Hampton v. Morton ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 25 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RUSSELL M. HAMPTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-1434
DON MORTON, BILL REED, and (D.C. No. 97-D-1878)
BEN GRIEGO, (D. Colo.)
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.**
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. Our jurisdiction arises under § 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we
affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his
constitutional rights when they revoked 180 days of his previously awarded earned time
credits. Plaintiff claims that the loss of these credits will require him to serve an
additional six months in prison. Plaintiff received the credits between 1990-1996 for his
participation in the Colorado Department of Corrections Sex Offender Treatment
Program. On March 6, 1996, Defendants withdrew the credits. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants informed him that the credits were revoked because he had failed to
participate in the treatment program. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the earned
time credits had already vested and that state law prevented the withdrawal of vested
earned time credits. He also claimed that the withdrawal of the credits violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the earned time credits were
revoked summarily. Plaintiff did not seek the restoration of his earned time credits, but
instead sought money damages. The district court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were
not cognizable under § 1983 and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v.
United States Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1997). We have
reviewed the parties’ briefs, pleadings and the entire record before us and agree with the
decision of the district court. A state prisoner may not bring a § 1983 suit for damages if
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the constitutional defect he alleges would, “if established, necessarily imply the invalidity
of the deprivation of his good time credits” unless the plaintiff can show that the
deprivation of the good time credits has previously been invalidated. Edwards v. Balisok,
117 S.Ct. 1584, 1588 (1997). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that his good time credits
were wrongfully revoked and that the procedure utilized by prison officials to deprive him
of the credits violated procedural due process. In deciding these claims, a district court
would have to determine whether the revocation of the earned time credits was proper.
Consequently, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of
the deprivation of his good time credits. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly dismissed the complaint. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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