Webb v. A.B.F. Freight ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 4 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RICK WEBB,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., a
corporation,
No. 96-1427
Defendant-Appellant,
and
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION
No. 17,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 94-Z-239)
Andrew W. Volin (E. Lee Dale with him on the briefs) of Sherman & Howard,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
John R. Olsen of Olsen & Brown, Niwot, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before EBEL and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BLACK, * District Judge.
*
The Honorable Bruce D. Black, District Court Judge, District of New
(continued...)
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a jury’s verdict of $112,124 for the appellee on his
claim that he was wrongfully fired from his job as a delivery truck driver on
trumped up charges after his delivery truck skimmed the underside of some tree
branches, and that the real reason for his discharge was retaliation for his union
activities. Appellant argues that the verdict should not stand because the appellee
failed to prove the elements necessary to his claims of breach of contract and
breach of the duty of fair representation. The appellant also challenges numerous
discretionary rulings by the district court during the course of the trial. We affirm
on all grounds.
Background 1
The dispute in this case arose in 1993, when defendant-appellant ABF
Freight System, Inc. (“ABF”), fired plaintiff-appellee Rick Webb. ABF alleged
(...continued)
*
Mexico, sitting by designation.
1
Because of the jury’s verdict in favor of the appellee, our review of the
evidence is presented here in the light most favorable to the appellee. See
Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir.
1997). This standard of review requires that we accept the jury’s factual
determinations as long as they are reasonably based on some evidence or the
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from such evidence. Id.
-2-
that Webb had violated his contractual duty to report immediately “any accident.” 2
The question in this case is whether ABF’s claim was the true basis for Webb’s
discharge or merely a pretext for firing a union activist.
1. Webb’s union activities
Webb worked as a truck driver with ABF for more than nine years before
he was fired on August 2, 1993. Webb also was a member of Teamsters Local
No. 17, 3 which represents all of ABF’s drivers in Colorado and elsewhere, and
Webb had been the shop steward for Local 17 at ABF’s Fort Collins terminal
from the day the company opened its terminal there.
2
The relevant language from the Teamsters’ national contract reads:
Accident Reports
Any employee involved in any accident or cargo spill
incident, involving any hazardous or potentially
polluting product, shall immediately report said accident
or spill incident and any physical injury sustained.
When required by his Employer, the employee, before
starting his next shift, shall make out an accident or
incident report in writing on forms furnished by the
Employer and shall turn in all available names and
addresses of witnesses to the accident or incident. . . .
Failure to comply with this provision shall subject such
employee to disciplinary action by the Employer.
National Mater Freight Agreement, for the period of April 1, 1991 through March
31, 1994, art. 16, § 3.
3
Local 17 originally was a defendant in this case, but Webb agreed to
dismiss his claims against the union prior to trial. Thus, the union is not a party
to this appeal.
-3-
In his role as shop steward, Webb prosecuted grievances on behalf of
himself and other drivers from Fort Collins, including grievances alleging unsafe
practices by ABF. Webb also was involved with disputes with ABF management
over the use of overweight trucks and a hazardous waste spill at the terminal.
During the winter of 1992-93 one of Webb’s grievances involved a dispute
over ABF’s use of drivers from the Denver terminal to do work in Fort Collins on
weekends. Webb secured a grievance award of overtime pay for one Fort Collins
driver who had lost weekend work to Denver drivers. However, two weeks later,
the Denver leadership of Local 17, including union president Ron Schwab,
negotiated a side letter with ABF that effectively reversed the results of the
grievance decision. This side letter was negotiated without input from Fort
Collins’ drivers, and it was adopted by the union before any Fort Collins drivers
could comment on it. The dispute over work allocation between the Denver and
Fort Collins terminals led to continuing friction between Webb and the Teamsters
leadership in Denver, including union president Schwab, whose political support
was based in the Denver terminal’s drivers.
2. Webb’s firing
On the afternoon of July 30, 1993, a Friday, Webb took a full truck out for
deliveries, with the first delivery at the Colorado State University Alumni Center
(“CSU”). As Webb was backing up to the alumni center, Webb’s truck became
-4-
entangled with overhanging branches. Webb testified that these branches were no
more than 1½- to 2-inches in diameter, and he pulled them out from between his
truck and the trailer. At the time, Webb did not notice any damage to the truck or
the trailer. After finishing his delivery at the alumni center, Webb continued on
his route without making any accident report. Webb returned the truck and trailer
to the ABF terminal in Fort Collins at the end of the day, again without making
any accident report or any log entry of damage in his vehicle condition log.
Company officials contended that Webb’s entanglement with tree branches
at CSU caused more than $600 worth of damage, bending the exhaust stack on the
tractor and crushing a corner of the trailer. At Webb’s subsequent grievance
hearings, Company officials introduced a picture of a tree limb measuring four
inches in diameter that they contend Webb’s truck pulled down. However, during
the trial in this case, Webb denied that he hit a branch that size. He also testified
that he later returned to CSU to look at the tree branches on the driveway of the
alumni center, and he noticed the stump where the pictured four-inch limb had
come from. He testified that his truck could not have pulled down that branch
because the stump showed that the branch had not been pointed out over the
driveway where Webb could have hit it.
On the evening of July 30, 1993, after Webb had left work, ABF’s manager
at the Fort Collins terminal, Bill Higley, noticed damage to Webb’s tractor and
-5-
trailer. Higley took several Polaroid pictures of the vehicle, and he called ABF
officials in Salt Lake City and Fort Smith, Arkansas, to report the incident. At
that time, he told ABF officials that Webb was the last driver of the damaged
truck, and ABF regional vice president Sid Hatfield told Higley that failing to
report an accident was a dischargeable offense.
When Webb returned to work the next Monday, Higley confronted Webb
about the damage to the truck and trailer. Webb told Higley about the tree-
skimming incident, and he pointed out that no driver had ever considered such an
incident to be subject to the company’s rule requiring the reporting of all
accidents. 4 Webb also requested an opportunity to view the damage for himself,
and after inspecting the vehicle, Webb provided a handwritten statement about the
incident. Webb’s statement indicates that Webb did not notice that the stack on
the tractor was askew until Saturday morning, after he had learned from a co-
worker that Higley had been taking pictures of the truck. Webb’s statement also
indicates that Webb did not notice any damage to the trailer until Monday
morning when he was confronted about the incident. However, nowhere in the
4
There was extensive testimony during the trial from both Webb and his
former co-workers that tree-skimming incidents were common for Fort Collins
drivers, and that ABF had never required drivers to report such incidents as
accidents under the mandatory accident-reporting policy. One witness testified
that it was only after Webb was fired that the company began to require such
reports for tree-skimming incidents.
