Mauchlin v. Hood , 167 F. App'x 735 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    February 10, 2006
    TENTH CIRCUIT                          Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    PETER P. MAUCHLIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                       No. 05-1388
    v.                                            (D.C. No. 05-CV-1042-ZLW)
    ROBERT A. HOOD, Warden; R.                              (D. Colo.)
    MADISON, Correctional Counselor;
    N. FIELDS, Adm. Remedy
    Coordinator; MICHAEL K. NALLEY,
    Regional Director; HARRELL
    WATTS, Adm. of National Appeals
    (Adm. Remedy’s [sic]),
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before HENRY, McKAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Appellant is in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons and is
    currently incarcerated in Florence, Colorado. He filed a pro se prisoner complaint
    pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
    
    403 U.S. 388
    , and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . The district court granted him leave to
    proceed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    . Appellant alleged that the complete ban
    on the sale, use, and possession of all tobacco products by Bureau of Prisons
    officials violated the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Webber v. Crabtree, 
    158 F.3d 460
     (1998), the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    (1974), and the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 551 163(a). The district
    court, in dismissing Appellant’s complaint, noted that
    [p]laintiff’s reliance on Webber and Wolff [is] misplaced. Further the
    Court finds no section under the C.F.R. that is referenced as § 551
    163(a). Nonetheless, inmates have no constitutional right to smoke
    in prison, see Beauchamp v. Sullivan, 
    21 F.3d 789
    , 790 (7th Cir.
    1994); see also Doughty v. B[d.] of County Comm’rs, 
    731 F. Supp. 423
    , 426 (D. Colo. 1989).
    Order and Judgment of Dismissal, 2 (July 15, 2005, D. Colo.). See also Jackson
    v. Burns, No. 95-3359, 
    1996 WL 362739
    , at *3 (10th Cir. June 28, 1996).
    The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint, as it is required to do,
    sua sponte, under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) if at any time the action is
    determined to be legally frivolous. In addition, the district court issued an order
    denying Appellant’s leave to proceed on appeal, stating that “[p]ursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (a)(3), the court finds that this appeal is not taken in good faith
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    because plaintiff has not shown the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
    argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Order
    Denying Leave to Proceed on Appeal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
     and Fed. R.
    App. P. 24 (Sept. 14, 2005, D. Colo.). While we have not yet determined whether
    the standard of review of an order denying leave to appeal under § 1915 is de
    novo or abuse of discretion, we would reach the same decision under either
    standard in this case and affirm the district court’s denial of leave to appeal. See
    Plunk v. Givens, 
    234 F.3d 1128
    , 1130 (10th Cir. 2000).
    Appellant’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees is granted.
    Appellant is reminded that he must continue making partial payments until the
    filing fee is paid in full.
    We have carefully reviewed the briefs of Appellant, the district court’s
    disposition, and the record on appeal. We are in accord with the district court’s
    dismissal and its denial of leave to appeal, and for substantially the same reasons
    set forth by the district court in its Order and Judgment of Dismissal of July 15,
    2005, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint as
    legally frivolous.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
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