Withiam v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma, Inc. , 98 F.3d 581 ( 1996 )

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 10/18/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
CATHERINE L. WITHIAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BAPTIST HEALTH CARE OF No. 95-6265
OKLAHOMA, INC.; ROLAND GEE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
LOGAN HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
CENTER AUTHORITY; JOEL TATE;
KENNY DAVIS,
Defendants.
______________________________
CATHERINE L. WITHIAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 95-6313
v.
BAPTIST HEALTH CARE OF
OKLAHOMA, INC.; LOGAN
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
CENTER AUTHORITY; ROLAND
GEE; KENNY DAVIS,
Defendants,
-2-
and
JOEL TATE,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
CATHERINE L. WITHIAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 95-6440
v.
BAPTIST HEALTH CARE OF
OKLAHOMA, INC.; ROLAND GEE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
LOGAN HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
CENTER AUTHORITY; JOEL TATE;
KENNY DAVIS,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-94-892-W)
-3-
Submitted on the briefs:
David L. Kearney, Gable & Gotwals, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jack S. Dawson, James A. Scimeca, and Leslie L. Lynch, Miller, Dollarhide,
Dawson, & Shaw, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff’s civil rights claims were premised on an alleged retaliatory
termination by her employer, a hospital management company. The primary
question presented is whether an employee’s public endorsement of a particular
company to manage a public hospital constitutes speech entitled to First
Amendment protection. The speech in question is not of sufficient public concern
to warrant such protection as the premise of a retaliatory termination claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These three appeals arise out of the same facts. 1 Plaintiff Catherine L.
Withiam was employed from 1972 until mid-1993 by a state public-trust hospital,
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-4-
now known as Logan Hospital and Medical Center. At the time of her discharge,
plaintiff had been Director of Personnel Services for fifteen years. The hospital
was managed by Quorum Healthcare Resources, Inc. until 1992, when the Logan
Hospital and Medical Center Authority, through its Board of Trustees, changed
management companies. On July 23, 1992, the Authority scheduled a meeting of
the trustees to discuss the change, which at that time was a mere proposal. At this
meeting, plaintiff and ten other hospital managers presented a signed resolution
which stated:
On behalf of the managers listed below, representing their respective
departments, let it be resolved that we the undersigned voice our
opinion in approval of retaining the current management contract
with Quorum Health Care Resources, Inc.
We have signed this document freely and at our own will to provide
the Board of Trustees of Logan Hospital and Medical Center, our
input for the future growth and stability of the hospital.
Dated this July 22, 1992.
3 Appellants’ App. (Nos. 95-6265, 95-6313) at 895.
The Authority decided to contract instead with defendant Baptist
Healthcare of Oklahoma, Inc. (BHO) to manage the hospital. BHO named
defendant Joel Tate interim administrator; he served for approximately ninety
days. Defendant Roland Gee took over as administrator on October 1, 1992, and
Mr. Tate left shortly thereafter. Mr. Gee terminated plaintiff in July 1993.
-5-
Plaintiff sued several defendants on a number of theories, but only two
claims went to trial: retaliatory termination for exercising her First Amendment
right to free speech in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma public policy.
While defendants asserted that the termination resulted from a reduction in force,
a jury found in favor of plaintiff and against defendants BHO and Gee on both
claims and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $226,279.49. The jury
also awarded punitive damages of $25,000 against BHO and $1.00 against Gee.
The district court awarded plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The jury found against
plaintiff on her claims against defendant Tate. The district court denied Tate’s
subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. This court has jurisdiction over all three
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
No. 95-6265
In No. 95-6265, defendants BHO and Gee argue that: (1) plaintiff’s acts of
signing and presenting the resolution to the hospital trustees are not protected
speech under the First Amendment; (2) they are not state actors for the purposes
of § 1983; (3) Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989) has not been
expanded to include a public policy exception to employment-at-will on the basis
of protected speech; and (4) the district court erred in allowing the jury to award
punitive damages. Resolution of the first of these issues is dispositive.
