United States v. Donte Taylor ( 2021 )


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  •                                         PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 20-3158
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    DONTE TAYLOR,
    Appellant
    _____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (District Court No.: 2-18-cr-00242-001)
    District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
    _____________________________________
    Argued November 16, 2021
    (Filed: December 21, 2021)
    Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit
    Judges.
    Lisa B. Freedland
    Renee Pietropaolo (Argued)
    Office of Federal Public Defender
    1001 Liberty Avenue
    Suite 1500
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellant
    Stephen R. Kaufman
    Laura S. Irwin (Argued)
    Office of the United States Attorney
    700 Grant Street
    Suite 4000
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Counsel for Appellee
    _________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _________
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
    In January 2020, a federal jury found Donte Taylor
    guilty of possession with intent to distribute controlled
    substances. Before us, Taylor raises a single claim of error:
    that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
    represent himself when it denied his request to proceed pro se.
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant, such
    as Taylor, the right to self-representation if he “knowingly and
    intelligently” waives his concomitant Sixth Amendment right
    to counsel. Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 835 (1975).
    Thus, when Taylor invoked his right to represent himself, the
    District Court bore “the weighty responsibility of conducting a
    sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that” Taylor
    2
    could make such a waiver. United States v. Peppers, 
    302 F.3d 120
    , 130-31 (3d Cir. 2002). We acknowledge that Taylor was
    a difficult defendant, questioning the District Court’s
    jurisdiction and pressing meritless legal arguments in pro se
    filings. Nonetheless, because the District Court denied
    Taylor’s request without completing the requisite inquiry, we
    will vacate Taylor’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
    I.
    In September 2017, Taylor was paroled and released
    from prison after serving a term of imprisonment for state drug
    offenses. Under the terms of his release, Taylor’s probation
    officer, Kent Jones, would conduct unannounced home visits
    of Taylor’s residence in Duquesne, Pennsylvania, which he
    shared with his girlfriend. On one such visit, which led to a
    search of the residence, Jones and other law enforcement
    officers discovered marijuana, crack cocaine, a firearm, and a
    significant amount of cash. Following the search, Taylor was
    arrested.
    In September 2018, a grand jury returned a single-count
    indictment against Taylor for unlawfully possessing controlled
    substances with the intent to distribute those substances in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii),
    841(b)(1)(C), and 841(b)(1)(D). The next month, the District
    Court appointed Robert S. Carey, Jr. to represent Taylor.
    Several months later, Taylor moved to suppress the evidence
    obtained during the search of his residence. After the
    Government moved to continue the initial hearing, the District
    Court scheduled a hearing on Taylor’s suppression motion for
    May 31, 2019.
    3
    Several weeks before the scheduled suppression
    hearing, Taylor filed two pro se motions for his immediate
    release. A few days after the second motion, Carey moved to
    withdraw as Taylor’s counsel.        He claimed that “the
    attorney/client relationship [was] irreparably damaged”
    because Taylor would not permit him to withdraw these two
    pro se motions in which Taylor refused to “accept that the laws
    of the United States govern him.” App. 37-38. The District
    Court denied Carey’s motion to withdraw approximately two
    weeks later. In the interim, Taylor had filed two more pro se
    documents. The day after the District Court denied his first
    motion, Carey moved to withdraw a second time, explaining
    that Taylor had “advised [him] that the attorney/client
    relationship was terminated” and “desires to proceed pro se.”
    App. 41-42. Over the next several days in the lead-up to the
    scheduled suppression hearing, Taylor entered five more pro
    se filings.
    The District Court held the scheduled suppression
    hearing on May 31, 2019. It began the hearing by addressing
    Carey’s second motion to withdraw. Carey explained that
    Taylor wanted to represent himself, but Carey had “concerns
    of a substantial nature [concerning] [Taylor’s] legal
    competency.” App. 53-54. As the District Court considered
    his competency, Taylor, addressing the Court directly, sought
    permission to represent himself. When he acknowledged that
    he “d[id not] understand law” and therefore requested that the
    District Court “deal with [him] commonly,” the District Court
    expressed its misgivings about Taylor’s ability to represent
    himself: “[W]hat concerns the Court is that some of [Taylor’s]
    pro se motions are just so—they’re of a rambling nature, and
    they are not founded on any rational legal principles.” App.
