Spagnola v. State Board of Agriculture , 13 F. App'x 870 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 13 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT G. SPAGNOLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1312
(D.C. No. 99-S-178)
THE STATE BOARD OF (D. Colo.)
AGRICULTURE, as governing
body of Colorado State University;
LOREN CRABTREE, Individually
and as Provost of Colorado State
University; DANIEL E. COSTELLO,
Individually and as Dean of the
College of Business for Colorado
State University,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Following his resignation as a tenured professor at Colorado State
University (CSU or the University), plaintiff Robert Spagnola filed this action
alleging violations of his due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to
defendants on Spagnola’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state-law claims. On appeal, Spagnola challenges the district
court’s rejection of his due process claim, in particular, its conclusion that he was
not constructively discharged from his position with CSU. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court did. Mitchell v. City of Moore , 218 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir.
2000). We affirm, though our analysis differs slightly from the district court’s.
See Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof’l Licensing of Dep’t of Commerce ,
240 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (appellate court may affirm on any ground
supported by record).
These are the facts viewed in Spagnola’s favor. Spagnola obtained tenure
at CSU in May 1997. In February 1998, he was offered a position at another
university. He wanted to accept the new position but did not want to relinquish
-2-
his tenured position at CSU, so he asked his department head for leave without
pay to take the new position. The department head told him that the dean of the
college, defendant Costello, would only grant leaves of absence for medical
reasons. Spagnola then asked Costello directly for a leave of absence, and
Costello denied the request. Spagnola resigned from CSU in May 1998 and took
the new position, but in June, he decided he did not want the new position, and he
asked his former department head if he could withdraw his resignation.
Defendant Crabtree, provost of the University, refused to rescind the resignation,
but Spagnola was offered, and he accepted, his former position on a temporary
basis.
Spagnola subsequently learned that leaves of absence had been granted to
other tenured professors for other than medical reasons, and he contends that his
department head and Costello misinformed him about CSU’s policy regarding the
availability of unpaid leave. Relevant to his due process claim, he claims this
misinformation effectively made his resignation involuntary and that the
University constructively discharged him without according him due process.
When an employee has a protected property interest in continued
employment, an employer cannot deprive the employee of that interest without
providing him or her due process. Yearous v. Niobrara County Mem’l Hosp. ,
128 F.3d 1351, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, an employer’s constructive
-3-
discharge of an employee with a property interest in employment raises due
process concerns and may be actionable under § 1983. Id. Because Spagnola
was a tenured professor, it is undisputed that he had a property interest in his
position with the University. The issue here is whether he voluntarily resigned
or was constructively discharged.
To determine whether Spagnola resigned voluntarily or was constructively
discharged, “we consider the totality of the circumstances under an objective
standard.” Id. at 1356. The factors we consider in making this determination
include
“(1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation;
(2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he was
given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time in
which to choose; and (4) whether he was permitted to select the
effective date of resignation.”
Id. (quoting Parker v. Bd. of Regents , 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1992))
(alterations omitted). Moreover, “a resignation is only considered involuntary
if the working conditions are viewed as so intolerable, a reasonable person
would feel compelled to resign.” Lighton v. Univ. of Utah , 209 F.3d 1213, 1222
(10th Cir. 2000). Spagnola claims he “was given no alternative to resignation--if
he wished to gain additional professional experience he would have to resign.”
Appellant’s Br. at 10. He further contends that the misinformation he was given
-4-
regarding the possibility of leave without pay led him to misunderstand the nature
of the choice he was given.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there can be no
factual dispute that Spagnola voluntarily resigned. Critically, the resignation was
solely his choice based, as he admits, on his personal career goals. Defendants
placed no pressure on him to resign or seek employment elsewhere, and he
presents no evidence that CSU had some obligation to grant him leave to “gain
additional professional experience” at some other university. He contends that
a factual dispute over which of two University leave policies applied to him
precludes summary judgment. This issue is simply irrelevant because no policy or
lack of policy induced him to resign. This fact distinguishes the cases on which
he primarily relies for his constructive discharge argument because in those cases,
the misinformation caused the resignations. See Covington v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. , 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air
Force , 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-5-