United States v. Zarate-Najera , 271 F. App'x 753 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 27, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 07-2152
v. (D. New Mexico)
LUIS ZARATE-NAJERA, (D.C. No. CR-02-1865-MCA)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). In its prior
Order dated February 28, 2008, this case was therefore ordered submitted without
oral argument.
Defendant and appellant, Luis Zarate-Najera, was charged with one count
of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty kilos of marijuana, in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Following a
jury trial, Zarate-Najera was found guilty and sentenced to fifty-one months’
imprisonment. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial,
made during the course of his trial in response to an allegedly prejudicial remark
by a government witness. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the evening of July 23, 2002, Zarate-Najera drove a Chevrolet pickup
truck with Texas dealer plates into the United States Border Patrol checkpoint on
New Mexico Highway 54, south of Alamogordo, New Mexico. A Border Patrol
agent noticed that the truck’s gas tank had tool marks on it and was covered in
sand. The agent became suspicious because the tool marks suggested that
someone had tampered with the gas tank. When asked where he was going,
Zarate-Najera responded that he was going to a pizza restaurant in Alamogordo to
pick up a car. The agent then inquired as to who owned the truck, and Zarate-
Najera told him that the truck belonged to Zarate-Najera’s father. When asked for
the truck’s registration, Zarate-Najera said he did not have the registration.
The agent then sought and received consent from Zarate-Najera to search
the truck. Zarate-Najera and his truck were referred to the secondary inspection
point, where another agent inserted a fiberoptic scope into the gas tank and
observed a metal box inside the tank. After dismantling the gas tank, the agents
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found three metal containers containing 150 pounds of marijuana, with a street
value of approximately $73,000. When the Border Patrol agents searched the
interior of the truck, they found a sales contract indicating that “Saul and Blanca
Sanchez” owned the vehicle.
After his arrest, Zarate-Najera told agents that Saul Sanchez owned the
truck and described the vehicle Sanchez was driving. Zarate-Najera also admitted
that he knew that the marijuana was in the truck he was driving, but claimed that
Sanchez had forced him to drive the load. Shortly thereafter, Sanchez drove
through the Border Patrol checkpoint where Zarate-Najera was detained. Agents
followed him and stopped him several miles north of the checkpoint. Sanchez
agreed to return to the checkpoint with the agents for questioning.
At Zarate-Najera’s trial, the government called Sanchez as a witness. 1
Sanchez testified that he had known Zarate-Najera for ten years and that he had
asked Zarate-Najera to help him smuggle marijuana through the United States
Border checkpoint. Of particular relevance to this appeal is the following
exchange between the prosecutor and Sanchez: when the prosecutor asked
Sanchez to explain “what arrangements [he] made with Mr. Zarate,” Sanchez
responded, “I knew Zarate prior to this. We – he showed me to a gentleman that
he was dealing with on meth, and he went and introduced me to that man.” Tr. of
Jury Trial at 75, Appellee’s Supp. App. at 35.
1
Sanchez pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government.
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Defense counsel objected to the testimony, and the court ordered both
counsel to approach the bench, where defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The
court responded that the statement “came in by mistake, obviously,” id., and then
stated that the testimony would be stricken from the record. Defense counsel
asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard Sanchez’s statement. At the
conclusion of the bench conference, and without objection, the court instructed
the jury as follows: “I’m going to strike this witness’ testimony in regard to his
most recent response, and I’d ask that you not consider anything he may have said
at this point.” Id. at 113.
Sanchez went on to testify that the plan called for Zarate-Najera to drive
the truck with the marijuana to the pizza restaurant in Alamogordo, from where
Sanchez would drive the truck to Memphis, Tennessee, and deliver the marijuana
to the buyer. Sanchez said he agreed to pay Zarate-Najera $2000 for his
assistance, and that Zarate-Najera, whose family owns a car dealership, would
supply the dealer license plates for the truck. Sanchez further testified that, in the
early evening of July 23, 2002, Sanchez, driving his own car, and Zarate-Najera,
driving the pickup truck containing the marijuana, left El Paso, Texas, and headed
north on Highway 54. During the trip, Sanchez’ car overheated and he was forced
to stop at a gas station to cool down the car for ten minutes. Sanchez then
proceeded to the border checkpoint, where he saw that Zarate-Najera’s truck had
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been stopped. As indicated above, Sanchez was ultimately stopped a few miles
north of the check point.
Zarate-Najera testified that he agreed to help Sanchez transport the drugs
because Sanchez threatened him. Zarate-Najera further stated that he had
borrowed $10,000 from Sanchez, which he was unable to repay, and that, because
of this debt, Sanchez beat him and threatened to harm Zarate-Najera and his
family if he did not drive the drug load through the checkpoint.
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Zarate-Najera was sentenced to
fifty-one months’ imprisonment. He timely appealed. Zarate-Najera’s sole
argument on appeal is that “for a government witness to allege prior dealings with
the Defendant in regard to a much stronger controlled substance than the one
alleged in the indictment is such an egregious error and so prejudicial that it is
error for the district court not to have declared a mistrial.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at
6-7.
DISCUSSION
“A trial court may appropriately grant a mistrial only when a defendant’s
right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired; a decision we review for an
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.
2002). “‘Whether a motion for mistrial should be granted is within the discretion
of the trial judge because he is in the best position to evaluate the effect of the
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offending evidence on the jury.’” United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183
(10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Laymon, 621 F.2d 1051, 1053 (10th
Cir. 1980)). We have further noted that motions for a mistrial “call for an
examination of the prejudicial impact of an error or errors when viewed in the
context of an entire case.” Id. (further citation omitted). To that end, “where the
prosecutor ask[s] a question [a] witness answer[s] in a potentially improper way,
. . . [t]he relevant factors . . . include (1) whether the prosecutor acted in bad
faith, (2) whether the district court limited the effect of the improper statement
through its instructions to the jury, and (3) whether the improper remark was
inconsequential in light of the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.Applying those factors to this case, we easily conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial. First, there is
no evidence that the government acted in bad faith in questioning Sanchez. As
the district court observed, Sanchez’s remark “came in by mistake.” Second, the
district court gave a curative instruction, specifically telling the jury to disregard
Sanchez’s remark. “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” Id. at 1184
(citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000)). Finally, there was ample
evidence of Zarate-Najera’s guilt. Zarate-Najera admitted he knew he was
transporting marijuana; his only defense was that Sanchez coerced him into doing
it. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Sanchez’s statement had any affect upon the
jury.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Zarate-
Najera’s motion for a mistrial.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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