    56-57. It elaborated that these filings “send[] up a red flag that,
    4
    even though [Taylor] may be legally competent in that [he]
    understand[s] the nature of these proceedings, that’s a different
    standard as to whether [he] [is] able to effectively represent
    [himself].” App. 57.
    In response, Taylor explained that he would “ask
    questions if [he] [did not] understand” the proceedings. App.
    58. The District Court explained that it was “not here to answer
    [Taylor’s] questions”; he should look to counsel for this
    purpose. App. 58. Taylor replied that he “just want[ed] to
    know if the Court [could] deal with [him] commonly so that
    [he] [could] speak regularly to” the Court and the prosecutor.
    App. 58. The District Court advised Taylor that trials involved
    complex rules, and that Taylor would be “at a great
    disadvantage by trying to represent [himself].” App. 58-59.
    Taylor again asked that the District Court “deal[] with [him]
    commonly so [he could] get an understanding of what[] [would
    be] said.” App. 59. The Court responded that it would “deal
    with [Taylor] . . . as [it] [had] been, explaining things on a level
    that [Taylor] [could] mentally assimilate,” and it reiterated that
    Taylor “[would] be at a very great disadvantage in representing
    [himself].” App. 59.
    Wrapping up the colloquy, the District Court returned
    to its concerns about Taylor’s request in light of his pro se
    filings, stating that his “understanding or [his] perceptions of
    legal principles [were] so askew that [Taylor and the Court]
    [were] on very shaky grounds.” App. 59. It determined that
    Taylor did not need a mental health evaluation, yet it proposed
    taking a break to give it time to conduct “basic fundamental
    research” about his request before it ruled definitively. App.
    59-60.
    5
    Taylor then asked the Court to consider “a jurisdictional
    issue in this proceeding,” which he had raised in his pro se
    filings. App. 60. In response, the District Court explained that,
    because Taylor was still represented by counsel, it would not
    consider his pro se filings. Carey interjected and mentioned
    that in one such filing Taylor contended that “the United States
    is not a country. It is a corporation. [Taylor] [is] not a United
    States citizen, nor [is] [he] an employee, agent of the United
    States.” App. 62. The District Court once again expressed its
    concerns about Taylor’s ability to represent himself. It
    explained to Taylor that it would not “allow [him] to turn this
    case into some strange journey with these theories that have
    absolutely no basis in law or logic.” App. 62-63. Taylor again
    claimed that the District Court had not established its
    jurisdiction over him. He then stated his name, address, and
    social security number. The District Court told Taylor that it
    would not engage in further discussion of his jurisdictional
    issue after he tried to broach the issue for a third time.
    Despite the District Court’s warning, Taylor continued,
    seeking to read two dictionary definitions of the United States
    into the record. At this moment, the District Court denied
    Taylor’s request to represent himself:
    THE COURT: No. I told you I’m
    not going to allow you to go down
    that path. And I can see—I can
    rule right from the bench right
    now. I don’t need any research.
    You are not going to be permitted
    to represent yourself. No way. No
    way. I’m not going to let you
    represent yourself.
    6
    MR. TAYLOR: All right. Well,
    Your Honor, the Defendant would
    like to invoke his Fourth and
    Fourteenth Amendment right in
    regarding—
    THE COURT: Okay. Whatever
    you say, I don’t know what that
    means, but you’re not going to
    represent yourself. You’re not.
    Your arguments make no sense.
    They’re convoluted. They’re just
    a waste of time. And I’m not going
    to turn this proceeding upside-
    down. I’m not going to do it.
    App. 64-65. The District Court then ended its colloquy and
    returned to Carey’s motion to withdraw. It determined that
    Carey could withdraw only after he represented Taylor through
    the end of the suppression hearing. Next, the Court turned to
    Taylor’s motion to suppress, which it ultimately denied.
    The following month, the District Court granted
    Carey’s second motion to withdraw and appointed James J.
    Brink to serve as Taylor’s counsel. Six months later, in
    January 2020, the grand jury entered a superseding indictment,
    which charged Taylor with the same count as his previous
    indictment.1 The next week, Taylor, represented by Brink, was
    1
    Unlike the superseding indictment, Taylor’s initial indictment
    also charged Ericka Smith, his girlfriend, with aiding and
    abetting his possession of controlled substances with the intent
    to distribute.