-6-
statement does Webb admit responsibility for the damage to the trailer.
When Webb finished writing out this statement, Higley informed Webb that
he was fired and he should leave the ABF premises. Higley then began drafting
letters to notify Webb formally that he had been discharged, with the sole basis
for Webb’s firing being Webb’s failure to report the tree-skimming incident as an
accident. 5
3. Webb’s grievance
Immediately after being fired, Webb called Ron Schwab, who was the
Local 17 official responsible for handling grievances out of the Fort Collins
terminal, and Webb requested that the union challenge his discharge. After
commenting that “we knew this was coming,” Schwab agreed to file a grievance
on Webb’s behalf. Schwab also agreed to obtain company documents that Webb
said would be helpful for the grievance, as well as to interview one of Webb’s co-
workers who could testify about the events leading up to Webb’s discharge.
5
The pertinent part of ABF’s “Letter of Discharge” states:
On July 30th, 1993, you were involved in an
accident which has been judged preventable by the ABF
Safety Department. You failed to report this
accident. . . .
In accordance with Article 46 of the Western Area
Supplemental Agreements and Article 16 Section 3 of
the National Master Freight Agreement, you are hereby
discharged for failing to report a preventable accident.
-7-
Schwab, however, decided not to call any witnesses for Webb during the
grievance hearing, and he failed to obtain any of the documents Webb requested.
The first hearing on Webb’s grievance occurred two days after the firing,
on August 4, 1993, in Denver before the joint Colorado-Wyoming Longline
Grievance Committee, an arbitration panel evenly composed of union and
company officials. Schwab focused his arguments during the hearing on Webb’s
account that the tree-skimming incident at CSU was not a reportable accident in
light of the small size of the branches involved and the fact that Webb had not
noticed any damage when he was at the scene. Schwab, however, failed to object
when an ABF official characterized the branch that Webb had hit as “about eight
inches in diameter and about 30 foot [sic] long.” Schwab also failed to review
the evidence ABF prepared before the hearing, and as a result, he was taken by
surprise when ABF introduced a statement by one of Webb’s co-workers that
detailed ABF’s account of the damage to Webb’s tractor and trailer. 6 Schwab’s
failure to review ABF’s evidence before the hearing also may have affected his
and Webb’s ability to raise questions about ABF’s alleged tampering with the
evidence of damage to Webb’s trailer. 7 Finally, despite telling Webb again before
6
Subsequent testimony at the trial demonstrated that ABF’s manager, Bill
Higley, prepared the co-worker’s statement. The co-worker signed the statement
two days after Higley wrote it, and four days after Webb’s alleged accident.
7
The photographs presented at Webb’s grievance hearing inexplicably show
(continued...)
-8-
the grievance hearing that “we knew this was coming,” and despite Webb
specifically asking Schwab to do so, Schwab did not present Webb’s allegation of
retaliation – that Webb’s firing was prompted by the company’s desire to silence
his union activities.
The grievance committee deadlocked on the question of whether to reverse
ABF’s discipline. As a result, the grievance was transferred one week later to the
Joint Western Area Committee (“JWAC”) in San Diego, an arbitration panel
whose voting members were again evenly split between union representatives and
company representatives. In the days before this second hearing, Schwab
apparently told Webb it wasn’t necessary for Webb to be present because no new
testimony or evidence would be introduced. 8
7
(...continued)
different kinds of damage to the top right corner of a trailer, with two
photographs showing the running light on the trailer still present but a third
photograph showing the running light missing. No mention of these discrepancies
was made during the grievance hearing.
8
Schwab disputed Webb’s testimony on this point. However, in light of the
jury’s apparent assessment of Schwab’s credibility, we must accept Webb’s
version of events.
In any event, Schwab’s statement about the JWAC proceeding turned out to
be incorrect. ABF officials introduced new photographs of the alleged damage to
Webb’s truck at the second hearing. Also, they offered new testimony as to the
specific events on the morning when Webb was fired, implying that Webb knew
he had “wrecked” his truck: Rick Porter, ABF’s manager for industrial relations,
told the JWAC panel that Webb gave his handwritten statement “when Mr. Higley
was asking him ‘Did you know that you wrecked the tractor?’ He said ‘Let me
tell you about it.’”
-9-
Despite his apparent discouragement of Webb’s attendance at the JWAC
hearing, Schwab told the JWAC panel, “Mr Webb was invited to be present here
and apparently has chosen not to be here to testify in his own behalf. The Local
Union will do its best with these conditions.” Schwab also told the JWAC
hearing that “the Union has no problem stipulating to the size of the tree branch.
We have seen the tree branch.” Schwab made this stipulation despite the fact that
the only offer from ABF as to the size of the tree branch was the eight-inch-
diameter claim that directly contradicted Webb’s account of branches no larger
than two inches in diameter. When a panel member asked Schwab whether Webb
was aware that any incident that resulted in damage to company equipment was a
reportable accident under the contract, Schwab responded, “I’m not Mr. Webb so
I don’t know exactly what his position would be because he’s not here to answer
that personally. . . .” In answer to another question, Schwab said, “I don’t know
why Mr. Webb did the things that he did at that time.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the JWAC panel upheld Webb’s
discharge. No reason or written decision was issued by the panel.
4. Webb’s federal suit
Webb subsequently brought suit in federal court under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(also known as § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947) in what is
commonly referred to as a hybrid § 301/DFR (duty of fair representation) suit.
- 10 -
Webb sued both ABF and Local 17, alleging that ABF had violated the Teamsters
contract through a wrongful discharge and that Local 17 had breached its duty to
represent him fairly. Webb sought reinstatement, an award of back pay,
emotional distress damages, and punitive damages. The union was dismissed out
of the case pursuant to a stipulation by Webb prior to the trial. Following a
seven-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Webb against ABF. The
jury found that Webb’s total economic damages were $112,124, and it allocated
$89,699.20 of the damages to ABF. 9 The jury declined to award any damages on
Webb’s claim of emotional distress. 10
5. Attorney misconduct claim
Following the end of the trial, the court fined Webb’s lawyer $757 for
conduct it found to be unethical. 11 This matter arose near the end of the trial when
Charles Cantrell, the superintendent of ABF’s repair shop in Denver, testified
about the damage to the tractor and trailer that Webb was driving on the day of
9
The jury’s division of damages – $89,699.20 against ABF and $22,424.80
against Local 17 – represents an 80% to 20% split.
10
The jury’s finding that Webb suffered no emotional distress rendered
moot ABF’s claim that emotional distress damages are unavailable for a § 301
claim against an employer. As a result, we offer no opinion on that legal
question.
