Landrith v. Bank of New York Mellon , 531 F. App'x 944 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 10, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BRET DAVID LANDRITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 13-3080
(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-02352-EFM-DJW)
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; (D. Kan.)
CATHERINE A. REIN; BANK OF
AMERICA CORPORATION;
COUNTRYWIDE HOMELOAN, INC.;
CWALT, INC.; ALTERNATIVE LOAN
TRUST 2007-OA7; BAC HOME
LOANS SERVICING, LP;
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL;
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS;
KPMG LLP; STEPHEN E.
SUMMERS;REALTY EXECUTIVES
OF KANSAS CITY; SOUTH &
ASSOCIATES, PC; BRYAN CAVE,
LLP,
Defendants-Appellees
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
Bret Landrith appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)
& (d), 1964(c), and its imposition of filing restrictions. The parties are familiar with
the facts, so we do not recite them here.
The district court applied collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), but we affirm
for another reason that defendants raised below. Landrith has no standing to bring
this suit because he has no ownership interest in the real property that underlies his
RICO claims (the Property). See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]tanding for private individuals under RICO requires a plaintiff to have been
injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Landrith’s purported interest in the Property
arises from a quitclaim deed that the former owner executed after a sheriff’s sale and
the expiration of the statutory redemption period. By that point, the former owner
had no interest in the Property to convey to Landrith, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2414,
and the quitclaim deed did not transfer to Landrith any cause of action that the former
owner might have had regarding the foreclosure on the Property, see Colver v.
McInturff, 212 P. 88, 88-89 (Kan. 1923). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the lawsuit.
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As for the filing restrictions, Landrith failed to file any response or objections
to the district court court’s order notifying him of the proposed injunction. “We do
not review claims on appeal that were not presented below.” Pignanelli v. Pueblo
Sch. Dist. No. 60, 540 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008).
Landrith’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs is denied.
The district court’s judgment and injunction are affirmed.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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