    7
    found guilty on this sole count after a brief jury trial. He was
    later sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 264 months.
    Taylor timely appealed.2
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
    3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
    engage in “plenary review” of the District Court’s
    determination of whether a defendant may exercise his Sixth
    Amendment right to self-representation. Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 127
    . In this review, “we must indulge every reasonable
    presumption against a waiver of counsel.” United States v.
    Jones, 
    452 F.3d 223
    , 230 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). We also review the facts found
    by the District Court for clear error. Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 127
    .
    Because the District Court commits structural error if it
    improperly denies a defendant’s request to represent himself,
    we may not consider its error harmless. 
    Id.
    III.
    “The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a
    defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
    personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta, 
    422 U.S. at 819
    . As a result, it guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
    decline the assistance of counsel and to represent himself. See
    
    id. at 819-21
    ; Jones, 
    452 F.3d at 228
    . Of course, to exercise
    this right, a defendant must relinquish his right to counsel and
    2
    On appeal, Taylor challenges only the District Court’s denial
    of his request to represent himself.
    8
    its accompanying benefits. Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 129
    . Thus,
    he must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
    right to counsel before a court may allow him to proceed pro
    se. Buhl v. Cooksey, 
    233 F.3d 783
    , 789 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Because of this “tension between the right to have
    counsel and the right to represent oneself,” a “trial court
    [shoulders] the weighty responsibility of conducting a
    sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that the
    defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and understanding
    as well as voluntary.” Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 130-31
    . During
    this inquiry, the court must ascertain whether the defendant
    (1) has clearly and unequivocally
    asserted his desire to represent
    himself; (2) understands the nature
    of the charges, the range of
    possible punishments, potential
    defenses, technical problems that
    [he] may encounter, and any other
    factors important to a general
    understanding of the risks
    involved; and (3) is competent to
    stand trial.
    Jones, 
    452 F.3d at 228-29
     (alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). Just as a court may not
    discharge this duty through “[p]erfunctory questioning,”
    United States v. Welty, 
    674 F.2d 185
    , 187 (3d Cir. 1982), it may
    not do so through recitation of a “rote speech,” Virgin
    Islands v. Charles, 
    72 F.3d 401
    , 404 (3d Cir. 1995). “Rather,
    a [d]istrict [c]ourt must engage in a ‘penetrating and
    comprehensive examination of all the circumstances’” before
    accepting or rejecting a defendant’s waiver of his right to
    9
    counsel. Jones, 
    452 F.3d at 228
     (quoting Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 131
    ). Indeed, without undertaking such an inquiry, “a district
    court cannot make an informed decision as to the knowing and
    voluntary nature of a defendant’s request to proceed pro se.”
    Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 133
    .
    On appeal, Taylor contends that the District Court erred
    because it denied his request based on its assessment of his
    understanding of law rather than the potential risks and
    consequences of proceeding pro se.3 That argument, then,
    leads us to examine the District Court’s basis for denying
    Taylor’s request. In other words, we must determine whether
    the District Court satisfied the Peppers inquiry’s second
    requirement, namely, whether Taylor could not appreciate the
    advantages he would forgo by waiving his right to counsel, the
    challenges self-representation could present, and the
    3
    Taylor preserved this issue for appeal despite the
    Government’s suggestion that he may have failed to do so.
    Although Taylor did not redouble his efforts to represent
    himself after the suppression hearing, he did not need to do so
    because the District Court definitively denied his clear request.
    See Buhl, 
    233 F.3d at 803
     (concluding that the defendant did
    not abandon his right to self-representation when the court
    “denied [his] motion to proceed pro se in no uncertain terms,”
    and he accepted the court’s decision); see also 
    id.
     (“To avoid a
    waiver of a previously-invoked right to self-representation, a
    defendant is not required continually to renew a request once
    it is conclusively denied or to make fruitless motions or forego
    cooperation with defense counsel in order to preserve the issue
    on appeal.” (quoting Orazio v. Duggar, 
    876 F.2d 1508
    , 1512
    (11th Cir. 1989))).
    10
    consequences he could face if found guilty.4 Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 134
    . Taylor maintains that, rather than fulfill this
    responsibility during its colloquy, the Court “focus[ed] on
    4
    Both Taylor and the Government agree that the other two
    Peppers inquiry requirements—that Taylor made a clear and
    unequivocal request to represent himself and was competent to
    stand trial—are not in dispute. We find that Taylor satisfied
    both requirements. First, he told the District Court that he
    “wishe[d] to proceed pro se.” App. 53; see United States v.
