Martin v. Hilkey , 460 F. App'x 760 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 2, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM MARTIN; SHELLEY
MARTIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 11-1148
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-02574-MSK-CBS)
(D. Colo.)
STAN HILKEY, as Sheriff of Mesa
County; TIM HENDERSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
William and Shelley Martin appeal from a district court order dismissing
their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 counseled civil-rights complaint against Sheriff Stan
Hilkey and Deputy Tim Henderson of the Mesa County, Colorado, Sheriff’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Department. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM for
substantially the same reasons given by the district court.
B ACKGROUND
In 1991, Mr. Martin was convicted in Colorado state court of felony
vehicular assault. In 2007, Deputy Henderson learned of Mr. Martin’s conviction
and discovered that he had over 100 firearms in his residence. Citing Colorado’s
law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1), 1
Deputy Henderson prepared an affidavit to obtain a no-knock search warrant. A
warrant was issued and executed.
According to the Martins’ first amended complaint, “members of the
Sheriff’s Department and [the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] held
[them] at gunpoint for nearly eight hours as they rummaged through the home,”
seizing over a hundred firearms. Aplee. Supp. App. at 3. Throughout that
1
Under the statute,
[a] person commits the crime of possession of a weapon by a
previous offender if the person knowingly possesses, uses, or carries
upon his or her person a firearm as described in section
18-1-901(3)(h) or any other weapon that is subject to the provisions
of this article subsequent to the person’s conviction for a felony, or
subsequent to the person’s conviction for attempt or conspiracy to
commit a felony, under Colorado or any other state’s law or under
federal law.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1).
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process, Mrs. Martin “was kept outside at gunpoint for approximately forty-five
minutes dressed only in her nightgown,” and “one of the officers threatened to
shoot the family pet.” Id. at 6. The Martins further alleged that Deputy
Henderson had “no basis to believe that [Mr. Martin] was in violation of C.R.S.
§ 18-12-108(1), as his rights to own and possess the firearms had been restored
once he completed his sentence.” Id. at 4. Additionally, they claimed that
“[e]ven after it had been made clear to Defendants that [Mr. Martin’s]
constitutional rights to possess the firearms had been restored[,] . . . Defendants
refused to return the firearms.” Id. at 4-5. Based on these allegations, the
Martins asserted violations of their federal “constitutional rights under the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.” Id. at 6.
The district court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety. As to
Deputy Henderson, the court concluded that he was entitled to qualified immunity
because his affidavit statement that Mr. Martin could not legally possess a firearm
was not contrary to clearly established Colorado law. Indeed, the court noted that
when Deputy Henderson drafted the affidavit in 2007, § 18-12-108(1) absolutely
and permanently banned felons from possessing firearms. The court recognized
that before 1994, the statute banned possession only in cases of felonies
“involving the use of force or violence” and only for ten years following release
from incarceration. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1) (1993), repealed and
re-enacted by Colo. S.B. 94-89 § 6 (effective July 1, 1994). But the Martins
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failed to identify any legal authority that would have suggested to Deputy
Henderson that Mr. Martin was exempt from the current version of the statute.
Thus, qualified immunity applied.
The court further noted that there were no allegations that Deputy
Henderson personally participated in any of the other claimed constitutional
violations. Regarding Sheriff Hilkey, the court noted that there were no
allegations showing either the sheriff’s personal involvement or a departmental
custom or policy that led to a constitutional violation.
The Martins appeal.
D ISCUSSION
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098
(10th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation
omitted). When the dismissal is based on qualified immunity, the “plaintiffs must
allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants
plausibly violated their constitutional rights, and that those rights were clearly
established at the time.” Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008).
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The Martins argue that United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir.
1994), would have put Deputy Henderson on notice that he was not barred by
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1) from possessing firearms. But Hall did not
involve the current version of that statute. Indeed, Hall was decided before the
statute was amended to make the firearms ban absolute and permanent. Thus,
Hall would have given Deputy Henderson no guidance as to whether the current
statute covers Mr. Martin’s possession of firearms. We agree with the district
court that when Deputy Henderson submitted his search-warrant affidavit, the law
was not clearly established that Mr. Martin was exempt from Colorado’s current
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute. 2
2
The defendants point out that roughly five months before the Martins filed
their civil-rights suit, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s
decision denying the Martins’ “motion for return of property and suppression of
evidence.” Aplt. App. at 51. In doing so, the Colorado Court of Appeals held
that the restoration of Mr. Martin’s civil rights under the former version of
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1) did not survive the statute’s 1994 amendment.
The court further rejected the Martins’ claim that the 1994 amendment raised
ex-post-facto concerns. Martin v. Colo., No. 08CA1363 (Colo. App. Ct. June 11,
2009), cert. denied, No. 2009SC630 (Colo. Oct. 19, 2009). See Aplt. App. at
50-55.
It is unclear whether the defendants contend that the Colorado Court of
Appeals’ decision collaterally estops the Martins in this federal civil rights case
from contesting the effect of amended § 18-12-108(1). See Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980) (holding that a federal civil rights plaintiff may be
collaterally estopped from litigating a § 1983 claim by a state court criminal
judgment in which the same issue has already been litigated). In any event, we
need not reach the preclusion issue given the Martins’ failure to identify clearly
established law in their favor.
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The Martins next argue that Deputy Henderson violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by seeking a no-knock warrant. The district court did not
expressly discuss the warrant-procurement aspect of the Martins’ Fourth
Amendment claim. Nevertheless, we note that the Martins’ first amended
complaint does not adequately plead such a claim. It merely alleges in conclusory
fashion that “[t]he procurement and execution of the no-knock search warrant on
November 15, 2007, violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” Aplee. Supp. App.
at 3. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Finally, the Martins summarily assert that “it was an abuse of discretion by
the District Court not to allow [Mr. Martin] to amend his pleadings to correct
deficiencies found by the District Court.” Aplt. Br. at 9. This assertion fails for
two reasons. First, we generally do not consider arguments unsupported by legal
authority or discussion. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.
1992). Second, the Martins made no formal request for amendment. Rather, they
merely stated in the middle of their opposition to dismissal that “in the event . . .
this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is somehow deficient, Plaintiffs’ [sic]
would simply ask for leave to file an amended complaint which cures any
deficiencies.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 39. Because a motion for leave to amend
was never properly before the district court, no abuse of discretion was possible.
See Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187
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(10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiff’s “single sentence [request for
amendment], lacking a statement for the grounds for amendment and dangling at
the end of her memorandum, did not rise to the level of a motion for leave to
amend”); see, e.g., Garmen v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 986
(10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff’s suggestion for amendment made in
opposition to dismissal was insufficient).
C ONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same
reasons identified by the district court in its March 10, 2011, dismissal order.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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