United States v. Washington , 441 F. App'x 605 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 22, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff!Appellee,
No. 11-4079
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:07-CV-00003-DB &
1:02-CR-00034-DB-1)
DARRELL EUGENE WASHINGTON, (D. Utah)
Defendant!Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Darrell Eugene Washington, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks to
appeal the district court’s dismissal of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for lack of
jurisdiction because it was essentially an unauthorized second or successive
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and
dismiss this proceeding.
Mr. Washington was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment for
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
possession of ammunition by a felon. He pursued a direct appeal, see United
States v. Washington, 157 F. App’x 43 (10th Cir. 2005), and relief under § 2255,
see United States v. Washington, 307 F. App’x 238 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying a
COA). In 2010, he filed a Rule 60(b) motion, alleging that the court had failed to
rule on his claim, asserted in his § 2255 motion, that he was legally innocent of
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the motion was attempting to
assert unauthorized second or successive § 2255 claims and dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251
(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Mr. Washington must obtain a COA to pursue an appeal. United States v.
Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). Because the district court’s ruling
rests on procedural grounds, he must show both “that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000).
A prisoner’s post-judgment filing (however entitled) should be treated like
a second or successive § 2255 motion (and therefore subject to the authorization
requirements of § 2255(h)) if it asserts or reasserts claims of error in the
prisoner’s conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531-32, 538 (2005);
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United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 2006). But authorization
under § 2255(h) is not required “when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the
substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some
defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at
532. In Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006), this court held
that an allegation that the district court failed to consider a habeas claim asserts a
defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, and therefore it does not
require authorization under § 2255(h). Mr. Washington argues that his Rule 60(b)
motion falls within the Spitznas rule. A close examination of Mr. Washington’s
Rule 60(b) motion and the order denying his § 2255 motion, however, reveals that
his real issue is not that the district court failed to address his legal innocence
claim, but how it addressed it.
In his § 2255 motion, Mr. Washington asserted he was legally innocent of
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base pursuant to
§ 841(b)(1)(A) because (1) he was not convicted of an offense involving one
portion (13.2 grams) of the 50 grams, and therefore § 841(b)(1)(A)’s mandatory
minimum should not have been imposed; (2) he did not commit any single
violation involving 50 or more grams of cocaine base; (3) he should have been
sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(B), involving 5 or more grams of cocaine base and
prescribing 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment; and (4) his counsel was ineffective for
not raising these issues during trial, sentencing, and direct appeal. In his
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Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Washington asserted that the court addressed only his
ineffective-assistance claim, and neglected to address the legal innocence issues.
In denying relief under § 2255, however, the court rejected the substantive
claims as part of evaluating whether counsel was ineffective. See R. at 49-51. In
fact, the court specifically rejected the concept that drug quantities could not be
aggregated, see id. at 49-50, and also noted that the mandatory maximum and
minimum sentences prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(A) played no role in setting
Mr. Washington’s sentence, id. at 50. Thus, it is apparent that the court addressed
Mr. Washington’s legal-innocence issues in denying his § 2255 motion.
Mr. Washington’s arguments to the contrary were merely disguised attempts to
have the issues decided differently in a reopened proceeding.
Because at its core Mr. Washington’s Rule 60(b) motion sought renewed
consideration of claims already decided against him, the district court correctly
held that it required authorization under § 2255. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532.
Without such authorization, the district court had no jurisdiction to consider the
motion and appropriately dismissed it. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251.
Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss this proceeding.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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