    Stubbs, 
    281 F.3d 109
    , 117-18 (3d Cir. 2002) (determining that
    the defendant “clearly and unequivocally” invoked his right to
    self-representation when he told the court that “I’m going to do
    my own thing . . . I’m going to represent myself as of now”
    (alteration in original)). Second, even though the District
    Court had concerns about Taylor’s competency, it did not find
    him incompetent. Because the record does not raise doubts as
    to his competency, see United States v. Coleman, 
    871 F.3d 470
    , 476-77 (6th Cir. 2017) (determining that the defendant’s
    arguments based in sovereign citizenship’s tenets did not on
    their own suggest that he was incompetent); United States v.
    Neal, 
    776 F.3d 645
    , 657 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[V]oluminous filings
    of nonsensical pleadings do not create per se serious doubt
    about competency.”), we will not question the District Court’s
    determination, see Charles, 
    72 F.3d at 405-06
     (explaining that,
    because the district court “was in the best position to observe
    [the defendant], evaluate his mental state, and determine
    whether a follow-up evaluation was necessary,” the court
    would not “second guess the district court’s [competency]
    determination”).
    11
    whether [he] could effectively represent              himself.”5
    Appellant’s Br. 29 (emphasis omitted).
    We agree that the District Court appears to have
    misdirected its focus when evaluating Taylor’s request to
    represent himself. In his pro se filings and at the suppression
    hearing, Taylor advanced “sovereign citizen” arguments.6
    5
    The Government suggests that whether the District Court’s
    colloquy satisfied Peppers is not before us because Taylor’s
    opening brief “did not challenge the Peppers colloquy in [this]
    respect.” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. 3 n.2. “When an issue or claim
    is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the
    particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather
    retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper
    construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
    Inc., 
    500 U.S. 90
    , 99 (1991).           Moreover, as Taylor
    axiomatically challenges whether the District Court conducted
    a sufficient inquiry in arguing that it violated Peppers by
    denying his request based on its perception of his
    understanding of law, whether the colloquy comported with
    Peppers is squarely before us.
    6
    Although “sovereign citizens” do not share identical beliefs,
    they generally believe that they are neither subject to federal
    law nor federal courts’ jurisdiction. See United States v.
    Banks, 
    828 F.3d 609
    , 615 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Defendants
    claiming to be ‘sovereign citizens’ assert that the federal
    government is illegitimate and insist that they are not subject
    to its jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)); see also United States v. DiMartino, 
    949 F.3d 67
    , 69
    (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the Sovereign Citizen
    movement” is “a loosely affiliated group who follow their own
    set of laws and, accordingly, do not recognize federal, state, or
    12
    E.g., App. 60-61 (questioning the District Court’s jurisdiction);
    App. 62 (discussing Taylor’s pro se filing in which he contends
    that he is “not a United States citizen, nor [is he] an employee,
    agent of the United States); App. 63 (“What I’m saying here
    today is I don’t recognize the jurisdiction in this courtroom.”).
    The District Court focused on these arguments, noting that
    Taylor’s claims were “not founded on any rational legal
    principles” and “sen[t] up a red flag.” App. 57. The record
    further indicates that the District Court had the merits of
    Taylor’s claims in mind rather than his appreciation for the
    consequences of representing himself when it denied his
    request:
    Whatever you say, I don’t know
    what that means, but you’re not
    going to represent yourself.
    You’re not. Your arguments make
    no sense. They’re convoluted.
    They’re just a waste of time. And
    I’m not going to turn this
    local laws, policies or regulations as legitimate” (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). Their claims, including
    Taylor’s, of course, lack merit. See United States v. Benabe,
    
    654 F.3d 753
    , 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an
    individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign
    citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood
    human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the
    courts.”).
    13
    proceeding upside-down. I’m not
    going to do it.
    App. 65.
    We share the District Court’s concerns about the merits
    of Taylor’s “sovereign citizen” arguments and their potential
    to upend courtroom proceedings, but these concerns should not
    have formed the heart of the District Court’s inquiry nor the
    basis for its determination. Courts have repeatedly concluded
    that “sovereign citizens” may represent themselves despite
    their frivolous beliefs about the law. See, e.g., United States v.