11
Webb filed, but eventually dropped, a cross-appeal to challenge this
penalty. The issue remains a live controversy in this case because ABF has
asserted that the district court’s failure to grant a mistrial on the basis of this
conduct was an abuse of discretion.
- 11 -
the accident. On cross-examination, Webb’s lawyer attempted to question
Cantrell about a statement Cantrell allegedly had made to the lawyer out of
court. 12 The court promptly conducted a consultation with the attorneys out of the
hearing of the jury in which she announced that the conduct by Webb’s lawyer
violated the ethical rule against attorney communication with a represented party
and she would entertain suggestions as to the appropriate remedy. ABF moved
for a mistrial, which the court denied the following day. Instead, the court gave
the jury a limiting instruction to disregard any evidence of a telephone
conversation between Webb’s attorney and Cantrell.
Discussion
I. ABF’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
This appeal comes to us following the district court’s denial of ABF’s Rule
50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law, using
the same standard applicable in the district court. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v.
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
12
It appears that Cantrell called Webb’s lawyer in an attempt to avoid the
subpoena that Webb’s lawyer had served on him. Webb’s lawyer told the court
during the subsequent hearing on the issue that he received the call without notice
and he did not ask any questions of Cantrell during the conversation. Rather,
Cantrell spontaneously blurted out the statement at issue.
- 12 -
297 (1996). Despite the breadth of our de novo standard of review, we may upset
the jury’s conclusion “only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible
to no reasonable inferences supporting the nonmoving party.” See Yearous v.
Niobrara County Mem. Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998). Under this standard of review, we may not “weigh the
evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our conclusions for
that of the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In support of its claim for judgment as a matter of law, ABF argues that
Webb did not establish the elements of a hybrid § 301/DFR claim because:
(1) Webb failed to prove that Local 17 breached its duty of fair representation; (2)
Webb failed to prove the required level of causal connection in the DFR claim,
and (3) Webb failed to prove a breach of contract by ABF. Furthermore, with
respect to the question of damages, ABF argues that Webb was not entitled to an
award of backpay from ABF for the period after the grievance arbitration
hearings. Each of these issues intertwines questions of law with questions of fact.
In light of our standard of review, we will discuss the applicable legal standards
first before addressing whether the evidence was sufficient.
A. Elements of a hybrid § 301/DFR claim
Federal labor policy generally extends great deference and finality to the
- 13 -
decision by a labor arbitrator that a company has not violated its collective
bargaining agreement in firing an employee. See DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-64 (1983). However, this deference can
result in “an unacceptable injustice” when the employee’s assertion of his rights
under the collective bargaining agreement has been tainted by conduct from his
union that breaches its duty of fair representation toward him. See id. at 164
(citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967)). As a result, the Court has explained that,
[W]hen the union representing the employee in the
grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a
discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory
fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation. . . ,
an employee may bring suit against both the employer
and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality
of the grievance or arbitration proceeding.
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164 (citations omitted).
The kind of suit authorized in Vaca, Hines, and DelCostello is a “hybrid”
action under § 301 because it combines two conceptually independent causes of
action, the first against the company for breach of the contract (a standard § 301
claim) and the second against the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation (a claim implied by operation of a union’s status under federal law
as the sole bargaining representative of the employee). See DelCostello, 462 U.S.
at 164. To prevail against his former employer under this hybrid § 301/DFR
- 14 -
cause of action, a discharged worker must prove three elements: (1) Some conduct
by the worker’s union that breached the duty of fair representation; (2) A causal
connection showing that the union’s breach affected the integrity of the
arbitration process, and; (3) A violation of the collective bargaining agreement by
the company. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 568 (“[W]here the union actually utilizes
the grievance and arbitration procedures on behalf of the employee, the focus
is . . . on whether, contrary to the arbitrator’s decision, the employer breached the
contract and whether there is substantial reason to believe that a union breach of
duty contributed to the erroneous outcome of the contractual proceedings.”). The
plaintiff in a hybrid § 301/DFR action need not sue both his union and former
employer in the same case, and he may choose to seek damages against only one
of the potential defendants, but in any event, “the case he must prove is the same
whether he sues one, the other, or both.” See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165.
B. Local 17’s duty of fair representation
In light of a union’s position as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of an employee with his employer, every collective bargaining
union has a duty to represent its members fairly in its dealings with management.
See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164 & n. 14. The scope of this duty in the context
of a grievance arbitration proceeding requires that the union “may not arbitrarily
- 15 -
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion.” See Vaca
386 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court has consistently repeated this standard for a
DFR claim: “A duty-of-fair-representation claim arises when a union that
represents an employee in a grievance or arbitration procedure acts in a
‘discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory’ fashion.’” International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 864 n.6 (1987) (quoting
Delcostello, 462 U.S. at 164); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (“In particular, a union breaches its duty when its
conduct is ‘arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith,’ as, for example, when it
‘arbitrarily ignore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunctory
fashion.’”) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 191).
In similar vein, this circuit also has reiterated the DFR standard as
prohibiting arbitrary, discriminatory, bad faith, or perfunctory conduct. See Foust
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 714-15 (10th Cir. 1978)
(quoting and discussing Vaca and Hines), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42
(1979); Nelson v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 37 F.3d 591, 594 & n.4 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting and discussing Vaca); Young v. United Auto. Workers-Labor
Employment & Training Corp., 95 F.3d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Vaca,
386 U.S. at 191); Lampkin v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers, No. 96-5212, slip op. at 18 (10th Cir. 1998) (proposed
- 16 -
publish opinion now in circulation).
1. “Perfunctory” grievance processing
ABF argues that the duty of fair representation includes only a duty to
avoid acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith fashion, but does not
include an obligation to avoid acting in a perfunctory manner. Based on the
authority cited above, we reject that argument. The district court properly
presented to the jury the duty not to act in a perfunctory fashion, 13 and we believe
the jury verdict can be upheld on the basis of that duty.
ABF relies principally on the Supreme Court’s most recent hybrid
§ 301/DFR case, in which the Court stated that a union’s duty of fair
representation is “tripartite,” i.e., a union’s actions may not be “‘arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499
U.S. 65, 67 & 77 (1991) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190)). In its omission of the
13
The text of Jury Instruction No. 10 provides in part:
In order to prevail against his employer on his
claim under 29 U.S.C. § 185, plaintiff Rick Webb must
prove . . .
2. That the Teamsters Local No. 17 breached its
duty of fair representation to the plaintiff by:
(a) failing properly to process his
grievance; and
(b) acting in a discriminatory, dishonest,
arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion.
