Smith v. Chrisman , 824 F.3d 1233 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 6, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
MICHAEL DEWAYNE SMITH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 14-6201
KEVIN DUCKWORTH, Interim Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00293-D)
_________________________________
Emma V. Rolls, Assistant Public Defender (Patti Palmer Ghezzi, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, with her on the briefs), Office of the Public Defender, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Thomas Lee Tucker (E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Robert
Whittaker, Assistant Attorney General on the brief), Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
McHUGH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Kevin Duckworth, who was appointed
Interim Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary on May 9, 2016, is automatically
substituted for Anita Trammell as Respondent in this case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael DeWayne Smith was charged with two counts of murder for the
killings of Sarath Pulluru and Janet Moore. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions on direct appeal
and denied his two applications for postconviction relief. Mr. Smith sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing, as relevant here, that he is ineligible
for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled, that the state trial court had
erred in admitting Mr. Smith’s videotaped confession to the murders at trial, that his
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in the presentation of his mitigation
case, and that cumulative error rendered his trial unfair.1 The district court denied
habeas relief, and Mr. Smith appealed.
We granted Mr. Smith’s request for a certificate of appealability on these four
issues, and we now affirm the district court’s judgment. Mr. Smith has failed to
demonstrate that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of his claims
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. Thus, applying the deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
1
Because the scope of our review is limited to the four issues on which we
granted a certificate of appealability, we do not discuss other claims Mr. Smith raised
in the state proceedings or in the district court.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 2
Petitioner Michael DeWayne Smith is a member of the Oak Grove Posse
(OGP), a subset of the Crips gang that operates in Oklahoma City. In November
2000, Teron “T-Nok” Armstrong and two other members of the OGP attempted to
rob Tran’s Food Mart in south Oklahoma City. The store owner shot and killed Mr.
Armstrong. Mr. Smith was not involved in the robbery but had “close personal ties”
to Mr. Armstrong. Smith v. State (Smith I), 157 P.3d 1155, 1161 (Okla. Crim. App.
2007).
The other two would-be robbers were later arrested and were set to be tried for
the robbery in February 2002. Two days before the trial, Mr. Smith, armed with a
.357 revolver, went to the apartment of Janet Moore. Believing Ms. Moore’s son was
a police informant, Mr. Smith kicked in her door and confronted her. When she
began to scream, Mr. Smith shot her to death. Before leaving, Mr. Smith wiped down
the apartment to eliminate any fingerprint evidence.
Mr. Smith next went to the A-Z Mart, a convenience store “immediately next
door” to Tran’s Food Mart—the site of the earlier failed robbery attempt. Id. at 1161.
Mr. Smith “emptied two pistols into” the clerk on duty, Sarath Pulluru, took money
2
This summary of the facts is based principally on the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals’ recitation of the facts in Mr. Smith’s direct appeal. See generally
Smith v. State (Smith I), 157 P.3d 1155 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007). We presume a state
court’s factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by
“clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Mr. Smith has not done so
here.
3
from the register, and then used lighter fluid to set fires around the store. Id. He set
fire to Mr. Pulluru’s body and “whatever he had touched in the A-Z Mart to destroy
evidence.” Id. at 1162. Afterward he disposed of the clothes he had worn during the
murders.
Mr. Smith returned home early the next morning and reported to his roommate
that he had killed Janet Moore, had “done something else to ‘take care of business,’”
and had “avenged his family.” Id. at 1161. A couple of hours later, Mr. Smith went to
the home of Sheena Johnson. He told her that he had killed Ms. Moore because her
son had been “snitching” and that he had “killed a person at a ‘chink’ store” because
someone connected to the A-Z Mart “had been on television ‘dissing’ his set” in
response to the earlier attempted robbery. Id. Ms. Johnson later reported this
conversation to police, who had already taken Mr. Smith into custody on a different
matter.
Three days after Mr. Smith was arrested, detectives interviewed him about the
killings. He signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights3 and agreed to talk to the
detectives. After initially denying his involvement, Mr. Smith admitted to both
murders, explaining that he “killed both victims in retaliation for wrongs done him or
his family.” Id. He explained that he went to Ms. Moore’s apartment looking for her
son but ended up killing her when she “panicked and started screaming.” Id. And he
3
Under Miranda v. Arizona, a suspect in custody must be informed of his
rights to refuse to answer questions or to have retained or appointed counsel present
during questioning. 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
4
stated that he killed Mr. Pulluru “in retaliation against the store owner who shot
Armstrong and in retaliation for disrespectful comments about Armstrong in the press
attributed to someone from the A-Z Mart.” Id. He further admitted that he had
disposed of the clothes he wore during the murders, wiped down Ms. Moore’s
apartment to eliminate fingerprints, and set fires in the A-Z Mart to destroy evidence.
Mr. Smith’s confession was videotaped.
B. Procedural Background
1. Trial and Direct Appeal
The State of Oklahoma charged Mr. Smith with two counts of murder,
burglary, robbery with a firearm, and arson. The state trial court held a pretrial
hearing to determine the validity of Mr. Smith’s Miranda waiver and the
admissibility of Mr. Smith’s videotaped confession. At the hearing, Mr. Smith put on
evidence that he was “a long term PCP user” and admitted to being under the
influence of PCP at the time of his arrest. Id. at 1171. An expert witness testified for
the defense and opined that Mr. Smith could have still been under the influence of
PCP at the time of his interrogation conducted three days after his arrest. Mr. Smith
also sought to elicit testimony regarding his low intelligence and information
processing deficits from Dr. Faust Bianco, a neuropsychologist. Mr. Smith proffered
Dr. Bianco’s opinion that Mr. Smith’s “functioning at a borderline or low average
[IQ] range with deficiencies in the information processing speed and the influence of
the chronic and current PCP use would affect his ability to understand the Miranda
5
warnings and more importantly to understand the consequences of waiving those
warnings.”
The trial court rejected the offer of proof, stating that “there are many indicia[]
demonstrat[ing] that this Defendant possessed intelligence” and “demonstrated in
many different ways his understanding of what was going on.” The trial court
reasoned that “testimony regarding [Mr. Smith’s] specific IQ range would [not] be
relevant” and excluded Dr. Bianco’s testimony. Relying on its own observations of
Mr. Smith’s demeanor over the course of the two-hour recorded interview, the trial
court concluded that Mr. Smith had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights and that his videotaped confession was therefore admissible.