    Johnson, 
    980 F.3d 570
     (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that the district
    court did not err in allowing a “sovereign citizen” defendant to
    represent himself); United States v. Mesquiti, 
    854 F.3d 267
    (5th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. Banks, 
    828 F.3d 609
    (7th Cir. 2016) (same). That is so because a court’s assessment
    of a defendant’s “sovereign citizen” claims sheds little light on
    the defendant’s appreciation of the risks and consequences of
    self-representation. Cf. Neal, 776 F.3d at 658-59 (concluding
    that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
    to counsel when he appeared to understand self-
    representation’s consequences even though he “clearly
    endorsed the ‘sovereign citizen’ ideology”).
    The District Court should have examined Taylor’s
    understanding “of the technical problems he may [have]
    encounter[ed] in acting as his own attorney and of the risks he
    [would] take[] if his defense efforts [were] unsuccessful.”
    Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 135
     (quoting Henderson v. Frank, 
    155 F.3d 159
    , 166 (3d Cir. 1998)). In Peppers, we held that the
    district court erred because it denied the defendant’s request to
    represent himself after focusing its inquiry on the defendant’s
    knowledge of the law and practical ability to mount a defense.
    14
    
    Id. at 134, 137
    . We determined that, instead, the court should
    have investigated whether the defendant appreciated “the
    structural limitations or perils of representing himself.” 
    Id. at 134
    . Here, the District Court advised Taylor at a general level
    about some of these limitations and perils. It explained that he
    would need to follow certain rules and procedures if he were
    to represent himself, and it warned him that he could not look
    to the Court for assistance. Yet, the District Court did not
    probe whether Taylor understood the risks and consequences
    of representing himself during this colloquy. Rather, it
    continued to return to Taylor’s arguments and the concerns
    they raised. Thus, like the district court in Peppers, it erred by
    failing to adequately investigate Taylor’s request to represent
    himself before denying his request. 
    Id. at 134
     (“Absent a
    proper inquiry, the District Court had no basis upon which to
    deny—or to grant—[the defendant’s] request for self-
    representation.”); see also Jones v. Norman, 
    633 F.3d 661
    , 667
    (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the trial court erred when it denied
    the defendant’s request to represent himself because “under the
    guise of inquiring about the validity of [the defendant’s]
    waiver, the trial court improperly considered factors related to
    [the defendant’s] ability to represent himself”).
    To ensure that a trial court has a basis for its decision to
    permit or prohibit self-representation, we have recommended
    that it structure its Faretta inquiry around a set of model
    questions. See Jones, 
    452 F.3d at 229
    ; Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 136-37
    . By relying on these questions, a trial court not only
    warns the defendant of self-representation’s consequences but
    also learns whether he appreciates those same consequences.
    That said, we do not require all trial courts to ask these
    questions⸻“there is no talismanic formula for the court’s
    inquiry.” Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 135
    . Indeed, we recognize that
    15
    a court may employ tools other than direct questioning if the
    circumstances call for them. See United States v. Garey, 
    540 F.3d 1253
    , 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that,
    when a defendant refuses to engage in a dialogue with the
    court, “a Faretta-like monologue will suffice”). Nevertheless,
    at a minimum, the inquiry must address whether the defendant
    understands “the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
    included within them, and the range of allowable punishments
    thereunder” to enable the trial court to assure itself that the
    defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to
    counsel. United States v. Booker, 
    684 F.3d 421
    , 425-26 (3d
    Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.
    Moskovits, 
    86 F.3d 1303
    , 1306 (3d Cir. 1996)) (discussing the
    standard for an effective waiver of the right to counsel). 7 The
    District Court’s inquiry here, which understandably focused on
    procedural problems that appeared likely to follow from
    Taylor’s self-representation, fell short of this minimum.8
    7
    In Jones, we stated that a trial court must examine “all of the
    subjects covered in the model questions set forth in
    Peppers . . . to the extent those subjects are relevant.” Jones,
    
    452 F.3d at 234
     (footnote omitted); see also Booker, 684 F.3d
    at 426. However, we do not doubt that there could be a case
    where we approve of a district court’s inquiry and its resulting
    conclusion even though the district court bypassed one or more
    such subjects. Nonetheless, we have no occasion here to opine
    on this issue because the District Court stopped short of a
    meaningful inquiry.