- 17 -
duty to avoid “perfunctory” conduct, the O’Neill articulation of a union’s
“tripartite” duties appears to back away from earlier case law stressing that a
union is under a legal obligation not to conduct its dealings with its members in a
“perfunctory fashion.” However, we believe that the prohibition against
“perfunctory” conduct remains the law despite its absence from the discussion in
O’Neill.
First, the dispute in O’Neill involved claims of union misconduct in the
context of contract formation, as opposed to contract administration in a
grievance proceeding. See id. at 70. Thus, under the facts in O’Neill there was
no need to address the question of a union’s duties when a union member seeks to
challenge a discharge in a grievance proceeding. Indeed, it would have been
dictum in O’Neill for the Court to express any opinion as to the DFR standards
for a grievance arbitration in light of the fact that the O’Neill case arose before
any grievance arbitration process had been established by the parties.
Second, it is easy to read the Court’s earlier cases prohibiting “perfunctory”
grievance processing as merely expressing a concrete example of the kind of
specific conduct prohibited by the tripartite standard. See Foust, 442 U.S. at 47
(listing perfunctory handling of a grievance as an “example” of union conduct
that is “arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith”). If “perfunctory” grievance
processing is a specific kind of conduct under the tripartite standard, then
- 18 -
O’Neill’s failure to mention this particularized DFR standard is immaterial.
In part, any potential doubt as to the applicability of the prohibition against
“perfunctory” conduct may arise from the fact that courts generally have failed to
give content to the meaning of that term. Indeed, the most this circuit has ever
said on the meaning of the prohibition against “perfunctory” conduct is that one
union’s handling of a member’s grievance was not perfunctory when “the record
shows a prompt and diligent effort by the union business agent . . . to have
appellant’s grievance heard and decided by the panel.” See Nelson, 37 F.3d at
594 n.4.
The other circuits have similarly had little to say about the meaning of the
term “perfunctory.” The most detailed explanation comes from the Eighth
Circuit, where the court explained that “we construe the Supreme Court’s
reference in Vaca to the ‘perfunctory’ processing of a grievance to mean that ‘the
union acted without concern or solicitude, or gave a claim only cursory
attention.’” Beavers v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local 1741, 72 F.3d 97,
100 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 457, 458
(8th Cir. 1983)). The Eighth Circuit’s construction comports with the standard
dictionary definition of “perfunctory.” See Websters Third New International
Dictionary (Unabridged) 1678 (1986) (defining perfunctory as “characterized by
routine or superficiality: done merely as a duty: CURSORY, MECHANICAL . . .
- 19 -
lacking in interest or enthusiasm: APATHETIC, INDIFFERENT”).
This is not to say that a union violates its duty of fair representation by
mere negligent conduct; carelessness or honest mistakes are not sufficient to
impose liability on a union. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362,
372-73 (1990); Young, 95 F.3d at 997. We need not here define the line between
negligent conduct and perfunctory conduct because the evidence was sufficient to
allow a jury to find, as it did, that the union conducted this arbitration in such a
perfunctory, apathetic, indifferent, and cursory way that Local 17 breached its
duty of fair representation. 14 Indeed the evidence was sufficient to support not
just a finding of perfunctory conduct, but also conduct by the union that rose to
14
Webb’s evidence could have allowed a reasonable juror to reach at least
the following conclusions: (1) Local 17 failed to present a grievance claim of
retaliation despite Webb’s request to do so and despite Schwab’s belief that
Webb’s firing was indeed a case of retaliation; (2) Schwab failed to follow Local
17’s regular practice in grievance cases of reviewing company evidence before
the arbitration hearings; (3) Schwab affirmatively misled Webb by telling Webb
that his presence was not needed at the second grievance hearing in San Diego
and that no new evidence or testimony would be allowed; (4) Schwab
affirmatively misled the JWAC grievance panel in San Diego when he told the
panel members that he did not know why Webb had chosen not to come to the
hearing; (5) Schwab disparaged his own union member before the JWAC panel by
suggesting that there was no explanation for Webb’s conduct in the tree-skimming
incident; and (6) Schwab directly contradicted Webb’s own account of the
incident by accepting the company’s claims as to the size of the tree limbs that
Webb had hit.
ABF insists these conclusions are contradicted by testimony from Schwab
and others. However, this contention misunderstands our standard of review,
which must uphold the jury’s verdict if any reasonable juror could have ruled as
the jury did. See Yearous, 128 F.3d at 1353.
- 20 -
the level of bad faith. See Young, 95 F.3d at 996 n.1 (noting that bad faith in a
DFR claim “requires a showing of fraud or deceitful or dishonest action”).
2. Pre-arbitration investigation
Next, ABF argues that the union did not have an obligation to conduct its
own investigation of Webb’s grievance because Webb undertook to do the
investigation himself. ABF also contends that a union has no legal duty to
conduct “some minimal investigation” of a grievance complaint. 15
In Foust, the Tenth Circuit agreed with other circuits that “the failure to
investigate the merits of a grievance could be arbitrary conduct and a breach of a
duty.” See Foust, 572 F.2d at 716 (citing De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores
Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970); Hughes v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977)). The amount of
investigation required of a union to meet its duty of fair representation depends
15
Jury Instruction No. 17 provides as follows:
An incomplete investigation of a grievance, or not
making every conceivable argument on behalf of the
grievant during the grievance procedure, does not
violate the union’s duty of fair representation unless the
union’s actions were discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary
or perfunctory. However, some minimal investigation is
required.
At trial, ABF objected to the last sentence of this instruction on the grounds
that “there is no minimum investigation threshold under the duty of fair
representation cases.”
- 21 -
on the circumstances of each case. See Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d
1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the thoroughness of a union’s required
investigation depends on the particular case); Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen’s
Union of the Pacific, 777 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
In this case, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Local 17 made no
serious effort to investigate the facts of Webb’s claims. The jury also could, and
apparently did, disbelieve the testimony from Schwab that Local 17 had no
obligation to conduct its own investigation because Webb allegedly had agreed to
undertake the investigation himself. It appears that the jury found Webb more
credible than Schwab, and it is not for us to upset that credibility determination.
See Yearous, 128 F.3d at 1353. Thus, we find the evidence sufficient to support
Webb’s contention that Local 17 breached its duty of fair representation by failing
to undertake an adequate investigation under the circumstances.
3. Judicial estoppel from a grievance arbitration
At the conclusion of the first grievance hearing, the chairman of the
grievance committee, a company representative, engaged Webb in the following
colloquy:
Chairman Bradfield: I will now ask the grievant, based
on the issue of your failure to report an accident
are you satisfied that the Union has represented
your position properly?