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all five
counts. In the penalty phase for Mr. Smith’s murder convictions, the State sought to
prove two aggravating circumstances: (1) that “each murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel,” and (2) that “there existed a probability that Smith would commit
future acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society.” Id. at 1160 & n.1.
Defense counsel presented a mitigation defense centered on Mr. Smith’s inability to
cope with his father’s death, leading to his increased involvement with gangs. The
jury found both aggravating circumstances for each killing and fixed Mr. Smith’s
punishment as death for each count. The trial court accordingly sentenced Mr. Smith
to death.
Mr. Smith appealed, arguing his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid because
the trial court refused to receive evidence of his low intelligence in evaluating the
6
validity of that waiver. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (the OCCA)
rejected that claim and affirmed Mr. Smith’s conviction and sentence on direct
appeal. Id. at 1171–72, 1180. Mr. Smith petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, which the Court denied. Smith v. Oklahoma, 552 U.S. 1191
(2008).
2. Postconviction Proceedings
Mr. Smith next filed his first Application for Post-Conviction Relief with the
OCCA. He argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty
phase by failing to fully investigate and present evidence of his family and social
history, including evidence of harsh discipline or physical abuse, early and consistent
exposure to drugs, and childhood head injuries. The OCCA denied relief in an
unpublished order.
Mr. Smith then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In that petition, Mr. Smith argued he was intellectually
disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia,4 the
OCCA had unreasonably determined that his Miranda waiver was valid, and his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in the mitigation phase by failing to
present evidence of his troubled upbringing, intellectual disability, and substance
abuse. With his habeas petition pending in federal court, Mr. Smith filed a second
4
As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v.
Virginia that execution of intellectually disabled defendants violates the Eighth
Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
7
Application for Post-Conviction Relief with the OCCA, seeking to exhaust his Atkins
claim and his ineffective-assistance claim based on failure to present intellectual-
disability and substance-abuse evidence. The OCCA denied this second application
in a published decision, Smith v. State (Smith II), 245 P.3d 1233 (Okla. Crim. App.
2010).
Mr. Smith then returned to federal court and sought adjudication of his habeas
petition. The district court denied relief, ruling that Mr. Smith was not intellectually
disabled and had not shown the OCCA’s decisions with respect to his Miranda
waiver or ineffective-assistance claim were contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. The district court denied a certificate of
appealability (COA) on all issues.
Mr. Smith then sought a COA from this court, which we granted on four
issues: Mr. Smith’s intellectual-disability claim, his challenge to the exclusion of Dr.
Bianco’s testimony concerning the validity of his Miranda waiver, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase, and cumulative error.
III. DISCUSSION
Federal habeas corpus review of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence is
circumscribed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief on a
claim that has been adjudicated in state court unless “the state court’s resolution of
his claims was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ or
8
‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.’” Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1163
(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2)). AEDPA thus “erects a
formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been
adjudicated in state court” and “requires a state prisoner [to] show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (alteration and omission in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if “some fairminded jurists could
possibly agree with the state court decision, then it was not unreasonable and the writ
should be denied.” Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014).
A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in
Supreme Court cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different
from that precedent.” Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior, 810 F.3d 724, 739 (10th Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state-court decision is an ‘unreasonable
application’ of Supreme Court precedent if the decision ‘correctly identifies the
governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s
case.’” Fairchild v. Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 711 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000)). In analyzing a state-court decision’s
compliance with clearly established federal law, we measure the decision against “the
9
governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the
state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003).
That inquiry focuses exclusively on “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the
Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at
71 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The absence of clearly established federal
law is dispositive under § 2254(d)(1).” Hooks, 689 F.3d at 1163.
Review of a state court’s factual findings under § 2254(d)(2) is similarly
narrow. We will not conclude a state court’s factual findings are unreasonable
“merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (brackets omitted). Rather, we must
defer to the state court’s factual determinations so long as “reasonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.” Id. Accordingly,
a state court’s factual findings are presumed correct, and the petitioner bears the
burden of rebutting that presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). But if the petitioner can show that “the state courts plainly
misapprehend[ed] or misstate[d] the record in making their findings, and the
misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim,
that misapprehension can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the
resulting factual finding unreasonable.” Ryder, 810 F.3d at 739 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In determining whether the federal district court erred in denying habeas relief,
“we review the district court’s legal analysis of the state court decision de novo and
10
its factual findings, if any, for clear error.” Frost, 749 F.3d at 1223 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Our review is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. at 1224.
A. Intellectual-Disability Claim
We first address Mr. Smith’s claim that he is intellectually disabled and that
the OCCA’s rejection of his intellectual-disability claim is contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Atkins. The OCCA determined this claim was
procedurally barred but evaluated the merits to determine if ineffective assistance of
counsel excused the procedural default. We therefore consider both the OCCA’s
procedural-bar and merits rulings.
1. Procedural Bar
Mr. Smith raised his intellectual-disability claim for the first time in his second
Application for Post-Conviction Relief before the OCCA. The OCCA concluded the
claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal, in Mr.
Smith’s first Application for Post-Conviction Relief, or within sixty days of its
discovery. Smith II, 245 P.3d 1233, 1236 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010). But the OCCA
evaluated the merits of the claim to determine whether Mr. Smith’s postconviction
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance that would excuse the procedural default.5
5
The OCCA evaluated the performance of Mr. Smith’s postconviction counsel
based on Mr. Smith’s argument that postconviction counsel had the first opportunity
to raise this claim because his trial counsel also served as appellate counsel. Smith II,
245 P.3d 1233, 1236 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010). The OCCA assumed for purposes of
11
Finding the underlying claim of intellectual disability without merit, the OCCA
determined that postconviction counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance and
that the substantive issue was waived for failure to timely raise it. Id. at 1237–38. Mr.
Smith raises three separate challenges to the application of Oklahoma’s procedural
bar to this claim, but we need not address those challenges because we elect to
proceed directly to the merits.
Federal habeas review is generally barred where the prisoner “defaulted his
federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural
rule,” unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and “actual
prejudice” resulting from the alleged violation. Thacker v. Workman, 678 F.3d 820,
835 (10th Cir. 2012). However, where “the claim may be disposed of in a
straightforward fashion on substantive grounds,” this court retains discretion to
bypass the procedural bar and reject the claim on the merits. Revilla v. Gibson, 283
F.3d 1203, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2002). Because we conclude this claim is readily
resolved on the merits, we elect to bypass the procedural issues.