    8
    The Government argues that the District Court’s abbreviated
    colloquy passes muster under the Supreme Court’s “pragmatic
    approach to the waiver question,” Patterson v. Illinois, 
    487 U.S. 285
    , 298 (1988). We, however, conclude that it does not.
    16
    Despite the Government’s arguments to the contrary,
    the District Court erred by failing to find out whether Taylor
    understood the risks and consequences of self-representation.
    The Government claims that the Court gathered enough
    information about Taylor’s understanding because “Taylor
    failed to adhere to the District Court’s decisions and thus failed
    to demonstrate his knowledge and appreciation of the
    importance of counsel or the consequences of self-
    representation.” Appellee’s Br. 26. If a defendant disobeys
    the court’s directions and, in doing so, stymies its inquiry into
    the defendant’s request to represent himself, the court may
    truncate its Faretta colloquy. See United States v. Pryor, 
    842 F.3d 441
    , 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[The defendant’s] refusal to
    provide a straight answer to the thrice-repeated question of
    whether he wished to be represented by counsel or by himself
    was a rejection of further inquiry into his waiver of counsel and
    justified the magistrate judge’s conclusion of the colloquy.”).
    However, it ought not end its inquiry when the defendant
    proves obstinate only briefly. Although Taylor wanted to
    argue about the District Court’s jurisdiction and tried to steer
    In Iowa v. Tovar, the Court recognized that a defendant may
    receive “less rigorous warnings pretrial” under this pragmatic
    approach. 
    541 U.S. 77
    , 90 (2004). But it held that the court
    must at least “inform[] the accused of the nature of the charges
    against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and
    of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry
    of a guilty plea” when a defendant seeks to represent himself
    at his arraignment. 
    Id. at 81
    . Accordingly, even under a
    “pragmatic approach,” the District Court’s inquiry would
    remain inadequate because it never advised Taylor on these
    subjects nor probed his understanding of them during the
    colloquy.
    17
    the Court’s attention to that subject, he did not thwart its
    inquiry. The Court elected to pause its colloquy with Taylor
    when it indicated that it wanted to perform additional research.
    And, moments later, it denied Taylor’s request outright when
    he pressed the Court to consider his “sovereign citizen” claims
    again.
    The District Court took this step even though the
    colloquy revealed little evidence that Taylor could not
    understand the risks and consequences of waiving his right to
    counsel. He repeatedly requested that the Court speak with
    him “commonly” if he were to represent himself. App. 56-57,
    58, 59. Each time, it advised that it had a limited ability to
    explain the complexities of the law and the criminal
    proceedings. While the Court may have exhausted its ability
    to clarify these limitations after the third attempt, it remained
    obliged to ascertain whether Taylor, in fact, failed to grasp self-
    representation’s risks and consequences. See Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 137
     (“[I]f, during the course of inquiry, it appears that
    the defendant needs further explanation, or it is evident that the
    defendant does not comprehend what the court is saying or
    asking, the court will need to probe further.” (footnote
    omitted)); cf. Stubbs, 
    281 F.3d at 119-20
     (determining that the
    district court erred when allowed a defendant to proceed pro se
    because, among other things, during the Faretta colloquy, the
    defendant indicated that he had not understood the court’s
    warning, and the court did not attempt to clarify this
    confusion). The District Court did not ask Taylor about his
    understanding and thus did not follow through on this
    obligation. As a result, we cannot conclude that Taylor could
    not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
    At the same time, we hasten to add that “the right to self-
    representation is not absolute.” Martinez v. Court of Appeal,
    18
    
    528 U.S. 152
    , 161 (2000). It permits defendants neither “to
    abuse the dignity of the courtroom” nor to disregard the
    “relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Faretta,
    
    422 U.S. at 834 n.46
    . The District Court, attuned to these
    concerns, no doubt understood that “the trial judge may
    terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately
    engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” 
    Id.
     Still, a
    trial court should exercise patience in difficult situations such
    as the one the District Court faced. It should refrain from
    denying a defendant’s initial request to represent himself on
    this ground where disruption is predicted but has not occurred.
