Neyra-Martinez v. Holder, Jr. , 410 F. App'x 85 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 3, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL FERNANDO
NEYRA-MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
No. 10-9528
v. (Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Miguel Fernando Neyra-Martinez is a native of Peru who overstayed his
visitor visa. After the Department of Homeland Security began removal
proceedings, Mr. Neyra-Martinez conceded he was removable but sought asylum
and to have his removal “withheld”; as well, he sought protection under the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge denied these
requests and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision.
Mr. Neyra-Martinez now asks us to undo this result, but as we will explain this
we cannot do.
We begin with Mr. Neyra-Martinez’s asylum and withholding of removal
requests. To prevail in his asylum claim, Mr. Neyra-Martinez had to show that he
could not return to Peru “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 1 To prevail on his
withholding of removal claim, Mr. Neyra-Martinez’s burden was similar: he had
to show “that his life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of
removal because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1267-68
(10th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
Mr. Neyra-Martinez challenges the BIA’s denial of his asylum and
withholding of removal requests primarily, though not exclusively, on the ground
that the Board’s decision rests on factual errors. We may review the BIA’s
1
The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to
require that an applicant show that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.” Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1268
(10th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because Mr.
Neyra-Martinez filed his application in 2003, the provisions of the REAL ID Act
do not apply to his case.
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findings of fact, however, only for the presence of “substantial evidence.” Under
this standard, the BIA’s “factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Witjaksono v.
Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Seeking to shoulder the burden of showing that the BIA’s factual findings
fall short, Mr. Neyra-Martinez argues that the facts before the BIA showed
members of the Shining Path guerilla movement persecuted him (and are likely to
persecute him again, should he return to Peru) because of his political beliefs.
But the BIA found otherwise and enough evidence exists in the record that we
cannot say any reasonable adjudicator would have had to find differently. The
evidence shows that Mr. Neyra-Martinez worked as a security officer for a mining
company in Peru and that this job provided him with access to various chemicals.
At some point, several members of the Shining Path sought his help in obtaining
certain chemicals for explosives. When he refused and reported the incident to
the government, among others, Mr. Neyra-Martinez was threatened by the Shining
Path group. So a threat did exist, at least at one time. But the BIA reasonably
found that any threat existed not because of any political beliefs Mr. Neyra-
Martinez harbored, but because he was doing his job as a security officer for the
mining company and seeking to avoid enmeshing himself in an illegal venture.
Mr. Neyra-Martinez replies that the BIA erred as a matter of law by failing
to take appropriate cognizance of the fact that the Shining Path is known to have
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engaged in guerilla warfare aimed at toppling the Peruvian government. With
this, however, we cannot agree. The Supreme Court has told us that “the mere
existence of a generalized ‘political’ motive underlying the guerrillas’ forced
recruitment is inadequate to establish . . . the proposition that [the petitioner]
fears persecution on account of political opinion”; instead, to trigger protection
under the asylum and withholding laws Congress has devised, the petitioner’s
persecution must be “on account of [his] political opinion, not the persecutor’s.”
See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (emphasis added). To
explain its point, the High Court has noted that “[e]ven a person who supports a
guerrilla movement might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons — fear of
combat, a desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better
living in civilian life, to mention only a few.” Id. at 482. Yet, under current law,
a person who resists recruitment for these reasons and who is threatened for that
resistance has no claim for asylum or to have his removal withheld. Id. To win
relief under the laws prescribed by Congress, then, a petitioner must present
evidence that he was or will be harassed not simply because he refused to support
a guerilla movement, but because of his own particular statutorily protected
status or beliefs. Here, Mr. Neyra-Martinez sought to establish that he was or
will be subject to recriminations based on his statutorily protected political
beliefs, but the BIA reasonably determined that the record did not bear out this
factual assertion.
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Even if all this is so, Mr. Neyra-Martinez says he was and will be
persecuted because he was a “whistle-blower” and because of his religious faith
— and that these are protected statuses or beliefs under the asylum and
withholding laws. The BIA disagreed and again substantial evidence supports its
findings.
First, the record is devoid of evidence that Mr. Neyra-Martinez was a
whistle-blower. To be sure, as Mr. Neyra-Martinez argues, “official retaliation
against one who threatens to expose governmental corruption may, in certain
circumstances, amount to political persecution” warranting relief. Hayrapetyan v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). But in this
case, as the BIA found, Mr. Neyra-Martinez did not seek to expose governmental
corruption. Instead, he informed the Peruvian government of the Shining Path’s
request for chemicals and actually sought (and received) the government’s
protection when doing so.
Second and similarly, although Mr. Neyra-Martinez received one
threatening letter that contained two religious slurs, the BIA found that this was
insufficient to rise to the level of religious persecution or a threat of future
religious persecution, and this court’s precedents compel this panel to sustain the
Board’s conclusion. See Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.
2003) (holding that the ethnic slurs fell “far short” of establishing “persecution”);
Maphilindo v. Holder, 323 F. App’x 659, 664 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)
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(holding that “taunts concerning [alien’s] faith and ethnicity, while deeply
insulting, are better characterized as harassment or discrimination than
persecution”); Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that
threats alone may constitute persecution only “when they are so immediate and
menacing as to cause significant suffering or harm in themselves”).
From his asylum and withholding of removal claims, we turn finally to
Mr. Neyra-Martinez’s CAT claim. “To receive the protections of the CAT, an
alien must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be subject to
torture by a public official, or at the instigation or with the acquiescence of such
an official.” Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). In this case, Mr. Neyra-Martinez presented the BIA with no
evidence that the Peruvian government would torture him. Neither is there
evidence the Shining Path operates with the acquiescence of the government. See
Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that
acquiescence may be established by showing a government’s “willful blindness”
(alteration omitted)). To the contrary, Mr. Neyra-Martinez concedes that the
police actively sought to protect him from the Shining Path. Given all this, we
cannot say that the BIA erred in denying Mr. Neyra-Martinez’s CAT claim.
Still, one more issue remains. In his brief to this court, Mr. Neyra-
Martinez seeks to argue that his due process rights were violated because the IJ
was biased against him. The government replies that we may not consider this
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argument because Mr. Neyra-Martinez never presented it to the BIA, and thus
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. We are compelled to
agree. In order to secure judicial review of an argument in this court, an
immigration petitioner generally must first present it to the Board for its
consideration and disposition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Garcia-Carbajal v.
Holder, No. 09-9558, 2010 WL 4367060, at *5 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010). This
Mr. Neyra-Martinez did not do.
The petition for review is denied.
Entered for the Court
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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