Reyes v. Toulouse-Oliver , 345 F. App'x 329 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 25, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PAUL KEITH REYES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 09-2043
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00070-KBM-WDS)
(D.N.M.)
MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
After a county clerk refused his voter registration application, convicted
felon Paul Keith Reyes sued for abuse of a position of trust and violation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the “VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. The district
court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
This case stems from an encounter between Reyes and an individual
registering voters outside an Albuquerque-area Wal-Mart. When Reyes stated
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
that he could not vote due to felony convictions, he was told that New Mexico
law had changed to permit felons to vote. Based on this information, Reyes
submitted a voter registration application to the Bernalillo County clerk.
Eventually, he received a letter informing him that his application could not be
processed because the “[clerk’s office’s] records show[ed] a felony conviction
against [him].”
Reyes then filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico, claiming that the clerk had “abuse[d] [a] position of
trust.” A magistrate judge, presiding by consent, reviewed Reyes’ complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Determining that New Mexico law prohibits
felons from voting subject to four exceptions, see N.M. Stat. § 31-13-1(A), the
magistrate judge granted Reyes an opportunity to amend his complaint to plead
that he fell within one of the exceptions. Reyes filed an amended complaint in
which he added a citation to the VRA but did not allege additional facts. Because
he did not claim that he met one of New Mexico’s exceptions to felon
disenfranchisement, the magistrate judge dismissed Reyes’ amended complaint
for failure to state a claim. In the same order, the magistrate judge denied Reyes
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
On appeal, Reyes advances the same arguments he made below.
Construing his complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972), we read it to raise two separate claims: (1) abuse of a position of trust,
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and (2) violation of the VRA. Even assuming he possesses a cause of action for
abuse of position of trust, 2 we agree with the magistrate judge that Reyes has not
pled such an abuse. The facts as alleged by Reyes show that the clerk’s actions
wholly comported with New Mexico law. 3
Further, although the magistrate judge did not directly address Reyes’ VRA
2
Reyes cites “18 U.S.C. § 3B1.3” as the governing statute for this claim.
We understand him to be referring to United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 3B1.3, which provides for a sentencing enhancement when a defendant “abused
a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated
the commission or concealment of the offense.”
3
N.M. Stat. § 31-13-1(A) provides:
A person who has been convicted of a felony shall not be permitted
to vote in any statewide, county, municipal or district election held
pursuant to the provisions of the Election Code, unless the person:
(1) has completed the terms of a suspended or deferred sentence
imposed by a court;
(2) was unconditionally discharged from a correctional facility under
the jurisdiction of the corrections department or was conditionally
discharged from a correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the
corrections department and has completed all conditions of probation
or parole;
(3) was unconditionally discharged from a correctional facility under
the jurisdiction of a federal corrections agency or was conditionally
discharged from a correctional facility under the jurisdiction of a
federal corrections agency and has completed all conditions of
probation or parole; or
(4) has presented the governor with a certificate verifying the
completion of the sentence and was granted a pardon or a certificate
by the governor restoring the person’s full rights of citizenship.
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claim, we conclude it too fails. Reyes cites 42 U.S.C. § 1971, but he does not
allege facts that would amount to a violation of that section: He does not contend
that the county clerk acted on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. Indeed, Reyes does not even make mention of his own race. See §
1971(a)(1). 4 Further, as explained supra, Reyes has not claimed that he is
“qualified under [New Mexico] law or laws to vote in any election.” See
§ 1971(a)(2)(A); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).
Nor does Reyes plead a violation of other VRA provisions: New Mexico is not
subject to § 5 of the VRA, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app., and Reyes does not claim
that New Mexico’s felon disenfranchisement law is “imposed or applied . . . in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on
account of race or color, or [because of membership in a language minority
group]” in violation of § 1973.
For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of Reyes’ complaint is
AFFIRMED and his request to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
4
Because the facts as alleged do not violate § 1971, we do not reach the
question of whether § 1971 supports a private right of action. See Schwier v.
Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1294-97 (11th Cir. 2003).
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