2. Merits
The OCCA evaluated the merits of this claim and our review is therefore
governed by AEDPA.6 As a result, we may not grant relief unless Mr. Smith
its analysis that Mr. Smith’s failure to raise the issue earlier was excused because he
was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Id.
6
Mr. Smith contends that because the OCCA concluded this claim was
procedurally barred, its analysis of the claim under the ineffective-assistance rubric
does not constitute an adjudication on the merits that would subject its decision to
12
demonstrates the OCCA’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. Fairchild, 784 F.3d at 711. Mr. Smith contends the
OCCA’s rejection of his intellectual-disability claim is contrary to Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), because the OCCA’s evaluation of his claim is “inconsistent
with clinical practices.”
a. Atkins and Intellectual Disability
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
“cruel and unusual punishments” forbids the execution of intellectually disabled
criminal defendants. 536 U.S. at 321. But the Supreme Court declined to “provide
definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who
claims [intellectual disability] will be so impaired” as to be ineligible for the death
penalty. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, recognizing that “serious disagreement” could exist regarding who should be
deemed so intellectually disabled as to be categorically excluded from execution, the
Court “le[ft] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
AEDPA deference. But we have held that “[w]hen a state court analyzes appellate
counsel ineffectiveness as an excuse for procedural default, we must afford AEDPA
deference to that analysis.” Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior, 810 F.3d 724, 746 (10th
Cir. 2016). The OCCA’s analysis of postconviction counsel’s performance as an
excuse for procedural default is no less an adjudication of the merits than the same
inquiry undertaken with respect to appellate counsel’s performance. Accordingly,
because the OCCA considered the merits of Mr. Smith’s intellectual-disability claim
in considering whether ineffective assistance excused his procedural default, we must
apply AEDPA deference to the OCCA’s evaluation of that claim.
13
constitutional restriction.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)).
The Court in Atkins did, however, base its analysis on clinical definitions of
intellectual disability, and the Court has since recognized that such definitions “were
a fundamental premise of Atkins.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014). In
particular, the Court noted that “clinical definitions of mental retardation require not
only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive
skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest
before age 18.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. And the Court observed that “an IQ between
70 and 75 or lower” is “typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual
function prong of the mental retardation definition.” Id. at 309 n.5. Most states have
responded to the Court’s decision in Atkins by incorporating clinical definitions of
intellectual disability into their death-penalty frameworks.
A clinical diagnosis of intellectual disability generally requires “an IQ score
that is approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering the
standard error of measurement for the specific instruments used.” American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability:
Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 31 (11th ed. 2010). The mean
score for a standardized IQ test is 100, and the standard deviation is approximately
15. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994. “Thus a test taker who performs two or more standard
deviations from the mean will score approximately 30 points below the mean on an
IQ test, i.e., a score of approximately 70 points.” Id.
14
Every IQ test has a “standard error of measurement,” or SEM, that reflects
inherent imprecision in the test. Id. at 1995. The generally accepted SEM adjustment
for assessing intellectual disability is plus or minus five points of IQ, or
approximately two times the typical SEM for an IQ test. Id.; accord American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 37
(5th ed. 2013) [DSM-5]. “On tests with a standard deviation of 15 and a mean of 100,
this involves a score of 65–75 (70 +/- 5).” DSM-5 at 37; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at
309 n.5.
Central to Mr. Smith’s challenge is a theory known as the Flynn Effect, which
proposes that the mean IQ score of a population increases at a rate of approximately
0.3 points per year. Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012). Under
this theory, the result of an IQ test must be adjusted to account for how long ago the
test was “normed,” or compared to a representative population at that time. In theory,
because the mean IQ goes up over time, a test normed years before it is given will
return an inflated score relative to the current mean IQ of the population—the
yardstick against which intellectual disability is measured. Accordingly, proponents
of the Flynn Effect argue IQ scores must be adjusted downward by 0.3 points for
each year that has passed since the test was normed to arrive at a proper measure of
the test taker’s IQ. Id. Scientific and legal acceptance of this theory is mixed. Id. at
1170.
15
b. Oklahoma’s Intellectual-Disability Statute
Oklahoma prohibits by statute the execution of a defendant who has
established intellectual disability by proving three elements: “significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, and that the onset of the mental retardation was manifested before the
age of eighteen (18) years.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.10b(C). The statute further
provides that an “intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below on an individually
administered, scientifically recognized standardized intelligence quotient test
administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence of significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning.” Id. The statute’s reference to IQ as a
touchstone for determining general intellectual function comes with two important
qualifications: first, “[i]n determining the intelligence quotient, the standard
measurement of error for the test administrated shall be taken into account.” Id.
Second, “in no event shall a defendant who has received an intelligence quotient of
seventy-six (76) or above on any individually administered, scientifically recognized,
standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist, be considered mentally retarded.” Id.
c. Mr. Smith’s Challenge
In support of his intellectual-disability claim, Mr. Smith offered the results of
three IQ tests indicating IQ scores of 76, 79, and 71. He contended that these scores,
once adjusted for the SEM and Flynn Effect, all fall below 70—within the typical
range of intellectual disability. The OCCA rejected this argument, concluding first
16
that the Flynn Effect “is not a relevant consideration in the mental retardation
determination for capital defendants.” Smith II, 245 P.3d at 1237 n.6. The OCCA
went on to conclude that Mr. Smith’s scores of 76 or higher disqualified him from a
finding of intellectual disability. The OCCA held the 76 cutoff was not subject to
adjustment for the SEM because “the Legislature has implicitly determined that any
scores of 76 or above are in a range whose lower error-adjusted limit will always be
above the threshold score of 70.” Id. at 1237. Because section 701.10b of the
Oklahoma Statutes provides that a score 76 or higher on any IQ test bars a defendant
from being found intellectually disabled, the OCCA concluded Mr. Smith’s
intellectual-disability claim failed under the express language of the statute. Id.
Mr. Smith argues that “Oklahoma’s rigid IQ score cut-off” is contrary to and
an unreasonable application of Atkins. Although Mr. Smith couches this argument
broadly in terms of the Oklahoma law’s failure to comport with clinical practices in
evaluating intellectual-disability claims, the only clinical practices he identifies as
relevant to our inquiry are adjustment for the SEM and the Flynn Effect.