-6-
Supreme Court cases establish the decisional framework. First, the
employee must show that her speech involves a matter of public concern.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983). Second, if the employee’s
expression meets this threshold requirement, the employee must then show that
her interest in the particular expression outweighs the employer’s interest in
efficiently performing its public service. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968). Third, the employee must demonstrate that her speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
Plaintiff’s expression of support for management in the resolution fails to
meet the threshold requirement of constituting a matter of sufficient public
concern to warrant First Amendment protection. Speech involves a matter of
public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
It is not enough that the subject matter be of public concern; the content of the
expression must also be of public concern. Wilson v. City of Littleton, 732 F.2d
765, 769 (10th Cir. 1984). The content is the “crux of the public concern content
inquiry.” Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 n.1 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). General public interest is not the equivalent of
public concern for First Amendment purposes. Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847
-7-
F.2d 1436, 1445 (10th Cir. 1988). To be protected speech, the expression must
“sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating the
conduct of government.” Wilson, 732 F.2d at 768.
The resolution plaintiff and the other managers signed and presented to the
hospital’s trustees expressed nothing more than the bare opinion that the then-
current management company should be retained. The resolution offered no
reasons or explanation at all for the opinion it expressed. Although the resolution
was presented at a trustees’ meeting, it simply offered nothing at all to inform the
public about the management of the hospital. It was neither an exposé of
government ineptitude, waste or corruption nor a recitation of reasons, arguments
or facts supporting retention of contract management. The resolution was but a
bald, unadorned and nonspecific endorsement. As such, it did not involve a
matter of public concern warranting First Amendment protection.
Because the resolution is undeserving of First Amendment protection, we
reverse the judgment based on the jury verdict. Plaintiff’s failure to present
evidence of any protected expression also undermines the very premise of her
Oklahoma public policy claim. It is therefore unnecessary to decide whether
defendants BHO and Gee are state actors for purposes of § 1983, or whether they
are liable for punitive damages.
-8-
No. 95-6440
In No. 95-6440, defendants BHO and Gee appeal from the district court’s
award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 of attorney’s fees to plaintiff as the prevailing
party on her claims against them. 3 Appellants’ App. at 894. Because we reverse
on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees to
plaintiff.
No. 95-6313
In No. 95-6313, defendant Joel Tate contends the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
after he successfully defended plaintiff’s claims against him. We review the
denial of a request for attorney’s fees under § 1988 for abuse of discretion.
Operating Eng’rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 737 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1984).
“Underlying findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while the
district court’s statutory interpretation and legal analysis are subject to de novo
review.” Carter v. Sedgwick County, 36 F.3d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1994).
Under § 1988(b), the district court may award fees only if plaintiff’s claims
were “‘frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith.’” Figures v. Board of Pub. Utils., 967 F.2d 357, 362 (10th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421
-9-
(1978)). Without making any specific factual findings, the district court
concluded that plaintiff’s claims against defendant were not frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. 3 Appellants’ App. (Nos. 95-6265, 95-
6313) at 827-28.
Tate argues in his Brief that it is Withiam’s failure to present evidence
showing Tate was causally connected to her termination 2 which made Withiam’s
claim frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. So far as this court is able
to discern, however, Tate never presented that argument to the district court.
Based upon the record provided us, 3 the only defense motions which
specifically referenced Tate as a defendant were his motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
amended complaint and his motion for attorney’s fees. Tate’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s amended complaint addressed jurisdictional and state actor issues
common to all defendants. 1 Appellants’ App. (Nos. 95-6265, 95-6313) at 72-75.
Tate’s motion for attorney’s fees simply argued that he was entitled to fees and
costs under § 1988(b) because he was the prevailing party. 3 Appellants’ App.
(Nos. 95-6265, 95-6313) at 767-801. The other motions presented by the
defendants again dealt only with issues common to all defendants. None of the
2
Tate ended his employment at the hospital approximately nine months
before Withiam was terminated.
3
Tate’s motion for directed verdict was not submitted as part of the record.
-10-
defense motions made specific mention of the argument that Withiam failed to
present any evidence showing Tate was causally connected to her termination.
In sum, as reflected in the record presented to this court, Tate never argued
to the district court that Withiam’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation based on a failure of proof of causation. 4 Thus, because that argument
was never made below, this court cannot find the district court abused its
discretion in denying fees on that ground. Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959
F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). We therefore affirm the district court’s
conclusion that Tate is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSION
In No. 95-6313, the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. In Nos. 95-6265 and 95-6440, the
judgment is REVERSED.
4
In fact, as indicated above, Tate never argued that Withiam’s case was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation for any reason. Instead, he simply
asserted that he was entitled to his fees as a prevailing party.
-11-