Mr. Webb: Yes.
Chairman Bradfield: Have they introduced all pertinent
- 22 -
information on your behalf in regard to this
defense?
Mr. Webb: Except for the bracket, I don’t have anything
else to say.
On the basis of these statements from Webb, ABF now suggests that Webb be
precluded from raising any argument that Local 17’s representation of his claims
fell below the legal standards required of the union.
We reject ABF’s argument for two reasons. First, ABF’s contention relies
on principles of judicial estoppel in which a party’s statements or positions in one
proceeding prevent him from subsequently raising a contradictory position in the
same or related proceedings. The Tenth Circuit has firmly established that it will
not be bound by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See Rascon v. US West
Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 223465, at *6 (10th Cir. May 6, 1998) (to be
reported at 143 F.3d 1324) (holding that claims inconsistent with others raised in
administrative context are not barred by judicial estoppel); United States v. 49.01
Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Osage County, Okla., 802 F.2d 387, 390
(10th Cir. 1986). 16 Second, any statements Webb made at the first grievance
hearing are not probative as to the quality of Local 17’s representation at the
16
Indeed, it seems likely that ABF cannot succeed on the merits of a judicial
estoppel claim because one of the elements of this doctrine is that the party
against whom estoppel is asserted must have prevailed on the basis of his
contradictory position in the prior proceeding. See 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d
at 390. In Webb’s case, he most assuredly did not prevail.
- 23 -
second hearing in San Diego. In light of the fact that many of the DFR breaches
that Webb asserted in this case involved the union’s conduct at the second
hearing, there is no sound reason to prevent Webb from raising his DFR claim.
Therefore, the district court properly allowed Webb to present his DFR claim to
the jury.
C. Causal connection between DFR breach and arbitration outcome
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., the Court held that a plaintiff in a
hybrid § 301/DFR case is entitled to relief if he can prove “an erroneous
discharge” and a union “breach of duty tainting the decision of the joint
committee.” 424 U.S. 554, 572 (1976) (emphasis added). The Court stated,
The union’s breach of duty relieves the employee of an
express or implied requirement that disputes be settled
through contractual grievance procedures; if it seriously
undermines the integrity of the arbitral process the
union’s breach also removes the bar of the finality
provisions of the contract.
Id. at 567 (emphasis added). In a later opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated the
“seriously undermines” standard. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 61 (1981). The Court said, “As Hines makes clear, an employee may go
behind a final and binding award under a collective-bargaining agreement and
seek relief against his employer and union only when he demonstrates that his
union’s breach of its duty ‘seriously undermine[d] the integrity of the arbitral
- 24 -
process.’” Id. (quoting Hines, 424 U.S. at 567); see also Barnett v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1984) (“If an employee can establish
that his union breached its implied duty of fair representation, then even a binding
decision of the [grievance arbitration] board can be set aside if the breach
seriously undermined the integrity of the arbitral process.”).
In its brief on appeal, ABF contends that the appropriate causation standard
in this case is the “but for” standard expressed in Edwards v. International Union,
United Plant Guard Workers of America, 46 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 1995).
We reject ABF’s argument on this point. First, the discussion in Edwards was
dicta – the issue to be decided in Edwards was not the definition of the elements
of a hybrid § 301/DFR case, but rather the appropriate statute of limitations in
such a case. See id. at 1053. As a result, we are not bound by the Edwards
panel’s articulation. See Bates v. Department of Corrections, 81 F.3d 1008, 1011
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that one panel is not bound by a prior panel’s dicta).
Second, in light of the conflict between Edwards and Barnett, we note that this
circuit follows the rule that “when faced with an intra-circuit conflict, a panel
should follow earlier, settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.”
See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996).
Having concluded that we must rely on the “seriously undermines”
language from Hines and Barnett, we also conclude that there was sufficient
- 25 -
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Local 17’s DFR
breach “seriously undermined” Webb’s grievance proceedings. 17 Taken in the
light most favorable to Webb, the record shows that Local 17 misled Webb about
the second grievance hearing in San Diego and that Local 17 misled the JWAC
hearing panel about the nature of Webb’s tree-skimming incident and Webb’s
explanation for his lack of a report to company officials about it. Indeed,
Schwab’s concessions allow a reasonable inference that Local 17 deliberately
attempted to submarine Webb’s case by sending the JWAC panel a message that
Local 17 had no faith in Webb’s claims and was merely going through the
motions on his behalf. This record meets the causation standard under Hines and
Barnett.
ABF, on the other hand, points to the testimony from the chairman of the
JWAC board, E. James Roberts, who suggested that Webb’s handwritten
statement was sufficient evidence alone to uphold his discharge. Putting aside the
dubious validity of a single, non-voting chairman of an arbitration panel testifying
as to the state of mind of the entire panel, ABF’s argument misunderstands our
standard of review in this appeal. Merely because there is some evidence in the
17
According to Jury Instruction No. 10, to award damages to the plaintiff
the jury in Webb’s case was required to find “That the breach of its duty of fair
representation by Teamsters Local No. 17 seriously undermined the integrity of
the grievance proceeding.”
- 26 -
record supporting ABF’s position will not cause us to upset the jury’s verdict.
Instead, ABF must show that there is no evidence in the record that would allow a
reasonable juror to find for Webb. See Yearous, 128 F.3d at 1351. We believe
there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the causation element. The
fact that there is some contradictory evidence in the record is immaterial.
D. Breach of contract
During the course of the trial below, Webb presented two different grounds
for finding that ABF had breached the collective bargaining agreement. First,
Webb argued that ABF’s asserted rationale for firing him – that he had failed to
report an accident as required by Article 16 of the national contract – was
baseless because the tree-skimming incident was not a reportable accident under
the custom and practice at the ABF terminal in Fort Collins. Second, Webb
argued that ABF’s actual reason for firing him was to retaliate for Webb’s union
activities, which was a violation of Article 21 of the national contract. 18 ABF
18
Article 21 of the National Master Freight Agreement provides as follows:
Union Activities
Any employee, member of the Union, acting in an
official capacity whatsoever shall not be discriminated
against for his acts as such officer of the Union so long
as such acts do not interfere with the conduct of the
employer’s business, nor shall there be any
(continued...)
- 27 -
responds that Webb’s tree-skimming incident was a reportable accident under the
contract, and therefore, Webb’s failure to report was a sufficient basis for the
discharge. ABF also argues that Webb should have been precluded from
submitting his retaliation claim to the jury because he failed to exhaust it in the
grievance arbitration proceeding.