With respect to the SEM, Atkins itself does not discuss the concept of the
SEM, and nothing in that decision mandates adjustment of IQ scores to account for
inherent testing error. Rather, the Supreme Court first held in Hall v. Florida that the
SEM must be accounted for in evaluating an Atkins intellectual-disability claim. 134
S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014). As discussed above, our review of the OCCA’s decision is
normally limited to evaluating whether that decision was contrary to or unreasonably
applied the holdings of the Supreme Court in force at the time it was rendered.
17
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). Because Hall was decided more than
three years after the OCCA ruled against Mr. Smith on this issue, Hall provides no
basis for us to disturb the OCCA’s decision.
But even assuming for purposes of argument that we could consider Hall’s
holding here, section 701.10b of the Oklahoma Statutes explicitly directs courts to
take into account “the standard measurement of error for the test administered” in
determining if a defendant has met the “threshold requirement” of an IQ score of 70
or below. Smith II, 245 P.3d at 1237. And as the OCCA explained in Smith II, the
Oklahoma legislature implicitly incorporated the SEM into the IQ cutoff of 76 by
excluding from the reach of the statute those defendants whose SEM-adjusted IQ
score would remain above the threshold score of 70. Id. That is, a score of 76
adjusted downward by 5 to account for the SEM equals 71 and therefore results in an
adjusted score that falls outside the intellectual-disability threshold of 70. Because
the statute’s cutoff score excludes only those whose SEM-adjusted IQ score would
fall outside the generally accepted range for intellectual disability, Oklahoma’s
statutory regime accounts for the SEM as required by Hall. Thus, even if subsequent
Supreme Court authority is considered, Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate the
OCCA’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Hall due to a
failure to account for the SEM.
Mr. Smith’s remaining challenge can therefore be distilled to a claim that the
OCCA unreasonably refused to apply the Flynn Effect in considering the evidence of
18
his IQ.7 His core contention is that “Oklahoma’s strict construction of the
intellectual-functioning element as a bright-line cutoff, with no adjustment for
obsolete norms of outdated IQ tests, misunderstands and distorts the use of IQ
scores.” And Mr. Smith criticizes “Oklahoma’s failure to adjust an IQ score for norm
obsolescence,” contending that his IQ test results were “inflated as a result of the
growing obsolescence of the tests themselves.” As discussed, the adjustment for
“obsolete norms” is known as the Flynn Effect and proposes a 0.3 point reduction in
a test taker’s IQ score for every year since the test was “normed” by comparing it to a
representative population.
This argument, however, squarely contradicts our ruling in Hooks v. Workman,
where we explained that Oklahoma’s failure to apply the Flynn Effect was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law in light
of Atkins. 689 F.3d at 1170. We concluded in Hooks that the threshold requirement of
clearly established federal law had not been met, because Atkins does not mandate an
adjustment for the Flynn Effect, federal and state courts are divided on the validity of
applying the Flynn Effect in an Atkins claim, and “no decision of the Supreme Court
squarely addresses the issue.” Id. at 1170 (brackets and ellipses omitted).
7
While Mr. Smith observes generally that, under Oklahoma law, “defendants
who have just one IQ score above 75 always fall outside of Atkins’ protection,
regardless of . . . the existence of other scores below 75,” he raises no specific
challenge to this aspect of the law beyond his Flynn Effect claim and has not
otherwise attempted to demonstrate that such a rule is contrary to federal law.
19
Mr. Smith contends that our holding in Hooks is “no longer tenable” in light of
Hall, which he argues “made clear that clinical practices must be followed” in
evaluating an Atkins claim. Again leaving aside whether Mr. Smith can rely on
Hall—a decision issued more than three years after the OCCA ruled against him—
Hall says nothing about application of the Flynn Effect to IQ scores in evaluating a
defendant’s intellectual disability. Rather, Hall focuses exclusively on the “statistical
fact” of the SEM for a given IQ test and holds that the SEM must be considered in
evaluating intellectual-disability claims. 134 S. Ct. at 1995. Because our review
under AEDPA is limited to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta” of the Supreme
Court’s decisions, Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71, Hall provides no basis for us to depart
from our conclusion in Hooks.8 And Mr. Smith has identified no other Supreme Court
case that has addressed the Flynn Effect at all, let alone mandated its consideration in
evaluating intellectual-disability claims under Atkins. Hooks therefore controls our
resolution of this issue.
Mr. Smith has failed to show that the OCCA’s refusal to apply the Flynn
Effect to his IQ scores was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of habeas
relief on Mr. Smith’s intellectual-disability claim.
8
Neither can Hall be read as more broadly prohibiting the application of
Oklahoma’s IQ cutoff score of 76. In Hall, the Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s
“strict IQ test score cutoff of 70” for intellectual-disability claims. Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1994 (2014). But the Court expressly excluded from its analysis “the
rule in States which use a bright-line cutoff at 75 or greater” because the petitioner
had not challenged the higher IQ cutoff. Id. at 1996.
20
B. Miranda Waiver
Mr. Smith next argues the OCCA’s rejection of his Miranda claim was
unreasonable because the trial court and the OCCA failed to properly apply the
“totality of the circumstances” standard in assessing the validity of his Miranda
waiver. Specifically, Mr. Smith argues the OCCA “flouted and unreasonably” applied
this standard when it agreed with the trial court that Dr. Bianco’s testimony regarding
clinical testing of Mr. Smith’s intellectual capacity was not relevant to the validity of
his Miranda waiver. Because the OCCA addressed this claim on the merits on direct
appeal, we may not grant relief unless Mr. Smith demonstrates the OCCA’s decision
is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Fairchild v. Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 711 (10th Cir. 2015).
Miranda v. Arizona holds that the Fifth Amendment guarantees a suspect in
custody the right to refuse questioning or to have retained or appointed counsel
present during questioning. 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). A defendant may waive
these rights, but any such waiver must be made “voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.” Id. at 444. To determine if a defendant has validly waived his Miranda
rights, the trial court must engage in two distinct inquiries:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
21
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
725 (1979)). “The totality approach permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725. These
circumstances include “evaluation of the [suspect’s] age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights.” Id. But mental deficiency alone does not render a Miranda waiver
invalid. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
Mr. Smith argued on direct appeal that the trial court “failed to properly
evaluate the validity of the Miranda waiver under the totality of the circumstances
standard” because the trial court “refused to allow a neuropsychologist, Dr. Bianco,
to testify at the suppression hearing as to [Mr. Smith’s] intelligence.” Smith I, 157
P.3d 1155, 1171 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007). Mr. Smith contended “Dr. Bianco’s
testimony was necessary to establish that [Mr. Smith] was of low intelligence and as
a result was unable to comprehend the nature or consequences of the rights he was
waiving.” Id. The OCCA rejected this argument, concluding the trial court had not
abused its discretion in rejecting the proposed testimony as irrelevant to the Miranda
inquiry. Id. at 1171–72. And the OCCA held that the trial court had “sufficient
evidence before [it] to find by a preponderance of evidence that Smith knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.” Id.
