State Of Washington v. Michael Joesph Gonzales ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                                                                 FILED
    COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION 1.1
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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                              No. 44433 -0 -II
    Respondent,
    v.
    MICHAEL JOESPH GONZALES,                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    LEE, J. — Michael Joesph Gonzales appeals his conviction of unlawful possession of a
    firearm in the first degree, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his
    pre -arrest statements, as well as a shotgun            found in his   car.    In a pro se statement of additional
    grounds (   SAG),       Gonzales also argues that the trial court erred in adopting the State' s proposed
    findings    of   fact    and   conclusions   of   law    following   the      suppression      hearing.         Because the
    circumstances surrounding Gonzales' s statements do not show that his will was overborne or that
    he made them during a custodial interrogation, the trial court did not err in admitting the
    statements.      And, because the      officer opened      the broken violin       case   in   which      the   firearm   was
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    found pursuant to a valid inventory search, the trial court did not err in admitting the firearm.
    The trial court properly adopted the State' s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
    because they accurately reflected the court' s oral rulings. We affirm the defendant' s conviction.
    FACTS
    Gonzales was taken to the hospital                after   being in       a car accident on a      city   street.   His car
    was   damaged     and required       towing.       After a towing company was called to impound the car, Port
    Orchard Police Officer         Jerry   Jensen inventoried the              car' s contents.       He found a damaged violin
    case in the back seat that was closed but not latched. Jensen opened the case and found a sawed -
    off shotgun      with   ammunition.         He also found a closed ammunition case that contained a pistol
    and ammunition. A subsequent investigation revealed that Gonzales was a convicted felon.
    A few hours after the accident, Detective E.J. Martin went to the hospital to speak to
    Gonzales.      Gonzales       was   being   treated in the      critical care unit.        The attending nurse told Martin
    that Gonzales was        in   pain   but   could   talk.    Martin entered the room and found Gonzales lying in
    bed wearing       a neck collar, with a        drain tube in his           chest.     When Martin stood by the bed and
    quietly   said   his   name,   Gonzales      opened      his   eyes and     looked    at   the detective.    Martin introduced
    himself    and   asked    if Gonzales       remembered what              had happened.            Gonzales said that the car' s
    steering had failed. When Martin showed him a photograph of the violin case and shotgun and
    asked about      it, Gonzales       remained silent.        Martin then asked if his fingerprints would be found
    on    these   items,    and   Gonzales      was    silent   again       before saying      yes.     He remained silent a few
    moments more           before asking if he         was     going to      prison.    The detective replied that he did not
    know, as he was merely investigating the case.
    2
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    After the State charged Gonzales with unlawful possession of a firearm in the first
    degree, Gonzales moved to suppress his hospital statements, the shotgun, and the contents of the
    ammunition case.           At the suppression hearing, Officer Jensen testified that when a car is towed,
    officers     have to   inventory its      contents.    Jensen added that the purpose of the inventory is not to
    investigate a crime but to see if there are valuables in the car and to protect them.
    Jensen explained that when he found the violin case, its " nose" was broken and the case
    was not      latched. Report       of   Proceedings ( RP) ( Oct. 8, 2014) at 27. He opened the case to see if it
    contained       a violin   that he      needed   to take to the          office   for safekeeping.       In doing so, he was
    following the procedures used by the Port Orchard Police Department.
    The trial court ruled that Jensen was performing an inventory search when he came upon
    the violin case and that his testimony that it might contain something of value was persuasive.
    The court concluded as follows:
    That the search of the violin case was an appropriate exercise of police
    prerogative in conducting an inventory search because it was consistent with
    policy of the agency, and because it was reasonable and appropriate for the officer
    to determine if the violin case contained valuable property that should be removed
    from the automobile for safekeeping and to determine if the contents had been
    damaged before being removed.
    Clerk'   s   Papers ( CP)   at    15 ( Conclusion     of    Law IV). Because the search of the violin case was an
    1
    appropriate and reasonable              inventory   search,    its   contents were admissible.
    With regard to the admissibility of Gonzales' s statements, Detective Martin testified that
    Gonzales        appeared     to    understand       their    conversation,        that his   answers to      questions were
    1 But, because the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the time he opened
    the ammunition case, the court concluded that this search required a warrant and suppressed the
    contents of the ammunition case. The State does not appeal this ruling.