    See Indiana v. Edwards, 
    554 U.S. 164
    , 185-86 (2008) (Scalia,
    J., dissenting) (reasoning that these “ground[s] for terminating
    self-representation [are] unavailable” when the defendants
    have not been permitted to proceed pro se and the defendants
    appear generally compliant); United States v. Smith, 
    830 F.3d 803
    , 810 (8th Cir. 2016) (adopting this position). Nonetheless,
    a defendant’s conduct may prove obstreperous enough to
    justify denying his request at the outset in some cases. See
    United States v. Hausa, 
    922 F.3d 129
    , 135-36 (2d Cir. 2019)
    (per curiam) (“[The defendant’s] obstruction is independent
    support for the denial of his purported waiver of counsel. [His]
    misconduct was egregious and intolerable by any measure: he
    hummed and screamed, and rambled incoherently; he cursed at
    the judge, declared him an enemy and threatened to kill him.”);
    see also Finch v. Payne, 
    983 F.3d 973
    , 982 (8th Cir. 2020)
    (“The type of conduct required for a court to deny a
    defendant’s request to proceed pro se generally requires
    extreme disruption of the judicial process.”).
    Here, however, the record does not establish that Taylor
    disrupted the proceedings. See United States v. Engel, 
    968 F.3d 1046
    , 1050 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that a district court
    19
    may not terminate a defendant’s self-representation when,
    among other things, the defendant “file[s] numerous
    nonsensical pleadings” and “[is] uncooperative at times”
    (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)); Smith, 830 F.3d at 810 (“Repeated, frivolous
    challenges to the court’s jurisdiction, to the government’s
    authority to prosecute, or to the validity of the federal laws
    [the] defendant is charged with violating, are not disruptive or
    defiant in this sense—unless they threaten to forestall pretrial
    or trial proceedings.”). Rather, it shows that Taylor made a
    few attempts to advance arguments that made no sense. Even
    though, in doing so, he tried the District Court’s patience and
    probably would have continued to do so if permitted to
    represent himself, the record does not reveal an “abuse [of] the
    dignity of the courtroom.”
    At bottom, while we respect the latitude that must be
    accorded to trial courts in evaluating litigants’ behavior, the
    District Court, no doubt out of understandable frustration,
    acted prematurely and thereby denied Taylor his Sixth
    Amendment right.        Rather than prohibit Taylor from
    representing himself at this early stage, it should have
    conducted the requisite inquiry and, if satisfied that he
    understood the consequences, allowed him to proceed pro se.
    That, however, would not have been the end of the matter. If
    the Court suspected that Taylor would eventually prove
    disruptive, it could have appointed standby counsel, knowing
    that he would step in if Taylor, in fact, sought to upend the
    proceedings.       See Faretta, 
    422 U.S. at 834 n.46
    (acknowledging that a court may appoint standby counsel “to
    be available to represent the accused in the event that the
    termination of the defendant’s self-representation is
    necessary”); Norman, 
    633 F.3d at 669
     (explaining that
    20
    appointing standby counsel would have offered the trial court
    an appropriate means to assuage any concerns it had about the
    defendant’s ability to represent himself).
    Under our case law, we may not hold the District
    Court’s constitutional error harmless. Peppers, 
    302 F.3d at 127, 137
    . Yet, we recognize that, by seeking to represent
    himself and to propound “sovereign citizen” claims, Taylor
    placed the Court in an unenviable position and somewhat of a
    catch-22. Indeed, whenever a defendant invokes his right to
    self-representation, a district court risks violating the
    defendant’s constitutional rights whether or not it permits the
    defendant to proceed pro se. Pryor, 842 F.3d at 451 (noting
    that the defendant’s request to represent himself may lead to
    “the potential for an unconstitutional denial of the right to
    counsel if the right to self-representation is too quickly
    provided or reversal for unconstitutional denial of the right to
    self-representation if the right to counsel is too vigorously
    shielded”). Today, with respect for the District Court and the
    challenges it faced here, we simply hold that it misstepped
    while “travers[ing] . . . [this] thin line.” Fields v. Murray, 
    49 F.3d 1024
    , 1029 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (second alteration in
    original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    IV.
    Because the District Court denied Taylor’s request to
    represent himself without completing a sufficient inquiry of the
    relevant matters, and thereby denied Taylor his Sixth
    Amendment right to self-representation, we will vacate
    Taylor’s conviction and remand to the District Court for a new
    trial.
    21