Mr. Smith argues that his intellectual capacity is relevant to whether he could
offer a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, and the OCCA’s
22
decision therefore “flies in the face of Moran, Edwards[ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981)], and [Fare v.] Michael C.” He contends Dr. Bianco could have provided
relevant testimony regarding Mr. Smith’s IQ, academic skills, reading ability, and the
potential effect of his chronic PCP use on his ability to understand the waiver of his
Miranda rights. Because the trial court rejected this testimony, Mr. Smith contends it
failed to properly consider his low intelligence in the totality of the circumstances
analysis, and he argues the OCCA’s approval of that decision was therefore contrary
to clearly established federal law.
But Mr. Smith’s narrow focus on Dr. Bianco’s clinical opinion ignores the trial
court’s broader consideration of Mr. Smith’s intelligence in evaluating the validity of
his Miranda waiver. After defense counsel offered Dr. Bianco’s testimony that Mr.
Smith is “borderline to low intelligence” and was “very slow in processing
information,” the trial court gave a detailed explanation of its findings that Mr. Smith
had sufficiently understood the waiver of his Miranda rights. Based on its review of
Mr. Smith’s videotaped interview, the trial court observed that Mr. Smith was “very
cocky” and “extremely verbal about how he tricks people and misleads them and has
got them convinced how crazy he is”; that he “was able to plan how to switch clothes
with different people and conceal his identity” to hide from police; that during the
interview he was not “disoriented or unable to comprehend” but rather was
“extremely animated and disturbingly explanatory about the murders he committed
and how they were other people’s fault”; and that he demonstrated the “ability to
reason, make intelligent decisions, to co-op other people into his plan and to
23
understand perfectly the consequences of his actions as he’s trying to avoid capture.”
Ultimately, the trial court determined that “there are many indicia[] demonstrat[ing]
that [Mr. Smith] possessed intelligence” and that, during the interview, “he
demonstrated in many different ways his understanding of what was going on.”
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that “testimony regarding his specific IQ
range” would not be relevant to its assessment of his Miranda waiver.
The trial court’s findings demonstrate that it gave fair consideration to Mr.
Smith’s intelligence with respect to his ability to understand the nature of the rights
he was waiving and the consequences of his waiver. The trial court’s findings
regarding Mr. Smith’s intelligence are based on the court’s own observations of Mr.
Smith’s behavior and interactions with the detectives over the course of a nearly two-
hour interview, and Mr. Smith has not rebutted the correctness of these findings. See
Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior, 810 F.3d 724, 739 (10th Cir. 2016). Neither has Mr.
Smith identified Supreme Court precedent establishing that a trial court must, when
evaluating the knowing and voluntary nature of a Miranda waiver, assess a
defendant’s intelligence through expert testimony concerning the defendant’s IQ
score or other clinical measures of intellectual ability rather than the trial court’s own
observations of the defendant.
Instead, Mr. Smith seizes on a statement by the trial court, viewed in isolation,
to suggest it failed to consider Mr. Smith’s intelligence in assessing his Miranda
waiver. In response to counsel’s explanation that Dr. Bianco would testify as to his
24
clinical testing of Mr. Smith’s intelligence, the trial court questioned whether that
testimony was relevant:
Now, the fact that he’s [of] low intelligence I don’t think is a huge surprise
to anybody based on the fact that we all deal with criminal law and most of
the Defendants who come in here are not rocket scientists. Is there any law
that says that I am to take that into consideration in Jackson v. Denno?
Even someone of low intelligence.
Mr. Smith believes this statement demonstrates “the trial court did not believe the law
required her to consider Mr. Smith’s low intelligence as part of the inquiry as to whether
Mr. Smith knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.” But this claim cannot
be squared with the trial court’s detailed discussion of Mr. Smith’s intelligence and its
reasons for finding his Miranda waiver voluntary. A more plausible interpretation is that
the trial court was questioning whether it was obligated to consider expert testimony
concerning clinical evidence of Mr. Smith’s specific IQ. Indeed, the trial court’s findings
demonstrate a proper and thorough consideration of Mr. Smith’s intelligence in assessing
whether he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Thus,
Mr. Smith has not demonstrated that the OCCA’s approval of the trial court’s ruling was
unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law, and we affirm the district court’s
denial of habeas relief on this claim.
C. Ineffective Assistance in Penalty Phase
Mr. Smith also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his
trial. Mr. Smith contends the mitigation case put on by defense counsel was
inadequate and failed to humanize Mr. Smith. Specifically, he claims trial counsel
25
should have instead presented evidence of his low intelligence and his troubled
childhood—including evidence of physical and sexual abuse, early and continuous
drug use, and childhood head injuries. The OCCA addressed these claims on the
merits, and its rulings are therefore subject to deferential review under AEDPA.
Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1163 (10th Cir. 2012).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defense was prejudiced by that
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). An
insufficient showing on either element is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim,
rendering consideration of the other element unnecessary. Id. at 697. To demonstrate
deficient performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” when evaluated from counsel’s
perspective at the time. Id. at 688. “The question is whether an attorney’s
representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not
whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). And to establish prejudice, the defendant must
show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Because imposition of the death sentence under Oklahoma law requires a unanimous
jury, Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 215 n.138 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007), “the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, [at least
26
one juror] . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
Although presented as a single claim, Mr. Smith’s argument challenges two
separate rulings by the OCCA. In his first Application for Post-Conviction Relief,
Mr. Smith argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a
“‘reasonable’ investigation into Mr. Smith’s family and social history.” He submitted
evidence showing he was delivered by forceps and born with a swollen area on his
head, his father was an abusive alcoholic, he grew up in a crime-ridden neighborhood
surrounded by gangs, he struggled with school work, and he got involved in gangs at
a young age. The OCCA rejected this claim, finding no prejudice when viewing the
record as a whole because this new evidence was largely cumulative with the
evidence presented at trial and “the slight bit of new information contained in these
materials is tenuous at best.” In his second Application for Post-Conviction Relief,
Mr. Smith argued trial counsel was ineffective for failure to present evidence that,
due to organic brain damage and the long-term effects of his PCP abuse, Mr. Smith
had low intelligence and limited mental abilities. The OCCA rejected this claim on
prejudice grounds as well, concluding the evidence had a “double-edged quality”
because “such evidence might bolster a conclusion that the defendant represents a
continuing threat to society.” Smith II, 245 P.3d 1233, 1242–43 (Okla. Crim. App.