    3
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    appropriate, and      that he did         not exhibit   any   confusion.   At the end, Gonzales asked a question
    that   related   to the topic        of   the   conversation.       Martin denied making threats or promises to
    Gonzales       and explained     that he did       not read    Gonzales his Miranda rights2 because he did not
    arrest, handcuff, or detain him.
    Gonzales testified that he was on pain medication at the time for injuries that included a
    broken pelvis. He added that he did not remember the conversation with Martin.
    The trial court rejected the argument that Gonzales' s Fifth Amendment rights were
    violated by Martin' s non -coercive questioning, reasoning that while Martin may have been
    somewhat        opportunistic"       in talking to Gonzales at the hospital, their conversation did not
    violate      Gonzales'   s   constitutional      rights.   RP ( Oct. 8,    2014)   at   19.   The court entered the
    following conclusions of law:
    That while the defendant was restrained in the hospital room by the
    medical therapy he was receiving from the hospital at no time was he restrained in
    a manner that would reasonably suggest to the defendant that he was under police
    restraint, and therefore he was not under arrest requiring him to be advised of
    Miranda warnings.
    That the statements made by the defendant to Detective E.J. Martin were
    voluntary and not the product of any threat or coercion that would violate the
    Fifth Amendment protections of the defendant.
    CP     at   12 ( Conclusions    of   Law II, III).      Consequently, Gonzales' s statements were admissible in
    the State' s case -in- chief.
    2 Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
     ( 1966).
    4
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    After the parties agreed to a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court found Gonzales
    3
    guilty   as charged and         imposed            based
    a prison -          Drug   Offender   Sentencing   Alternative   sentence.
    Gonzales appeals the trial court' s denial of his motions to suppress.
    ANALYSIS
    A. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS
    1. Standard of Review
    We review the decision to deny a motion to suppress by determining whether the findings
    of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings support the conclusions
    of   law. State   v.         Miranda, 176 Wn.
    Rosas -                         App.   773, 779, 
    309 P. 3d 728
     ( 2013); State v. Ross, 
    106 Wn. App. 876
    , 880, 
    26 P. 3d 298
     ( 2001),    review    denied, 
    145 Wn.2d 1016
     ( 2002).          Where the
    findings are not challenged, we treat them as verities on appeal and review the conclusions of
    law de   novo.     State   v.   O' Neill, 
    148 Wn.2d 564
    , 571, 
    62 P. 3d 489
     ( 2003); State v. Johnson, 
    128 Wn.2d 431
    , 443, 
    909 P. 2d 293
     ( 1996).
    Gonzales challenges the trial court' s conclusions that his statements were voluntary and,
    thus, admissible. He contends that the admission of his involuntary statements violated his right
    to due process, as well as his Miranda rights.
    2. Due Process
    The due process voluntariness test examines whether a defendant' s will was overborne by
    the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. Dickerson v. United States, 
    530 U.S. 3
     RCW 9. 94A.660.
    5
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    428, 434, 
    120 S. Ct. 2326
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 405
     ( 2000). 4                      If a person' s confession was not the
    product of a rational intellect and free will, the confession was coerced and is inadmissible.
    Townsend      v.   Sain, 
    372 U. S. 293
    , 307, 
    83 S. Ct. 745
    , 
    9 L. Ed. 2d 770
     ( 1963),                  overruled on other
    grounds    by Keeney      v.    Tamayo- Reyes, 
    504 U.S. 1
    ,            
    112 S. Ct. 1715
    , 
    118 L. Ed. 2d 318
     ( 1992);
    State v. Reuben, 
    62 Wn. App. 620
    , 624, 
    814 P. 2d 1177
    , review denied, 
    118 Wn.2d 1006
     ( 1991).
    To be voluntary, a confession must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
    obtained   by      any direct   or   implied     promises.    United States v. Lall, 
    607 F. 3d 1277
    , 1285 ( 11th
    Cir. 2010).        Reviewing courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
    confession was voluntary. Lall, 
    607 F. 3d at 1285
    .
    These standards apply to a drug- induced statement. Townsend, 
    372 U.S. at 307
    ; see State
    v.   Gregory,      
    79 Wn.2d 637
    , 642, 
    488 P. 2d 757
     ( 1971) (                 admissibility of statements made by
    defendant    who     has been    administered narcotic            drugs depends   on unique   facts   of case), overruled
    on other grounds by State v. Rogers, 
    83 Wn.2d 553
    , 
    520 P. 2d 159
    , cent denied, 
    419 U. S. 1053
    1974).    At issue in Townsend was the voluntariness of a confession made after the defendant
    was   administered a       drug      constituting   a "   truth    serum."   
