Finn v. Great Plains Lending , 689 F. App'x 608 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           June 1, 2017
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    KEITH FINN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                         No. 16-6348
    (D.C. No. 5:16-CV-00415-M)
    GREAT PLAINS LENDING, LLC,                                (W.D. Okla.)
    Specially-Appearing
    Defendant - Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    The district court dismissed Keith Finn’s lawsuit against Great Plains Lending,
    LLC, based on tribal sovereign immunity. Finn appeals, contending that the district
    court should have granted his request for limited discovery into matters relevant to
    immunity. Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we vacate the judgment
    and remand for further proceedings.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    I
    Great Plains is a limited liability company formed by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe
    of Indians, a federally recognized tribe. Great Plains offers short-term loans at high
    interest rates. After the company made numerous automated calls to Finn’s cell
    phone, he sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 
    47 U.S.C. § 227
    .
    Great Plains filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), asserting
    that it was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. Finn argued that sovereign
    immunity should not protect Great Plains because the company is actually controlled
    by and exists for the benefit of a non-tribal entity, Think Finance, Inc. He requested
    limited jurisdictional discovery to substantiate this claim. The district court
    dismissed based on tribal sovereign immunity and denied Finn’s request for
    jurisdictional discovery. Finn appeals.
    II
    “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where
    Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” Kiowa Tribe
    of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 751
    , 754 (1998). “Tribal immunity extends to
    subdivisions of a tribe, and even bars suits arising from a tribe’s commercial
    activities.” Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 
    546 F.3d 1288
    , 1292
    (10th Cir. 2008); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 
    134 S. Ct. 2024
    ,
    2036-39 (2014) (declining to limit tribal immunity for off-reservation commercial
    activities). Tribal immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Bonnet v. Harvest (U.S.)
    Holdings, Inc., 
    741 F.3d 1155
    , 1158 (10th Cir. 2014).
    2
    Finn appeals the district court’s denial of his request for limited jurisdictional
    discovery. “[I]mmunity entitles a [sovereign] not only to protection from liability,
    but also from suit, including the burden of discovery, as a party, within the suit.”
    Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Vratil, 
    96 F.3d 1337
    , 1340 (10th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,
    we have held that “[w]hen . . . there is a factual question regarding a . . . sovereign’s
    entitlement to immunity, and thus a factual question regarding a district court’s
    jurisdiction, the district court must give the plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and
    present evidence relevant to the existence of jurisdiction.” Hansen v. PT Bank
    Negara Indon. (Persero), TBK, 
    601 F.3d 1059
    , 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation
    omitted).
    As with other types of discovery, district courts possess discretion to permit
    jurisdictional discovery. See Sizova v. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 
    282 F.3d 1320
    , 1326 (10th Cir. 2002). We review the denial of such discovery for abuse of
    discretion. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort,
    
    629 F.3d 1173
    , 1189 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] refusal to grant [jurisdictional] discovery
    constitutes an abuse of discretion if the denial results in prejudice to a litigant.
    Prejudice is present where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are
    controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Sizova,
    
    282 F.3d at 1326
     (citations and quotations omitted); see also Breakthrough Mgmt.
    Grp., 
    629 F.3d at 1189
    . It is Finn’s burden, as the party seeking discovery, to
    demonstrate his entitlement to jurisdictional discovery and the resulting prejudice
    from its denial. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., 
    629 F.3d at
    1189 n.11.
    3
    To determine whether a tribal entity is entitled to immunity, we consider the
    following factors: (1) the method of the entity’s creation; (2) the entity’s purpose;
    (3) the entity’s “structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of
    control the Tribe has over the entit[y]”; (4) “whether the Tribe intended for [the
    entity] to have tribal sovereign immunity”; (5) the financial relationship between the
    Tribe and the entity; and (6) “whether the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are
    served by granting [the entity] immunity.” 
    Id. at 1191
    . Finn argues that evidence
    produced from limited discovery could support his allegations regarding
    Think Finance’s effective control of Great Plains, affecting the analysis of factors
    2, 3, 5, and 6.
    We conclude that a more satisfactory showing regarding the actual workings of
    Great Plains and its financial relationship with the Tribe is necessary for a thorough
    consideration of the Breakthrough factors. Finn’s allegations are specific and
    plausible. They are also supported by several pieces of circumstantial evidence,
    including website screenshots listing Great Plains as a Think Finance product, media
    reports, and judicial pleadings in a different case against Think Finance. In that case,
    Pennsylvania’s Attorney General alleged that Think Finance contracted with three
    tribe-created payday lending companies, including Great Plains, to evade
    Pennsylvania’s cap on interest rates and that the tribes received less than 5% of the
    profits generated. Additionally, unlike in Breakthrough, 
    629 F.3d at 1189-90
    , in
    which we affirmed the denial of jurisdictional discovery, Finn specifies which
    4
    documents he would have sought in discovery and describes their relevance to the
    immunity analysis.
    Further, a recent California Supreme Court decision illustrates the potential
    importance of jurisdictional discovery in sovereign immunity cases involving
    tribe-created payday loan companies. In People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation
    Enters., 
    386 P.3d 357
     (Cal. 2016), the California Supreme Court adopted the first five
    Breakthrough factors, and applying that test, denied immunity to two tribe-created
    payday loan companies. 
    Id. at 371-73, 375
    . The court “[took] into account both
    formal and functional considerations—in other words, not only the legal or
    organizational relationship between the tribe and the entity, but also the practical
    operation of the entity in relation to the tribe.” 
    Id. at 365
    . In this regard, the court
    noted that “the purpose factor considers the extent to which the entity actually
    promotes tribal self-governance; the control factor examines the degree to which the
    tribe actually, not just nominally, directs the entity’s activities; and the financial
    relationship factor considers the degree to which the entity’s liability could impact
    the tribe’s revenue.” 
    Id. at 371
    . As the court recognized, “organizational
    arrangements on paper do not necessarily illuminate how businesses operate in
    practice.” 
    Id. at 375
    .
    The district court in this case largely relied on such formal arrangements as set
    forth in Great Plains’ organizational paperwork to hold that tribal sovereign
    immunity applied. The court recognized that a contract detailing the profit ratio
    between Think Finance and Great Plains could be material to its decision, but it
    5
    denied Finn the opportunity to obtain any such document. Thus, practically
    speaking, Finn has no way to secure evidence to verify—or disprove—his belief
    about Great Plains’ lack of tribal control or benefit without engaging in the
    jurisdictional discovery that the district court disallowed. See Ignatiev v. United
    States, 
    238 F.3d 464
    , 467 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred in
    denying limited jurisdictional discovery because although plaintiff suspected the
    existence of policies relevant to sovereign immunity, he had no way to know if such
    policies actually existed absent discovery).
    Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is a “need for further
    factual development” regarding Great Plains’ actual operation. Sizova, 
    282 F.3d at 1328
    . Of course, “discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify
    allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination,” and a discovery
    order should be “narrowly tailored . . . to the precise jurisdictional fact question
    presented.” Hansen, 
    601 F.3d at 1064
     (quotations omitted).
    III
    The district court’s judgment is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED
    for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    6