1. Failure to report an accident
There is no dispute in this case that Article 16, section 3 of the National
Master Freight Agreement requires all employees “involved in any accident” to
report that accident “immediately.” Instead, the dispute focuses on what is an
“accident” under the Teamsters contract. ABF contends that any incident that
causes damage to company equipment or to the property of a customer is an
“accident.” Webb, on the other hand, contends that at least within the experience
of ABF employees in Fort Collins and Denver prior to his discharge, brushes with
overhanging branches that caused limited damage to ABF’s trucks were not
“accidents.”
It is well-established that when interpreting the terms of a labor contract, a
fact-finder is entitled – and indeed, in some cases required – to look to the past
practices of the parties and the “common law of the shop” to determine the
18
(...continued)
discrimination against any employee because of union
membership or activities.
- 28 -
parties’ contractual obligations. 19 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) (holding that the interpretation of
contract terms “is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the
industrial common law – the practices of the industry and the shop – is equally a
part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it”);
National Labor Relations Board v. Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669,
676 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Where past practice has established a meaning for
language that is used by the parties in a new agreement, the language will be
presumed to have the meaning given it by such past practice.”) (quotation
omitted); see also Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 25, __
F.3d __, 1998 WL 278289, at *3 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 1998) (en banc) (upholding an
arbitrator’s contract interpretation in part because the arbitrator considered “the
‘industrial common law’ of the hotel business”); Trailways Lines, Inc. v.
Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 807 F.2d 1416, 1423 & n. 12 (8th Cir. 1986)
(vacating an arbitrator’s award in part because the arbitrator failed to consider the
“common law of the shop”). This is especially the case when a disputed contract
19
Jury Instruction No. 8 reflects this understanding of the law. It states,
The interpretation of a contract by the parties, as
shown by their conduct before any dispute arose
between them, is one of the best indications of their
intent.
- 29 -
term is ambiguous on its face and no other language in the contract provides a
basis for construing the term. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
Union No. 611 v. Public Serv. Co., 980 F.2d 616, 617-19 (10th Cir. 1992)
(upholding an arbitrator’s interpretation of ambiguous contract terms in light of
the arbitrator’s consideration of the parties’ past practices).
In Webb’s case, he presented extensive testimony from co-workers and an
ABF maintenance worker that tree-brushing incidents were common, including
incidents that resulted in minor damage to ABF tractors and trailers. In no case
were these incidents treated as reportable accidents, and the witnesses testified
that they could not recall anyone being fired for failing to report these incidents.
In light of this testimony, a reasonable juror could conclude that the “common law
of the shop” at ABF’s Fort Collins and Denver terminals was that minor tree-
skimming incidents were not subject to the mandatory reporting provision of the
contract. As a result, a reasonable juror could conclude that ABF breached the
contract by firing Webb for an incident that was not a reportable accident.
Therefore, ABF is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its reportable-
accident claim.
2. Retaliation for union activities
ABF contends that Webb should have been barred from presenting his
retaliation claim to the jury because he failed to raise the claim during the
- 30 -
grievance proceedings. This argument, however, founders on Webb’s proof of a
breach of Local 17’s duty of fair representation.
As the Supreme Court explained in Hines, a union’s DFR breach “relieves
the employee of an express or implied requirement that disputes be settled
through contractual grievance procedures.” Hines, 424 U.S. at 567. This circuit
has applied the non-exhaustion rule in several cases. See, e.g., Aguinaga v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1472 (10th Cir.
1993) (“[I]n determining whether Plaintiffs are required to exhaust, the relevant
inquiry is whether the Union . . . breached its duty of fair representation.”);
United Food & Commercial Workers Local 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d
940, 945 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily
presses the individual’s claim, or otherwise acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in
bad faith, then the union has breached its duty of fair representation and . . . the
employee has ‘exhausted’ his or her remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement.”) (quotation and citations omitted). Thus, when a union member
proves that his or her ability to prosecute a particular breach of contract claim
against his employer has been “seriously undermined” by the union’s failure to
represent him or her adequately in grievance proceedings, the union member has
fulfilled the exhaustion requirement. Here, it was not error for the district court
to present Webb’s retaliation claim to the jury because Webb offered sufficient
- 31 -
evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that having
specifically requested the union to raise the retaliation issue, Webb’s claim was
seriously undermined by Local 17’s actions in declining to raise that issue.
ABF also contends that as a matter of law Webb could not prove retaliation
because he failed to show that the company official who made the decision to fire
Webb – which ABF contends was Sid Hatfield – was aware at the time of Webb’s
protected union activities. ABF’s argument is based on its premise that Hatfield
did not know that it was Webb who had caused the damage that terminal manager
Bill Higley had reported. However, in light of Higley’s initial report to ABF
headquarters that Webb was the last driver of the damaged truck, a reasonable
juror could have concluded that ABF was aware of Webb’s identity at the time.
Therefore, ABF is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Webb’s
retaliation claim.
E. Allocation of damages between union and employer
When allocating the amount of money damages in a hybrid § 301/DFR case,
“[t]he governing principle . . . is to apportion liability between the employer and
the union according to the damage caused by the fault of each.” Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967); Lampkin v. International Union, United Auto.,
- 32 -
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, No. 96-5212, slip op. at 7 (10th Cir.
1998) (proposed publish opinion now in circulation) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at
197-98). In light of this principle, we have held that the apportionment of
damages “must serve the following purposes: (1) damages must be apportioned
according to each party’s fault, (2) the union must be held responsible for any
increases in the employee’s damages, which were caused by the union, and (3) the
employee must be made whole.” Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Int’l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1476 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotations and
citations omitted).
In Webb’s case, the jury was instructed in accordance with this law, 20 and
the jury determined that Webb had suffered total economic damages of $112,124.
The jury then allocated $22,424.80 of the damages to Local 17 and $89,699.20 to
ABF. This allocation suggests that the jury found that Local 17 was 20 percent at
20
Jury Instruction No. 23 provides as follows:
You must apportion any award of damages
between the employer and the union according to the
damages caused by the fault of each. Damages
attributable solely to the breach of the National Master
Freight Agreement by ABF Freight Systems, Inc. should
not be charged to Teamsters Local Union No. 17, and
increases in those damages caused by Teamsters Local
Union No. 17’s failure to fairly represent Rick Webb
should not be charged to the employer. The combined
amount of these damages should make Rick Webb
whole.
- 33 -
fault while ABF was 80 percent at fault.