    372 U.S. at 308
    .     The Court found it
    difficult to imagine a situation where a confession would be less the product of a free intellect
    and less voluntary than when brought about by such a drug. Townsend, 
    372 U.S. at
    307 -08.
    In Gregory, the Washington Supreme Court .cited Townsend in determining that the
    hospitalized defendant' s rationality was not hindered, diminished, or affected by the narcotics he
    had   received.       
    79 Wn.2d at 642
    .    Although drowsy on first awakening, the defendant freely
    4 The Court traced this test to cases decided before Miranda but noted that it has not been
    abandoned. Dickerson, 
    530 U. S. at 434
    .
    6
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    answered        the   officers'   questions.    Gregory,       
    79 Wn.2d at 642
    .   He refused to answer further
    questions only after being accused of lying, and this defensive action supported the view that he
    5
    was   in full    possession of       his   mental   faculties.       Gregory, 
    79 Wn.2d at 642
    ; see also State v.
    Kelter, 
    71 Wn. 2d 52
    , 55, 
    426 P. 2d 500
     ( 1967) (                statements elicited by police while defendant was
    hospitalized were voluntarily given; his volition was not impaired and he was not disabled from
    making a rational choice).
    Here, the trial court found as follows with regard to the effect of pain medication on
    Gonzales:
    That while the defendant appeared to be in pain, and was likely on pain
    medication, the detective carried on a short conversation with the defendant in
    which it was apparent that the defendant was oriented to time and place,
    understood        English,       understood the nature and subject of the defendant' s
    questions and gave appropriate and logical answers to the questions posed by the
    defendant. At one point the defendant also asked the detective a question that was
    relevant and pertinent to the subject matter of the conversation, which was about
    firearms in the car at the time of the collision.
    CP at 11 ( Finding of Fact VI).
    While not assigning error to this finding, Gonzales argues that it improperly focuses on
    his   coherence       during   the questioning.      As support, he cites Townsend, which disapproved of a
    standard that rendered a confession admissible as long as the accused was capable of making a
    narrative of past events or of stating his own participation in the crime. 
    372 U. S. at 320
    .
    Even if not determinative of voluntariness, coherency appears relevant in considering the
    circumstances         surrounding     a    defendant'   s   confession.   If, as alleged, the intoxicated defendant
    5
    We   note   that the defendant in        Gregory    received     Miranda    warnings   before his questioning. 
    79 Wn.2d at 642
    .
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    was unable      to   stand alone and was "           jabbering," " babbling,"              and "   raving,"   the error in admitting
    his contemporaneous confession " was so gross and so prejudicial as to amount to denial of due
    process."       Gladden        v.   Unsworth, 396 F. 2d. 373, 379, 380 ( 9th Cir. 1968); see also State v.
    Cuzzetto, 
    76 Wn.2d 378
    , 383, 
    457 P. 2d 204
     ( 1969) ( defendant' s intoxication requires exclusion
    of confession when intoxication amounts to mania).
    Similarly, coherency was part of the due process analysis in Mincey v. Arizona, 
    437 U.S. 385
    , 398, 
    98 S. Ct. 2408
    , 
    57 L. Ed. 2d 290
     ( 1978).                                 In addressing whether the defendant' s
    statements were the product of a rational intellect and free will, as Townsend requires, the Court
    observed:
    It is hard to imagine              a    situation    less   conducive       to the     exercise   of " a
    rational   intellect    and a    free   will"      than   Mincey' s. He had been seriously wounded
    just a few hours earlier, and had arrived at the hospital " depressed almost to the
    point of coma,"         according to his attending              physician.       Although he had received
    some treatment, his condition at the time of [the officer' s] interrogation was still
    sufficiently   serious     that he      was       in the intensive     care unit.      He complained to [ the
    officer]   that the     pain   in his   leg He was evidently confused and
    was " unbearable."
    unable to think clearly about either the events of that afternoon or the
    circumstances of his interrogation, since some of his written answers were on
    their face not entirely coherent.
