United States v. Walker , 576 F. App'x 725 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT August 12, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 13-3250
v. (D. Kansas)
(D.C. No. 6:13-CR-10068-MLB-1 and
6:13-CR-10068-MLB-2)
DARRIN WALKER;
ANGELA JOHNSON, a/k/a Primitiva
Johnson,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
The district court sua sponte dismissed a federal indictment against Mr.
Darrin Walker and Ms. Angela Johnson, reasoning that the case belonged in state
court. The government appeals, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion. We agree.
*
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and
judgment may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The decision to file federal charges lies within the exclusive province of
the executive branch. If the executive branch decides to charge a federal crime,
the judicial branch incurs a responsibility to determine the sufficiency of the
charge. But here, the district court exercised powers that it didn’t have, invading
the province of the executive branch by dismissing the indictment based on
disagreement with the charging decision. This action constituted an abuse of
discretion, requiring us to reverse the dismissal and reinstate the indictment.
I. The District Court’s Sua Sponte Dismissal
This appeal grew out of a search of trash cans near the residence of Mr.
Walker and Ms. Johnson. Inside the trash cans, police found bags containing
white residue. This finding led to issuance of a search warrant, the discovery of
drugs and a gun, and the filing of drug and gun charges.
In defending against these charges, Mr. Walker and Ms. Johnson moved to
suppress the drugs and gun. During the hearing on this motion, the district court
stated without warning:
I’m going to dismiss this case without prejudice. This is a case that
should be, if it’s going to be handled at all, should be handled in
state court, not in federal court. This is not a federal case. It’s a
state case. It’s a state officer, or offices. It’s a state warrant. It’s a
state judge. And this business of being -- of elevating it to a federal
case in this particular case is unwarranted. Now, I don’t know. You
can take it back to state court and see what the state judges will do
with their own problems. It’s without prejudice, so if something gets
resolved and you want to refile it here, then I’ll reconsider it; but at
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this point in time, I just don’t think this case needs to be here --
shouldn’t be here. So that’s the ruling of the court.
Id. at 72.
The prosecutor did not object, and the district court later issued a one-
sentence order dismissing the case without prejudice “for the reasons stated in
open court.” Id. at 63.
II. Standard of Review
When the government timely objects to dismissal of an indictment, we
generally review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v.
Bergman, 746 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2014). But when the government fails
to timely object, we ordinarily apply the plain-error standard. See United States
v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 660-61 (10th Cir. 2008).
The government acknowledges that it failed to contemporaneously object to
the district court’s dismissal. But when a district court sua sponte resolves an
issue of law on the merits, the appellant may challenge that ruling regardless of
the failure to contemporaneously object. See United States v. Hernandez-
Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 2003). Our review under these
circumstances follows the standard applicable when the appellant timely objects:
abuse of discretion.
III. Invading the Province of the Executive Branch
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The government argues that the district court lacked authority to sua sponte
dismiss a legally sufficient indictment. Mr. Walker and Ms. Johnson defend the
dismissal, but do not question the legal sufficiency of the indictment. Instead,
Mr. Walker and Ms. Johnson rely on the district court’s broad supervisory power.
This power does not permit dismissal of an indictment based on disagreement
with the prosecutor’s decision on which charges to bring. Accordingly, the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing the indictment.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Federal prosecutors “are designated by statute as the President’s delegates
to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.’” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3). In this capacity, prosecutors enjoy broad
discretion in deciding on the charges. “Such discretion is an integral feature of
the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon
improper factors.” United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997).
Our decision in United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir.
2003), provides guidance. There, the defendant claimed that prosecutors should
have charged a violation of state law rather than federal law. We rejected this
claim as “plainly without merit,” noting that “[i]t is settled law that as long as a
prosecutor’s charging decision is not based on an impermissible factor such as
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race . . . a prosecutor may exercise broad discretion with respect to his charging
decisions.” Id. at 1064; see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124
(1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
Under Curtis, prosecutors have discretion in deciding whether to file state
or federal charges. This decision was not for the district court to make.
B. The District Court’s Supervisory Power
Mr. Walker and Ms. Johnson rely on the district court’s supervisory power.
This reliance is misguided.
Generally, a district court cannot use its supervisory power to dismiss a
legally valid indictment. See United States v. Hudson, 545 F.2d 724, 726 (10th
Cir. 1976) (holding that a district court lacks the “inherent power” to dismiss an
indictment based on the defendant’s poor health). But as Mr. Walker and Ms.
Johnson point out, a district court may use its supervisory authority to dismiss an
indictment when prosecutorial misconduct influenced the grand jury’s decision
and caused prejudice to the defendant. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988); United States v. Hillman, 642 F.3d 929, 933-34 (10th
Cir. 2011).
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These circumstances are not present: The district court dismissed the
indictment solely because it believed the case belonged in state court. This
choice was for the prosecutor, not the court. 1
In support, Mr. Walker relies on a Ninth Circuit case, United States v.
Gonsalves (Gonsalves I), 691 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1982). See Walker Br. at 12-
13. But that case is neither controlling nor applicable. In Gonsalves I, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal of a “cumbersome
indictment.” 691 F.2d at 1322. But this decision was vacated by the Supreme
Court. See United States v. Gonsalves, 464 U.S. 806 (1983) (vacating decision
and remanding for consideration in light of United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 509 (1983)). On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal,
recognizing that the “scope of a federal court’s supervisory powers [is limited] to
very specific areas, not including the unmanageability or complexity of an
indictment.” United States v. Gonsalves (Gonsalves II), 781 F.2d 1319, 1320
(1986).
1
At the suppression hearing, the district court commented on the state
court’s procedure preceding issuance of the search warrant. See Aplt.’s App. at
72 (stating: “You can take it back to state court and see what the state judges
will do with their own problems”). But the district court did not rule on the
validity of the warrant or the legality of the resulting search; instead, the court
based its dismissal on the prosecutor’s decision to bring federal charges rather
than state charges.
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The Ninth Circuit case also bears critical differences with our case. In
Gonsalves I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
indictment because it found the case was an “unmanageable monstrosity” and
would “gravely impair the basic function of the District Court.” Gonsalves I, 691
F.2d at 1320. Here, the district court dismissed the indictment based on
disagreement over the decision to charge federal crimes rather than state crimes.
Under our precedents, a district court cannot invoke its supervisory power
to dismiss an indictment based on disagreement with the prosecutor’s decision to
file federal charges. In ordering dismissal on this ground, the district court
abused its discretion.
C. Reassignment on Remand
The government requests that we reassign the case to another district judge
on remand. Aplt.’s Br. at 6, 16. We deny this request because the government
fails to explain why reassignment would be appropriate.
Reassignment of a case involves an “extraordinary” step. Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727, 744 (10th Cir. 2005). We can take this
step only in limited circumstances: (1) when there is evidence of actual bias or
prejudice against a party, or (2) on the basis of a three-part approach:
“(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon
remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind
previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous
or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment
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is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether
reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to
any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.”
Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1450 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986)).
The government does not allege personal bias or any facts suggesting a
need for reassignment based on the three-part test. In light of this failure and the
“extraordinary nature of such an order,” we decline to reassign the case to a
different judge on remand. See Procter & Gamble Co., 427 F.3d at 744.
IV. Disposition
We reverse the dismissal, order the district court to reinstate the
indictment, and remand for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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