidence indicates Defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. He bases this argument on Stone’s enigmatic
reference to Townsend. Townsend said a federal court ought to grant an evidentiary
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hearing in a habeas case “[i]f . . . there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence.” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. Of course, Townsend did not address a Fourth
Amendment situation. In fact, it said the new evidence “must bear upon the
constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal
habeas corpus.” Id. at 317. But new evidence related to a suppression motion bears upon
neither the habeas petitioner’s guilt or innocence nor the constitutionality of his detention
in federal custody. So we do not think the Stone Court, in citing Townsend, meant to
automatically require an evidentiary hearing whenever there was “newly discovered
evidence” related to a Fourth Amendment claim.
Defendant next argues the newly discovered evidence in this case establishes a
Brady violation, which, unlike a Fourth Amendment violation, is cognizable on collateral
review. Defendant says “If proved, [Defendant’s] newly discovered evidence would
establish a Brady violation that would allow the reexamination of his Fourth Amendment
claim through his § 2255 motion.” Aplt.’s Supp. Br. at 21. This argument goes a step
too far. As we discussed above, Defendant failed to raise Brady in the district court, and
he cannot bring it in through the back door. So the only way Defendant can prevail is if
his lack of access to the impeaching evidence deprived him of a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. This is a question of law we review de novo.
Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir. 1992).
We have never considered whether evidence discovered after a suppression
hearing can circumvent the Stone bar. The Seventh Circuit, however, considered a
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similar situation in Brock v. United States, 573 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2009). There, the
defendant brought a § 2255 motion after he located a witness who was previously
unavailable to testify at the defendant’s suppression hearing. Id. at 498. The witness’s
testimony would have potentially rendered the search warrant for the defendant’s
apartment invalid. Id. at 499. The court held that the later-discovered evidence did not
deprive the defendant of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Id. at 501. The court said
the defendant’s arguments did not “bear[] upon the central issue in Stone and the one
which we must ultimately decide: whether the deterrent benefit of applying the
exclusionary rule in a particular situation outweighs the social costs of letting the guilty
go free, expending limited judicial resources, and disturbing finality in criminal trials.”
Id. at 501. The court reasoned that police were unlikely to be deterred by fear that Fourth
Amendment violations undiscovered during trial and direct appeal would surface in a
§ 2255 motion, “at least when there is no allegation that the officers prevented the
defendant from finding the evidence.” Id. The “additional incremental deterrent effect”
of applying the exclusionary rule to newly discovered evidence “would be outweighed by
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice.” Id.
(quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 494). The court concluded, “Stone prevents [the defendant]
from bringing this § 2255 motion solely on the ground that newly discovered evidence
would have triggered the exclusionary rule if presented earlier.” Id.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brock. A defendant is not
deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate simply because he does not discover all
potentially relevant evidence until after his suppression hearing. Under Stone, habeas
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corpus relief is unavailable as long as the Government afforded “an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 482 (emphasis
added). Absent ineffective assistance of counsel or government concealment, a
defendant cannot claim that the mere existence of undiscovered material evidence
deprived him of an opportunity to litigate his claim. As the Court said in Stone, “[W]here
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 482.
Defendant says this case differs from Stone and Brock because the Government
withheld the impeaching evidence. Whether or not Brady applies at the suppression
stage, we can at least assume that Defendant might be deprived of a “full and fair
evidentiary hearing” if the Government withholds material evidence. Cook, 997 F.2d at
1318. But nothing suggests the Government covered up evidence. The Wyoming
Highway Patrol did not put Trooper Peech on paid leave until October 2007, four months
after Defendant’s suppression hearing. No one involved in this case, other than Peech
himself, apparently knew about the false dispatch report at the time of Defendant’s
suppression hearing.
Defendant cites our cases indicating that “[f]or purposes of Brady, knowledge by
police or investigators is imputed to the prosecution.” Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of
Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). But, even if this Brady authority applies, Trooper Peech’s knowledge of his
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own false dispatch report can hardly be imputed to the Government. The Supreme Court
has explained that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). But Brady “does not require the
prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that could conceivably benefit
the defendant.” Smith, 50 F.3d at 823. We do not think prosecutors have a duty to
investigate officers’ actions in entirely unrelated cases just in case some impeaching
evidence may show up. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150 (1972) (saying
prosecutors should establish procedures “to insure communication of all relevant
information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it” (emphasis added)). Nor
would Trooper Peech have thought he had a duty to disclose the information at the time
since it was part of an unrelated, secret DEA investigation. Of course, things might have
been different if the Wyoming Highway Patrol had begun investigating Peech for
possible misconduct before the suppression hearing. But nothing indicates that was the
case. So even assuming the Government has a Brady-like duty to disclose all material
evidence prior to a suppression hearing, that duty does not extend to discovering every
tidbit of information that is, or could ripen into, impeachment evidence.5
5
We are not even sure the evidence here would qualify as material under Brady.
The only disputed facts at the suppression hearing involved whether Defendant and Thao
withdrew their consent to the search. On that point, Officer Peech’s testimony was
backed up by the testimony of three other officers whom the district court found credible.
Because of the other testimony, we are not certain that “there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would
have been different.” United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir.
2012).
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Even if the Government can be charged with knowledge of the evidence here, that
would not be a sufficient reason to afford Defendant a second suppression hearing. This
is because the policies behind the exclusionary rule do not support allowing this evidence
to circumvent the Stone bar. The exclusionary rule is designed to “deter[] . . . police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 487. But the new
evidence in this case was simply impeaching evidence that called into question Trooper
Peech’s credibility.6 So a new suppression hearing would only be appropriate if
suppressing the evidence would deter future Fourth Amendment violations. For a
number of reasons, we cannot say suppression would have this effect. First, evidence
that merely impeaches an officer’s credibility is not the same as direct evidence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. Allowing the introduction of impeaching evidence on
collateral review can only deter Fourth Amendment violations where (1) the district
court’s ruling on the suppression motion hinges entirely on credibility and (2) the
testifying officer could foresee at the time of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation
that the impeaching evidence might be discovered and damage his credibility at a second
suppression hearing.
Such a situation seems highly unlikely. The Supreme Court has said the
likelihood of additional impeaching evidence being discovered after the suppression
hearing but before collateral review is too small to affect police officers’ calculations. Id.6
Nothing suggests that Trooper Peech violated the Constitution during the April
2007 wall stop. Trooper Peech did not use the dispatch report as a basis to stop the
vehicle, but only to get called on duty. He based the vehicle stop on his personal
observation of the vehicle driving four miles per hour over the speed limit.
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at 493. This is especially true when, as here, the impeaching evidence arose after the
alleged Fourth Amendment violation. At the time of the allegedly nonconsensual search
of Defendant’s vehicle, Trooper Peech had not yet falsified the drunk driver report. We
find it hard to believe officers will avoid violating the Fourth Amendment for fear that
some wrongful act they might commit in the future will come back to haunt them on
collateral review. Allowing impeachment evidence around the Stone bar might deter
some police misconduct that is useful for impeachment, such as evidence the officer
falsified reports. But the exclusionary rule is aimed only at a narrow class of police
misconduct—Fourth Amendment violations. In short, allowing evidence of Trooper
Peech’s false report to be introduced on collateral review would do little or nothing to
deter future Fourth Amendment violations. Allowing the evidence would therefore be
contrary to the purposes of the exclusionary rule and inconsistent with Stone v. Powell.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is not entitled to § 2255 relief.
AFFIRMED.
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