Michael Alexander Lajeunesse v. The Iowa Board of Medicine ( 2021 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 20-1295
    Filed December 15, 2021
    MICHAEL ALEXANDER LAJEUNESSE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    THE IOWA BOARD OF MEDICINE,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William P. Kelly, Judge.
    Michael Lajeunesse appeals the dismissal of his case for lack of
    prosecution. AFFIRMED.
    Michael Lajeunesse, Anamosa, self-represented appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Caroline Barrett and Anagha Dixit,
    Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
    2
    GREER, Judge.
    In a pro se filing, Michael Lajeunesse petitioned for writ of mandamus
    pursuant to Iowa Code section 661.9 (2020).1 In that February 12, 2020 filing,
    Lajeunesse referenced his “petition for a declaratory order against the [Board] of
    [M]edicine’s licensee: Dr. [Gregory A.] Schmunk.” Lajeunesse claimed he mailed
    the petition to the Iowa Board of Medicine (Board) on December 30, 2019. From
    that pleading, we glean that Lajeunesse sought information related to Dr. Schmunk
    from the Board to use in his defense involving his conviction for attempted murder
    and willful injury causing serious injury. Dr. Schmunk, as the Polk County medical
    examiner, testified as an expert witness in Lajeunesse’s criminal case about the
    nature of injuries suffered by the victim.     Although Lajeunesse appealed his
    conviction, our court affirmed it. State v. Lajeunesse, No. 17-0507, 
    2018 WL 1099024
    , at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018). Lajeunesse has since applied for
    postconviction relief (PCR). Lajeunesse’s PCR action is currently on appeal.
    Returning to the filing at hand, Lajeunesse failed to serve the Board with a
    copy of the writ of mandamus by the May 13, 2020 deadline—ninety days after
    filing the petition. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302(5).2 Recognizing that failure, on July
    14, 2020, the district court ordered:
    1 Section 661.1 provides: “The action of mandamus is one brought to obtain an
    order commanding an inferior tribunal, board, corporation, or person to do or not
    to do an act, the performance or omission of which the law enjoins as a duty
    resulting from an office, trust, or station.”
    2 Rule 1.302(5) states:
    If service of the original notice is not made upon the
    defendant, respondent, or other party to be served within 90 days
    after filing the petition, the court, upon motion or its own initiative after
    notice to the party filing the petition, shall dismiss the action without
    prejudice as to that defendant, respondent, or other party to be
    3
    1. Plaintiff shall within fourteen (14) days of this Order, either:
    • File with the Clerk of Court the Return of Service or similar
    document which evidences service on the Defendants within ninety
    (90) days of filing of the Petition as required by Iowa Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.302(5) and deliver a copy to the assigned Judge; or
    • In the event the Plaintiff has not served the Defendants
    within the ninety (90) days of filing of the Petition, or otherwise cannot
    file a Return of Service or similar document evidencing timely
    service, the Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s attorney shall file a motion with
    supporting affidavit stating the good cause for Plaintiff’s failure to
    timely serve the Defendants or inability to file a Return of Service or
    similar document, and requesting the Court to direct an alternate
    manner of service, or to extend the time for an appropriate period of
    service, or filing of the return. A copy of the motion shall be delivered
    to the assigned Judge.
    2. If the Plaintiff fails to comply with the provision of the
    subparagraphs in paragraph 1 by the date specified, pursuant to
    Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5) the Court will dismiss this case
    without prejudice.
    The deadline for action passed. Neither option was exercised by Lajeunesse, so
    the district court found that the Board had “not been served with the Original Notice
    nor has the plaintiff filed an application for an extension of time.” To that end, the
    district court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution on August 3, 2020.
    Lajeunesse moved to amend or enlarge, but the district court found his reasons
    inadequate to overcome the dismissal and overruled the motion. Lajeunesse
    appeals the dismissal of his case. We review the district court’s decision to grant
    a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. See Rucker v. Taylor, 
    828 N.W.2d 595
    , 598 (Iowa 2013). On a motion to dismiss for delay of service, the
    court may consider facts outside the pleadings. Carroll v. Martir, 
    610 N.W.2d 850
    ,
    856 (Iowa 2000).
    served or direct an alternate time or manner of service. If the party
    filing the papers shows good cause for the failure of service, the court
    shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
    4
    Now on appeal, Lajeunesse raises several issues3 for review not germane
    to the question presented under this record. Yet, both parties made numerous
    references to filings and information outside of the record and both ask we take
    judicial notice of other filings between the parties.4 Even without these additional
    filings, what the record does show is Lajeunesse’s continual engagement with the
    Iowa legal system. At the core, Lajeunesse did not follow the required steps to
    move his case past dismissal. While he is treading into a world of legal deadlines
    and requirements, self-represented parties receive no preferential treatment. See
    3 In his appellate brief, Lajeunesse details these issues:
    a. Should the [Board] be forced to perform disciplinary
    proceedings against Dr. Schmunk for his “expert opinionated”
    testimony during Appellant’s criminal trial?
    b. Since the extraordinary writ of mandamus can only be
    issued for the performance of a statutorily imposed duty in
    accordance with the law, can the Board claim that their “licensee” will
    suffer prejudice even though the Board’s primary discretion is left
    intact, therefore allowing Dr. Schmunk his due process of the law?
    c. Will the writ further compel the Board to provide a page by
    page summarized analysis into the contents of the medical records
    in question—that is also “certified” and peerly reviewed? And,
    d. It is to the best of the Appellant’s understandings [sic] that
    the Honorable William P. Kelly did this Appellant justice by
    “summarily adjudicating” his case when he ruled on the Appellant’s
    motion to enlarge or expand conclusions of law?
    4 The Board requests that we take judicial notice of the cases involving Lajeunesse
    to determine if the issues in this appeal are moot. Likewise, along with the issues
    raised in the appeal, Lajeunesse requests we take judicial notice of the termination
    of Dr. Schmunk and the proceedings before the Board related to that status.
    “Judicial notice is defined as ‘the cognizance of certain facts which judges and
    jurors may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
    them.’” McBeth v. Merchs. Motor Freight, Inc., 
    79 N.W.2d 303
    , 325 (Iowa 1956)
    (Thompson, C.J., specially concurring) (citation omitted). “[O]rdinarily judicial
    notice may not be taken of court proceedings in related but wholly different cases.”
    In re Adkins, 
    298 N.W.2d 273
    , 277 (Iowa 1980). Here, the parties did not identify
    portions of any record or filing that addresses the issue we decide today—the
    failure to timely serve—so we avoid that exercise. Likewise, our ruling does not
    require we address the Board’s mootness argument.
    5
    Hays v. Hays, 
    612 N.W.2d 817
    , 819 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). “The law does not judge
    by two standards, one for lawyers and the other for lay persons. Rather, all are
    expected to act with equal competence. If lay persons choose to proceed pro se,
    they do so at their own risk.” Metro. Jacobson Dev. Venture v. Bd. of Rev., 
    476 N.W.2d 726
    , 729 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). Under this record, Lajeunesse did not
    establish good cause for his failure to serve the Board within ninety days of
    petitioning for writ of mandamus. See Crall v. Davis, 
    714 N.W.2d 616
    , 620 (Iowa
    2006) (holding that attempts at service with no legal significance are not adequate
    justification for delay in service).
    We affirm the district court’s dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1295

Filed Date: 12/15/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2021