Kostich v. McCollum , 647 F. App'x 887 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 20, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WALTER EDWARD KOSTICH, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-5007
(D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00065-CVE-PJC)
TRACY MCCOLLUM, Warden, (N.D. Okla.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Walter Edward Kostich, Jr., an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, requests
a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s denial in part
and dismissal in part of his post-judgment motions seeking relief from the denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application. We deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Kostich was convicted of federal crimes and then convicted in an
Oklahoma court of a state crime arising out of the same conduct. His § 2254
application argued that his Oklahoma conviction violated the Double Jeopardy
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Clause and his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue double
jeopardy. The district court denied relief, and this court denied a COA, see Kostich
v. McCollum, 624 F. App’x 618, 624 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 659712(2016) (No. 15-8164).
Mr. Kostich then filed four motions in the district court: (1) a recusal motion;
(2) a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reopen his habeas case; (3) a motion to change
venue, and (4) a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The district court addressed the
merits of the recusal motion, but found no grounds justifying recusal and therefore
declined to recuse. Therefore the court also denied the motion to change venue.
The district court further determined that the Rule 60(b) motion was a mixed
motion. One claim—that the judge was biased in the habeas case—properly was
raised under Rule 60(b). The court denied that claim for the reasons given in denying
the motion to recuse. Because the other allegations in the Rule 60(b) motion all
asserted or reasserted grounds for habeas relief, however, the court held that they
were second or successive habeas claims that were subject to the authorization
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Accordingly, the court dismissed those
portions of the motion for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251
(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). It then denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
To appeal, Mr. Kostich must obtain a COA. Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213,
1217-18 (10th Cir. 2006). The standard for a COA depends on whether the district
-2-
court has rejected a claim on the merits or dismissed a filing on procedural grounds.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For a merits decision, the movant
“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. With regard to a procedural
dismissal, however, the movant must show both “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.A. Recusal Allegations
The recusal motion and the first claim in the Rule 60(b) motion alleged that
judicial bias tainted the habeas decision. Because these assertions challenged the
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, the district court appropriately decided
them on the merits. See Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1216-17. For a COA, therefore,
Mr. Kostich must show the decisions are debatable or wrong. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
We review the denial of recusal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cooley,
1 F.3d 985, 994 (10th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Kostich alleges that the district judge is biased against him because the
prosecutors involved in his state and federal cases are “assigned” to her. He relies on
a docket in an unrelated matter, In re United States Attorneys and Clerks, which
appears to be an administrative matter for the filing of documents regarding the
appointment and termination of attorneys in the executive branch, including Assistant
-3-
United States Attorneys and Special Assistant United States Attorneys. Near the top,
the docket report states “United States Attorneys and Clerks,” and immediately
following on the next line, “Assigned to: Judge Claire V Eagan.” R. at 91.
Mr. Kostich apparently misunderstands the docket to mean that the “United
States Attorneys and Clerks” are “assigned” to the district judge. This is incorrect.
The docket merely shows the name of the matter and the judge to which the matter is
assigned. It does not mean that the “United States Attorney and Clerks” are
somehow “assigned” to the judge. As the district judge explained, attorneys entering
appearances before her do not work for her and are not “assigned” to her. Nothing
about any of these circumstances (including the fact that Mr. Kostich’s state
prosecutor was named a Special Assistant United States Attorney) calls into question
the district judge’s impartiality.
Mr. Kostich also notes that he has filed complaints about the judge with
various agencies and officials. Such complaints, however, do not require recusal.
See In re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2000); Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993, 994 n.5.
Further, Mr. Kostich complains that the district judge has granted virtually no
habeas petitions in the past five years. Even assuming this allegation is true, it does
nothing to show that the judge was biased in his case. Moreover, adverse judicial
rulings themselves provide no basis for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994); Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993-94.
-4-
No reasonable jurist could debate whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to recuse and the Rule 60(b) claim predicated upon
alleged judicial bias. We thus deny a COA as to these issues.
B. Second or Successive § 2254 Claims
The district court dismissed the other Rule 60(b) claims as unauthorized
second or successive § 2254 claims. Accordingly, for a COA on these allegations,
Mr. Kostich must satisfy Slack’s test for a procedural ruling, including showing it is
debatable whether the procedural ruling is correct. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
But no reasonable jurist could debate that ruling. Besides the bias allegations,
Mr. Kostich’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged the validity of his Oklahoma conviction
and reargued the merits of his § 2254 claims, particularly double jeopardy. Thus, the
motion attempts to bring habeas claims. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532
& n.4 (2005); Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215-16. Mr. Kostich already has pursued relief
under § 2254, so these claims are second or successive claims that require
authorization under § 2244(b). “A district court does not have jurisdiction to address
the merits of a second or successive . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim until this court has
granted the required authorization.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251.
Mr. Kostich suggests that his motion should be considered an “independent
action” as contemplated by United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1998), and
therefore it is not subject to § 2244’s restrictions. He is mistaken. The “independent
action” provision discussed in Beggerly was in Rule 60(b), but since has been moved
-5-
to Rule 60(d)(1). Motions brought under Rule 60(d), however, are subject to the
same analysis as other motions to determine if they bring unauthorized second or
successive habeas claims. See United States v. Baker, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.
2013) (addressing a fraud-on-the-court claim brought under Rule 60(d)(3)); see also
Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1277 n.11 (11th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (“Nor may a petitioner circumvent the restrictions on second or successive
petitions by the simple expedient of filing an independent action aimed at the
judgment denying habeas relief.”), aff’d, Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
No reasonable jurist could debate the propriety of the district court’s dismissal,
for lack of jurisdiction, of those portions of the Rule 60(b) motion setting forth
habeas claims. We also deny a COA as to these claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Kostich’s motion to certify a question of state law is denied. His request
for counsel, made in his combined opening brief and application for a COA, is
denied. A COA is denied and this matter is dismissed.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
-6-