2010). We address the OCCA’s rulings in turn.
27
1. Family and Social History
Mr. Smith contends the OCCA’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim
in his first Application for Post-Conviction Relief was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.9 We will not conclude that a state court’s determination of
the facts is unreasonable unless the court plainly and materially misstated the record
or the petitioner shows that reasonable minds could not disagree that the finding was
in error. Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior, 810 F.3d 724, 739 (10th Cir. 2016).
In support of his first Application for Post-Conviction Relief, Mr. Smith
submitted affidavits from family members recounting details of Mr. Smith’s
childhood: that his father and other family members imposed harsh physical
discipline or abuse; that his father was an alcoholic and abusive toward his mother
until his parents separated when Mr. Smith was approximately two years old; that
Mr. Smith was introduced to drugs and gangs at a young age by his brothers; that Mr.
Smith was born with a swollen area on his head, was delivered by forceps, and
suffered other head injuries as a child; and that Mr. Smith was sexually abused by an
older woman when he was seven or eight years old. Mr. Smith also attached a
protective order his mother had obtained against his father, in which she stated that
Mr. Smith’s father was “very violent” and had threatened “to kill and to fight” her.
In rejecting Mr. Smith’s claim, the OCCA stated the “affidavits and documents
establish a larger quantity of mitigating evidence than was presented at trial, but
9
Mr. Smith has presented no argument that the OCCA’s ruling on this point
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
28
cover little new ground.” The OCCA observed that the evidence tended to show
“Smith’s father was an alcoholic, that he was abusive, . . . that Smith was a gang
member,” and “that Smith grew up in a neighborhood known for gang activity,
violence, and drug activity.” In the OCCA’s view, this information had, “in one form
or another,” already been developed at trial. The OCCA also noted Mr. Smith had
failed to connect the evidence of childhood head injuries to any then-current medical
diagnoses of brain damage, intellectual disability, or other impairment.10 And the
OCCA concluded that the “slight bit of new information” was “tenuous at best.” The
OCCA therefore concluded that, “when the materials are viewed as a whole,” there
was no reasonable probability the outcome of Mr. Smith’s sentencing would have
been different. Accordingly, the OCCA rejected Mr. Smith’s ineffective-assistance
claim on prejudice grounds without evaluating trial counsel’s performance.
Mr. Smith argues the OCCA’s factual determinations are unreasonable for two
reasons. First, he challenges as “patently unreasonable” the OCCA’s conclusion that
the relevant information had been developed at trial and that the postconviction
materials therefore “cover[ed] little new ground.” While Mr. Smith concedes the jury
heard evidence of his father’s “criminal behavior” and “Mr. Smith’s exposure to
gangs through older brothers,” he contends the jury never heard about the “sexual
10
At the time the OCCA ruled on this claim, Mr. Smith had yet to present to
the OCCA the opinion of Dr. Saint Martin, who diagnosed Mr. Smith with
intellectual disability and opined that his intellectually disability could have been
caused, in part, by “genetics or intrauterine developmental problems” that a
childhood head injury “could have worsened.”
29
and physical abuse Mr. Smith suffered as a child,” the head injuries Mr. Smith
experienced, or “the extent of the violence perpetrated” by his father against his
mother.
But even if the OCCA mischaracterized the specific contours of the evidence
that had been placed before the jury, and even assuming for purposes of our analysis
that the OCCA’s factual error was unreasonable, Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate
that error entitles him to habeas relief. Under § 2254(d)(2), “an unreasonable
determination of the facts does not, itself, necessitate relief.” Byrd v. Workman, 645
F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a habeas
petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s decision is “based on”—i.e., “rests
upon”—that unreasonable determination of the facts. Id.
Mr. Smith has failed to make the necessary showing with respect to the
OCCA’s analysis of prejudice under Strickland. In pressing this argument, Mr. Smith
makes no real attempt to explain how this purported factual error undermined the
OCCA’s Strickland analysis. Rather, he merely asserts that, had the jury been
presented with additional mitigation evidence, “there is a reasonable probability at
least one [juror] would have arrived at a sentence less than death.” But that claim
illustrates only that Mr. Smith disagrees with the OCCA’s ultimate determination that
he suffered no prejudice; it says nothing about whether the OCCA’s prejudice
decision was “based on” an erroneous factual finding.
Mr. Smith’s failure to explain the relationship between the alleged error and
the OCCA’s analysis is fatal when considering the prejudice standard the OCCA was
30
required to apply. In evaluating whether prejudice resulted from the omission of
mitigation evidence, the OCCA was obligated to consider the totality of mitigation
evidence before it—both that adduced at trial and that adduced in the postconviction
proceeding—and to reweigh the combined mitigation evidence against the
aggravation evidence presented by the state. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–
98 (2000). The OCCA was then required to consider whether, in light of the old and
new evidence taken together, a reasonable likelihood existed that one or more jurors
would have voted against the death penalty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Mr. Smith
has made no attempt to explain how the OCCA’s alleged misunderstanding of
whether certain evidence had been first presented at trial or in Mr. Smith’s
Application for Post-Conviction Relief affected its analysis of whether the totality of
the mitigation evidence gave rise to a reasonable probability of a non-death verdict.
Moreover, the OCCA stated that its prejudice determination was based on a review of
the evidentiary materials as a whole, and Mr. Smith does not argue the OCCA failed
to properly apply the correct standard. Accordingly, Mr. Smith has failed to
demonstrate that the OCCA’s prejudice decision was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Second, Mr. Smith challenges the OCCA’s characterization of the evidence
presented in support of his first Application for Post-Conviction Relief as “slight,”
and “tenuous at best.” He asserts this characterization is unreasonable because it fails
to recognize the relevance of a disadvantaged background to the issue of moral
culpability. However, the OCCA’s characterization of the evidence as “slight” and
31
“tenuous” is a matter of weight, not relevance. Mr. Smith’s argument thus advances
nothing more than his disagreement with the weight afforded to this evidence by the
OCCA. But neither his disagreement, nor even this court’s disagreement, can render
a state court’s weighing of the evidence unreasonable. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct.