ABF argues that its damages should have been capped as a matter of law to
those wages that Webb lost prior to the grievance proceedings and that the district
court erred in giving the jury its proportionate fault instruction. We reject this
argument because it carries forward ABF’s mistaken argument as to the causation
standard in a DFR claim.
ABF contends that all of the economic damages Webb incurred after the
grievance hearings are attributable to Local 17 because “but for” the union’s DFR
breach Webb would have prevailed in the grievance hearings and he would have
been reinstated to his job. However, Local 17’s DFR breach need not have been
the “but for” cause of Webb’s subsequent economic damages; instead, Webb only
needed to prove that Local 17’s actions “seriously undermined the integrity of the
arbitration proceedings.” See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 567
(1976). In light of this standard, it is logically possible for a jury to assess
damages against an employer based on proportionate fault that includes damages
incurred after the date of the flawed grievance hearing. A proportionate fault
system of allocating damages ensures that the “primary wrongdoer” shoulders an
appropriate burden, especially when an allocation of damages based on the
grievance arbitration date would shift a disproportionate amount of damages onto
the party that was less at fault. See Aguinaga, 993 F.2d at 1476. Furthermore,
- 34 -
Aguinaga directly contradicts ABF’s claim here that a chronological allocation of
damages based on the date of Webb’s grievance hearing was the required method
of apportionment: “[W]e hold that the hypothetical arbitration date method [of
allocating damages] is not required in every hybrid case . . . .” Id. at 1477. Thus,
ABF is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its allocation of damages
claim.
II. ABF’s motion for a new trial
In addition to its request for judgment as a matter of law, ABF moved for a
new trial in light of various procedural decisions by the court that ABF argues
were in error. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion, and we may reverse the district court “only if [it] made a clear error of
judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”
See Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, a party is entitled to a new trial only if the alleged error
“affect[ed] the substantial rights of the parties.”
A. Attorney Misconduct
ABF contends that Webb’s lawyer, John R. Olsen, committed an ethical
breach in communicating with ABF’s maintenance supervisor Charles Cantrell at
- 35 -
a time when Olsen knew that Cantrell was a management representative for ABF.
ABF argues that this ethical breach caused such prejudice to ABF’s substantial
rights that the district court’s curative instruction was insufficient. As a result,
ABF asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a new
trial.
The applicable Rule of Professional Conduct in Colorado provides,
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do
so.
Colo. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2. We are not convinced that Olsen’s conduct with
respect to Charles Cantrell ran afoul of Rule 4.2 because he did not initiate the
communication with Cantrell and he did not ask any questions of Cantrell during
their brief telephone conversation. Cantrell blurted out his claim – that he did not
know anything about Webb’s case – without any prompting from Olsen. Thus,
Olsen’s attempt to raise Cantrell’s statement during cross-examination may not
have been inappropriate.
In any event, the district court promptly gave the jury a curative instruction,
advising them to disregard this portion of the examination. Even if it was
improper for Olsen to have asked the question, it was adequately addressed by the
district court, and we see no error here that would render the failure to grant a
- 36 -
new trial an abuse of discretion.
B. Evidentiary Rulings
ABF contends that it is entitled to a new trial in light of various evidentiary
decisions during the trial. Such rulings generally are committed to the very broad
discretion of the trial judge, and they may constitute an abuse of discretion only if
based on an erroneous conclusion of law, a clearly erroneous finding of fact or a
manifest error in judgment. See Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir.
1995). Under this standard of review, we must “give deference to the district
court’s evidentiary rulings.” Id. Furthermore, if we find an erroneous evidentiary
ruling, ABF would be entitled to a new trial only when the error affected the
party’s substantial rights. See Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039,
1049 (10th Cir. 1993).
1. Other discipline against Webb
Before the trial began, the district court ruled on a motion in limine that the
only evidence of company discipline against Webb that would be admitted during
the trial was evidence concerning events during the nine months before Webb was
fired. The court based this limitation on the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement that prevent an employer from considering multiple
disciplinary incidents outside a nine-month window and the fact that ABF’s basis
- 37 -
for firing Webb was solely Webb’s failure to report the incident at CSU.
ABF challenges the district court’s ruling on the grounds that Webb was
allowed to introduce evidence to support his claim of retaliation. ABF contends
that because Webb was allowed to claim retaliation, ABF should have been
allowed to present evidence of Webb’s disciplinary record going farther back than
nine months.
ABF’s argument is unpersuasive because of its faulty premise that Webb
opened the nine-month door with his retaliation claim. First, Webb’s retaliation
evidence – i.e., his testimony about grievances he had filed and complaints he had
registered – all involved his conduct within nine months of his discharge.
Second, ABF affirmatively denied having fired Webb as a result of his prior
record of accidents. ABF has consistently insisted that the sole basis for the
discharge was Webb’s failure to report the incident at CSU. As a result, nothing
about Webb’s prior work history was relevant to the company’s justification.
Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude ABF’s evidence of Webb’s
prior discipline.
2. Exhibits of grievance arbitration decisions
During the course of its case-in-chief, ABF called one of its executives to
testify about its interpretation of contract provisions that allow an employer to
fire a worker who fails to report an accident even if the worker has no prior
- 38 -
history of company discipline or other accidents. The executive testified that
there were two arbitration precedents from other states which upheld company
discharges for failing to report an accident. When ABF sought to introduce
exhibits of these grievance decisions, the district court sustained Webb’s
objection to the exhibits. Nevertheless, the court allowed ABF to present the
substance of the decisions through the testimony of ABF’s executive.
ABF has failed to show how it was prejudiced by the district court’s decision not
to allow introduction of the actual decisions, given that the substance of the
grievance decisions was presented to the jury through the testimony of ABF’s
executive.
3. Evidence of Webb’s NLRB complaint
During ABF’s cross-examination of Webb, ABF attempted to introduce
evidence that Webb filed an unfair labor practice charge against ABF with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) prior to filing the instant federal suit,
claiming that his discharge was in retaliation for his union activities. Because
Webb withdrew his NLRB charge after preliminary investigation, ABF sought to
argue that Webb did not believe his retaliation claim had merit. The district court
excluded this evidence as not relevant because there could have been many
reasons for Webb’s decision not to pursue his NLRB charge, including difficulties
in his divorce and responsibility for his children. We find no abuse of discretion
- 39 -
in the district court’s decision to exclude the NLRB evidence.