    Mincey,      
    437 U. S. at
      398 -99 ( footnotes        omitted);     see also Vandegriff v. State, 
    219 Tenn. 302
    ,
    308 -09, 
    409 S. W.2d 370
     ( Tenn. 1966) ( statements were not product of free intellect when made
    by intoxicated, severely injured, and dazed defendant).
    Even though Gonzales was under the .effect of pain medication when he spoke with the
    detective, the circumstances do not show that he was unable to exercise his rational intellect or
    that   he   was " shorn of      his   volition."     Vandegriff, 219          Tenn.   at   309. The detective did not threaten
    Gonzales in any way.                  Gonzales answered some questions readily, declined to answer one
    8
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    question, hesitated before responding to another, and asked an appropriate question as well. The
    circumstances do not show that his will was overborne by either the detective' s questions or the
    pain medication he was taking, and we reject this due process challenge to the voluntariness of
    his statements.
    3.   Miranda Test
    Gonzales argues further that his statements must be suppressed because he made them
    without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
    Police must give Miranda warnings when a suspect is interrogated while in police
    custody.       Rosas -Miranda, 176 Wn.        App.     at   779. "     Without Miranda warnings, a suspect' s
    statements      during   custodial   interrogation    are   presumed         involuntary."    State v. Heritage, 
    152 Wn.2d 210
    , 214, 
    95 P. 3d 345
     ( 2004).
    There is no dispute that Gonzales was interrogated; the issue is whether that interrogation
    occurred while he was in custody. See State v. McWatters, 
    63 Wn. App. 911
    , 915, 
    822 P. 2d 787
    interrogation involves express police questioning that is likely to elicit an incriminating
    response),     review    denied, 
    119 Wn.2d 1012
     ( 1992).             The "   in custody" determination requires an
    inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and whether a reasonable person
    would     have felt that he   was not at   liberty   to terminate the interrogation          and   leave.   Thompson v.
    Keohane, 
    516 U.S. 99
    , 112, 
    116 S. Ct. 457
    , 
    133 L. Ed. 2d 383
     ( 1995).                        When a person is unable
    to leave an interrogation due to medical treatment, the question becomes whether he was at
    liberty   to terminate the interrogation      and cause         the officers to leave.       United States v. Infante,
    
    701 F. 3d 386
    , 396 ( 1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 2841
     ( 2013).
    9
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    In Infante, the First Circuit concluded that the circumstances showed that a reasonable
    person in the defendant' s position would have felt free to terminate two interviews and ask the
    officers to leave. 701 F. 3d at 397. The relevant circumstances included the neutral setting of the
    hospital room as well as the facts that Infante went to the hospital of his own accord, hospital
    staff came and went freely during the interviews, the number of officers in the room was not
    overwhelming, the officers did not physically restrain Infante or act in a threatening manner, the
    interviews      were short ( 26 and      21   minutes),   and an officer informed Infante during each interview
    that   he    was not under arrest or      in custody      and   did   not   have to   speak with   the   officers.   Infante,
    701 F. 3d      at   397 -98. Moreover, "[     d] espite having received pain medication, Infante was coherent
    and responsive,         showing    no sign of mental      impairment." Infante, 701 F. 3d at 397.
    Similarly, a hospitalized defendant was not under custody when he spoke to a detective in
    State   v.   Butler, 
    165 Wn. App. 820
    , 828, 
    269 P. 3d 315
     ( 2012). Of significance were the facts that
    the defendant was restricted to a hospital room by his injuries and not by the police, no officers
    were     stationed       inside   or   outside   his   room,     and    the    defendant'   s   nurse,   rather than law
    enforcement, ultimately controlled access to him. Butler, 165 Wn. App. at 828; see also Kelter,
    
    71 Wn.2d at 54
     ( defendant was not in custody even though confined to hospital room because he
    had not been arrested or otherwise restrained by the police).
    Where a hospitalized defendant' s attempts to terminate his communication to officers
    were twice disregarded, however, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that he was in
    custody. Effland         v.   People, 
    240 P. 3d 868
    , 876 ( Colo. 2010);          see also Clay v. State, 
    290 Ga. 822
    ,
    825, 
    725 S. E.2d 260
     ( 2012) (           concluding that defendant was in custody when he awoke to find
    police officer in his treatment room who avoided the defendant' s questions about whether he was
    10
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    going to be charged, told the defendant that he needed to come down to the police station to talk
    to the police, never told the defendant he was not under arrest, and called for a patrol vehicle to
    transport the defendant to the police station).