2269, 2277 (2015). Rather, Mr. Smith was required to show that “reasonable minds
reviewing the record” could not disagree that the OCCA’s determination that he had
not been prejudiced by counsel’s performance was erroneous. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). He has not undertaken to do so and, based on our review of the
record, we conclude that reasonable minds could differ on this point. We must
therefore defer to the OCCA’s evaluation of the evidence presented in Mr. Smith’s
first Application for Post-Conviction Relief.
Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate the OCCA unreasonably concluded he
was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present the omitted family- and social-
history evidence in mitigation. Because the OCCA reasonably concluded that Mr.
Smith suffered no prejudice, we do not consider whether trial counsel rendered
deficient performance by failing to present this evidence. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of habeas relief on this aspect of Mr. Smith’s ineffective-
assistance claim.
2. Low Intelligence and Drug Use
We next consider Mr. Smith’s challenge to the OCCA’s rejection of the
claim—raised in his second Application for Post-Conviction Relief—that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failure to present evidence of his low intelligence due to
32
organic brain damage and long-term PCP use. He contends the OCCA’s
determination that no prejudice stemmed from the omission of this “double-edged”
evidence is contrary to Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010). We will conclude a
state-court decision is contrary to governing federal law only if it applies a
contradictory rule or confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a different result. Ryder, 810 F.3d at 739.
In his second Application for Post-Conviction Relief, Mr. Smith argued that
trial counsel was “ineffective for failing to provide Mr. Smith’s jury with evidence
that he suffers from organic brain damage and low intelligence” because “[t]rial
counsel failed to investigate the long term effects of phencyclidine (PCP) use and
abuse.” “If counsel had done this investigation,” Mr. Smith contended, “they could
have presented powerful mitigation evidence to the jury.” In support of this claim,
Mr. Smith relied on reports from Drs. Manuel Saint Martin and Deborah Mash, who
both opined that Mr. Smith’s long-term use of PCP likely contributed to brain
damage and lowered intelligence. Mr. Smith specifically quoted Dr. Saint Martin’s
conclusions regarding the effect of drug use on his developing brain:
[T]he clinical picture for Mr. Smith is . . . childhood/adolescent brain insult
caused by substance abuse.
....
The substances linked to neural damage in Mr. Smith’s developing brain
are PCP, alcohol and marijuana. PCP is known to produce dissociative
states and symptoms similar to schizophrenia. Long term use of PCP is
neurotoxic in rat and primate brains, and in humans it inhibits the brain’s
ability to learn new information.
....
33
The tests indicate non-specific brain damage affecting his attention,
calculation, and short term memory. These . . . neuropsychological deficits
could be due to Mr. Smith’s substance use, especially PCP . . . .
(Alteration and omissions in original.) Mr. Smith also quoted Dr. Mash’s opinion that
“[t]he early exposure to PCP and [Mr. Smith’s] chronic use contributed to diffuse
impairment of cognitive functioning” and “Mr. Smith’s [early] exposure [and chronic
use of] ‘wet’ undoubtedly contributed to developmental brain abnormalities . . . .”11
(Alterations and omission in original.)
The OCCA rejected Mr. Smith’s ineffective-assistance claim. Limiting its
analysis to prejudice, the OCCA concluded this evidence has a “double-edged
quality,” and noted that a “a jury presented with evidence that the defendant is a
chronic substance abuser might draw a negative inference from that evidence just as
easily as it might find it mitigating.” Smith II, 245 P.3d at 1242–43. The OCCA also
noted, in the context of Mr. Smith’s case, “such evidence might bolster a conclusion
that the defendant represents a continuing threat to society, one of the aggravating
circumstances charged.” Id. at 1243. The OCCA accordingly concluded that Mr.
Smith failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different sentencing result if it had been presented with evidence of [Mr.
Smith’s] chronic use of PCP and its allegedly attendant brain damage.” Id.
11
According to Dr. Mash, “wet” is slang for a method of PCP ingestion that
involves “dipping cigarettes or marijuana cigarettes in liquid PCP” or a solution of
PCP and embalming fluid.
34
Mr. Smith raises three challenges to the OCCA’s conclusion. First, he argues
the OCCA unreasonably “presupposed that Mr. Smith’s organic brain damage and
low intelligence [were] caused by long-term daily use of [PCP].” (Alterations in
original, internal quotation marks omitted.) He contends that Dr. Saint Martin
attributed only some of his impairments to PCP use but “made clear there is evidence
from [Mr. Smith’s] school records and developmental history that he had significant
intellectual impairments before he began using illicit substances.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Thus, he claims, “[a]ny statement that Mr. Smith’s intellectual
limitations were caused exclusively by his substance abuse is objectively
unreasonable.”
In making this argument, Mr. Smith ignores his own briefing of the claim in
his second Application for Post-Conviction Relief. As discussed above, Mr. Smith’s
argument before the OCCA focused exclusively on his drug abuse as a cause of brain
damage and low intelligence. Indeed, in presenting Dr. Saint Martin’s opinion to the
OCCA, Mr. Smith omitted language from the quoted portions of Dr. Saint Martin’s
report that attributed Mr. Smith’s “mental retardation” to “prenatal or idiopathic
brain insult” and opined that his neuropsychological deficits could also be due to “the
factors causing his idiopathic mental retardation.” The OCCA’s view of Mr. Smith’s
theory as claiming that his alleged brain damage and low intelligence were caused by
his history of drug abuse is not unreasonable in light of Mr. Smith’s selective
quotation of his own experts’ opinions to present precisely that picture to the court.
35
Second, Mr. Smith contends the OCCA’s characterization of this evidence as
having a “double-edged quality” is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent.
Mr. Smith contends the Supreme Court “rejected the ‘double-edged’ characterization
of this type of mitigating evidence” in Sears. In particular, he relies on the Court’s
statement in Sears that “[c]ompetent counsel should have been able to turn some of
the adverse evidence into a positive—perhaps in support of a cognitive deficiency
mitigation theory.” 561 U.S. at 951. Thus, Mr. Smith contends, Sears constitutes a
clearly established rejection of the “double-edged” theory of prejudice employed by
the OCCA.