4. Excerpts of Webb’s deposition testimony
At the close of all the evidence in this case, ABF sought to introduce
blown-up reprints showing excerpts from Webb’s pre-trial deposition. These
exhibits illustrated various portions of Webb’s deposition testimony that ABF
contends contradicted Webb’s testimony at trial. The district court excluded the
exhibits on the grounds that the jury had heard the deposition testimony during
ABF’s efforts to impeach Webb on cross-examination.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. Our own
review of the proffered excerpts confirms the implication that the exhibits were
merely cumulative and offered nothing new. In addition, because ABF failed to
identify any contradictory statements in the proffered deposition excerpts that
were not already brought out during ABF’s cross-examination of Webb, we can
find no prejudice.
5. Emotional distress evidence
The district court allowed Webb to present evidence of his emotional
distress. ABF now argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting this
evidence because ABF contends emotional distress damages are not available
against an employer in a § 301 case.
We need not reach ABF’s substantive argument, however, because the jury
- 40 -
found no basis for awarding emotional distress damages and refused to award any
money on that claim. Thus, there was no prejudice to ABF from the admission of
the emotional distress evidence. ABF argues that this evidence “likely”
influenced the jury’s verdict on the primary liability issues as well as on the jury’s
allocation of fault between ABF and Local 17. However, the district court
instructed the jury that it could not award emotional distress damages unless it
first found that Webb’s case involved “extreme and outrageous misconduct” and
that he had suffered “severe emotional distress.” We presume the jury followed
the court’s instruction to disregard the emotional distress evidence in the absence
of these findings. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir.
1998) (“A central assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the
instructions they receive.”).
6. Hearsay statements by Schwab
During the course of Webb’s direct testimony, he discussed Schwab’s
reaction to the news that ABF had fired Webb. Webb testified over ABF’s
hearsay objection that Schwab had said, “We knew this was coming,” indicating
that Schwab felt Webb’s firing came in reaction to Webb’s union activities. Prior
to eliciting this testimony, the district court instructed the jury on the definition of
hearsay and on Webb’s stipulation that the Schwab statement was non-hearsay
- 41 -
because it was not offered to prove the truth of Webb’s claim that his firing was
retaliatory. ABF contends that it was an abuse of discretion to admit this
testimony because the only purpose for offering Schwab’s statement was to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Webb was the victim of retaliation.
We find no abuse of discretion because we agree with the district court that
Webb’s testimony about Schwab’s statement was not hearsay. Although
Schwab’s statement could have been interpreted as suggesting that ABF actually
had retaliated against Webb, the district court properly instructed the jury not to
consider the statement for that purpose. Instead, Schwab’s statement was
probative of Schwab’s own state of mind and his awareness of Webb’s desire to
raise a retaliation claim, both of which were relevant to Webb’s claim that Local
17 breached its duty of fair representation in failing to raise his retaliation claim.
Thus, the court did not abuse it discretion in admitting the testimony.
C. Jury Instructions
ABF challenges a series of decisions by the district court admitting or
excluding certain jury instructions. We review a trial court’s decision on whether
to give a particular instruction for abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. Denny’s,
Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 626 (1997). Within
the scope of this review, we will find an abuse of discretion if the challenged
- 42 -
instruction incorrectly states the governing law. See id. Furthermore, “[n]o
particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the
correct statement of the applicable law.” Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,
43 F.3d 1349, 1365 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Finally, we must decide
whether the jury “could seriously have been misled in its understanding of the
issues and law applicable to the case before it.” United States v. Laughlin, 26
F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1994).
ABF argues that two of the instructions given to the jury incorrectly stated
the applicable law. First, ABF repeats its contention that Jury Instruction No.
10 21 incorrectly allowed the jury to find a breach of Local 17’s duty of fair
representation based on “perfunctory” conduct. Second, ABF also contends that
Jury Instruction No. 17 22 incorrectly allowed the jury to find a DFR breach if
Local 17 failed to conduct at least a “minimal investigation.” Both of these
claims, however, rely on legal arguments rejected in our discussion, in Part I.A
above, on the substantive scope of a hybrid § 301/DFR case. Because these
instructions accurately stated the law, there was no abuse of discretion in
overruling ABF’s objections to them.
ABF also challenges the district court’s refusal to give five of its proposed
21
The relevant text of Jury Instruction No. 10 is provided in footnote 13.
22
The text of Jury Instruction No. 17 is provided in footnote 15.
- 43 -
jury instructions. We have reviewed each of ABF’s claims, and in each instance,
the language proposed by ABF either was adequately conveyed by the instructions
the court did give, constituted an incorrect statement of the law, or was without
evidentiary support. Therefore we find no abuse of discretion.
D. Special verdict form
In addition to its challenges to the district court’s jury instructions, ABF
also raises two challenges to the wording of the special verdict form given to the
jury. We will review the language of a special verdict form with the same abuse
of discretion standard that we apply to jury instructions. See United States v.
Reed, Nos. 97-10053, 97-10072, __ F.3d __, 1998 WL 372749, at *2 (9th Cir.
July 7, 1998).
ABF’s first contention points to the wording of the initial question in the
special verdict form, which asks the jury to decide whether Webb was
“wrongfully discharged.” ABF argues that the phrase “wrongfully discharged”
incorrectly characterizes the legal requirement of finding that Webb’s firing
breached the collective bargaining agreement. We see no mischaracterization in
the use of the phrase “wrongfully discharged” instead of “breached the contract.”
Furthermore, we note that Jury Instruction No. 10 ensures that the jury was aware
that in order to find that Webb was “wrongfully discharged,” it must find that
- 44 -
“ABF Freight Systems Inc. violated the National Master Freight Agreement by
terminating Webb from his employment without ‘just cause’ or other valid reason
under said contract.” As a result, we find no abuse of discretion in the special
verdict form’s use of the words “wrongfully discharged.”
ABF next contends that the special verdict form incorrectly failed to set
forth a “but for” causation standard for Webb’s DFR claim. However, as we
discussed above in Part I.C., the case law does not require a “but for” causation
standard in a DFR case.
E. Excessive damages
ABF’s final basis for claiming a right to a new trial is a rearticulation of its
earlier argument on the allocation of damages. ABF contends that the jury’s
award of $89,699.20 in damages against ABF was “plainly excessive” because
this amount includes lost wages incurred by Webb after the date of the grievance
hearings. However, as discussed above in Part I.E., the jury properly allocated
damages on the basis of its findings of proportional fault. As a result, we reject
ABF’s related claim that the damages are excessive.
Conclusion
In this case, a properly instructed jury having heard seven days of testimony
- 45 -
found that Teamsters Local 17 had breached its duty of fair representation to Rick
Webb and that this breach seriously undermined Webb’s ability to defend his
rights under the collective bargaining agreement after ABF Freight System had
wrongfully terminated his employment. We have found no errors of law or abuse
of discretion in the proceedings below, and therefore, we AFFIRM.
- 46 -