    The evidence here shows that the attending nurse told Detective Martin that Gonzales
    was on pain medication but could talk. The detective stood at the side of the bed and had a brief
    conversation          with    Gonzales.       He was the only officer present and did not touch or threaten
    Gonzales.         Although Martin never informed Gonzales that he was not under arrest and did not
    need   to   speak,      Martin did    not act      in any way to       compel      Gonzales to     respond.    We hold that the
    trial court did not err in concluding that Gonzales was not under custody sufficient to require
    Miranda warnings.
    B. VALIDITY OF SEARCH
    Gonzales also argues that the warrantless search of his car and the violin case violated the
    Fourth Amendment               and article    I,   section   7   of   the Washington Constitution.            He claims that the
    search of his car was not a valid inventory search and adds that even if we uphold that search, the
    opening          of   the   closed   violin   case    exceeded        its lawful         scope.   Here again, we review the
    challenged findings of fact for substantial evidence, and we review the court' s conclusions of
    law de novo.
    1.    Inventory Search
    The Fourth Amendment                   and   article      I, section 7 protect citizens from unreasonable
    government searches. State v. Mireles, 
    73 Wn. App. 605
    , 611, 
    871 P.2d 162
    , review denied, 
    124 Wn.2d 1029
     ( 1994).             Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall within an exception
    to the   warrant requirement. ,           Mireles, 73 Wn.             App.   at   611.    One such exception is an inventory
    11
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    search   accompanying            a    lawful      vehicle    impound.            State v. Tyler, 
    166 Wn. App. 202
    , 208, 
    269 P. 3d 379
     ( 2012), aff'd, 
    177 Wn.2d 690
    , 
    302 P. 3d 165
     ( 2013).                                 An officer may take custody of an
    unattended vehicle            if it   obstructs      traffic     or   jeopardizes        public   safety.   RCW 46. 55. 113( 2)( b).
    Gonzales does not challenge the court' s finding that the towing and impoundment of his car was
    necessary.
    Unlike a probable cause search and a search incident to arrest, the purpose of an
    inventory search is not to discover evidence of a crime but to perform an administrative or
    caretaking function.            Mireles, 73 Wn.             App.      at   611 - 12.     The principal purposes of an inventory
    search are        to ( 1)   protect   the   vehicle owner' s          property, ( 2) protect the police against false claims
    of   theft   by   the   owner, and (        3)   protect   the   police     from    potential     danger.   Tyler, 166 Wn. App. at
    209 -10.
    Officer Jensen testified that he needed to inventory the contents of the car before it was
    towed to protect any valuables it contained, which he would then take to the office for
    safekeeping. He testified that he had used this procedure in his 32 years with the department and
    that   other officers performed                  inventory     searches         in the   same   way.   The trial court entered this
    finding of fact reflecting his testimony:
    That Officer Jensen has been with the Port Orchard Police Department for
    over thirty years and it is department practice, and his practice, to look for items
    of possible significant value or hazard so that they can be removed from the
    vehicle    for safekeeping.           The officer is aware that tow storage lots are commonly
    victimized by thieves.
    CP at 14 ( Finding of Fact IV).
    12
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    While not assigning error to this finding, Gonzales argues that it does not establish that
    the officer performed the inventory search pursuant to the necessary standardized procedures.
    Standardized criteria or established routine must regulate an officer' s actions during
    inventory       searches.         Florida   v.   Wells, 
    495 U. S. 1
    , 4, 
    110 S. Ct. 1632
    , 
    109 L. Ed. 2d 1
     ( 1990);
    Colorado        v.   Bertine, 
    479 U. S. 367
    , 375 -76, 
    107 S. Ct. 738
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 739
     ( 1987).                                Such
    policies are intended to limit the discretion of law enforcement officers so that inventory
    searches      do     not   become evidentiary          searches.    United States v. Andrews, 
    22 F. 3d 1328
    , 1334 -36
    5th Cir.),        cert.    denied, 
    513 U.S. 941
     ( 1994).                  Written policies, however, are not required.