We cannot agree that Sears clearly prohibits courts from considering the
“doubled-edged” nature of mental-health and substance-abuse evidence in evaluating
prejudice resulting from its omission during the penalty phase of trial. We first note
that Mr. Smith relies on a portion of Sears discussing the attorney-performance
element of the petitioner’s Strickland claim, not prejudice. Thus, to the extent Sears
can be read as establishing a general rule relating to the handling of this type of
evidence, it establishes at best that an attorney’s failure to use evidence of
“substantial deficits in mental cognition and reasoning” in some positive fashion may
constitute deficient performance. But because the OCCA never reached the issue of
deficient performance, Sears does not control our analysis here. 12
12
The Court in Sears did determine the state court’s analysis of prejudice was
flawed, but it did so on a different ground. Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 954–56
(2010). The state trial court had failed to consider both the newly uncovered evidence
36
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that mental-health
evidence, including evidence of low intelligence, can have a double-edged impact on
the jury. In Atkins v. Virginia, the court specifically noted that the intellectually
disabled face “a special risk of wrongful execution” in part because “reliance on
mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by
the jury.” 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). And subsequent to Sears, in Cullen v.
Pinholster, the Court reiterated the principle, citing Atkins for the proposition that
“mitigating evidence can be a ‘two-edged sword’ that juries might find to show
future dangerousness.” 563 U.S. 170, 201 (2011). Like this case, Cullen involved a
claim of ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating
evidence. There, the Court concluded that the bulk of new evidence presented by the
petitioner in support of his state habeas petition—evidence that he suffered from
bipolar mood disorder and that his family had a history of “serious substance abuse,
mental illness, and criminal problems”—was of “questionable mitigating value”
because it could have opened the door to rebuttal and may have convinced the jury
the petitioner “was simply beyond rehabilitation.” Id. Because the other new
evidence presented by the petitioner was “sparse,” the Court held the state court did
and the evidence introduced at trial in weighing the probability of a different
sentencing result. Id. at 955–56. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded for the
state court to perform a proper prejudice analysis. Id. at 956.
37
not unreasonably conclude that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate prejudice
under Strickland. Id. at 202.
From these decisions, it is apparent the Supreme Court did not clearly establish
in Sears that mental-health and substance-abuse evidence cannot be viewed as
“double-edged” in evaluating the prejudicial effect of omitting such evidence in the
penalty phase.13 “The absence of clearly established federal law is dispositive under
§ 2254(d)(1).” Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1163 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Last, Mr. Smith argues more generally that the OCCA’s prejudice
determination was unreasonable. We interpret this challenge as a claim that the
OCCA unreasonably applied the Strickland analysis. He contends “the OCCA’s
reliance on the role of the continuing threat aggravating circumstance” is
unreasonable because the jury “had already heard the State’s case in aggravation,
including evidence of Mr. Smith’s behavior.” Although Mr. Smith does not develop
this argument further, he presumably seeks to liken his case to those like Smith v.
Mullin, where we have concluded that the aggravating “edge” of the evidence was
blunted because the negative aspects of the evidence had already been placed before
the jury. 379 F.3d 919, 943 & n.11 (10th Cir. 2004). But Mr. Smith does not explain
how the aggravating edge of this evidence—that damage to his brain was caused or
13
Mr. Smith also contends our own precedents “foreclose a finding of no
prejudice on the ‘double-edged’ characterization.” But none of the decisions Mr.
Smith cites have addressed the dispositive question here: whether the Supreme Court
has clearly established the rule he seeks to apply to the OCCA’s decision.
38
exacerbated by habitual drug use—was before the jury in such a way that it was
unreasonable for the OCCA to conclude the evidence was likely to be as harmful to
him as helpful. Absent such a showing, we cannot conclude the OCCA’s application
of Strickland was unreasonable.14
Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate the OCCA unreasonably concluded he
was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to present additional evidence in
mitigation. Absent a showing of prejudice, his claims under Strickland must fail. We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief on Mr. Smith’s ineffective-
assistance claims.
D. Cumulative Error
As a final point, Mr. Smith contends he is entitled to relief on the basis of
cumulative error. “A cumulative-error analysis aggregates all errors found to be
harmless and analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is
such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” Cargle v.
Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003). “The cumulative-error analysis applies
where there are two or more actual errors. It does not apply, however, to the
cumulative effect of non-errors.” United States v. Franklin-El, 555 F.3d 1115, 1128
(10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent contends our review
14
Mr. Smith also contends the OCCA failed to properly conduct a totality of
the evidence review under Strickland and “considered only Mr. Smith’s ‘chronic use
of PCP and its allegedly attendant brain damage,’” rather than all of the evidence
offered in mitigation, to evaluate prejudice. Mr. Smith has identified nothing in the
OCCA’s decision to suggest its analysis was so limited, and we can identify nothing
that lends merit to Mr. Smith’s claim.
39
of this claim is constrained by AEDPA and that no clearly established federal law
recognizes cumulative error as a ground for habeas relief. However, because we can
easily resolve these claims on the merits, it is not necessary for us to evaluate what
deference may be owed to the OCCA under the circumstances.
Mr. Smith identifies what he terms two “clusters” of error that he contends
cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. With respect to the first cluster, Mr. Smith
argues his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, his claimed intellectual disability, and the
admission of his confession “individually and in combination resulted in an
unreliable sentence of death.” Because we have concluded that the OCCA did not
unreasonably reject Mr. Smith’s Atkins claim or his challenge to the admission of his
confession, there are not “two or more actual errors” to cumulate with respect to this
claim. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The second cluster of errors Mr. Smith identifies involves the admission of his
confession compounded with the trial court’s error in responding to a jury question
outside the presence of Mr. Smith’s counsel, an error the OCCA recognized on direct
appeal. Because we have concluded the OCCA did not unreasonably reject Mr.
Smith’s challenge to the admission of his confession, there is only one error—the
trial court’s response to the jury’s question—and, therefore, nothing for us to
cumulate.
Thus, Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate that the cumulative effect of two or
more errors had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial, and he is not entitled
to habeas relief on this claim.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate that the OCCA’s decisions on his
intellectual disability, Miranda waiver, or ineffective-assistance claims were
unreasonable. The district court properly denied habeas relief on each of Mr. Smith’s
claims. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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