    United States         v.   Lowe, 
    9 F.3d 43
    , 46 ( 8th Cir. 1993),              cert.   denied, 
    510 U.S. 1181
     ( 1994);        see also
    State   v.   Weide, 
    155 Wis. 2d 537
    , 549, 
    455 N.W.2d 899
     ( 1990) (                        cases stating that inventory search
    must be carried out in accordance with standardized procedures or established routine impose no
    requirement          that the policy        or procedure         must      be in writing).      Nor must inventory policies
    address      every    possible container an officer             may   encounter       during   an   inventory   search. "   A police
    officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or
    should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container
    itself."      Wells, 
    495 U. S. at 4
    ; see also United States v. Mundy, 
    621 F. 3d 283
    , 290 ( 3d Cir. 2010)
    declining to create " a rule of constitutional dimension that requires an inventory search protocol
    to predict every conceivable scenario an officer may happen upon while conducting an inventory
    search "),     cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 1531
     ( 2011).
    As stated, an inventory search is permissible if it is conducted to protect the vehicle
    owner' s      property       or   to   protect   the   police   against    false   claims of   theft.   Officer Jensen testified
    that it is department practice to do an inventory search to see if there are any valuables in the car
    13
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    and   to   protect   them.   He testified that he had followed this practice during his 32 years with the
    department        and   that his fellow   officers       did   so as well.     The trial court' s finding that Jensen was
    following department practice was sufficient to show that the officer acted in accordance with
    established routine and agency policy and engaged in a lawful inventory search.
    2. Closed Container
    Gonzales argues further that even if Officer Jensen' s initial search of his car was lawful,
    the officer exceeded the permissible scope of that search by opening the closed violin case.
    Opening a closed container pursuant to established inventory search procedure does not
    violate     the Fourth Amendment.          Wells, 
    495 U.S. at 4
    ; Bertine, 
    479 U.S. at 374
    ; Mundy, 
    621 F. 3d at 290
    ; Mireles, 73 Wn.         App.    at    612.       In arguing that article I, section 7 compels a different
    conclusion, Gonzales relies on State v. White, 
    135 Wn.2d 761
    , 
    958 P. 2d 982
     ( 1998) and State v.
    Houser, 
    95 Wn.2d 143
    , 
    622 P. 2d 1218
     ( 1980).
    Houser adopted a bright -
    line rule prohibiting police from intruding into an individual' s
    privacy interests in a locked trunk and limiting inventory searches to the passenger compartment
    of a vehicle.        White, 
    135 Wn.2d at 772
    .    The Houser court determined that property left in the
    locked trunk         of a vehicle was not           in   great   danger   of   theft.   
    95 Wn.2d at 159
    .   Based on this
    reasoning, the Houser court concluded that the police exceeded the bounds of a proper inventory
    search      by   searching the   contents of a closed            toiletry bag found in      a   locked trunk. 
    95 Wn.2d at 159
    .       In so holding, the Houser court recognized that citizens have a significant privacy interest
    in their personal luggage, as opposed to other containers. 
    95 Wn.2d at
    157 -58.
    The White court reaffirmed Houser and its limitation of inventory searches to the
    passenger        compartment     of a vehicle.             
    135 Wn.2d at 772
    .     Because the opening of the trunk
    14
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    exceeded the scope of a lawful inventory search, the court did not address the search of a closed
    tackle box found in that trunk. White, 
    135 Wn.2d at 772
    .
    Houser and White do not show that Officer Jensen exceeded the scope of a lawful
    inventory   search   in this   case.   First of all, the officer searched the passenger area of the car and
    not a locked trunk. Second, he opened an unlatched and broken violin case rather than a piece of
    personal    luggage.    We agree with the trial court that " it was reasonable and appropriate for the
    officer to determine if the violin case contained valuable property that should be removed from
    the automobile for safekeeping and to determine if the contents had been damaged before being
    removed."     CP at 15 ( Conclusion of Law IV (part)).
    The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and in admitting the contents
    of the violin case.
    C. SAG
    Gonzales contends in his SAG that the trial court erred by adopting the State' s proposed
    findings of fact and conclusions of law and that we should strike the findings and conclusions as
    a result.
    When the State prevails in a suppression hearing, it is obligated to prepare, present, and
    have entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which will, standing alone, withstand an
    appellate court' s     scrutiny for    constitutional error.   State v. Poirier, 
    34 Wn. App. 839
    , 841, 
    664 P. 2d 7
     ( 1983).   The State' s findings and conclusions reflected the trial court' s oral rulings in this
    case, and we see no error in the court' s adoption thereof.
    15
    No. 44433 -0 -II
    We affirm.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
    2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
    We concur:
    16